

THE

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POLITICAL SCIENCE

Review



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

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The American Political Science Review

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DECEMBER, 1961

NO. 4

REFLECTIONS ON A DISCIPLINE*

EMMETTE S. REDFORD

The University of Texas

Presidential addresses in our Association are frequently discourses on the state of our discipline. In the past twenty years nine presidents have reflected on its status, trends and needs. It would be presumptuous for another president to return to the topic now if the moment did not validate the need. After a period of novel developments, accompanied by uncertainties and tensions, there is need to reemphasize our community of interest and our common obligation.

It is a community extending across diversities and an obligation with many components. The study of the science and art of government has many facets which reflect search in that eternal triangle of science, values, and utility.

I

In the beginning it is well to remark that we are constantly drawn toward two poles in a dual quest. We would like to find verifiable propositions or working assumptions about political activity which, like the law of gravity or the laws of motion, transcend time, and technology and culture variations. We would like even to extend our vision further: just as the biologist seeks for the origins of life and the astronomer for the initial creative impulse for the universe, we want to know if there is a universal plan in history and a destiny for man.

Such cosmic vision must be based on the assumption of some constants in human behavior, such as self-love; or in human relations, such as power; or in natural morality, such as justice. Yet grasp for certainty fades as we wonder whether all such things are relative to environment, and hence whether ecology and the search for the laws of change must be the

centers of inquiry. As we contemplate how such great cultural changes as the secularization of thought in the Enlightenment, or such tremendous physical events as the discovery of America have upset the assumptions of thought, and as we try to think of what nuclear energy, automation and the dominion of scientists may mean, we are humble before the task of building an enduring science of politics.

Yet humility cannot turn us from the task. We will, as Arthur Holcombe did in his presidential address to this Association, seek for knowledge that does not evaporate with our time and our culture, and which will also guide us somewhat in our present.

At the other pole we work with the realities and the problems of our day. We seek knowledge of contemporary systems and subsystems or of the behavior of men within them. The search shifts to another level—from that of Plato and Hobbes to that of de Tocqueville and Bryce. Or it shifts from general systems to particular features within a system—for example, to the details of the operation of cabinet systems, the interpretation of the due process clause, the reasons why Americans vote as they do, or the techniques by which pressures are exerted in democratic systems. Likewise, we struggle with problems within systems, such as national security, metropolitan organization, and civil rights. All the while, the study tends to reflect contemporary American concerns and to turn inward to American problems.

It is at the second pole that most of our American political science study has been conducted in the past. The cultural influences flowed from the watersheds of ancient Mediterranean civilization to the tributaries of Western European evolution and on to the broad stream of American political institutions—and here we took our position and viewed the banks around us. In the twentieth century our

* Presidential address delivered before the American Political Science Association in St. Louis, September 6, 1961.

political science became increasingly culture-bound, American-focused and problem-oriented.

Many causes contributed to these developments. There was the natural concern for things contiguous to us and affecting our own lives; there was physical and language isolation; and there was the wondrous American heritage and the thrill of its unfolding. In addition, there were two practical influences. First, it has been a responsibility of political scientists to educate people for the tasks of citizenship in a country where government, as Madison said, "derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people." This is a tremendous responsibility and one which we must forever cherish—for we will believe, as Francis Lieber stated in his inaugural address at Columbia University, that one who studies political science "will be better prepared for the grave purposes for which the country destines him, and a partner in the great commonwealth of self-government." The other influence was concern with improvement of political arrangements. American political science has been policy-oriented in the broadest sense. Its practitioners have been interested in research and counsel on the problems of political organization and process and of substantive policy. This too is an important responsibility, not to be taken lightly simply because it carries one into applied science or because it calls for prescriptive suggestion in advance of fully tested knowledge.

The second World War became a turning point from American provincialism. Political science itself exploded into the world arena. The study of comparative government leaped quickly beyond old borders. Asia and Africa became as significant for study as Europe and the Americas. American-oriented students of public administration became students of comparative administration. Thus, for example, a student of things American, and interested in field administration, has now studied this subject in South Asian, French, and African settings.

This explosion shows how time-restricted is our study of political science. When our own social revolution of the 'thirties was substantially completed, and our constitutional crisis of the same period was resolved, and war and its aftermath created new world-wide American problems, then our political science was expanded.

What is significant is that the expansion has created opportunities for a broader-visioned political science. Neither Aristotle, nor any scholar or group of scholars since him, has had

comparable opportunities for cross-cultural study. And with the rapidity of change, time is compressed within the span of vision of the scholar. In the extended dimensions of study we may hope for discovery of new basic identities and regularities, and of bases for propositions about universal political realities. If conclusions about these realities have something less than eternal validity, it may yet be that study will move in an intermediary area between the two poles of the past. And that for the limited future for which we may have some vision, our knowledge will be more complete and our capacity for policy formation more adequate.

II

There have been other eruptions in our discipline in the postwar period so explosive as to reflect an unprecedented intellectual ferment. At the base of these eruptions is the consciousness that our search is for reality, for the substance rather than the mere forms of political activity. Such names as Ostrogorski, Wallas, Beard, Merriam, Lippmann, Holcombe, and Herring will remind us that there were precursors of the ferment, and will remind us also that search for reality, for the depths of political meaning, will flourish only in a free and open society.

One set of eruptions has produced a group within our midst called behavioralists—a loose term but one which describes a set of attitudes. The behavioralist focuses his attention on persons acting politically instead of on institutions, events or ideologies, though some incarnate the group and give it a position similar to that previously held by institutions. The behavioralist has been interested also in methodology, seeking on the one hand for preciseness and empirical testing characteristic of exact science and on the other for systematic theory. He uses contemporary data. He finds common grounds of interest with psychologists, sociologists, and cultural anthropologists—groups that are also interested in human behavior.

Another eruption has been the case-study approach. A case study is a kind of history. It is short-span, intensely developed, sharply focused history. It is a capsule of reality. It may be designed and prepared as rigorously as a scientific experiment. Though the original aim of case-study writers was to supply a new teaching technique, the cases have deepened the perception of the scholar. Although individual cases do not provide generalizations, they do increase knowledge. Many regard the cases as better indicators of behavior than the artificial models, working hypotheses, and quanti-

tative measures of partial reality used by those normally called behavioralists.

These elements of novelty in approach should not cloud our realization of the value of the intuitive grasp of those who have broad awareness and deep perception of political process. Those who worked in administrative positions during World War II acquired understanding of nuances of behavior of men in organizations, and this understanding transformed the study of public administration from formalism to grasp of living reality. Experience and a more vital literature have enriched concepts and generalizations through the whole field of political science. Through perception Arthur Macmahon could place consensus beside choice as an objective in decision making, Ernest Griffith could see the legislative process as whirlpools of activity, Herbert Simon could see organization as wheels within wheels within wheels, and Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom could define the price system, hierarchy, polyarchy and bargaining as central socio-political processes. Our very search for meaningful categories of study—the group, clienteles, decision making, communications, national interest—has been evidence of and contributor to the ferment of thought.

Nor should we overlook the freshness and versatility in use of traditional methods. The intuitive grasp of a descriptive study like V. O. Key's *Southern Politics* should remind us that not all analysis of this type will be hyperfactual and unimaginative. The "uses of history" have been once again revealed in Leonard White's monumental volumes on administrative development and in biographical and historical accounts reflecting wartime experience. The ability of reason to spin out new theory from a background of familiar knowledge is potently exhibited in books like David Truman's *The Governmental Process*. The opportunities for institutional analysis to move fruitfully in new directions is shown in the last two presidential addresses before this Association—by Presidents Cole and Swisher.

I think it is helpful to ponder in this connection the youth and growth of the concentrated study of political science. This Association is younger in years than your speaker; and when at a point not quite midway in its history he completed his graduate work, it had a membership about one-fourth that of the present. Anyone who has practiced in this profession through this second half knows that our discipline has grown richer in concept, routes to reality, and descriptive and theoretical analysis.

Yet we are conscious of hazards. One of

these has been the threat that our various lateral affinities would destroy our consciousness of community, and indeed of purpose. Public administration, international relations, and public opinion have been sub-areas of study in which the outward tug has sometimes seemed stronger than the inward. More recently, methodological involvement and unities of substantive interest in human behavior have led many in our group toward absorption in a general behavioral science. Even the scheduling at this meeting of a panel on "The Business Firm as a Political Order" may indicate, not merely that we may learn from lateral fields, but that we are not sure of our boundaries.

The reply is that though the concepts "public," "political" and "authority," which lie at the core of our discipline, are vague in their outer dimensions, they are clear and strong at the center. The vitality of the realities which they describe has been sufficient in the past to insure a loose integration of interest. Moreover, though the various new lateral affinities may, like those of law, economics and philosophy from earlier days, draw some in our midst into closer communities of interest with other groups than our own, it may still be expected that political science can profit, as it has in the past, from its dependence upon other disciplines. Political science is an integrating focus, but it draws its methodology and data from other disciplines. Its strength as a field is dependent upon the continued consciousness that public action is of great significance and also that there is something different about administration, human behavior, opinion, intercultural relations, or other facets of human activity when these are "public" or "political."

A second hazard is that we may fail to appreciate the value of a variety of approaches to knowledge about public affairs. This may result from a kind of myopia of specialization—not the myopia of subject-matter study but that of methodological approach. We are split into groups which, while they seek understanding of the same processes, often do not recognize complementary values in different approaches. Paul Appleby once said that "the division of labor among thinkers itself becomes a kind of separation of powers." We now face a division on techniques more threatening to our unity than specializations in subject-matter interests. This may be accompanied by an exaggeration of differences by the labels we affix. We are all in a sense behavioralists to the extent that we are realists. We are all likewise institutionalists, for we will recognize that institutions may create new roles for human beings, and in this way modify behavior patterns. We may all

wish to be scientists, though perhaps not one among us would make himself mute by refusing to generalize beyond propositions which could be verified scientifically.

Currently, the greatest danger is perhaps the distortion of emphasis by the expectancies from what are called the methods of science—the development of systematic theory based on propositions validated by empirical analysis. There has been so much debunking of historicism, hyperfactual descriptionism, and formalistic institutionalism that the challenge now is for a renaissance of belief and demonstrations of fruitfulness in older pathways to understanding. The “new science,” and its current handmaiden—the study of contemporary human behavior—may, however, be embraced more enthusiastically than hardheaded expectancy can justify.

The great hopes for contributions by the “new science” to our discipline will be realized most largely if tempered by recognition of dangers. The least of these dangers, in my judgment, are faddism, extremism and jargon creation; for these, we may hope, will fade and leave a hard core of contribution behind. A larger danger is that we will overconcentrate our energies on things to which the methods of science can be adapted, sacrificing thereby the pursuit of other studies. There is the particular risk that we will overlook the analysis of experience in different time spans and of factors of continuity and change as they have shaped the political activities of men. There are further dangers that we will draw our profession away from practicality, and that by adopting a stance of positivism we will contribute to the idea that “what is” is the standard of “what should be.”

Even though computers, sampling and other technologies make it possible to consider large bodies of data and multiple variables in particular situations, I venture the suggestions that empirically tested generalizations will not establish a predictive base for most of the multifarious political situations which protrude upon our attention; that the gap between what we can explain to our full satisfaction with respect to small-scale problems or precisely definable situations and what we need to know in large, complex problem settings with numerous and disparate variables will be disappointingly large; that the perception of men in different time spans, restudied with new perspectives, will continue to fertilize the roots of political science; that the utility of the “new science” will be the double service of providing us with a core of modest propositions of utility in some, though not all, areas of intellectual inquiry and of driving us toward more precise

thinking in all of our approaches to knowledge.

These are no mean functions. They are sufficient to justify hearty and discriminating reception of the “new science” by members of our discipline, but they are insufficient to force into discard the less precise methods of history and institutional analysis or the sheer artistry in intuitive grasp which characterizes the work of the knowledgeable and imaginative thinker. Even gathering and interpreting data requires a perspective not furnished by the data themselves.

At this time it appears that our most sanguine hope must be that we will be wise in countless ways. We may reach to all disciplines which can supply relevant data about government, including law, geography, history and economics, as well as psychology, sociology and cultural anthropology. We may hope that enrichment and sharpening of perception will come from a variety of approaches to reality. We may, while we still know so little, be humble, tolerant, and open-minded.

III

The move toward scientism has made it more essential to define the role of political philosophy in the study of political science. When we speak of political philosophy we include the study of ideologies, the search for normative theory, the quest for values. We move into the realm of evaluation and into what is ultimately a moral discourse. In this realm we are concerned with what ought to be or what might better be, in contrast to the *status quo*.

Even the most ardent advocate of scientism will see the inevitability of value projections in his study. For one thing, in a social science values are part of the basic data of study. Value judgments become patterns of belief, and whether these become “rules of the game” as David Truman puts it, or are contending patterns, they are part of the factors in the sequence of causes, results, more causes and more results. The other thing is that the researcher is never so objective—so culture free, so oblivious to utility—that he chooses his subject, organizes his data, and draws his conclusions without intrusion of value assumptions. The very effort to exclude value judgments is a kind of implicit assumption that the data of science have intrinsic value only, that they constitute an end in themselves, and are not to be sought because they are means for the accomplishment of ends and values not furnished by the data. This results in a further implicit assumption that explanation of things, not change in things, is the function of the scholar. Positivism is, therefore, a conservative stance for the scholar. The positivist would be interested in

discovering a law of gravity, but not in whether it would be useful for man to counteract it by a parachute or by some built-in arrangements to prevent the top half of a bikini from falling to the ground.

The more fundamental reason, however, for quest for values is that this is part of the pursuit of truth. Men need not assume that there is no constancy in nature, either in the relation of causes to effect or in guidelines for human conduct. To seek uniformity in one case leads toward systematic theory, in the other toward normative theory. Both are parts of a quest, and though certainty may expire in each case at a circumference with short radius, hope will forever spring that the radius is more than zero and can be extended by study.

There are tough questions of value which are enduring parts of the subject matter of politics, and which must excite the curiosity of the scholar of political science who thinks profoundly about his subject. Man is everywhere in chains; what can make this legitimate remains as central an inquiry of political science as when Rousseau propounded it. What is justice is equally pivotal in the political science quest. These are questions of relevance whether one is studying dictatorship, civil rights, the national state system, or other significant aspects of political power.

There is danger that out of the comfort of the American consensus on goals, or the despair of improvement of the prospects for man, or the shallowness of curiosity, the attention of the political scientist will be drawn only to circumstantial. A science of circumstantial would be no more comforting to the modern mind than metaphysical theory. But it may be the hope of the political scientist that he will find truth beyond the first and short of the second. And in this day when Orwell's spectre of what man can do to man with the use of the tools of science is before us, the increased relevance of philosophical inquiry is evident.

The suggestion is sometimes made that though these questions of value are important, they should be the province of the discipline of philosophy or religion and not that of political science. Three answers, separately and cumulatively, are convincing. The first may be stated negatively: if political scientists do not give attention to basic value questions, is there any assurance that these will receive adequate attention? Or positively: this is inherently and unavoidably part of the inquiry undertaken in the study of government. It is part of the search for truth about things political, particularly about man's power over man.

The second answer is that the competence both of those who study the "is" and of those

who study the "ought" may be increased by knowledge of the other domain. Profound understanding of the central issues of morality raised in political philosophy should provide some guidelines of relevance for the student of political behavior. Knowledge about political behavior should give some tone of reality to the conclusions about political morality of the political philosopher. This factor of mutual advantage suggests that there should be firm interlinking between the study of political behavior and political philosophy, between the search for systematic theory and the search for normative theory—indeed, even, that the most productive work may often be anticipated from those who work in both domains.

The third answer is that there is a middle ground of "what may be" which may have joint relevance for both types of inquiry. The juncture of the "is" and the "ought" in the "may be" is a legitimate concern for the behavioralist and for the philosopher. It unites the two in a common interest in utility on which I shall have more to say presently.

In the meantime, it is appropriate to note that the foregoing remarks reveal the only dependable safeguards against excesses of moralism, which may be as great a hazard as the excesses of scientism. It is idealism without realism and without practicality that constitutes the hazard. It is only knowledge of "what is" and "what has been" and concern with "what may be" that can prevent the search for "the ought" from going into sheer subjectivity and fantasy.

The foregoing discussion also provides clues to the answer to the question: what shall we do with the classics, i.e., the great books of the past? They are, it may be noted first, part of the data of politics. We are told that Locke's *Second Treatise* is one of the causative factors in the evolution of the American political system, and Louis Hartz has recently enlarged the description of Locke's influence. Classics, then, may be studied, not for their truth, but for their influence. They also contain some systematic theory and some intuitive grasp of realities of political behavior. They may be studied for the conclusions they suggest about such behavior. Finally, they may be studied for the abiding questions of moral significance which they present. It is not too much to say that no person is really literate about political science unless he has become conscious of the timeless issues presented by Plato and Rousseau, among others, and that his knowledge about those issues will probably be superficial unless he has moved through the profound classical texts. New methods of study, more systematic and less historical, may be in order for the classics,

but escape from their study may be escape to superficiality and circumstantiality.

IV

Reference to "what may be" recalls the emphasis on policy in political science study. As was noted earlier, political scientists have been interested in the utilization of their knowledge for the improvement of mankind's lot. They have served their governments in official positions or as consultants, they have worked in institutes devoted to the practical application of knowledge, and they have in their studies and publications focused their knowledge and sense of purpose on problems of concern to their generation.

In a policy science, utility takes its place beside science and morality. The problems facing man, currently or over time, determine choices of subjects for inquiry and give meaning to the search for knowledge and morality. Conversely, the sense of concern which animates anyone except a scholastic eunuch or a cynic propels the scholar toward use of his knowledge for human welfare.

As I look at the function of the American political scientist, as it has been or as it may be, in the policy role, I see three characteristics which in their total impact give him a distinctive position and make his science indeed the master science.

First, he is profoundly aware of the complexities of the problem-solving process. He senses the inescapability both of continuity and of change—of heritage and of contemporary need. He appreciates the respective roles of conflict, consensus, and choice in a free society. He has deliberated on the complementary functions of expert, politician, and citizen. He has imbibed the spirit of administrative and political due process. In sum, his political science knowledge, if it has sunk its tap roots in his thought, will have provided comprehension and balance to serve his judgment.

Second, the political scientist is concerned with feasibilities. His study of politics and administration gives him a consciousness of limits and possibilities. His digging leads inevitably into earthy foundations, into organic and human obstinacies, into rigidities which impede human ingenuity. It leads him also to the discovery of areas of pliability in social fact and human purpose—areas in which those who must solve problems will find opportunity for constructive solution.

The political scientist has had some theoretical models, such as the organismic theory of the state, separation of powers, and executive integration; but these have not dominated his

thought to the same extent that high-vaulted equilibrium theories have constrained the thought of economists. As the political scientist has turned to applications, he has tended to become downright practical.

Finally, and most distinctively, his peculiar competence is in the evaluation and construction of institutions. It is in the structuring of organization and process to channel prevailing ideas or to serve as shells within which conflict, consensus and choice can operate. It is in constitutionalization—in the preparation of frameworks within which the business of society can be conducted.

The political scientist may have, in addition, an important role in substantive policy development. This has been true in such areas as international policy and resources policy, and it may be true in the future in economic policy. It may be, however, that his role here should be to search for elements of policy so basic that they carve channels within which future policy is developed, and hence that his function is similar to that in the creation of institutions. The crucial point is that political science deals with the arrangements under which men live in political order; and hence whatever may be required in knowledge about individual and group behavior, political science in its largest dimension will be focused on these arrangements for political order. The constitution, in the largest and broadest sense of the enduring institutions and public policies, is the political scientist's central concern, and the process of constitutionalization is the heart of his utilitarian role.

There is, it may be alleged, danger that the utilitarian objective will conflict with the search for a durable science and an enduring morality. There is always the danger that attention to today's problems will narrow scope and vision in study. There is danger that scientists will become captives of their time. This, of course, is in large measure, unavoidable—as the history of our discipline shows. It is, however, something we will strain against.

This, as I have indicated earlier, is less a problem today than it has ever been before. The explosion of political science into the world-wide arena has brought us into contact with problems of revolutionary change, intercultural relations, and national and international structuralization so vast and diversified that work on their solutions will expand the search for basic meanings. Even within our own borders, where solutions are only ameliorative, the confrontation of new problems of urban living, civil rights, and economic change and stability will have the same effect of broadening

rather than narrowing perspectives. If work in such problem areas does not lead away from the search for theory, systematic and normative, then a veritable renaissance in study may indeed be possible.

One other danger is that we may overaccenuate our activism. This, however, need not be a great danger, for it has its own correctives. We cannot be, we do not have the power to be, what we should not be. We will not be philosopher-kings. In a pluralistic society political scientists should not and cannot constitute a priesthood which tells the people what they ought to do. We can only bring what knowledge we possess and what sense of purpose our study has bestowed to the society in which we live. We can, in addition, keep alive the great debates over moral purpose and political process which should go on in a free society. And it may be our hope that what learned men have learned about what is possible and good, or what they have learned should be avoided, will be useful to free men who finally make their own decisions.

V

It is in eclecticism encompassing science, morality, and practicality that political science has been rooted and has grown vigorously in the twentieth century. It is in such eclecticism that the clues to policy in our own house must be found. As our curricula, particularly in the graduate centers, are restudied and revised, it may be hoped that means can be found whereby the trinity of purpose can prevail in educational practice.

The education of our successors should be as inclusive as the challenges to the workers in the discipline. Certainly the developments of the past fifteen years have shown the importance of knowledge of methodology. The political scientist must learn the tools of research applicable to his field. This must be training in all the methods by which understanding can be gained in his peculiar field of political science—the traditional methods of historical and documentary research and the newer methods of assembling and analyzing contemporary data.

Yet this is all preliminary. The scientist does not study laboratory technique merely for the purpose of being a skilled technician, nor does the student of law study legal bibliography and methods of legal research as ends in themselves. We may indulge the hope that we will move toward a period of maturity when we will know enough about the value of new techniques so that experimentation on methodology will give way, in large measure, to the use of technology in exploring for substance.

As for substance, it must be our aim to provide the student an opportunity to see what man's inquiries have revealed about political activity and about standards of political morality. He must learn something of what research into contemporaneous data reveals about political, including institutional, behavior. He must assimilate what seems truthful and meaningful whether obtained by quantification and empirical testing or by the keen perception of the educated observer. This contemporaneous study, however realistic, will nevertheless be nearsighted and one-eyed unless vision is spread to other time spans through study of political evolutions, to different cultures through study of comparative political behavior, and to issues of political morality through study of the profoundest literature. This may suggest some turnabout in curricula—a greater emphasis on breadth of knowledge in political science. It suggests that whatever specialties may be selected by the young political scientist for concentrated study over the long span, and whatever advantages he may obtain from study in other disciplines, the task of the graduate center in political science is to produce, insofar as possible, a person who is literate in the broad span of political science knowledge.

A final element in graduate education will be development of competence for problem-solving in some arena where the near future demands further or new constitutionalization of political activity or new public policy. Political scientists must serve their time, even though they may not yield to it. The challenges of the future for their help in such diverse fields as metropolitan problems, institution creation in developing countries, and policy elaboration in international relations will be tremendous. But while serving their time, or preparing to serve it, they will supplement, sharpen, and bring to meaningful focus the knowledge gained by other means. The search for a practicable solution to a problem should increase awareness of the distinction between fact and theory, between means and values, between the *status quo* and what "ought to be," and between what "ought to be" and "what may be." It should increase competence for teaching, research, and practice. It is desirable, therefore, that each student should have to meet the challenge of trying to find solutions for problems, and that, as John Gaus suggested in his presidential address to this Association, each political scientist should grapple with a policy problem.

These approaches in graduate education—both extensions of our traditional practice and response to the new ferment—should maintain the three-point perspective of science, morality,

and utility. I express the hope that such a perspective will support a community of interest and a capacity for discharge, in reasonable measure, of our great obligation. We will, unavoidably and purposely, be moralists; but we will be aware of our moralism and will be restrained by a sense of feasibility, by knowledge about human adventures, and by tolerance arising from a double heritage—that of a pluralistic Western civilization and that of the searcher for truth. We will be policy developers;

but policy developers with knowledge both of our abilities and of our limitations, and with loyalties both to our society and to truth as it is established or believed. We will be scientists; but scientists guided by awareness of the relevance of scientific data to moral purpose and to the solution of human problems, and by consciousness of the many and varied routes to knowledge in a social science. Not in any single one of these elements of perspective, but in all, will political science be whole.

THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: EPITAPH FOR A MONUMENT TO A SUCCESSFUL PROTEST*

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Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the "behavioral approach" in political science is the ambiguity of the term itself, and of its synonym "political behavior." The behavioral approach, in fact, is rather like the Loch Ness monster: one can say with considerable confidence what it is not, but it is difficult to say what it is. Judging from newspaper reports that appear from time to time, particularly just before the summer tourist season, I judge that the monster of Loch Ness is not Moby Dick, nor my daughter's goldfish that disappeared down the drain some ten years ago, nor even a misplaced American eight heading for the Henley Regatta. In the same spirit, I judge that the behavioral approach is not that of the speculative philosopher, the historian, the legalist, or the moralist. What, then, is it? Indeed, does it actually exist?

I

Although I do not profess to know of the full history of the behavioral approach, a little investigation reveals that confusing and even contradictory interpretations have marked its appearance from the beginning. The first sightings in the roily waters of political science of the phenomenon variously called political behavioral approach, or behavioral(ist) research, evidently occurred in the 1920s. The term "political behavior," it seems, was used by American political scientists from the First World War onward.¹ The honor of first adopting the term as a book title seems to belong, however, not to a political scientist but to the American journalist Frank Kent, who published a book in 1928 entitled *Political Behavior, The Heretofore Unwritten Laws, Customs, and Principles of Politics as Practised in the United States*.² To Kent, the study of political behavior meant the cynical "realism" of the

tough-minded newspaperman who reports the way things "really" happen and not the way they're supposed to happen. This meaning, I may say, is often implied even today. However, Herbert Tingsten rescued the term for political science in 1937 by publishing his path-breaking *Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics*. Despite the fact that Tingsten was a Swede, and his work dealt with European elections, the term became increasingly identified with American political science.

The rapid flowering of the behavioral approach in the United States no doubt depended on the existence of some key attitudes and predispositions generated in the American culture—pragmatism, factmindedness, confidence in science, and the like.³ But there were also at least six specific, interrelated, quite powerful stimuli.

One was Charles E. Merriam. In his presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 1925, Merriam said:

Some day we may take another angle of approach *than the formal, as other sciences do*, and begin to look at *political behavior* as one of the essential objects of inquiry.⁴

During the next decade under Merriam's leadership at the University of Chicago, the Department of Political Science was the center of what would later have been called the behavioral approach. A number of the political scientists who subsequently were widely regarded as leaders in introducing that approach into American political science were faculty members or graduate students there: for example, Harold Lasswell as a faculty member and V. O. Key, Jr., David Truman, Herbert Simon, and Gabriel Almond, all graduate students in Merriam's department before the Second World War. Chicago was not the only place where the new mood of scientific empiricism was strong. At Cornell University, for ex-

* A paper presented at the Fifth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Paris, September 26, 1961.

¹ David Easton, *The Political System* (1953), p. 203.

² Kent's earlier book, *The Great Game of Politics* (1924), made no pretence of being systematic and continued to be widely read by students of American politics, but within a few years *Political Behavior* fell into an obscurity from which it has never recovered.

³ Cf. Bernard Crick, *The American Science of Politics, Its Origins and Conditions* (London, 1959).

⁴ "Progress in Political Research," this *REVIEW*, Vol. 20 (February, 1926), p. 7, quoted in David B. Truman, "The Implications of Political Behavior Research," *Items* (Social Science Research Council, December, 1951), p. 37. Emphasis added.

ample, G. E. G. Catlin was expounding similar views.⁵ But the collective impact of "the Chicago school" as it was sometimes called, was greater than that of a single scholar.

A second force was the arrival in the United States in the 1930s of a considerable number of European scholars, particularly German refugees, who brought with them a sociological approach to politics that strongly reflected the specific influence of Max Weber and the general influence of European sociology. American political science had always been strongly influenced by Europeans. Not only have Americans often interpreted their own political institutions most clearly with the aid of sympathetic foreigners like de Tocqueville, Bryce, and Brogan, but American scholars have owed specific debts to European scholarship. The first American university chair in political science (actually in History and Political Science), established in 1858 at Columbia, was occupied by the liberal German refugee Francis Lieber. In the second half of the nineteenth century, many of the leading academic advocates of a "science of politics" sought to profit from the methods and teachings in some of the leading European universities.⁶

In the 1930s, there was once again an abrupt revival of European influences as the life of American universities was enriched by the great influx of refugee scholars.

A number of these scholars who came to occupy leading positions in departments of sociology and political science insisted on the relevance of sociological and even psychological theories for an understanding of politics. They drew attention to the importance of Marx, Durkheim, Freud, Pareto, Mosca, Weber, Michels and others. Although some of them might later reject the behavioral approach precisely because they felt it was too narrow, men like Franz Neumann, Sigmund Neumann, Paul Lazarsfeld, Hans Speier, Hans Gerth,

Reinhard Bendix and many others exerted, both directly and indirectly, a profound influence on political research in the United States. Political sociology began to flourish. Political scientists discovered that their sociological colleagues were moving with speed and skill into areas they had long regarded as their own.

The Second World War also stimulated the development of the behavioral approach in the United States, for a great many American political scientists temporarily vacated their ivory towers and came to grips with day-to-day political and administrative realities in Washington and elsewhere: a whole generation of American political science later drew on these experiences. The confrontation of theory and reality provoked, in most of the men who performed their stint in Washington or elsewhere, a strong sense of the inadequacies of the conventional approaches of political science for describing reality, much less for predicting in any given situation what was likely to happen.

Possibly an even bigger impetus—not unrelated to the effects of the War—was provided by the Social Science Research Council, which has had an unostentatious but cumulatively enormous impact on American social science. A leading spirit in the Council for the past two decades has been a distinguished political scientist, E. Pendleton Herring. His own work before he assumed the presidency of the Council in 1948 reflected a concern for realism, for breaking the bonds of research confined entirely to the library, and for individual and group influences on politics and administration. In the mid-1940s Herring was instrumental in creating an SSRC committee on political behavior. The Annual Report of the SSRC for 1944-45 indicated that the Council had reached a

... decision to explore the feasibility of developing a new approach to the study of political behavior. Focused upon the behavior of individuals in political situations, this approach calls for examination of the political relationships of men—as citizens, administrators, and legislators—by disciplines which can throw light on the problems involved, with the object of formulating and testing hypotheses, concerning uniformities of behavior in different institutional settings. (Emphasis added.)

In 1945 the Council established a Committee on Political Behavior, with Herring as the chairman. The three other members⁷ were also

⁵ See Catlin's, *Science and Method of Politics* (1927). Another early example of the behavioral approach was Stuart Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (1928). Rice had received his Ph.D. at Columbia University.

⁶ Cf. Bernard Crick, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-31. Crick notes that "The Fifth Volume of the Johns Hopkins University *Studies in Historical and Political Science* published a long study, edited by Andrew D. White, 'European Schools of History and Politics' (December, 1887). It reprinted his Johns Hopkins address on 'Education in Political Science' together with reports on 'what we can learn from' each major European country." Fn. 1, p. 27.

⁷ Herbert Emmerich, Charles S. Hyneman, and V. O. Key, Jr.

well known political scientists with a definite concern about the state of conventional political science. In 1949, the Council, together with the University of Michigan's Department of Political Science and its Institute for Social Research held a week's conference on Research on Political Behavior at Ann Arbor. The topics covered help to provide an implicit definition of the term: papers were presented on regional politics, the possible contributions of related social sciences (*e.g.*, George P. Murdoch, the anthropologist, discussed the "Possibility of a General Social Science of Government"), voting behavior, political attitudes, groups, and methodological problems.⁸

Near the end of 1949, a new SSRC Committee on Political Behavior was appointed, with V.O. Key, Jr., as the chairman. In 1950, this committee succinctly defined its task: "The committee is concerned with the *development of theory and improvement in methods* which are needed if *social science research on the political process* is to be more effective."⁹ This committee has been an active stimulant in the growth of the behavioral approach down to the present time; indeed, in recent years (under the chairmanship of David Truman) the committee has also awarded research grants.

The fifth factor was the rapid growth of the "survey" method as a tool available for the study of political choices and attitudes, and specifically of the behavior of voters. Where Tingsten had necessarily relied on aggregate voting statistics, the survey method provided direct access to the characteristics and behavior of individuals: an advantage that anyone who has ever labored with aggregate data is quick to recognize. As survey methods became more and more "scientific," particularly under the auspices of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan and the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia, political scientists found their presumed monopoly of skills in the scholarly interpretation of voting and elections rudely destroyed by sociologists and social psychologists who in a series of path-breaking studies of presidential elections began to convert the analysis of voting from impressionistic—even when it was brilliant—history or insightful journalism to a more pedestrian but occasionally more impressive and convincing empirical science. To political scientists

dissatisfied with the conventional methods and manners of the discipline, the new voting studies offered encouragement. For in spite of obvious defects, the voting studies seemed to provide ground for the hope that if political scientists could only master the tools employed in the other social sciences—survey methods and statistical analysis, for example—they might be able to go beyond plausible generalities and proceed to test hypotheses about how people in fact do behave in making political choices.

A sixth factor that needs to be mentioned is the influence of those uniquely American institutions, the great philanthropic foundations—especially Carnegie, Rockefeller, and more recently Ford—which because of their enormous financial contributions to scholarly research, and the inevitable selection among competing proposals that these entail, exert a considerable effect on the scholarly community. The relationship between foundation policy and current trends in academic research is too complex for facile generalities. Perhaps the simplest accurate statement is that the relationship is to a very high degree reciprocal: the staffs of the foundations are highly sensitive to the views of distinguished scholars, on whom they rely heavily for advice, and at the same time because even foundation resources are scarce, the policies of foundation staffs and trustees must inevitably encourage or facilitate some lines of research more than others. If the foundations had been hostile to the behavioral approach, there can be no doubt that it would have had very rough sledding indeed. For characteristically, behavioral research costs a good deal more than is needed by the single scholar in the library—and sometimes, as with the studies of voting in presidential elections, behavioral research is enormously expensive.

In the period after the Second World War, however, the foundations—reflecting important trends within the social sciences themselves, stimulated by the factors I have already mentioned—tended to view interdisciplinary and behavioral studies with sympathy. The Rockefeller Foundation, for example, had helped finance the pioneering panel study by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet of voting in the 1940 presidential election in Erie County, Ohio, and it has also, almost singlehandedly, financed the costly election studies of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. In the newest and richest foundation, Ford, the short-lived Behavioral Sciences Program probably increased the use and acceptability of the notion of behavioral sciences as something both more behavioral and more scientific than

⁸ Alexander Heard, "Research on Political Behavior: Report of a Conference," *Items* (Social Science Research Council, December, 1949), pp. 41–44.

⁹ Social Science Research Council, *Items* (June, 1950), p. 20. (Emphasis added.)

the social sciences (I confess the distinction still remains cloudy to me despite the earnest attempts of a number of behavioral scientists to set me straight). The most durable offshoot of the Behavioral Sciences Program at Ford is the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Palo Alto. Although the Center has often construed its domain in most catholic fashion—the “fellows” in any given year may include mathematicians, philosophers, historians, or even a novelist—in its early years the political scientists who were fellows there tended to be discontented with traditional approaches, inclined toward a more rigorously empirical and scientific study of politics, and deeply interested in learning wherever possible from the other social sciences.

All these factors, and doubtless others, came to fruition in the decade of the 1950s. The behavioral approach grew from the deviant and unpopular views of a minor sect into a major influence. Many of the radicals of the 1930s (professionally speaking) had, within two decades, become established leaders in American political science.

Today, many American departments of political science (including my own) offer undergraduate or graduate courses in Political Behavior. Indeed, in at least one institution (the University of Michigan) Political Behavior is not only a course but a field of graduate study parallel with such conventional fields as political theory, public administration, and the like—and recently buttressed, I note enviously, with some fat fellowships.

The presidency of the American Political Science Association furnishes a convenient symbol of the change. From 1927, when Merriam was elected president, until 1950, none of the presidents was prominently identified as an advocate of the behavioral approach. The election of Peter Odegard in 1950 might be regarded as the turning point. Since that time, the presidency has been occupied by one of Merriam's most brilliant and intellectually unconventional students, Harold Lasswell, and by three of the four members of the first SSRC Committee on Political Behavior.

Thus the revolutionary sectarians have found themselves, perhaps more rapidly than they thought possible, becoming members of the Establishment.

II

I have not, however, answered the nagging question I set out to answer, though perhaps I have furnished some materials from which an answer might be derived. What is the behavioral approach in political science?

Historically speaking, the behavioral approach was a protest movement within political science. Through usage by partisans, partly as an epithet, terms like political behavior and the behavioral approach came to be associated with a number of political scientists, mainly Americans, who shared a strong sense of dissatisfaction with the achievements of conventional political science, particularly through historical, philosophical, and the descriptive-institutional approaches, and a belief that additional methods and approaches either existed or could be developed that would help to provide political science with empirical propositions and theories of a systematic sort, tested by closer, more direct and more rigorously controlled observations of political events.

At a minimum, then, those who were sometimes called “Behaviorists” or “Behavioralists” shared a mood: a mood of skepticism about the current intellectual attainments of political science, a mood of sympathy toward “scientific” modes of investigation and analysis, a mood of optimism about the possibilities of improving the study of politics.

Was—or is—the behavioral approach ever anything more than this mood? Are there perhaps definite beliefs, assumptions, methods or topics that can be identified as constituting political behavior or the behavioral approach?

There are, so far as I can tell, three different answers to this question among those who employ the term carefully. The first answer is an unequivocal yes. Political behavior is said to refer to the study of *individuals* rather than larger political units. This emphasis is clear in the 1944-45 SSRC report (which I quoted earlier) that foreshadowed the creation of the Political Behavior Committee. This was also how David Easton defined the term in his searching analysis and criticism of American political science published in 1953.¹⁰ In this

¹⁰ “To precisely what kind of research does the concept of political behavior refer? It is clear that this term indicates that the research worker wishes to look at participants in the political system as individuals who have the emotions, prejudices, and predispositions of human beings as we know them in our daily lives. . . . Behavioral research . . . has therefore sought to elevate the actual human being to the center of attention. Its premise is that the traditionalists have been reifying institutions, virtually looking at them as entities apart from their component individuals. . . . Research workers often use the terms . . . to indicate that they are studying the political process by looking at the relation of it to the motivations, personalities, or feelings of the

sense, Tingsten, Lasswell, and studies of voting behavior are prime examples of the behavioral approach.

The second answer is an unequivocal no. In his recent *Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis* (1960), Vernon Van Dyke remarks: "Though stipulative definitions of *political behavior* are sometimes advanced, as when a course or a book is given this title, none of them has gained general currency."¹¹ Probably the most eloquent and resounding "No!" was supplied three years ago by an editorial in *PROD*, a journal that some American political scientists—and many of its readers—probably regarded as the authentic spokesman for the newest currents among the *avant garde* of political behavior. As an alumnus both of Merriam's Chicago department and the SSRC Committee on Political Behavior, the editor of *PROD*, Alfred de Grazia, could be presumed to speak with authority. He denied that the term referred to a subject matter, an interdisciplinary focus, quantification, any specific effort at new methods, behaviorist psychology, "realism" as opposed to "idealism," empiricism in contrast with deductive systems, or voting behavior—or, in fact, to anything more than political science as something that some people might like it to be. He proposed that the term be dropped.¹²

The third view is perhaps no more than an elaboration of the mood I mentioned a moment ago. In this view the behavioral approach is an attempt to improve our understanding of politics by seeking to explain the empirical aspects of political life by means of methods, theories, and criteria of proof that are acceptable according to the canons, conventions, and assumptions of modern empirical science. In this sense, "a behavioral approach," as one writer recently observed, "is distinguished predominantly by the nature of the purpose it is designed to serve. The purpose is scientific. . . ."¹³

If we consider the behavioral approach in political science as simply an attempt to make the empirical component of the discipline more scientific, as that term is generally understood in the empirical sciences, much of the history that I have referred to falls into place. In a wise, judicious, and until very recently neg-

lected essay entitled "The Implications of Political Behavior Research," David Truman, writing in 1951, set out the fruits of a seminar on political behavior research held at the University of Chicago in the summer of 1951. I think it is not misleading to say that the views Truman set forth in 1951 have been shared in the years since then by the members of the Committee on Political Behavior.

Roughly defined, [he wrote] the term political behavior comprehends those actions and interactions of men and groups which are involved in the process of governing. . . . At the maximum this conception brings under the rubric of political behavior any human activities which can be said to be a part of governing.

Properly speaking, political behavior is not a "field" of social science; it is not even a "field" of political science.

. . . Political behavior is not and should not be a specialty, for it represents rather an orientation or a point of view which aims at stating all the phenomena of government in terms of the observed and observable behavior of men. To treat it as a "field" coordinate with (and presumably isolated from) public law, state and local government, international relations, and so on, would be to defeat its major aim. That aim includes an eventual reworking and extension of most of the conventional "fields" of political science . . .

The developments underlying the current interest in political behavior imply two basic requirements for adequate research. In the first place, research must be systematic. . . . This means that research must grow out of a precise statement of hypotheses and a rigorous ordering of evidence. . . . In the second place, research in political behavior must place primary emphasis upon empirical methods. . . . Crude empiricism, unguided by adequate theory, is almost certain to be sterile. Equally fruitless is speculation which is not or cannot be put to empirical test.

. . . The ultimate goal of the student of political behavior is the development of a science of the political process . . .¹⁴

Truman called attention to the advantages of drawing on the other social sciences and cautioned against indiscriminate borrowings. He argued that the "political behavior orientation . . . necessarily aims at being quantitative wherever possible. But . . . the student of political behavior . . . deals with the political institution and he is obliged to perform his task in quantitative terms if he can and in qualitative

participants as individual human beings." David Easton, *The Political System* (1953), pp. 201-205.

¹¹ As we shall see, Van Dyke distinguishes the term "behavioral approach" from "political behavior."

¹² "What is Political Behavior?," *PROD*, July, 1958.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

¹⁴ Social Science Research Council, *Items* (December, 1951), pp. 37-39. (Emphasis added.)

terms if he must." (Emphasis added). He agreed that "inquiry into how men *ought* to act is not a concern of research in political behavior" but insisted on the importance of studying values as "obviously important determinants of men's behavior."

Moreover, in political behavior research, as in the natural sciences, the values of the investigator are important in the selection of the objects and lines of inquiry. . . . A major reason for any inquiry into political behavior is to discover uniformities, and through discovering them to be better able to indicate the consequences of such patterns and of public policy, existing or proposed, for the maintenance or development of a preferred system of political values.

Truman denied that "the political behavior orientation implies a rejection of historical knowledge . . . Historical knowledge is likely to be an essential supplement to contemporary observation of political behavior." Finally, while suggesting that the conventional graduate training of political scientists needed to be supplemented and modified, Truman emphatically opposed the notion that the behavioral approach required "the elimination of . . . traditional training."

Any new departure in an established discipline must build upon the accomplishments of the past. Although much of the existing literature of politics may be impressionistic, it is extensive and rich in insights. Without a command of the significant portions of that literature, behavioral research . . . is likely to be naive and unproductive. . . . Many attempts made by persons not familiar with the unsystematized facts [have been] substantively naive even when they may have been methodologically sound.

I have cited Truman's views at length for several reasons: because I wholeheartedly agree with them; because they were expressed a decade ago when the advocates of the behavioral approach were still searching for acceptance and self-definition; because they have been neglected; and because I believe that if the partisans and critics of "political behavior" and "the behavioral approach" had read them, understood them, and accepted them as a proper statement of objectives, much of the irrelevant, fruitless, and ill-informed debate over the behavioral approach over the past decade need never have occurred—or at any rate might have been conducted on a rather higher level of intellectual sophistication.

III

Thus the "behavioral approach" might bet-

ter be called the "behavioral mood" or perhaps even the "scientific outlook."

Yet to explain the behavioral approach as nothing more or less than an emphasis on the term "science" in the phrase "political science" leaves unanswered whatever questions may be raised as to the present or potential achievements of this mood of protest, skepticism, reform, and optimism. Fortunately, there is an element of self-correction in intellectual life. The attempt to increase the scientific competence of political studies will inevitably be judged by results. And the judges of the next generation will share the skepticism of the past. If closer attention to methodological niceties, to problems of observation and verification, to the task of giving operational meaning to political concepts, to quantification and testing, to eliminating unproductive intervening variables, to sources of data, hypotheses, and theory in the other social sciences; if all of these activities do not yield explanations of some important aspects of politics that are more thoroughly verified, less open to methodological objections, richer in implications for further explanation, and more useful in meeting the perennial problems of political life than the explanations they are intended to replace; if, in short, the results of a scientific outlook do not measure up to the standards that serious students of politics have always attempted to apply, then we may confidently expect that the attempt to build an empirical science of politics will lose all the impetus in the next generation that it gained in the last.

The representatives of the "scientific outlook" are, it seems to me, right in saying that it is a little early to appraise the results. We shall need another generation of work before we can put the products of this new mood and outlook in political science in perspective. Nonetheless, I believe it may be useful to make a tentative if deliberately incomplete assessment.

The oldest and best example of the modern scientific outlook at work is to be found in studies of voting behavior using survey methods. These begin with *The People's Choice*,¹⁵ a study of the 1940 presidential election first published in 1944, and end—for the moment at least—with the magnificent study of the 1956 election entitled *The American Voter*.¹⁶ It is no

¹⁵ Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1944).

¹⁶ Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Donald Stokes, and Warren Miller, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), a study extended and refined

exaggeration to say that in less than two decades this series of studies has significantly altered and greatly deepened our understanding of what in some ways is the most distinctive action for a citizen of a democracy—deciding how to vote, or indeed whether to vote at all, in a competitive national election. Each study has profited from the last; and as broadly trained political scientists have begun to work on these studies together with sociologists and social psychologists, the contributions of the studies to our understanding of politics—rather than of individual psychology—have greatly increased. On many topics where only a generation ago we had not much beyond impressionistic evidence, today we can speak with some confidence.

Although in a field as ambiguous and rich in contradictory hypotheses as political science, it is nearly always possible to regard a finding as merely confirming the obvious, in fact a number of the findings point in rather unexpected directions: *e.g.*, that “independent” voters tend to be less interested, involved, or informed than partisan voters;¹⁷ that socio-economic “class” whether objectively or subjectively defined is not a factor of constant weight in American presidential elections but a variable subject to great swings; and that only a microscopic proportion of American voters can be said to bring any ideological perspectives, even loosely defined, to bear on their decisions. Where once one might have asserted these propositions or their contraries with equal plausibility, the evidence of the voting studies tends to pile up in a single direction. Moreover—and this is perhaps the most important point of all—these studies are cumulative. The early studies were highly incomplete and in many ways unsatisfactory. They were subject to a good deal of criticism, and properly so. Even the latest ones will not escape unharmed. Yet it seems to me there has been a steady and obvious improvement in quality, range, and depth.

The voting studies may have provided an

indirect stimulus to the “scientific outlook” because of a psychological effect. It seems to be beyond much doubt that some political scientists, particularly younger ones, compared the yield produced by the methods used in the studies on voting with the normal yield of conventional methods and arrived at the inference—which is probably false—that the application of comparable new methods elsewhere could produce a comparable gain in results.

A closely related topic on which the scientific outlook, has, in my view, produced some useful and reliable results of great importance to an understanding of politics is in the general domain of political participation. A listing of some of the chapter headings in Robert E. Lane's *Political Life* (1959) indicates the sort of question on which our knowledge is very much better off than it was only a few years ago: “Who Takes Part in Elections and What Do They Do?,” “Who Tries to Influence Public Officials and How Do They Do It?,” “Political Discussion: Who Listens to What? Who Talks to Whom?,” “Why Lower-Status People Participate Less than Upper-Status People,” “The Way of the Ethnic in Politics,” etc.

Since I am not responsible for a complete inventory, I shall limit myself to mentioning one more subject where the behavioral mood has clearly made itself felt. This is in understanding the psychological characteristics of *homo politicus*: attitudes, beliefs, predispositions, personality factors. The range of “behavioral” scholars and research in this area is very great, though the researchers and the research may not always bear the professional label “political science.” A few scattered names, titles, and topics will indicate what I have in mind: Lasswell, the great American pioneer in this area; Cantril; Lane; McClosky; Adorno, et al, *The Authoritarian Personality*; Almond, *The Appeals of Communism*; Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*; and Lipset, “Working Class Authoritarianism” in *Political Man*. The fact that these scholars bear various professional labels—sociologist, psychologist, political scientist—and that it is not easy to read from the professional or departmental label of the author to the character of the work itself may be regarded by some political scientists as an appalling sign of disintegration in the distinctive properties of political science, but it is also a sign of the extent to which a concern by “behavioral scientists” with similar problems now tends to transcend (though not to eliminate entirely) differences in professional origins.

by the same authors in “Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election,” this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (1961), pp. 269–280.

¹⁷ A finding, incidentally, that may have to be revised in turn. A recent re-analysis of the data of the voting studies, completed after this paper was prepared, has turned up new evidence for the active, interested independent voter. William Flanigan, *Partisanship and Campaign Participation* (Ph.D. dissertation. Yale University Library, 1961).

IV

What of the yield in other matters that have always been of concern to students of political life? There are a number of important aspects of political studies where the behavioral mood has had, is having, or probably soon will have an impact, but where we must reserve judgment for the time being simply because the results are too scanty.

A good example is the analysis of political *systems*. The most distinctive products of the behavioral mood so far have dealt with *individuals*—individuals who vote, participate in politics in other ways, or express certain attitudes or beliefs. But an individual is not a political system, and analysis of individual preferences cannot fully explain collective decisions, for in addition we need to understand the mechanisms by which individual decisions are aggregated and combined into collective decisions. We cannot move from a study of the attitudes of a random sample of American citizens to a reasonably full explanation of, say, presidential nominations or the persistent problems of policy coordination in the United States.

Yet one classic concern of students of politics has been the analysis of *systems* of individuals and groups. Although the impact of the scientific outlook on the study of political systems is still unclear, there are some interesting straws in the wind. In *Union Democracy*, Lipset, Trow and Coleman brought the behavioral mood and the intellectual resources of three highly trained social scientists to bear on the task of explaining how it is that a legitimate two-party system is maintained, as it is not in other American trade unions, in the International Typographers' Union. Recently a number of political scientists have followed sociologists into the study of local communities as systems of influence or decision-making.¹⁸ Deutsch reflects the behavioral mood in his study of international political systems.¹⁹ A number of other studies are in process that may help us formu-

¹⁸ Cf. Janowitz, ed., *Community Political Systems* (1961); Edward Banfield, *Political Influence* (1961); and the English study by Birch and his colleagues at the University of Manchester, *Small Town Politics* (1959).

¹⁹ E.g., in his *Nationalism and Social Communication* (1953). See also his recent article with the economist Alexander Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890-1959," *World Politics* (January, 1961), pp. 267-299; and his "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (September, 1961), pp. 493-514.

late some new, or if not new then more persuasive, answers to some ancient questions.²⁰ But until more evidence is in, anyone who does not believe he knows *a priori* the outcome of this present expression of the scholar's age-old quest for knowledge will perhaps be pardoned if he reserves judgment and awaits the future with skepticism—mixed, depending on his prejudices, with hope or dread.

V

Where will the behavioral mood, considered as a movement of protest, go from here? I think it will gradually disappear. By this I mean only that it will slowly decay as a distinctive mood and outlook. For it will become, and in fact already is becoming, incorporated into the main body of the discipline. The behavioral mood will not disappear, then, because it has failed. It will disappear rather because it has succeeded. As a separate, somewhat sectarian, slightly factional outlook it will be the first victim of its own triumph.

Lest I be misunderstood in what I am about to say, let me make clear that the present and probable future benefits of the behavioral revolt to political studies seem to me to outweigh by far any disadvantages. In retrospect, the "behavioral" revolt in political science was, if anything, excessively delayed. Moreover, had that revolt not taken place, political science would have become increasingly alienated, I believe, from the other social sciences. One consequence of the behavioral protest has been to restore some unity within the social sciences by bringing political studies into closer affiliation with theories, methods, findings, and outlooks in modern psychology, sociology, anthropology and economics.

But if the behavioral revolt in political science has helped to restore some unities, it has shattered others; and the fragments probably cannot ever again be united exactly along the old lines. There are, so to speak, five fragments in search of a unity. These are: empirical political science, standards of evaluation, history, general theory and speculation.

The empirical political scientist is concerned

²⁰ For an interesting example of an application of the behavioral mood to comparative politics, see Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, "Parties, Elections and Political Behavior in the Northern Countries: a Review of Recent Research," *Politische Forschung* (1960). Probably the most ambitious attempt to apply survey methods to comparative politics is represented by a study of political socialization and political values in five nations, conducted by Gabriel A. Almond; this study has not yet been completed.

with what *is*, as he says, not with what *ought* to be. Hence he finds it difficult and uncongenial to assume the historic burden of the political philosopher who attempted to determine, prescribe, elaborate, and employ ethical standards—values, to use the fashionable term—in appraising political acts and political systems. The behaviorally minded student of politics is prepared to *describe* values as empirical data; but, *qua* “scientist” he seeks to avoid prescription or inquiry into the grounds on which judgments of value can properly be made. To whom, then, are we to turn for guidance on intricate questions of political appraisal and evaluation? Today, probably no single professional group is qualified to speak with wisdom on all important political alternatives.

It may be said that this is the task of the political philosopher. But the problem of the political philosopher who wishes to engage in political evaluation in a sophisticated way is rendered ever more formidable by the products of the behavioral mood. An act of political evaluation cannot be performed in a sterile medium free from contamination by brute facts. Surely no one today, for example, can intelligently consider the relative merits of different political systems, or different arrangements within a particular political system, unless he knows what there is to be known about how these systems or arrangements work, what is required to make them work, and what effects they have on participants. No doubt the specialist who “knows the facts”—whether as physicist, physician, or political scientist—sometimes displays great naïveté on matters of policy. Still, the impatience of the empirical political scientist with the political philosopher who insists upon the importance of “values” arises in part from a feeling that the political philosopher who engages in political evaluation rarely completes all his homework. The topic of “consensus” as a condition for democracy is a case in point; when the political philosopher deals with this question, it seems to me that he typically makes a number of assumptions and assertions of an empirical sort without systematic attention to existing empirical data, or the possibility of gaining better empirical data.²¹ Obviously some division of labor will

always be necessary in a field as broad as the study of politics, but clearly the field needs more people who do not regard rapid shifts of mood—I mean from the behavioral to the philosophical—as a symptom of severe schizophrenia.

Second, in his concern for analyzing what *is*, the behavioral political scientist has found it difficult to make systematic use of what *has been*: *i.e.*, with history. In a trivial sense, of course, all knowledge of fact is historical; but I am speaking here of the history of the historian. Despite disclaimers and intentions to the contrary, there seems to me little room for doubt that the actual content of almost all the studies that reflect the behavioral mood is a-historical in character. Yet the scientific shortcomings of an a-historical theory in political science are manifest, and political scientists with “behavioral” predispositions are among the first to admit them. As the authors of *The American Voter* remark:

In somewhat severe language, theory may be characterized as a generalized statement of the inter-relationships of a set of variables. In these terms, historical description may be said to be a statement of the values assumed by these variables through time . . .

If theory can guide historical descriptions, the historical context of most research on human behavior places clear limitations of the development of theory. In evolving and testing his theoretical hypotheses the social scientist usually must depend on what he is permitted to observe by the progress of history. . . . It is evident that *variables of great importance in human affairs may exhibit little or no change in a given historical period*. As a result, the investigator whose work falls in this period *may not see the significance of these variables* and may fail to incorporate them in his theoretical statements. And even if he does perceive their importance, *the absence of variation will prevent a proper test of hypotheses* that state the relation of these factors to other variables of his theory (pp. 8–10, emphasis added).

There are, I think, a number of nodes around which a unity between behavioral political studies and history may be expected to grow. Because it is unreasonable to suppose that anything like the whole field of history will lend itself successfully to the behavioral approach, both historians and political scientists might profitably look for targets-of-opportunity on which the weapons forged by modern social science can be brought to bear. In this respect the work of the American historian, Lee Benson, seems to me particularly promising. By the application of rather elementary methods, which the historian has not been prone to em-

²¹ In 1942, in *The New Belief in the Common Man*, C. J. Friedrich challenged the prevailing generalizations about the need for consensus (ch. 5). However, his challenge seems to have met with little response until 1960, when Prothro and Grigg reported the results of an empirical study of consensus on “democratic” propositions in Ann Arbor, Michigan and Tallahassee, Florida. See their “Fundamental Principles of Democracy,” *Journal of Politics* (May, 1960), pp. 276–294.

ploy, including very simple statistical analysis, Benson has shown how the explanations of five eminent American historians of four different presidential elections are dubious, if not, in fact, downright absurd.²² The sociologist, S. M. Lipset, has also contributed a new interpretation of the 1860 election, based upon his analysis of Southern voting patterns in the presidential election of that year and in referenda on secession a few months later.²³ Benson has also turned his attention both to Charles A. Beard's famous interpretation—which Beard called an economic interpretation—of the creation and adoption of the American Constitution, and to the latter-day critics of Beard's somewhat loosely stated theory; he demonstrates convincingly, at least to me, some of the gains that can arise from a greater methodological sophistication on matters of causation, correlation, and use of quantitative data than is customary among professional historians.²⁴

In addition to these targets-of-opportunity that occur here and there in historical studies, a problem that obviously needs the joint attention of historian and "behavioral" political scientist is the matter of political change. To the extent that the political scientist is interested in gaining a better understanding of political change—as, say, in the developing countries, to cite an example of pressing importance—he will have to work with theories that can only be fully tested against historical data. Unfortunately, the a-theoretical or even anti-theoretical biases of many historians often make their works a storehouse of data so vast as to be almost unmanageable for the theorist. Rather than demand that every theorist should have to become his own historian, it may be more feasible to demand that more historians should become theorists, or at any rate familiar with the most relevant issues, problems, and methods of the modern social sciences.

I have already implied the third unity that needs to be established, namely a unity between empirical political studies and a concern

for general theory. The scientific outlook in political science can easily produce a dangerous and dysfunctional humility: the humility of the social scientist who may be quite confident of his findings on small matters and dubious that he can have anything at all to say on larger questions. The danger, of course, is that the quest for empirical data can turn into an absorbing search for mere trivialities unless it is guided by some sense of the difference between an explanation that would not matter much even if could be shown to be valid by the most advanced methods now available, and one that would matter a great deal if it should turn out to be a little more or a little less plausible than before, even if it still remained in some considerable doubt. So far, I think, the impact of the scientific outlook has been to stimulate caution rather than boldness in searching for broad explanatory theories. The political scientist who mixes skepticism with methodological rigor is all too painfully aware of the inadequacies of any theory that goes much beyond the immediate data at hand. Yet it seems clear that unless the study of politics generates and is guided by broad, bold, even if highly vulnerable general theories, it is headed for the ultimate disaster of triviality.

Finally, I should like to suggest that empirical political science had better find a place for speculation. It is a grave though easy error for students of politics impressed by the achievements of the natural sciences to imitate all their methods save the most critical one: the use of the imagination. Problems of method and a proper concern for what would be regarded as an acceptable test of an empirical hypothesis have quite properly moved out of the wings to a more central position on the great stage of political science. Yet surely it is imagination that has generally marked the intelligence of the great scientist, and speculation—often-times foolish speculation, it turned out later—has generally preceded great advances in scientific theory. It is only fair to add, however, that the speculation of a Galileo, a Kepler, a Newton, or an Einstein, was informed and controlled by a deep understanding of the hard empirical facts as they were known at the time: Kepler's speculations always had to confront the tables of Tycho Brahe.

There is every reason to think that unities can be forged anew. After all, as the names of Socrates, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Tocqueville remind us, from time to time in the past the study of politics has been altered, permanently, by a fresh infusion of the spirit of empirical inquiry—by, that is to say, the scientific outlook.

²² The historians and the elections were: Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., on the election of 1824, Samuel E. Morison and Henry S. Commager on the election of 1860, Allan Nevins on the election of 1884, and William Diamond on the election of 1896. See his "Research Problems in American Political Historiography," in Komarovsky, ed., *Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences* (1957).

²³ "The Emergence of the One-Party South—the Election of 1860," in *Political Man* (1960).

²⁴ Lee Benson, *Turner and Beard, American Historical Writing Re-Considered* (1960).

ON THE NATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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Political activity is dangerous. Arising inevitably out of men's ability to influence each other, conferring upon them the benefits of joint endeavour, an indispensable source of social boons, it is also capable of doing great harm. Men can be moved to injure others or to ruin themselves. The very process of moving implies a risk of debasement for the moved and for the mover.¹ Even the fairest vision of a good to be sought offers no moral guarantee, since it may poison hearts with hatred against those who are deemed an obstacle to its achievement.²

No apology is required for stressing a subjective dread of political activity: the chemist is not disqualified as a scientist because he is aware that explosives are dangerous; indeed that chemist is dangerous who lacks such awareness.

This feeling of danger is widespread in human society³ and has ever haunted all but the more superficial authors. Although, to be sure, few have, like Hobbes, brought it out into the open, it has hovered in the background, exerting an invisible but effective influence upon their treatment of the subject; it may be, to a significant degree, responsible for the strange and unique texture of political science.

I

There are no objects to which our attention is so naturally drawn as to our own fellows. It

¹ "Tel se croit le maître des autres qui ne laisse pas d'être plus esclave qu'eux," says Rousseau in the first lines of the *Social Contract*. He elucidates in *Emile*: "Domination itself is servile when beholden to opinion: for you depend upon the prejudices of those you govern by means of their prejudices."

² It is a sobering exercise to count the expressions of anger (as against those of good will) which occur in the speeches or writings of political champions of this or that moral cause.

³ Different voices denounce the encroaching State, overbearing Lords, an established Church, or tentacular unions, or the dominant party: yet such voices, however discordant, all express distrust of some form of established power. In the same manner, emergent power is deemed frightening by some when an agitator musters a mob, by others in the case of a rising dictator—though one may turn into the other. The same feeling crystallizes on different stems.

takes a conscious purpose to watch birds or ants, but we can not fail to watch other men, with whom we are inevitably associated, whose behaviour is so important to us that we need to foresee it, and who are sufficiently like us to facilitate our understanding of their actions. Being a man, which involves living with men, therefore involves observing men. And the knowledge of men could be called the most fairly distributed of all kinds of knowledge since each one of us may acquire it according to his willingness and capacity.

As politics consists of nothing other than human behaviour it seems that, over time, the study of it should have made great progress through accumulation, comparison and systematisation of observations. If politics is understood restrictively as the conduct of men in offices of authority and the consequent march of public affairs, then all those who have over time found themselves in office have found out something about political behaviour. I hold the view that we should regard as "political" every systematic effort performed at any place in the social field to move other men in pursuit of some design cherished by the mover. According to this view, we all have the required material: anyone of us has acted with others, been moved by others and has sought to move others.

It is clear of course that mere "facts" can never compose a knowledge unless they be marshalled, and their marshalling always calls for a "theory" which seizes upon certain similar appearances, assigns to them common names and supposes processes which bring them about. The processes we assume constitute a sort of model in the mind of what occurs in observable reality; a necessary attempt to reduce phenomenal diversity to intellectual simplicity. Such "theory" has a "representative" purpose; it guides us in the collection of facts. These in turn call for amendments to our theory insofar as it can not account for them. We move from initial simplicity to increasing complexity of our theory until a possibly quite different one is offered which achieves the representative function with greater elegance and accuracy.

Theory of this kind progresses over time, accounting for an ever-increasing store of observations. All this is trite: but it then comes as a surprise that political science should offer so little of such "theory": what is commonly

called "political theory"⁴ is an altogether different thing. In the theory of astronomy there is no place for Ptolemaeus, in the theory of chemistry no place for Paracelsus: not so in political theory. The theory of any science is an integrated whole from which past theories have been discarded. Political theory is a collection of individual theories which stand side by side, each one more or less impervious to the impact of new observations and to the advent of new theories. This can be the case only because political theories are normative (i.e., are doctrines), and are not meant to perform the representative function which the word "theory" evokes in the case of factual sciences.

Why is political science rich in normative theories, deficient in "representative" theory? Only a fool would opine that the masters of the past were incapable of establishing the latter: they must have been unwilling. And why? The reason may lie in the sense of danger which I noted at the beginning.

II

Libido sciendi is a noble passion: it is inherently incapable of debasing the man it possesses, and the delights it affords do not wait upon the possession of the object pursued but attend its very pursuit. This *libido* is indispensable to the making of a scientist,⁵ and it seems also sufficient. Yet if one studies the personalities of the great scientists, one finds that their *libido* was habitually associated with one or both of the motives expressed in Bacon's timeless sentence: "for the glory of God and the relief of man's estate."

The word "understanding" denotes the grasping of a pattern which underlies the waywardness of phenomena: the scientist finds beauty in such a pattern and loves it the more the higher its aesthetic quality. The word "discovery" signifies the unveiling of what was both present and hidden. Such terms reveal that ancient inquirers into "the secrets of Nature" (another telling expression) assumed the existence of an "order": and what better warrant for it than the belief in Creation? If everything that is comes from the divine planning of a Supreme Intelligence—"Dieu est géomètre"—then the design which stands at the source guarantees that far lesser intelligences, partaking of the same Reason, can grasp some parts of the design.

⁴ Discussed in Arnold Brecht, *Political Theory* (Princeton, 1959), and in Eric Weil, "Philosophie politique, Théorie politique," *Revue française de Science politique*, Vol. 11, No. 2.

⁵ Cf. Michael Polanyi, *Science, Faith and Society* (London 1946).

Such was the language of scientists in the Deist age of the 17th and 18th centuries, who felt that the displaying of some lineaments of the universal order was a new publication of God's wisdom. Few scientists would today speak in this manner:⁶ they now state that their patterns are "made up" and disclaim that they "make out" the "true" structure of things. Deep down, however, they hardly doubt that their "made up" patterns are in some way representative of a true structure. Nor do they hesitate to choose between two equally "serviceable" models that which is the more beautiful; and, though careful to explain that this is a mere preference, in fact they act no differently from their predecessors who would have said that the more elegant model was the truer, as the worthier of God's sapience; indeed every day scientists resort to metaphysical convictions such as the Malebranche-Maupertuis principle of least action.

Turning to the second member of Bacon's sentence, it is true that scientists have ever taken pride in the practical results afforded to their fellows by their findings. Just as there has been a high tide of the first Baconian theme (Newton), more recently there has been a high tide of the second, arising from the very advance of technology. Science and technology have not always been wedded. For a long time practical advances were achieved more often by practical men⁷ than by scientists whose minds moved on a different plane. But the social impact of technology affected science which rapidly became what it is today, the great source of material innovations.⁸ Even when scientists are furthest from any specific concern for practical applications, they can not be unaware that the high esteem in which they are presently held is derived from the general opinion that the increase of knowledge promises an increase of power:⁹ so much so that the sciences which hold out no promise of practical applications are put on a starvation diet.

⁶ Nor was this language so natural to a more theological age: it sits specially well with Deism.

⁷ Cf. Singer, Holmyard and Hall, *A History of Technology* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1954 et seq.).

⁸ Science now "changes the world": not so in Chinese civilization. Cf. Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China* (Cambridge, 1954 et seq.). Question: if science does so, is it not because of an urge which arose outside the scientific community and challenged it?

⁹ Hobbes' view: "The end of knowledge is power . . . the scope of all speculation is the performing of some action, or thing to be done." Opening of *De Corpore*.

The sole purpose of the foregoing rough notes for an argument is to stress that two powerful motives in general reinforce the zeal of the scientist for systematization of observable facts: these same motives, however, assume negative values for the student of political phenomena. He has no occasion to delight in the discovery of a seemly pattern, and every reason to distrust practical applications of his findings.

III

While the student of nature can rejoice in the fundamental harmony he discovers beneath disorderly appearances, such aesthetic enjoyment is denied to the student of politics. Never was there any such thoroughgoing apologetic of universal order as that of Leibniz: and never was a sharper blow dealt it than Voltaire's *Candide*. Trust this prince of controversialists to seek the weak point of the system he attacks: and where does he find it? Voltaire carries the discussion away from the harmonies of nature to the distempers of human affairs.¹⁰ There is nothing here to evoke a reverend appreciation of the course of things, there is no pattern to be found ("a tale told by an idiot . . . signifying nothing"). And whenever our mind can rest in the recognition and acknowledgment of "sufficient reason," this is but an uneasy repose: what is explained is not justified. *Causa efficiens* is neither *justa causa* nor visibly at the service of a plausible *causa finalis*.

We are inevitably more exacting when investigating human affairs than in the case of natural phenomena. Regarding the latter we may be content to find an order, whatever it may be; in human society however we are not content to find some pattern, we want it to fit our idea of justice.

The Deist Apologetic of Universal Order has exerted upon the social sciences a most powerful influence, displayed to the full in economics: each man's striving for his own advantage results in a social optimum. This has been taken as axiomatic, and whatever went wrong was attributed to "artificial" obstacles. Restraints upon trade and competition were first named;

¹⁰ This choice of ground is the more remarkable in that Voltaire, who originally subscribed to Leibnizian optimism, was shaken out of it, so the scholars tell us, by a natural event, the disaster of Lisbon. Yet he chose the ground of human affairs for his attack. Note that even on this ground, Voltaire had previously illustrated Leibnizianism (in *Zadig*, as stressed by Hazard). But in so doing he must have felt the difficulty and thus when he declared war upon the system this was the battlefield he elected.

much later, "property" itself came to be questioned as an artificial restraint.¹¹

However questionable the philosophic foundations of economic science¹² they had one great empirical virtue: economists could accept unquestioningly the motives of economic actors, since a good outcome was expected from the vigour of desires. Economists may take exception to my statement, but I feel that the "ethical neutrality" which has served them well has been made possible by a teleological optimism.¹³ It is thanks to this promise of a good outcome that intellectual doctors could move to the business of understanding economic activity and away from a centuries-old attitude of upbraiding acquisitiveness.

Such a descent from a moral pulpit has occurred only quite recently in political science,¹⁴ arousing ardent controversy.¹⁵ There are strong intellectual reasons to applaud this descent and call it belated; there are strong prudential reasons to deplore it and call it treason. Light can be cast on the matter only if we reject the fiction that the scientist can and should be soulless. It is not because the economist is an ethical eunuch that he can envisage phenomena with ethical indifference. Rather it is because he expects a desirable ethical outcome regardless of the ethical concern and enlightenment of the actors; his short-term or atomistic ethical indifference is warranted by his long-range or overall optimism. The proof thereof lies in the revival of moral passion regarding economic behavior in the most schol-

¹¹ This theme appears in John Stuart Mill and in our day has been fully developed by Maurice Allais.

¹² These have been less discussed than one would wish. See, however, W. Stark, *The Ideal Foundations of Economic Thought* (London, 1943); G. Myrdal, *The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory* (English ed., London, 1953); Lindely M. Frazer, *Economic Thought and Language* (London, 1947); and J. A. Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis* (London, 1954); but above all, Vilfredo Pareto, *Manuel d'Economie Politique* (Paris, 1909).

¹³ Openly stated by Adam Smith, and underlying Pareto's great work.

¹⁴ This is most clearly recounted in Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science," in this issue of this REVIEW, above, pp. 763-772.

¹⁵ The most authoritative attack is that of Leo Strauss: "What Is Political Philosophy?" *Journal of Politics* (Aug. 1957); see also Irving Kristol, "The Profanation of Politics" in *The Logic of Personal Knowledge, Essays presented to Michael Polanyi* (London, 1961).

arly economists as soon as they find reason or occasion to question the assumption of overall maximization. Now in politics such an assumption seems untenable.

The postulate that economic activity is not to be feared and that the more of it the better is allegorized in Dupont de Nemours' picture of a giant in chains, with the caption: "Otez-lui ses chaînes et le laissez aller."¹⁶ But in those countries where political freedom has been most prized and practiced, see what attention has been devoted to the formalization of political activity, and to imbuing political actors with a public philosophy.¹⁷ We may hold the view that economic activities tend to combine harmoniously: we can not hold it in the case of political activities. Indeed Hobbes devised a model displaying the chaotic outcome of political activities running wild. Rousseau subscribed to the Hobbesian picture in his very refutation, since he found it necessary to base his opposite picture upon the supposition of a tiny, closed and static society.

IV

The barbarians are coming, big men with a cruel laughter, who use the conquered as playthings, dishonoured and tossed about. Our knees shake at the very thought of them. Our bishop, however, goes out in state and, bearing the Cross, he stands in the path of the fierce captain. Our town then shall be spared. The strange chief with the awesome mane shall indeed become our sovereign; but, guided by the man of God, he shall be a just master, and his son will, at an early age, learn from the bishop the finest examples of wise kingship.

The bishop, in my apologue, is political philosophy: its function is to civilize power, to impress the brute, improve its manners, and harness it to salutary tasks. In dealing with our wild chieftain the bishop will often say bluntly: "You can not do this." That is not a factual statement; the very motive for the utterance is that the power-bearer can in fact do this thing. What lies in the bishop's mind, behind the simple statement, is far more complex: "He wants to do this and has the means thereof; I can not convince him—nor am I certain—that

from this bad action some harm shall come to him that he can recognize as a harm. He must be prevented from doing this, the moral prohibition therefore has to be made in his imagination a hard, concrete obstacle. Hence: 'You can not. . . .' This manner of speech is required for preceptive efficiency.

Similarly, when teaching the ruler's turbulent child, the bishop accumulates examples of princely virtue: "That", says he, "is what is done." He means, of course: "... what is to be done." Not all that has been done by past rulers is relevant to his purpose but only those praiseworthy attitudes and actions which can contribute to the forming of a noble image, which, being firmly implanted in the youth, will exert its pull upon the conduct of the grown man. Deplorable instances are adduced only if they can be joined with a tale of ensuing disaster. Not until the love of virtue has been firmly established shall the pupil be faced with the hard saying: "... there be just rulers to whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked; again there be wicked rulers, to whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous."¹⁸ It is the test of virtue that this bleak truth be accepted by the mind, yet serenely spurned by the soul.

The political learning which I sought to describe by means of an apologue turns upon two sentences: "You can not. . ." (ideal of law) and "This is what is done" (right example). Such lessons are designed to edify: strange indeed that this word should have fallen into disrepute, since it means "to build up"; and surely it is important to build up the virtue of the men who rule, whether it be one, few, or many.

And here we come to the difficulty attending a factual science of politics: by its very nature it pulls down what the preceptive science has endeavoured to build up. Where the preceptive science stressed "You can not," factual science is bound to observe that "You can"; and what the preceptive science indicated as "What is done" is denied by the findings of factual science: actual doings are very different. A factual science in this realm is therefore dangerous medicine for weak moral constitutions.

Imagination, properly cultivated and addressed, imparts a magic prestige, the loss of which may be a public disaster.¹⁹ Madame de

¹⁶ I allude to the frontispiece of Dupont de Nemours' pamphlet of 1788: *Réponse aux Observations de la Chambre de Commerce de Normandie*.

¹⁷ It takes an observer foreign to Britain and the United States to note the extreme formality attending the least political move (e.g., the decorous conduct of even the most insignificant meetings) and to notice the fundamental orthodoxy which underlies all political differences.

¹⁸ *Ecclesiastes*, 8, 14.

¹⁹ This seems to be the main lesson which Necker has drawn from the great events he was so well placed to witness. It impregnates the two main works he wrote in his years of retreat: *Du Pouvoir Exécutif dans les Grands Etats*, 2 vols.

Staël helps us here with two pictures:

The Constituent Assembly ever believed, erroneously, that there was some magic in its decrees, and that all would stop in every way at the line it traced. But its pronouncements can be compared to the ribbon which had been drawn through the garden of the Tuileries to keep the people at some distance from the palace; while opinion remained favourable to those who had drawn the ribbon, no one dreamed of trespassing; but as soon as the people wanted no more of this barrier, it became meaningless.²⁰

* * *

The grenadiers marched into the hall where the representatives were assembled, and hustled them forward by simply advancing in solid formation from one end of the room to the other. The representatives found themselves pressed against the wall and had to flee through the window into the gardens of St. Cloud in their senatorial gowns. Representatives of the people had already suffered proscription; but this was the first time that political magistrates were ridiculed by the military; and Bonaparte, who wished to establish his power on the degradation of corporate bodies as well as of individuals, delighted that he had been able, in this first moment, to destroy the reputation of the people's representatives. As soon as the moral power of national representation was destroyed, a legislative body, whatever it might be, meant no more to the military than a crowd of five hundred men, less vigorous and disciplined than a battalion of the same number.²¹

Indeed, the law is a mere ribbon, but traditional political science has been at great pains to make it seem an impenetrable wall; indeed, the body of representatives is incapable of standing its ground against a battalion, but traditional political science has been at great pains to so raise its prestige that battalions may never challenge it but ever obey it. The danger of the factual approach is that it should deflate these salutary prestiges.

The dangers of the factual approach are not yet fully manifest because studies of this kind

(1792, no place of publication); and *De la Révolution Française*, 4 vols. (1797). Strangely enough, in view of the very important political role their author played, these works enjoy a very limited reputation. But a preoccupation which imbues the whole work of Necker is sharply brought into view in these two vivid paragraphs written by his famous daughter, which are here quoted.

²⁰ Baronne de Staël: *Considérations sur les Principaux Événements de la Révolution Française*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1818), I, 416.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, II, 240-41.

have mostly been addressed to "weak" political behavior, such as voting. I speak of weak political behavior since it is precisely a finding of such studies that voters do not care very much. Strong political behaviors are those inspired by strong passions,²² and into which men throw themselves whole-heartedly. The picture of politics which is apt to emerge from the factual analysis of strong political behaviors may be nefariously suggestive.

V

However little the scientist thinks of practical applications, whenever it comes to his mind it is with a favourable connotation: the gain in efficiency to be expected from the increase in knowledge is a good thing. No such optimism is allowed in the case of the "technology" which may be derived from increased factual understanding of politics: political efficiency may be a bad thing. Knowing how men are won over and induced to lend their energies is a knowledge that can be used for good or evil. Indeed, it is more apt to be used for evil. A good man is humble and therefore advances his views with some diffidence; he respects his fellows and therefore is not apt to be an aggressive salesman. The presumptuous, overbearing man is most prone to exploit the technology of moving men for his purpose.

This thought is very disquieting. And it might suffice to turn the scholar away from a search for knowledge which may be ill-used, if the technology of politics waited upon his discoveries. But such is not the case: the technology has been mightily developed outside political science during the last half-century, and developed by the very men to whom the prudent scientist would like to deny it. Naturally enough those who are least sensitive to the aesthetic and ethical appeal of traditional theory have broken away from its restraints and guidance; while those with finer feelings are victims of processes which they can not grasp. In such a situation all the harm which a factual science of politics can do is already loose, and it can come as a useful warning.

VI

It has been suggested here that recognition of the dangers inherent in political activity may have held up the progress of scientific inquiry in politics; but however important this factor, it can hardly serve as a full explanation. A useful complement is suggested by a comparison with medical science, a comparison

²² *E.g.*, militantism in its moderate and extreme forms (conspiracy, terrorism).

current since the days of Plato.²³

What is the purpose of medicine? The health of the body. What therefore is the knowledge required in a doctor? The knowledge of health. This seems a reasonable approach to medicine: it leads first to the primacy of hygiene,²⁴ but second, to envisaging any disease as a derangement of a natural harmony.²⁵ Hence for instance Themison's classification of diseases: they arise from an undue constriction (*strictum*) or from an undue relaxation (*laxum*) or from a combination of both (*mixtum*).²⁶ In a case of *strictum*, antispasmodic, sedative medication is indicated; in a case of *laxum*, tonic, roborative remedies. This is very attractive, so much so that economic policies of our own day are "Themisonian": if there are inflationary areas in the economy, relieve the pressure of demand by the sedatives of deflation (including if necessary *saignare*, the removal of excess buying power); and if there is laxity in the market, administer stimulants.

However reasonable it seems to take the satisfactory state of affairs as the axial concept, it has not paid off well in medicine: the concept of health led neither to a close study of diseases attuned to their specificity, nor to a far-reaching physiology.²⁷ It is amazing that the emphasis laid upon the proper functioning of the body should have sparked so little curiosity about this very functioning. Physiology can hardly be said to have started before Harvey (b. 1578) when medical science was twenty centuries old, and it took wing only with Haller (b. 1708). I regard it as encouraging for

my view of political science that the microscope proved so important an instrument of physiological knowledge, and led finally to the discovery that many illnesses are not mere derangements of natural harmony but arise from the intrusion of minute agents.²⁸

When resorting to analogy, one should always stop to note contrasts between the systems compared. There is a most striking contrast between the object studied by medical science, the body of man, and the object of political science, the body politic. In the former case, only the integrated whole has value in our eyes, while the component cells are expendable: not so in the case of the body politic, where the whole is justified by its components, real persons. But the contrast goes further. Human bodies are built on the same model; not so political bodies. The health of the human body is therefore a clearer and more distinct notion than a state of health in a body politic. The anatomy of the human body is a datum, while political anatomy changes. Therefore, if anatomy is already inadequate knowledge in the former case,²⁹ how much more inadequate it must be in the latter.

The "healthy body politic" is an attractive starting point but one that leads to little progress of knowledge. If the body politic wherein we find ourselves is accepted as presently healthy³⁰ we are inadequately provoked to look into the minute day-to-day processes which keep it so. If we regard it as presently disordered, we are apt to go back to some past moment of "health" with a strong chance of substituting our fancy for the true past, and only a slight chance of understanding what has changed, where, how and why. Even worse is

²³ The two sciences are of equal antiquity. Hippocrates was born in 460 B.C., between Socrates (469) and Plato (427).

²⁴ "For the worshippers of Hygeia, health is the natural order of things, a positive attribute to which men are entitled if they govern their lives wisely. According to them, the most important function of medicine is to discover and teach the natural laws which will ensure a man a healthy mind in a healthy body." René Dubos, *Mirage of Health* (London, 1960), p. 113.

²⁵ Galen said that the duty of the doctor is to conserve the natural condition, to reestablish it when perturbed, and to restore what is lacking as far as feasible. From F. J. V. Broussais, *Histoire des Doctrines Médicales et des Systèmes de Nosologie*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1829.), I, 200.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 107 ff.

²⁷ Dubos stresses that the broad point of view of orthobiosis leads to "the danger of substituting meaningless generalities and weak philosophy for the concreteness of exact knowledge." *Op. cit.*, p. 137.

²⁸ The word "microbe," now a popular term abandoned by scientists, was introduced by them as late as 1878.

²⁹ Claude Bernard wrote: "Descriptive anatomy is to physiology what geography is to history, and as it is not enough to know a country's topography for the understanding of its history, it is not enough to know the anatomy of organs for the understanding of their functions. An old surgeon, Méry, compared anatomists to those messengers who are to be found in great cities, and who know the layout of the streets, and the numbering of buildings but do not know what goes on inside. Indeed, in tissues, in organs, vital physicochemical phenomena occur which mere anatomy can not reveal." *Leçons sur les Phénomènes de la Vie Commune aux Animaux et aux Végétaux*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1878), I, 6-7.

³⁰ This complacency is a most uncommon attitude.

our picking upon some body politic distant in time and using it as our model of health. This leads, for instance, to the ludicrous mistake of the French Jacobins who wanted to build a Sparta, ignoring that it had rested upon extreme social inequality, its renowned "equals" forming but a minute fraction of the whole population.³¹

The notion of a healthy political body leads to pseudo-restorations of which the Germanic "Holy Roman Empire" is a striking instance.³²

³¹ Again, when one takes Athens as a model, one forgets that in its age of extreme democracy (which did not exclude slavery) the notion that "aliens" could not become part of the body politic was so fundamentally embedded that Pericles himself was the author of a law which struck from the registers a large fraction of the citizenry who could not prove that they were descended from both an Athenian father and an Athenian mother.

³² Though why the Roman Empire should have

It leads to transpositions which have never worked out very well.³³ It ceases altogether to be relevant if it is recognized that one has to meet new needs by means of new institutions, or if one cherishes the fancy of building up a body politic such as has never been seen before. In either case, one must form some idea of the probable working-out of new arrangements. And such an idea can not even be formed unless one has acquired as much basic knowledge as possible about the elementary behaviors which are to be dovetailed in a new combination. Thus we always come back to factual inquiry into the elements of political behavior.

been looked back upon as a healthy political body is beyond my understanding.

³³ For instance, the transposition of the U. S. constitution in Latin America, or, for that matter, the transposition of the Westminster model in Continental Europe.

A MULTI-BLOC MODEL OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

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This essay will attempt to define an abstract model of the international system (or, more precisely, a model of the *structure* of that system), as a supplement to the types presented by Morton A. Kaplan.¹ Before attempting such a construction, it is well to show the utility of the "multi-bloc system" as an alternative to his six models. Kaplan's "balance-of-power" and "unit veto" systems are essentially defined in terms of nation-states as "actors";² and his "universal" and "hierarchical" systems have essentially but one "actor," though in the former the nation-state subsists as an administrative and local political unit.³ The two "bipolar" models ("loose" and "tight") have, by definition, two major bloc "actors," with uncommitted nation-states on the margin and an "international actor" such as the U.N. playing a limited role in the former model.⁴ It is true that his "unit veto" system may have blocs instead of nation-states for "actors," but by this very token the *difference* between a system with a multiplicity of states and one with a multiplicity of blocs is not suggested by Kaplan's typology.⁵

¹ *System and Process in International Politics* (New York, 1957), ch. 2. For a more general presentation, see also his "Balance of Power, Bipolarity, and Other Models of International Systems," this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (September, 1957), pp. 684-95.

² *System and Process*, pp. 22, 50.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-49.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-44.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 78. A note on the use of the word "bloc" is in order. This term will be used to describe a group of nation-states to the extent that they act as a unit in international relations. Although at the outset it will be assumed that each bloc acts as a unit, the word "bloc" itself implies neither particular institutional structures nor any measure of unity of action. Indeed, one might consider alliances as the generic term for relationships between states; in this case a "bloc" would be regarded as a species of alliance—i.e., an alliance having a "functional organization" as an ongoing institution. For the purposes of theoretical exposition, however, the reverse usage will be adopted here. A "bloc" will be considered as a genus or general category, describing all types of relationships between a group of nation-states. This usage is advantageous because, although the term "alliance" usually connotes a relation-

I. INTRODUCTION

The possibility of an international system composed of a multiplicity of blocs has been considered by a number of writers in the past few years. Even before the end of the Second World War, Walter Lippmann wrote:

The question is whether some sixty to seventy states, each acting separately, can form a universal organization for the maintenance of peace. I contend that they cannot, and that single sovereign states must combine in their neighborhoods, and that the neighborhoods must combine into larger communities and constellations, which then participate in a universal society.⁶

More recently, Stanley Hoffmann has argued that, to the unpleasant alternatives of nuclear war or continued rigid bipolarity

there remains a third possibility . . . the progressive transformation of the non-communist world, not into a series of States . . . but into a series of supranational communities, at first regional, and continuously enlarging themselves. Such communities, built according to a confederal or federal model, . . . would be formed parallel to the international organization, whose survival will be necessary for the settlement of disputes between States outside partial communities or [between] members of different communities, as long as the international arena remains based essentially on States.⁷

Ernst B. Haas, in describing the useful function

ship in which *states* are the constituent units, it is possible to conceive of alliances between *blocs* as well as between states. Hence, considering the entire international system as the frame of reference, an alliance is but one way in which several "actors" (nation-states or blocs) may coordinate their political, military, and economic actions. From a general theoretical perspective, the varying degrees of coordination between nation-states can best be expressed in terms of a continuum; for a typology expressing the range of possibilities in this continuum, see below, Table I.

⁶ *U. S. War Aims* (Boston, 1944), p. 187. Cf. Edward Hallett Carr, *Nationalism and After* (New York, 1945), pp. 53-54, 60-62.

⁷ *Organisations Internationales et Pouvoirs Politiques des États*, Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, No. 52 (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1954), pp. 416-17. (My translation.)

of the UN in permitting the uncommitted nations to "balance" the Eastern and Western blocs, has concluded:

International organization, understood in these terms, would not produce the millennium of law, progress, and order expected by ardent advocates of international cooperation. But it might ensure the international breathing spell necessary to develop a multi-polar and multi-functional pattern of policy expectations, and thereby further the habits of peaceful adjustment of basic tensions.⁸

Clearly, if only from these references, it has been considered *possible* that the international system could develop into a multiplicity of blocs.

In addition, it has recently been suggested that the development of supra-national organisms, at least in the West, is *desirable* and should be encouraged. For example, it has been said that the United States should consider a *partial surrender of its sovereignty to NATO*. But little careful thought has been directed to the characteristics of a world order in which the nation-state is no longer the "sovereign" unit (or "actor") which makes foreign policy decisions. Before one can make a well informed *political* choice concerning the desirability of federated or regional institutions, it seems essential to speculate on the consequences, for world politics, of the replacement of nations by regional blocs. Any long-range foreign policy goals must consider the possible choice between a world composed of sovereign states and a world in which alliances or blocs act as units. Although the model to be proposed does *not* imply a preference for any given policy, the ultimate need to determine long-run policy aims provided the impetus for the present essay, which will try to specify the characteristics of a multi-bloc world order.

John Herz, having seen this possibility, has argued that a system of multipolarity would take the form of the "unit veto" system as defined by Kaplan. Since this assertion, if correct, would render superfluous the specification of the unique characteristics of a multiple bloc system, perhaps it is justifiable to quote him at some length:

For bipolarity . . . may already be passing, and, with the rise of countries like China, Western Germany, and possibly Japan and India, its disintegration into a new multipower system may be in the offing. . . . If, or when, in addition to the present two atomic powers or power blocs, an in-

definite number of other countries possess atomic capabilities, any new multipower system thus arising will have aspects vastly different from what those who talk in terms of a "return" to a five-power or six-power system are envisaging. It would be radically new in the sense that it would add to the present two nuclear blocs an indefinite number of units which, whether "big," "medium," or "small" in traditional terms, would all exist on a basis of fundamental "equality" as possessors of the new weapon. "Multipolarity" (on the pattern of the term "bipolarity"), or "polycentrism," might be terms better fitting a situation, or system, in which each unit constitutes a center or pole of absolute power. This is something utterly different from the classical constellation of "multinational" or "multipower" system with its graduated power of comparable "powers."⁹

At this point, Herz adds in a footnote: "If I understand him correctly, this is the system Mr. Kaplan has in mind when he calls one of his 'models' the 'unit-veto system'." As the lengthy citation implies, the term "multipolarity" is applied to an international system in which each "actor," regardless of size, possesses an invulnerable nuclear capability such that it may destroy any other actor (even if being destroyed itself in the process). This problem is inherent in the diffusion of nuclear weapons among a large number of nation-states, creating an approximation of Hobbes' "war of all against all."

But is it necessary to assume that a "multipolarity" of states with nuclear striking forces will be identical with a multiplicity of blocs, each composed of a number of states? Such an argument could be based on the assertion that the hydrogen bomb is an "absolute weapon" to such an extent that it equalizes a single state and a bloc of states with respect to their defensive security (or "impermeability," to use Herz' term):

In principle, such countries [i.e., with nuclear capabilities] acquire equal power status. True, as I have indicated before, possession of nuclear weapons as such does not necessarily mean equal power to destroy or retaliate, especially when nuclear units included in defense blocs with some amount of coordinated policy are involved. But when any number of uncommitted and uncoordinated units have this power, the situation may be different. . . . The world would not only be at the mercy of each power as such but would

⁸ "Regionalism, Functionalism, and Universal International Organization," *World Politics*, VIII (January, 1956), 263.

⁹ John H. Herz, *International Relations in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 34-35.

also be dependent on whoever—that is, which person, group, regime within each unit—was controlling the military establishment. . . .¹⁰

In other words, Herz concludes that the “equalization” caused by nuclear diffusion would have its “unit veto” effects when a *large number* of states or blocs attain the capability to destroy any rival. Despite his use of the term multipolarity in this context, Herz leaves open the possibility that “defense blocs with some amount of coordinated policy” may *not* stand in a “unit veto” relationship with one another.¹¹

If the “unit veto” system implies a large number of actors, therefore, it is not at all certain that Kaplan’s model describes the behavior of a small number of blocs (say less than ten), even assuming each is armed with nuclear weapons. In economic theory, for example, small-numbers markets (oligopolies) have been found to differ fundamentally from systems with large numbers of actors. This suggests that it might be desirable to construct a “multi-bloc” model while ignoring the effects of nuclear weapons; their introduction can be made later as a more “realistic” assumption. This follows the method used by Herz, since his brilliant analysis of the post-World War II international system rests on a distinction between the effects of bipolarity (a structure of power) and nuclear weapons (a crucial implement of military power).¹²

There is one additional reason why a model of the type proposed may be useful. Although the current discussions of the “cold war” generally assume the existence of a “bipolar” situation, there are in fact a multiplicity of regional alliances of varying degrees of integration. In the West, to be sure, this multiplicity has been well described as a “wheel,” with the United States at the hub and its many allies distributed around the circumference.¹³ None-

theless the theoretical implications of the rise of many multilateral organizations deserve study apart from this apparently overriding bipolar orientation; American participation in any one bloc (*e.g.*, NATO) need not determine the behavior of another bloc (*e.g.*, OAS), particularly with respect to intra-regional problems. Although the model which follows is not intended as a descriptive one, therefore, it may not be without significance for an understanding of the numerous regional organizations currently in existence.

II. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MULTI-BLOC SYSTEM

In order that the construction of the “multi-bloc model” may serve as a theoretical extension of Kaplan’s typology, it is helpful to define the system with reference to his work. Once the characteristics of this model have been established on the basis of Kaplan’s propositions, it will be feasible to introduce elements unique to a system composed of a plurality of bloc actors. This procedure has a further advantage, because it enables one to begin with the assumption that a small number of blocs would behave like a small number of nation-states, at least while ignoring the effect of nuclear weapons. To determine the specific elements of a multi-bloc (or “balance of bloc”) system, therefore, we can conveniently start with an analysis of the changes resulting from the substitution of bloc actors for the states in Kaplan’s “balance of power” model. This substitution will suffice for the establishment of the general characteristics of the model proposed.

In brief, then, the “pure” multi-bloc system is merely Kaplan’s “balance of power” model with five or more regional blocs as actors. For the sake of illustration, the blocs might be the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, the Soviet Union and East Europe, an Asian region dominated by China, and an African region. Other actors are possible (*e.g.*, an Indo-Australian or Middle Eastern bloc, not to mention states not committed to a bloc), and of course other patterns are conceivable. Each region must be sufficiently integrated to act as a unit in its relations with external powers or actors.¹⁴ If two crucial variables—the extent of integra-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

¹¹ Kaplan himself has implied that a multiplicity of blocs might arise if the use of nuclear weapons were prohibited by joint agreement. (*System and Process*, p. 52). This suggests that, for Kaplan, the “unit veto” model describes a *state* of an international system rather than a determinant structure. But certain structures are more likely to produce self-limiting agreements than others, as will be argued below. Kaplan’s “unit veto” model, by stressing the implications of nuclear capabilities, ignores the power context within which such military weapons are placed.

¹² *International Politics*, chs. 7, 8. See esp. p. 111.

¹³ Arnold Wolfers, “Stresses and Strains in ‘Going It with Others,’” in Arnold Wolfers, ed., *Alliance Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 7.

¹⁴ The definition of “integration,” the extent to which it may vary, and the effects of different degrees of integration must all be of crucial importance for the operation of the system. Although it is convenient, in order to establish the general configuration of the multi-bloc model, to assume that all blocs are equally integrated, this assumption will be examined, in Section V.

tion and the effect of nuclear weapons—are temporarily ignored, the system will approximate a rivalry of power between regional blocs comparable to that which existed, say, in Italy in the Fifteenth Century between the Italian city-states¹⁵ or in Europe in the Nineteenth Century between the European nation-states.¹⁶ That is to say, the actors would use the means of internal growth and consolidation, alliances, claims of prestige, and war to compete for the achievement of conflicting but limited goals. These characteristics of the multi-bloc model can be described with reference to Kaplan's rules for the "balance of power" system.

Rule 1.—"Act to increase capabilities, but negotiate rather than fight."¹⁷ It might be objected that the emergence of regional blocs or "super-States" as international actors would render negotiation impossible. According to this view, because each member of the international system would be so large, a "titanic conflict" would inevitably result.¹⁸ There are, however, several important theoretical reasons why this inability to negotiate need not follow. First, a study of the process of the "integration" of states into larger political communities has developed the hypothesis that such integration is normally followed by an inward or "selfish" orientation rather than by outward "aggression."¹⁹ Secondly, the decision-makers of a regional bloc, being responsible to a large, multi-national "constituency," would be forced to take into consideration a

multiplicity of considerations and cross-pressures; as the famous argument of the *Federalist*, No. 10, suggests, such broader units tend to be less dangerous than narrow and homogeneous societies.²⁰ A similar consideration is suggested by Kaplan's proposition that the more numerous the roles occupied by decision-makers, the more information they will consider and hence the more flexible their policies will be.²¹ If it be assumed that blocs would tend to require complex institutional structures with some "federal" basis, this hypothesis suggests that those responsible for a bloc's foreign policy would tend to be somewhat "flexible."

It is not being suggested here that a multi-bloc system would necessarily be peaceful. Although Hoffmann apparently makes this assumption, it is certainly gratuitous if not utopian.²² But if a plurality of blocs need not be peaceful, there is equally no reason to believe that bloc actors would be necessarily incapable of preferring negotiation to war. Even if one introduces the possession of nuclear capabilities (which will not be attempted formally until Section IV), there is no need to assume that the behavior of a bloc-actor would be more "aggressive" than that of a nation-state. Certainly the experience of NATO with respect to nuclear warheads shows that in a regional organization including conflicting interests, "immobilism" and indecision are as likely as an expansionist hostility. And this is so in a relatively rigid bipolar system, in which NATO is opposed by a homogeneous bloc, *i.e.*, the Warsaw Pact nations. To say the least, therefore, a multi-bloc system seems compatible with Kaplan's first rule; war in such a system would not arise from sources fundamentally different from those in a "balance of power" model.

Rule 2.—"Fight rather than pass up oppor-

¹⁵ Cf. Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955), Pt. II.

¹⁶ The bibliography on the "balance of power" system is, of course, quite large. For a survey of the operations of the system after 1848, see A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe* (Oxford, 1954).

¹⁷ Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 23.

¹⁸ Lippmann's reply to this argument with reference to World War II is not irrelevant: "It will be feared that great constellations like the Atlantic Community, the Russian Orbit, the Chinese Community will become engaged in a titanic conflict. The members of these communities are now engaged in a titanic conflict, and in order to survive they have had to organize impromptu and tardily, the strategical combinations which, in my view, they ought to maintain and perfect. It cannot be said that this titanic conflict was caused by regional combinations. It can be said that it was not prevented and has very nearly been lost because they did not exist." *U. S. War Aims*, p. 191.

¹⁹ Karl W. Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 25.

²⁰ "The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression." *The Federalist*, Edward Mead Earle, ed. (New York: Modern Library, n.d.), pp. 60-61. While Madison here refers to internal oppression, the same argument could be made with reference to foreign policy.

²¹ Kaplan, *System and Process*, pp. 104-105.

²² Cf. *Organisations Internationales*, pp. 417-18. Hoffmann even implies that the unique virtue of regional associations is that they *couldn't* engage in "power politics," at least if properly regulated.

tunities to increase capabilities."²³ No structure of the international system precludes conflict. The conception of a "stable" system does not mean that no violence occurs or that no change takes place, but that violence and change remain within "tolerable" limits such that the identity or underlying structure of the system is not overthrown.²⁴ While it has been argued above that a total war of annihilation is not implicit in the structure of a multi-bloc system (as distinguished from the weapons likely in that system), it has also been suggested that blocs are not intrinsically "peaceful" either. Indeed, it seems impossible to determine, in the abstract, the relative likelihood of conflict in the multi-bloc system, since the outbreak of violence depends on the goals (*i.e.*, the kinds of "capabilities" to be increased) and the power situation of the actors.

One can suggest, however, the kinds of "opportunities" for fighting which might exist in the multi-bloc model, since these are partially determined by the structure of the system. Four possibilities can be distinguished: (1) Occupation of territory outside the blocs, either "marginal" to a bloc or "uncommitted" to any bloc (the device employed by European nation-states, especially with respect to colonies);²⁵ (2) division of a rival bloc, rendering it impotent (the classic "divide and rule"); (3) control over a rival bloc, resulting either in direct amalgamation or indirect subversion and dominance (comparable to the means of Soviet control over Eastern Europe); or (4) forcible establishment of world government. The last of these "opportunities" clearly involves changing the very structure of the international system, creating something approximating Kaplan's "hierarchical" or "universal" model. While this indicates the obvious fact that a multi-bloc system, if established, could not be expected to be permanent, it is not especially interesting as an indication of the workings of the multi-bloc system itself. To be sure, in any "realistic" sense, it would be necessary to assume that a bloc or blocs (*e.g.*, the Soviet bloc) would attempt to establish their hegemony, but this is explicitly dealt with by Kaplan's rules four and five.

Of the remaining three kinds of "opportuni-

ties" to increase a bloc's "capabilities" by fighting, two depend upon the internal vulnerability of rival blocs: division, and subversion or conquest of a bloc are unlikely whenever intra-bloc integration provides the regional organization with sufficient means to maintain control over its "constituency." Since a high degree of integration is being assumed, these objectives would be relatively unpromising in the "pure" model.²⁶ The remaining type of "opportunity" (fighting to occupy marginal territories) is, it will be noted, a "limited" one. That is, the likely cause of overt hostilities in the "pure" multi-bloc model is compatible with the third rule formulated by Kaplan.

Rule 3.—"Stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national actor."²⁷ The relevance of this rule does not depend on the possession of a nuclear capability, as is evident from Hitler's overt violation of it. As the example shows, there is no assurance that a bloc (any more than a state in classical international relations) would tolerate a competitive relationship with other power equals. It is necessary, however, to distinguish between the ideological goals of an actor and the power limitations placed upon him by the structure of the international system as he perceives it. For example, the Soviet Union is now committed to the "victory of socialism" throughout the world, but this has not prevented the emergence of a doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" which explicitly claims to accept the present bipolar system, especially with respect to Germany. While hegemonic goals are possible, therefore, the existence of a number of rivals, capable of forming a coalition, can force any given "actor" (nation or bloc) to limit his objectives, at least with regard to the destruction of any other major member of the system.²⁸ However, this circumspection, created by the interdependence of a small number of significant international "actors," need not apply to those entities which are of lesser size and importance.

As a corollary to this rule, it therefore follows that one could "eliminate any non-essential

²³ Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 23.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7. See below, Section III.

²⁵ The possibility of the opening of space to conquest, while not absurd, is ignored for these purposes (if only because its consequences seem hard to predict, although the parallel with the exploration and control of the non-European world after the Sixteenth Century obviously suggests itself).

²⁶ This restriction will, as has been suggested, be removed in Section V.

²⁷ Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 23.

²⁸ It may not be irrelevant in this respect that the Soviet Union rejected suggestions, after World War II, that its Eastern European satellites join the U.S.S.R. as integral member-republics. If the maintenance of the form of nation-states, even with reference to minor ones, was compatible with Soviet ideology and political domination, self-restraint with major rivals might also be expected.

actor when convenient." As was implied by the definition of the "opportunities" in a multi-bloc system, the uncommitted states between blocs are the most likely objectives of "aggression." It might even be assumed that no such intermediate states would ultimately remain outside of the major blocs, thus producing what Kaplan has called (with reference to bipolarity) a "tight" rather than a "loose" system.²⁹ While such a procedure might be violent, it need not cause "total" war, since the continued existence of any bloc would not be at stake. The implications of this corollary suggest the possible "realism" of a multi-bloc model, since it describes one possible means of absorbing the many nation-states of Asia and Africa into the structure of the international system.³⁰ Since Kaplan's other models do not provide a completely satisfactory framework for integrating the "uncommitted nations,"³¹ this may be claimed as an "advantage" for the multi-bloc model.

Rule 4.—"Act to oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to assume a position of predominance with respect to the rest of the system."³² If the assumptions made to this point are accepted, it is unlikely that the substitution of bloc actors for nation-states would change the operation of this rule. The most ready objection would be, of course, the ideology of the Soviet bloc and the danger that should other Communist blocs emerge (e.g., a Chinese-centered region in Asia), they would combine in a drive for hegemony due to their common ideology. Such ideological solidarity was not, historically speaking, absent from the "balance of power" system.³³ As is shown by the

policies of France in the Thirty Years' War, beliefs need not prevent "unholy" alliances for the purpose of checking a hegemonic power.³⁴ Indeed, if one contrasts the "containment" policy under which one state (the United States) has an ultimate commitment to preserve the *status quo* everywhere in the world, a system with a multiplicity of regional units might well be *more* capable of checking threats to predominance than a bipolar system, whose rigidities make even a slight change of position a dangerous sign of "predominance."³⁵

Rule 5.—"Act to constrain actors who subscribe to supra-national [here supra-regional] organizing principles."³⁶ It is conceivable that a multi-bloc system could exist without an "international actor" such as the UN, and it is even likely that the regional institutions would be as jealous of their "sovereignty" as are nation-states today. Indeed, Lippmann argued that this is one of the great advantages of regional organizations, since they preclude the conversion of "local" issues into global conflicts.³⁷ Because the weakening of national loyalties might well imply the substitution of regional allegiances—and not the automatic emergence of "universalism"—world government would be likely to serve the hegemonic interests of one bloc even if it emerged out of the multi-bloc system. Unless statesmen suddenly decide to accept the preponderance of a single power or bloc, therefore "supra-regional" sovereignty over the internal affairs of blocs would probably be opposed.³⁸

³³ The religious wars of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries are a frequently cited illustration of this; the "liberal"—"monarchist" split after the Congress of Vienna is a more recent example.

³⁴ An even more extreme proof may be found in the tacit opposition of the Papacy to Hapsburg expansion (most especially when directed toward Italy) and the somewhat less than messianic zeal of the Pope's opposition to the Protestant princes on some occasions.

³⁵ Herz, *International Relations*, pp. 153–56. Cf. Walter Lippmann's definition of a "solvent" foreign policy, *U. S. Foreign Policy* (Boston, 1943), pp. 9–10.

³⁶ Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 23.

³⁷ *U. S. War Aims*, pp. 189–90.

³⁸ It would seem that this is the weakest point in Herz' analysis, for he appears to leap from the era of allegiance to nation-states (now "obsolete" because of nuclear weapons) to "universalism" (*International Relations*, ch. 12). In point of fact, men's loyalties have been shifted from narrow to broader communities, but rarely has the scope of

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³⁰ Cf. Robert C. Good, "The U. S. and the Colonial Debate," in Wolfers, *Alliance Policy*, esp. pp. 269–70.

³¹ In Kaplan's models, these nonaligned states might be: (a) "neutral" balances within an international actor ("loose bipolar system"), (b) powerlessly integrated into two opposed blocs ("tight bipolar"), (c) relatively equal members of a world government ("universal system") or largely dissolved into a world government ("hierarchical system"), or finally, (d) all either provided with an invulnerable nuclear capability or destroyed ("unit veto system"). The first of these roughly corresponds with the present situation, and does not indicate how the rising power of these areas will affect the "balancing" procedure; the second and third are relatively unlikely. The last ("unit veto") would be not only highly unstable, but, in any prudent sense, "undesirable".

³² Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 23.

Although according to Kaplan's propositions the multi-bloc system would not include a "universal actor," an international organization like the UN will be included in the model for the sake of "realism." As a symbol of the interdependence of regional blocs, the UN or a parallel agency would primarily serve mediating functions—i.e., providing a locus for diplomatic contacts and implement agreed solutions under an "impartial" aegis.³⁹ In other words, the international organization would be likely to continue its current functions, rather than to develop punitive sanctions as a "pure" collective security system. Within a framework of a system of a limited number of blocs—especially if their power is relatively equal—it is possible that something like the Concert of Europe mechanisms might develop in the context of the UN, as indeed was apparently intended in the Security Council. Trends in this direction might lead to an approximation of what George Liska has defined as a "multiple equilibrium," in which regional and universal organizations complement one another.⁴⁰

the community involved such a revolutionary change. To commit himself to world government, the average American citizen would be forced to "identify" himself with Laos, South Africa, and Yemen as well as South Carolina. Herz is forced to argue that the threat of nuclear annihilation must induce this change, but popular apathy would seem to belie the actuality of this process. Of course, a nuclear war or an attack from Mars might do the trick. . . . In the meantime, worldwide organization, if it assumes direct powers over all regions and states, is likely to do so under the "guidance" of a hegemonic power center. Cf.: "A world organization may be a necessary convenience as well as a valuable symbol. But the intermediate unit is more likely to be the operative factor in the transition from nationalism to internationalism." Carr, *Nationalism and After*, pp. 46-47.

³⁹ This is not the place to enter into an extensive discussion of the current role of the UN or its possibilities. See Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords Into Plowshares* (New York, 1959) for a balanced judgment. Cf. Ernst B. Haas, "Regional Integration and National Policy," *International Conciliation*, No. 513 (May, 1957), esp. pp. 438-42.

⁴⁰ See his *International Equilibrium* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), esp. chs. 5, 6, 7. Because of the general unwillingness of statesmen to surrender power to an external organization beyond their control, it has seemed wiser to take Kaplan's "balance of power" model rather than Liska's "multiple equilibrium" as a theoretical starting point. Nonetheless the effects

Should an international organization play at least the minimum role of providing "diplomatic sanctions" (or acting as the "policeman" for agreements between powers), its effectiveness as a "balancer" would be somewhat different from its role today. In a loose bipolar system with relatively equal power constellations, the "balancing" function is extraordinarily delicate and cannot replace a rough parity between blocs.⁴¹ It is at least arguable, in contrast, that in a multi-bloc system the UN would have a more independent function as a mediator or formulator of the predominant views. In the classical "balance of power" system, it was necessary for one state to act as the "balancer." Usually England, the so-called "swing" power, played this role, so that when the English followed isolationist policies, the flexibility of the entire system was threatened. An organization (and especially a civil service) identified with the international "community" would be forced to perform its "balancing" functions or lose its *raison d'être*; since experience shows the tendency of organizations to maintain themselves, the UN might stabilize the multi-bloc system by insuring that changes in power constellations were met with an effective "balancing" response.

Rule 6.—"Permit defeated or constrained national actors to reenter the system as acceptable role partners or act to bring some previously unessential actor within the essential actor classification."⁴² Treat all essential actors as acceptable role partners."⁴³ The condition in the last sentence is perhaps the most essential factor when comparing current regional agreements with the blocs in the model being proposed. In order to ensure the "perfect" or "pure" model, the requirement of absolute flexibility of alignment implies that no state can participate in more than a single bloc. Such regional integrity and separateness is radically different from the present structure of over-

of the possession of nuclear weapons by a small number of actors may well create a congruence of the two seemingly diverse schemes. See below, Section IV.

⁴¹ Cf. Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalism, and Universal International Organization."

⁴² This part of the rule is implied in Rule 3. However, since the changes in the identity of actors are not instantaneous, this rule also implies that the number of members of the system may change. This part of the rule will not be analyzed in any detail, save for passing references to the influence of numbers in Section III.

⁴³ Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 23.

lapping bloc ties or networks of alliances.⁴⁴ This aspect of the model can be clarified by the contemporary example of the United States as a member of both NATO and the OAS. Regardless of the future integration of either of these two regions, it would be difficult for them to be aligned against one another; the overlapping membership of the United States introduces a "rigidity" which is perhaps comparable to the dynastic rigidities of classical diplomacy.⁴⁵ As the example shows, such a rigidity would not make a "balancing" system impossible, especially since dynastically allied states often diverged when "reason of state" seemed to override family ties. Nonetheless, overlapping membership in more than one bloc would seriously reduce the flexibility of alignments, and in so doing would make the operation of all the other rules more difficult. In particular, the rigidity of alliances would make more likely the expansion of any conflict into a total war with total aims.⁴⁶

To specify completely the effects of overlap-

⁴⁴ Cf. Haas, "Regional Integration and National Policy," pp. 381-83, 433-37; William Lee Miller, "The American Methods and the Alliance System," in *Alliance Policy*, pp. 33-34; and William Welch, "Soviet Commitments to Collective Action," *ibid.*, pp. 280-81. This remark ignores, obviously, the varying integration in different blocs; moreover, current regional agreements are integrated at a low level, whereas the "pure" model assumes uniformly and highly integrated units.

⁴⁵ "Rigidity" here does not mean that two blocs with a common member state could not conceivably be aligned against each other, but only that the presence of the common member makes them less likely to choose allies according to the needs of the moment. *E.g.*, the dynastic union of the states of Austria and Spain under the Hapsburg family (and later of France and Spain under the Bourbons) limited the ability of the "branches of the family" to oppose one another. It might be added that if a single nation-state is a member of two blocs, these two blocs might be encouraged to oppose one another should each bloc seek sole control over the common member; in this case the "rigidity" introduced by overlapping membership is an increase in the probability of opposition, rather than an increase in the probability of alliance.

⁴⁶ *E.g.*, it is often argued that the rigidity of the Austro-German alliance brought about World War I as a "total" rather than a "limited" war, because it forced conflict, with any European state to become conflict with all. Cf. Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 29.

ping membership, however, it is necessary to go somewhat further. The extent of rigidity introduced by the simultaneous membership of one state in two blocs is determined by the relative power of the central decision-making units of the two blocs with respect to the power of the state with overlapping membership. For example, if both NATO and OAS had an institutional body with the authority and power to override the United States (as one federated member-state among equals), clearly the rigidity would be of limited importance in a crucial case. But where both regions are absolutely dependent upon the power of a common member, the model as defined above could not operate. As an aside, it might be noted that the opposition of many "new nations" to regionalism has been based precisely on the fear that such overlapping membership would enable the ex-colonial powers to dictate to regions of which they are not geographically contiguous members.⁴⁷ Yet conceivably the relations between the former colonies and their erstwhile mother countries may be sublimated into a tacit preference for alliances between the "new" blocs and the bloc containing the European powers. Such an alignment would imply a rigidity, but one less stringent than the rigidity caused by overlapping membership.⁴⁸

The foregoing discussion indicates some of the difficulties involved in "realizing" a model of the present type. The value of such models lies, however, not in their immediate descriptive virtues, but in their ability to indicate an underlying structure and thereby to suggest alternative modes of organizing the international system. As with Weber's "pure types" of authority, such a method is dangerous, for it is always tempting to take the abstraction as a "norm" which should be a guide for policy and a standard of judgment. And while such a norm may not be undesirable, it should be a conscious choice.

In what has been said to this point, a multi-bloc system following Kaplan's rules for a

⁴⁷ Hence an Indian author has opposed a regional organization in the Indian Ocean having "punitive" collective security powers, largely on the ground that English participation in the bloc would enable Great Britain to maintain a kind of quasi-colonial control. K. M. Pannikar, "Regionalism and World Security," in Pannikar *et al.*, *Regionalism and Security* (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1948), pp. 3-6.

⁴⁸ This type of rigidity might be comparable to the English preference for the Austrian alliance prior to the "Diplomatic Revolution" of 1756.

"balance of power" model has been proposed, with the addition of a "universal actor" as a presumably unavoidable part of the structure. To do so, it has been necessary to make three assumptions: first, that Kaplan's rules all apply; second, that nuclear weapons are irrelevant; and third, that each bloc is a perfectly integrated whole, acting as a unit. The following sections will remove these assumptions one at a time.

III. THE STABILITY OF THE SYSTEM

To this point, the multi-bloc model has been described with reference to Kaplan's six rules for the "balance of power" system. It is important to ascertain whether the stability of the multi-bloc model would be undermined should these rules not apply completely. "Stability" here means only that a system, in reacting to internal and external changes, remains within certain arbitrary bounds which define the system; rigid maintenance of the *status quo* is not implied. In other words, a stable system is capable of adapting itself to altered conditions so that it can survive.⁴⁹ The limits within which a system can "find" an "appropriate" response to its surroundings are of course variable, and the unique element in the "balance of power" system was its extraordinary flexibility, and hence the wide range of arrangements which were possible within it. One can therefore distinguish highly flexible or adaptive systems from more rigid ones.⁵⁰ Moreover, it should be noted that the flexibility of a system does not, *a priori*, determine its stability as measured by the capacity to persist through time; stability is a function of both the flexibility of response and the type of stimulus, and a system with a great multitude

of possible reactions, if it can be upset by a minor change, may be unstable.

Kaplan has argued that the inconsistency between his rules 1 and 2 is a necessary element of the model, since without the contradiction between the desire to negotiate and the desire to fight there would be less flexibility.⁵¹ While it is true that a highly flexible system is able to adapt itself to quite varied circumstances, however, there are limits to the rapidity with which any social system can change. Hence Kaplan's "pure" model of infinitely changeable alliances within a system of five or more powers is, like the economic theory of perfect competition, rarely achieved in its complete form.⁵²

Apart from this consideration of "realism," should rules 1 and 2 not be followed because an actor did not desire to increase his capabilities or fight, although the system would be less adaptable in its response to disturbances, such disturbances themselves might be less likely. On the other hand, actors violating rule 1 because they refuse to negotiate would radically increase the instability of the system, in the sense of the likelihood of violent change through war. Generally speaking, however, these two rules are the most "natural" ones since they conform to the calculating self-interest of competitors. Therefore, although it is possible that the traditional pattern of diplomacy would be transformed in a multi-bloc system into a kind of declaratory propaganda exchange, the competitive elements of the "balance of power" system are not likely to be absent—and if absent, the model might well be further stabilized.

The one exception to this, the bloc with hegemonic ambitions, violates even more clearly rules 3 and 4. Certainly ideological ties between blocs would be possible (if not likely), and these would gravely weaken the operation of rule 4. However, as long as those blocs having a preponderance of power opposed any bloc with hegemonic tendencies, the stability of the system would not be destroyed. Still leaving nuclear weapons aside, this would depend on the number of blocs in the model. Kaplan's definition holds for a system with five or more actors, but historically there have been international systems or sub-systems with four or three actors as well. Clearly, in the five-bloc

⁴⁹ Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 6.

⁵⁰ In the terminology of system-theory, a highly flexible system is "ultra-stable" since, in responding to stimuli, it can "search" for the level or general type of response. In contrast, a system which can only adapt to its environment on a given level or "field" of behavior is technically called "stable." See W. Ross Ashby, *Design for a Brain* (New York, 1952), p. 99; Kaplan, *System and Process*, pp. 6-8. An ultra-stable system can be illustrated by a system of five powers in which a large number of alliances is possible; within any set of alliances, the system would be capable of adapting to changes and maintaining itself. In contrast, a bipolar system may be "stable" (since it can maintain itself in the face of internal and external changes), but no different arrangement of power is possible without altering the very structure of the system.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁵² Kaplan recognized that the "balance of power" model could be stable only if the rate of change of alliances is within limits (*ibid.*, p. 35), but his rules themselves contain no provision for this "realistic" limitation.

instance, violation of rules 3 and 4 by more than two blocs would tend to destroy the system; similarly a hegemonic pair in the three-bloc system could be expected to reduce the number of independent actors and alter the system. But whereas systems with an odd number of members require a majority of "rule-abiding" blocs, an even number of blocs may be stable (although rigid) when there is a standoff. This is so in the current bipolar antagonism of East vs. West, and might hold for a two-to-two division of four blocs (e.g., Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere vs. Communist Chinese-dominated Asia and the USSR). Thus it appears that the more numerous the blocs, the more stable the system will be, since the number of "aggressive" actors required to destroy the system increases.

This holds under the condition that all blocs are relatively equal, and with the proviso that systems with odd numbers of actors will be relatively flexible whereas those with an even number of member-blocs will tend toward rigidity.

In Kaplan's "pure" model, a high degree of flexibility is required not only by the provision for five or more actors, but by rules 4 and 6, which demand opposition to *any* threatening state and willingness to ally with *any* state. While violation of these rules would doubtless reduce the range of possible responses, however, it is not clear how far the resulting rigidity would necessarily lead to violent instability. It has often been pointed out that rigidity of alliance policy often contributed to war in the classical state system, but overly rapid adjustments, too delicately attuned to some presumed "balance," were more important as the source of conflict.⁵³ Rigidity of alliances *will* cause the system to be unstable if a bloc is forced to go to war against its own self-interest merely to protect a disintegrating ally, as is likely to occur when the two allied blocs are both isolated and unable to find other possible alliance partners. But this type of rigidity, which may be said to have destroyed the Nineteenth Century European system by "causing" World War I, is an extreme case—and its importance may be reduced by the impact of nuclear weapons, since these make the danger of such a war more immediately apparent to the stronger of the two isolated actors. In contrast, the highly "flexible" system derives its stability not from its ability to avoid conflict, but due to a configuration of power which tends to limit the violence and

objectives of any war. Nevertheless, when the classical state system was "flexible," peace and even the stability of the system were far from assured; on the contrary, the attempt to "balance" every change in every rival's power position often led to extended wars which were limited only by the resources available to monarchs, and not by a voluntary restriction of the scope of violence. The current tendency to "idealize" the classic "balance of power" era, while understandable as a reaction against the utopian desire to banish power from international politics, should not be accepted uncritically as a theoretical proposition. Hence it is not at all clear that the "pure" multi-bloc model, which would be highly flexible according to Kaplan's rules, would necessarily be the most stable system with a plurality of blocs.

At this point it is desirable to introduce theoretical properties developed in economics with reference to systems of a small number of interdependent, rival actors. In oligopolistic markets (i.e., those with few firms), each decision-maker is aware of the effects of his policies on the actions of each of his competitors and *vice versa*. Economic theorists have called this situation "mutual interdependence recognized."⁵⁴ That is, each firm is aware that an apparently advantageous action will lead to a response by the others nullifying the original act. The clearest example is price-cutting; firm A may be tempted to cut its price in order to increase sales, but if it does so, firms B, C, etc. are likely to "retaliate," and may even reduce their prices below A's. What ensues is significantly called a "price war." Prices charged by all firms fall, so that no one firm gains the additional sales anticipated when it was first decided to undersell the rivals. The only result is that *all* firms suffer, especially if each continues to sell roughly the same quantity of merchandise, but at far lower prices than before.⁵⁵

Under these circumstances, price wars are in fact relatively rare, as the repeated prosecution of oligopolistic industries for violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act shows. Rather, a tendency develops toward what has been called "quasi-agreement" or "tacit collusion."

⁵⁴ See especially William Fellner, *Competition Among the Few* (New York, 1949), pp. 15-16, 24-50, 120-136 and *passim*.

⁵⁵ Elasticity of demand can be ignored, at least for those "price wars" in which the selling price is reduced below total average cost. Since such severe price wars are not incomparable with large scale modern warfare in their effects, the parallel seems justified.

⁵³ Cf. Kaplan's image of the precarious nature of the "balancing" process, *ibid.*, p. 32.

Each actor, aware that any change on his part will bring about immediate responses by others, refrains from making overt price cuts unless he is quite certain that the others will "follow" him exactly. Thus prices of all firms tend to be the same (or nearly so), with prices changing at the same time and by the same amount. In connection with this pattern, one firm has often become traditionally accepted as the "leader" responsible for initiating all changes. In this way no one firm can maximize its profits, but all firms are able to practice what Fellner has called "limited joint profit maximization."

The relevance of this type of behavior to international relations is obvious. The interdependence of actors in the international system has normally been recognized, since any change can normally be attributed to a single actor and normally affects others. And while states have not, in the past, been reluctant to enter into the international analogue to "price wars," this has largely been due to the considerable opportunities for gain present in the emerging European state system, which were not overshadowed by the consequences of losing a war. By the Nineteenth Century, this situation began to change radically (save with respect to non-European territories, which continued to be the object of conflicts), and the emergence of the Concert of Europe after 1815 could even be attributed to a recognition of this fact. Indeed, the European state system after the Congress of Vienna provides a striking example of an international "quasi-agreement," since competition between states (or alliances of states) for direct or indirect control over territories on the margins of Europe was tacitly limited. Nevertheless, as long as power was relative and hence alliance a prime means of increasing one's capabilities, the behavior of states only partially approximated that of oligopolistic firms. With the appearance of nuclear weapons which equalize all actors—and which render violent competition (*i.e.*, "war") mutually disadvantageous—the possibility of "quasi-agreement" becomes of great importance. Hence it is advisable to remove the assumption that only conventional military means are available to members of a multi-bloc system.

IV. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Under contemporary technological conditions, Arthur Lee Burns has distinguished three types of nuclear capability: "The independent, the triggering, and the minimum atomic variety."⁵⁶ An independent or complete

deterrent requires that a nuclear power be able to retaliate effectively after suffering a surprise ("first strike") attack. At present such a deterrent seems to require submarine launched, mobile, or hard-site ICBMs, which provide an invulnerable "second strike" capability large enough to make the costs of a nuclear exchange prohibitive to all rivals. In contrast, the possessor of a "triggering" deterrent, while not having an invulnerable second-strike capacity, is assured that a nuclear exchange with any rival actor having an independent capability would render that rival vulnerable to a third (or *n*th) independent nuclear power.⁵⁷ That is, even though a delivery system (*e.g.*, long-range manned bombers) is vulnerable to surprise attack, it may deter more powerful rivals with invulnerable striking forces, provided that the invulnerability and number of weapons comprising the rival's independent deterrent are not unlimited. If, however, two or more independent nuclear powers have virtually infinite quantities of weapons, the triggering effect would not ensue; all powers lacking an independent deterrent would then be reduced, *vis-à-vis* the greatest powers, to the third or lowest class of nuclear capabilities.

This lowest or "minimum atomic" category is capable of anything less than unambiguously deterring all rivals from engaging in a total nuclear exchange. By means of its ability to destroy several cities, such an actor (even without allies) might nonetheless still deter an attack from a neighbor having an independent deterrent.⁵⁸ Moreover, the possession of a few

ton University, Center of International Studies, 1959), p. 18 and *passim*. The following analysis will assume the unlikelihood of technological changes which make an invulnerable second-strike capability impossible; such an innovation would probably lead to hegemony for its possessor, total war, or both.

⁵⁷ Burns distinguishes between "passive triggering" (in which the expenditure of missiles by an attacking independent power would remove the invulnerability of the attacker's second-strike capability *vis-à-vis* a third, independent nuclear power) and "active triggering" (in which the triggering power, by using its weapons in a first strike on an independent nuclear power, renders the victim vulnerable to a succeeding first strike by another nuclear power). *Ibid.*, pp. 12–13. It should be noted that while the two types of triggering are different, especially under the technological assumptions which Burns makes, they could well reinforce one another.

⁵⁸ This would follow when the more powerful nuclear actor wished to avoid both the initiation

⁵⁶ "Power Politics and the Growing Nuclear Club," *Policy Memorandum Number 20* (Prince-

isolated atomic weapons falling short of even this capability might still deter conventional attacks from non-nuclear or similarly armed powers. Considerable variation in the nuclear weapons systems within this "weakest" class might well be crucial when such actors are rivals among themselves, granted that each "minimum" deterrent power would be vulnerable to attack by all actors with an independent deterrent. Let us now apply these categories of military potential to the multi-bloc model as it has been developed to this point.

To begin, it will be assumed that all blocs have symmetrical military establishments, including both an independent deterrent and the means (as well as the strategy) for conventional or limited warfare. This approximates a rather "pure" instance of the " n th country problem" where n is equal to about five.⁵⁹ Burns, who analyzed the calculus of deterrence for systems with two, three, and four actors, concluded that the "strain" of five or more nuclear powers on the balance of terror is increased, and that triggering effects would be "quite unreliable as deterrents."⁶⁰ His conclusion is to the point: "These very uncertainties, however, *might* constrain all parties to be conservative, eschew blackmail, and subscribe to international projects for reducing the possibility of surprise attack."⁶¹

In order to be stable, such a reaction to uncertainty would have to take the form of either express treaties or "quasi-agreements." This possibility suggests that the strategies of nuclear powers may not be based solely upon a rational calculation of deterrence. In other words, one must distinguish between an analysis of deterrence (which depends on calculating the likely action of each individual actor in response to specified acts of each rival) and an analysis of systems of small numbers of com-

petitors, studied as a system. One is therefore tempted to turn to the characteristics developed by oligopoly theory in economics in order to determine the likelihood of the emergence of a tacit (or overt) agreement to limit the use, or at least the initial use, of nuclear weapons.⁶²

The danger of nuclear annihilation has often been traced to the disproportion between the possible goals of policy and the destructive power of nuclear weapons. Yet this danger is similar to that of a price war for an oligopolistic firm. To be sure, bankruptcy is not the immediate result of a price cut, whereas nuclear annihilation is commonly believed to be the likely result of "push-button" missile warfare;⁶³ but the ultimate effects are roughly the same.⁶⁴ Once the decision-makers of blocs are aware of the implications of nuclear warfare, a tacit agreement not to initiate an all-out nuclear strike would have a rather high probability of effectiveness, especially if violations are unambiguous. This possibility is attested to by the length of the recent "tacit agreement" prohibiting nuclear testing, and the fact that when it was terminated some advance notice was publicly given—abroad at least, where it was indispensable, if not at home in the USSR. Although the awareness of mutual interdependence, necessary for such an agreement, would probably be weakest in the early years of each actor's possession of a nuclear capability,⁶⁵ it is possible that "experimenting" with the results of a nuclear exchange need not require the explosion of bombs.⁶⁶

The main problem facing an "anti-nuclear quasi-agreement" is the requirement that violations be ambiguous. In a system with few actors, unlike a large-numbers system such as

⁵⁹ Cf. Fellner, *op. cit.*, pp. 120 ff.

⁶⁰ It is, however, uncertain that nuclear war would be as rapid as is generally assumed in the West. The Russians apparently plan for a more protracted battle. See Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (New York, 1958), pp. 87-89.

⁶¹ The experience of those who tried to compete with John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company attests to this similarity. Cf. Ida Tarbell, *The History of the Standard Oil Company* (New York, 1904), II, *passim*.

⁶² Compare the behavior of the United States, England, and the USSR on attaining a nuclear capability with their strategic attitudes (as well as that of France) at the present time.

⁶³ It is, however, true that the emergence of a "tacit agreement" requires the kind of "learning" and "testing" which is associated with the "stochastic" model in game theory. See Kaplan, *System and Process*, pp. 225 ff, 247.

of nuclear attack (necessary to neutralize the small, vulnerable stockpile of its neighbor) and the loss of one or two cities (which would result from any non-nuclear attack). See the example of Sweden deterring Russia, *ibid.*, p. 17, and George W. Rathjens, Jr., "NATO Strategy: Total War," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *NATO and American Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), ch. 4, pp. 88-89.

⁵⁹ Note that although the "unit veto" model assumes that each of a large number of countries has an independent deterrent, nuclear symmetry is far less likely to be realized on the level of nation-states, where economic and technical prerequisites are often limited by sheer size, than on the level of regional blocs.

⁶⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* (original italics).

the "unit-veto" model, it is less likely that an actor could use nuclear weapons anonymously. Radar missile tracking is presumably sufficiently sophisticated to distinguish the *continent* from which missiles are launched. Although missiles launched from submarines (or space platforms) might enable an unidentified power to launch a nuclear strike, each region in a system of five or six blocs would probably be aware of those enemies who might initiate a nuclear attack. Moreover, the effect of this order of numbers could well reinforce the quasi-agreement in another sense. Although Herz has noted that, in a bi-polar world, a pledge not to begin a nuclear war has advantages,⁶⁷ a self-denying agreement would be more stable with more than two parties to the accord. This follows simply because, in a face-to-face encounter, relative power is easier to compute; the state (or bloc) losing a bi-polar conventional war or armaments race may unleash nuclear war rather than suffer ultimate defeat. By contrast, when there are about five rivals, it is more difficult to ascertain whether a further decline in power will be disastrous. Since alliance, neutrality, or protection by a stronger power remain alternatives, even defeat in war—provided it is limited—may be more acceptable than nuclear suicide.

Even if it were possible to establish a stable agreement preventing the initiation of all-out nuclear war, of course, it does not follow that all nuclear weapons would necessarily be "out-lawed." In the first place, it can be assumed that no actor would surrender his nuclear weapons, since it is impossible to conceive of a system of arms control which would insure that all rivals could not possibly cheat.⁶⁸ Secondly,

⁶⁷ *International Politics*, pp. 285–86.

⁶⁸ Current discussions of disarmament, with their emphasis on controls, usually fail to recognize that the *possession* of nuclear weapons, as distinct from their manufacture, is now probably beyond any feasible system of international inspection. Agreements to disarm should be restricted to those armaments whose presence can be detected with a relatively high probability—i.e., especially conventional forces. Extending agreements, especially in writing, beyond this point merely invites the least scrupulous power to violate the agreement; since a cheater has some grounds for believing his rivals will not cheat. It is one of the great advantages of quasi-agreements in general that the certainty of being the only cheater is denied the unscrupulous; hence when a quasi-agreement covers an action which can be detected by suspicious rivals (e.g., weapons testing or all-out nuclear assault), violations are

there are two possible uses for nuclear weapons which need not be prevented by the existence of an agreement not to initiate all-out, "strategic" strikes against the civilian population of rivals: "tactical" or limited nuclear war,⁶⁹ and "limited retaliation" by the selective use of "strategic" weapons.⁷⁰ In both these instances, the "catalytic" eruption of a general nuclear war would be a distinct possibility, and the greater the probability of that eruption, as judged by all actors, the more likely that any agreement against the initial use of nuclear weapons would be extended to include these less-than-total initiatives.

"Tactical" nuclear warfare and "limited retaliation" are not necessarily identical in this respect. Since the latter requires a willingness to "play the game," a selective attack by a few long-range missiles will elicit "massive retaliation" unless the distinction between all-out and limited strategic nuclear war is considered politically and militarily legitimate. At present, for example, popular abhorrence of the idea of nuclear devastation might well make this strategy politically impracticable, even should its military effects be deemed favorable.⁷¹ As long as this remains the case, any quasi-agreement prohibiting the initial use of nuclear weapons would probably include limited nuclear retaliation. Because cleaner, low-yield warheads have been developed, on the other hand, it is somewhat more likely that "tactical" weapons could be used without violating a self-limiting nuclear agreement. Although this is still questionable, it would seem that the most effective check on the use of battlefield nuclear weapons would be (paradoxically) a dispersed deployment of combat troops in anticipation of tactical nuclear warfare.⁷² Otherwise a bloc losing a conventional war would probably consider the gains from using such weapons to be greater than the risks of unleashing an all-out nuclear exchange.

Despite the doubts of some students con-

relatively unlikely, though by no means impossible.

⁶⁹ See Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1957), ch. 6.

⁷⁰ See Morton A. Kaplan, "The Strategy of Limited Retaliation," *Policy Memorandum Number 19* (Princeton University, Center of International Studies, 1959).

⁷¹ Cf. Kaplan's discussion of limited retaliation in the context of NATO policy: "Problems of Coalition and Deterrence," in Knorr, *NATO and American Security*, ch. 6, pp. 142–48.

⁷² Cf. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 178–82.

cerning the feasibility of a distinction between limited nuclear attacks (be they "tactical" or "strategic") and total nuclear war, the initiation of the latter (and possibly the former as well) might be prohibited by an overt or quasi-agreement in a multibloc system. Such an agreement might well serve, however, to make limited warfare, especially with conventional weapons, less dangerous and therefore more attractive. Indeed, when only political factors were under consideration, it was suggested that in a well-integrated multi-bloc system, limited aims would be likely to have priority for all actors. The presence of nuclear weapons held equally by all blocs would further increase the likelihood of limited conventional warfare by changing considerably the character of alliances.

In a world of roughly equal blocs, each with independent nuclear capabilities, every actor would presumably have approached a level of "absolute" power which renders alliances unattractive unless they serve to check a specific opponent; the commitment to defend an ally against *his* rivals entails dangers which are not likely to be overbalanced by the advantages of the alliance. It is far more to be expected that "friendly" blocs would agree to oppose specific rivals in specific areas; rigid commitments for mutual protection (e.g., "collective security" pacts) would be hardly credible and hence of little use. Because the small-numbers situation of a multi-bloc system would be conducive to ideological rivalry, often as a substitute for open warfare, subversion or revolution within rival blocs may well become a major aim of an aggressive actor. But inter-bloc alliances formed to counter an actor (or actors) with subversive or hegemonic ambitions could hardly be expected to preclude overt military conflict: since it is unlikely that any single bloc would be completely isolated, replacement of the currently fashionable "collective security" treaties by limited purpose alliances might *encourage* blocs to conduct restricted warfare. As long as allies could be expected to prevent annihilation of a bloc, a limited aggressor would have "insurance" against total defeat.

It is now necessary to remove the assumption of an equality of military capabilities, and with it, the implied equality of economic and technical potential. It is scarcely probable that any set of five or more regional actors would be as nearly identical as the foregoing analysis has assumed. Given that some actors in a multi-bloc system have large, invulnerable missile forces and that others have lesser capabilities, what would be the deterrent effect? The factor of the size of regional blocs

would be crucial; invulnerability would be easier to achieve at any level of technology, but a tremendous nuclear strike would be required in order to achieve the objectives of a total strategic attack. Because the damage resulting even from an extensive strategic attack might no longer seem decisive to a unit of continental size, it might follow that complete nuclear independence would be rare if not impossible.

Again due to the sheer size of regional blocs, it would be necessary to expend a considerable number of missiles in a first or counter-force strike in order to be relatively certain of success against any rival except a victim having a handful of weapons in vulnerable and known locations. This means that "passive triggering" would be more likely than "active triggering," although neither would be possible against a bloc with a very large supply of invulnerable missiles. Because of these factors, it would seem most probable that regions with lesser nuclear forces would be in the position of states having a "minimum atomic capability" which could, under certain conditions, act as a "passive trigger." These considerations suggest that in a multi-bloc system, actors with nuclear capabilities would most probably be divided into the powerful (i.e., those with large supplies of long-range, invulnerable missiles) and the weak (i.e., those whose delivery systems were limited in numbers, accuracy, or invulnerability). More accurate predictions seem impossible because of the uncertainties arising from the size of the units.

It appears, therefore, that it is virtually impossible to specify in detail the deterrent abilities of blocs possessing different types of nuclear weapons. Fortunately, however, it may not be necessary to go into great detail. While the calculus of deterrence is crucially dependent on the forces-in-being of each actor, the analysis of a system in which "mutual interdependence" is recognized does not. In oligopolistic markets, the analogy to unequal nuclear potential is the phenomenon of "price leadership" arising out of size or cost differentials. In a market with limited numbers, one or two of the largest firms may become accepted, by tacit convention, as the only actors who may legitimately initiate changes of price; smaller actors may compete freely in matters of product quality or (to some extent) conditions of sale, but they are normally aware that they operate under the "umbrella" of those larger firms who set the prevailing price level of the industry. A multi-bloc model might well operate in a similar way. The blocs with the largest nuclear arsenals, provided that more than one

of this class exists, would have the most to lose by the initiation of all-out nuclear warfare; barring an alliance between the powerful blocs to oppress the weaker ones, each "great power" would have to be the prime target of similarly armed rivals in the event of extensive nuclear exchanges. Hence, as long as at least two "giants" can maintain a rough parity in the qualitative arms race, they might expect to be followed by lesser nuclear powers in establishing an overt or tacit agreement limiting the initiation of nuclear war.⁷³ Such an agreement might be stable simply because the calculations of deterrence by each actor would be so uncertain that it would be impossible to initiate the use of nuclear weapons without an intolerably high probability that such weapons would be used in return by one or another actor.

Assuming that the agreement would have roughly the same characteristics as outlined under the assumption of nuclear parity, the only additional qualification might arise out of alliances. A treaty which preempted the friendship of most or all major nuclear powers might, by reducing the likelihood of nuclear attack, also reduce the uncertainty of the deterrent calculus to the point at which a nuclear strike might seem profitable. But alliances are only likely to give such assurance to the partners when there is considerable asymmetry between the nuclear potentials of the participating blocs; otherwise the weaker of the allies would gain little, and the stronger might lose a great deal, from a pact which was believed to restrict the freedom of action of the partners. Even with large power differentials, if the more powerful ally possesses an invulnerable deterrent he gains relatively little advantage from the alliance, since the commitment to a weaker ally always carries the risk of involvement with other great nuclear powers. Indeed, this consideration might induce rival great powers to make tacit or explicit agreements creating non-nuclear zones in the area of a weaker bloc, in return for which the weaker bloc might forego or limit its own development of nuclear weapons.

It is more likely, however, that a "nuclear giant" would make a kind of sharing alliance with a more "backward" bloc; in return for an alliance excluding the influence of rivals, the more powerful bloc would undertake to pro-

vide its weaker ally with whatever nuclear weapons the latter would need for self-defense.⁷⁴ Such "nuclear sharing" would be necessary in order to convince the weaker ally of the will of the stronger to defend it in case of attack (or rather, to replace the incredibility of such an intention). Only if there existed a generally trusted and enforced agreement prohibiting the initiation of nuclear warfare might an "underdeveloped" bloc be willing to ally with a "protecting" nuclear power without receiving nuclear weapons of its own. As the current behavior of the uncommitted nations indicates, however, such alliances might still be unlikely unless stimulated by a direct and clear threat of hegemony by one power, which would then either attract or repel the weaker blocs. As long as those blocs with large, invulnerable nuclear capabilities are relatively equal, it is to be expected that weaker blocs would attempt to play the more powerful rivals off against each other, using the rivalry as a source of economic and military (and most especially nuclear) aid. And even if the more advanced nuclear powers should attempt to prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the very process of economic development may sooner or later provide the opportunities for the autonomous development of at least "minimal" nuclear capabilities.

This suggests that rival "nuclear giants" might well prefer some form of "controlled diffusion," in which adherence to an explicit agreement not to initiate the use of these weapons was the condition for their delivery. While such a condition would require the pre-existence of a more general overt or quasi-agreement to the same effect (without which conditional diffusion could hardly be effective), within such a general agreement different "giants" might well be understood to be entitled to supply different "underdeveloped" blocs, after the manner of territorial divisions of oligopolistic markets. In this way the emergence of dangerous nuclear powers might be avoided by insuring that no power has an atomic capability which is too weak. The bloc receiving nuclear weapons need not be tempted to use them, provided that its nuclear capability is so great that its decision-makers must be conscious of their participation in a "mutually interdependent" system, in which self-restraint is necessary. Although this reasoning emphasizes the tenuous stability of any

⁷³ In contrast, "leadership" should not be expected to prevent other blocs or powers acquiring nuclear weapons, because on this issue each actor may feel that without nuclear weapons he is not really a participant in the system. See Burns, "Power Politics," pp. 6-9.

⁷⁴ This type of "controlled diffusion" is discussed by Arthur Lee Burns, "NATO and Nuclear Sharing," in Knorr, *NATO and American Security*, ch. 7.

international system with a plurality of nuclear powers, it also indicates the great difference between a large-numbers system and a small-numbers system. And it is largely on the grounds of this distinction that a multi-bloc model might approximate the only international system in which the diffusion of nuclear weapons does not have catastrophic results.

V. INTEGRATION OF BLOCS

Although it has been assumed up to this point that each bloc acts as a common unit, extensive theoretical problems are raised by the notion of "integration." Of the many variables which would determine the integration of regional political communities, and thereby provide the foundation for the political behavior of the multi-bloc system, only one—the structural organization of the bloc—can be analyzed here. Other crucial factors, especially the goals of regional communities and their size or "scope of control," could not be ignored in an exhaustive treatment. Typologies of the structures possible in an integrated supra-national political community have been proposed, but they provide little general assistance.⁷⁵ It is likely that the best approach is to postulate a continuum, extending from the least to the most extensively organized structure.⁷⁶ At one end of the spectrum would be a

"null bloc" (*i.e.*, a group of nation-states with no alliance or other common policy relating them), at the other end a unitary "bloc-state" operating directly on individual subjects.⁷⁷ It should be added that the range set forth in Figure 1 is a theoretical abstraction; it is not assumed that a structure at any point on the continuum can or will "grow" to the next stage. Relating this typology to Kaplan's terminology, the extent of "system dominance"⁷⁸ (*i.e.*, structural centralization) varies from none ("null bloc") to complete (unitary "bloc-state"); each type may be more or less "directive"⁷⁹ (*i.e.*, autocratic or politically centralized) according to the proportion of bloc decisions at all levels which are made by the group formally (or actually) responsible for "bloc-wide" decision-making.

Ex hypothesi, the more structurally centralized ("system dominant") as well as the more autocratic ("directive") the organizational structure of a bloc, the greater the potential energy with which the bloc could act. Obviously, however, the common institutions could direct their policies either "inward" to intra-bloc problems or "outward."⁸⁰ It may be suggested that priority is more likely to be given to inter-bloc problems if the bloc is either very autocratic ("highly directive") or structurally decentralized ("sub-system dominant"). The former type of bloc, because of its control over resources, can readily respond to external threats or opportunities, but is equally capable of turning to internal problems should they be more pressing. A structurally decentralized ("sub-system dominant") bloc—*i.e.*, an alliance between nation-states—is likely to hold together only in opposition to some external "enemy," and therefore generally lacks the capacity to deal effectively with internal problems.

Should these hypotheses be correct, a multi-bloc system would be most stable if all of its members were both structurally centralized ("system dominant"), at least to the extent of being "amalgamated," and "democratic" ("non-directive"). In this case, each bloc would be most likely to devote its energies to intra-

⁷⁵ *E.g.*, Kaplan has suggested a distinction between "hierarchical," "mixed-hierarchical," and "non-hierarchical" blocs (*System and Process*, pp. 74–83); Deutsch *et al.* have proposed a simpler dichotomy between "amalgamated" and "pluralistic" "security communities." (*Political Community*, pp. 6–7). In neither case, however, do the authors propose any general relationships between the types of integration and the kind of behavior which is likely.

⁷⁶ *Cf.* David Easton, "Political Anthropology," in Bernard J. Siegal, ed., *Biennial Review of Anthropology, 1959* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 239–41. It should be noted that the theoretical problems concerning the political structures of so-called "primitive societies" are closely parallel to those concerning the international system. Incidentally, this parallel shows the weakness of Kaplan's definition of the "political system" (*System and Process*, pp. 12–14)—or rather, of his interpretation that the international system has a null political sub-system. Here Kaplan equates the political system with political structures, thereby risking an error made in some early studies of what have been called "stateless societies." *Cf.* the debate on this point in the literature of anthropology (largely cited in Easton's article, just noted).

⁷⁷ Easton's continuum, applied to primitive societies, is based on three interrelated variables: the differentiation of political roles from other roles, the differentiation among political roles (*i.e.*, their number), and the specialization of roles by kind or by level. These variables are implicit in Table I.

⁷⁸ Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 16.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁸⁰ *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 56–58.

TABLE I. TYPES OF BLOC STRUCTURES

TYPE	CHARACTERISTICS
Null bloc	Unrelated states
Tacit alliance	No formal commitments, but awareness of common interest
Friendship alliance	Purely verbal commitment of good intentions ^a
Formal alliance commitment:	At least tacit material commitment:
One state dominant	Stronger committed to protect weaker ^b
Between equals	Tacit division of labor ^c

Decentralized functional bloc organizations:	Dependence on accord of "sovereign" members (<i>i.e.</i> , veto or "concurrent majority")
One state dominant	Stronger has disproportionate influence ^d
Between equals	General parity ^e
* * * * *	
Centralized functional bloc organizations	Independent authority of specialized organization ^f
Federal bloc-state	All bloc-wide political decisions in competence of central structures, but action is through member states ^g
Unitary bloc-state	Bloc-wide institutions act directly on individuals ^g

^a The classic form of international treaty in the Sixteenth through Nineteenth Centuries, implying no structure or organization whatsoever.

^b *E.g.*, American bilateral assistance treaties with S. Korea or Nationalist China.

^c *E.g.*, the Concert of Europe. Common institutions are "contingent," being created for particular problems, *e.g.*, the conference system.

^d In Kaplan's terms, the "mixed-hierarchical bloc" when highly "directed" by a key member state (*e.g.*, the Warsaw Pact); the "non-hierarchical bloc" if "non-directive" (*e.g.*, NATO). *Cf.* Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 80. Note that NATO may tend toward the following type, especially where the key member state does not use its leadership.

^e *E.g.*, the Western European Union (WEU) and, often, NATO.

^f *E.g.*, the European Coal and Steel Community.

^g Included in the "hierarchical" bloc in Kaplan's terminology (*ibid.*, pp. 74-75); the structural difference is similar to that between the "hierarchical" and "universal" international systems, only on the bloc level.

- - -: Approximate point of the emergence of permanent, institutionalized structures.

* * *: Approximate point of the emergence of "amalgamated" communities (*cf.* Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community*, pp. 5-6).

bloc development, while at the same time being capable of taking effective action in response to external challenges. But since increased structural centralization creates opportunities for increasing power within a bloc, the development of authoritative common institutions is more determinant of behavior than "democracy" (or "autocracy") within the institutions.⁸¹

⁸¹ *E.g.*, note the foreign policy of the French revolutionaries of 1848, which did not differ from the policy of the July Monarchy in its effect, despite verbal differences. Taylor, *Struggle for the Mastery of Europe*, pp. 8-11, 15-16. This does not mean that "directive" blocs may not be more "aggressive" than "non-directive" ones, but it suggests that the difference lies in the goals moti-

To be effective, a self-denying nuclear "quasi-agreement" would require that each bloc have at least an authoritative functional organization controlling the military establishment, independent of veto by any member-state in the bloc. Otherwise those bloc-members with access to nuclear weapons could use them independently in a crisis, and the system would risk degeneration into a "unit veto" relationship. Moreover, weaker or "sub-system dominant" structures (*i.e.*, alliances), since they permit—and encourage—overlapping memberships, would restrict the ability of a bloc to

vating decision-makers (and not in structure *per se*). *Cf.* the Second Empire and the Second Republic on the one hand, and present day Spain with Imperialist England on the other.

align itself with other blocs, in violation of Kaplan's rule 6. To the extent that nuclear capabilities reduce the need for inter-bloc alignments, this effect may not be too serious. But because few nations are powerful enough to make a considerable military and economic contribution to more than one regional grouping, a more important result of "interlocking" membership might be to reduce the capacity of those blocs which contain members with multiple allegiances.⁸²

Finally, the more vulnerable and disorganized a bloc is internally, the greater the "opportunity" it presents to a rival bloc (or blocs) for attack. Just as the disintegration of once great Empires (Turkey and Austro-Hungary) underlay the two greatest European wars in the century after the Congress of Vienna,⁸³ similar violence would be the likely result of a decaying bloc. From these considerations, a significant structural integration of *all* blocs would seem necessary for the stability of the multi-bloc system. Any large differentials of integration will tend to invite more integrated blocs to attack (or subvert) less integrated ones, and such direct attacks would be the most likely cause of total or nuclear war. In particular, a bloc in which foreign policies were merely "concerted" would be, in all probability, insufficiently integrated to become a stable member of a multi-bloc system; experience with such "consultation" in the West has shown the overwhelmingly negative nature of agreements, which tend toward policies of *immobilisme*. Nonetheless the degree of structural integration need not approach that of a "super-state"—and indeed, such a development may be "undesirable" on other grounds. But the emergence of functional organizations with "veto-proof" control over all weapons—or at least nuclear ones—is neither completely utopian nor, *a priori*, undesirable *qua* policy.⁸⁴ Such a develop-

ment would presumably make possible a "tacit agreement" to refrain from initiating the use of nuclear weapons, and might well enforce a higher degree of policy coordination than now exists in most regional groupings. Perhaps with the growing threat of nuclear diffusion, such a development will appear as a welcome alternative to a "unit veto" relationship between a large number of "nuclearized" nation-states.

VI. CONCLUSION

It may be useful to summarize the characteristics of the multi-bloc model as it has been developed above. In the "pure" model, based solely on *political* considerations, five or more integrated regional blocs participate in a "balance of power" system not unlike the traditional historical system of European nation-states. This implies a considerable flexibility in alignments, a willingness to limit all warfare (especially in order not to destroy a major bloc), and a tendency to absorb all uncommitted states into one or another bloc. The complete flexibility of alliances is not, however, a necessary feature of the system as long as the rigidities preventing realignment are not so strong that a commitment to weak or disintegrating allies overrides a bloc's own interest in self-preservation. It is even possible for the multi-bloc system to operate with less than five actors, though the maintenance of the necessary adaptability is somewhat more difficult. The introduction of an invulnerable nuclear capability considerably alters the influence of numbers by reducing the desirability of alliance as a means of achieving objectives. Unlike the "unit veto" model, in which a large number of actors have "absolute" military power, the multi-bloc system is likely to produce a "quasi-agreement" limiting the initiation of nuclear warfare. This depends, however, on the attainment of a minimal degree of func-

⁸² *E.g.*, the United States would of course be capable of devoting more resources to its NATO commitments if it did not have commitments to SEATO, etc.

⁸³ The other major war of the century (the American civil war) might well have produced an international cataclysm but for the logistic and technological isolation of the American continent at the time and the relative strength of the contending parties.

⁸⁴ In fact, one can visualize the international political system as already having a structure similar to what has been described, in the context of African tribes, as a "segmentary state." Aiden W. Southall, *Alur Society* (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, n.d. 1956?), esp. ch. 9. Cf. John

Middleton and David Tait, eds., *Tribes Without Rulers* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), esp. Introduction; and M. G. Smith, "On Segmentary Lineage Systems," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 86 (July-December, 1956), pp. 39-80. In this respect, the emergence of bloc organs, functionally responsible for nuclear weapons, represents merely a further trend in contemporary developments—and a development which has already been suggested with respect to NATO. See Roger Hilsman, "On NATO Strategy," in *Alliance Policy*, ch. 6; Morton A. Kaplan, "Problems of Coalition and Deterrence," in Knorr, *NATO and American Security*, ch. 6, esp. pp. 139-42.

tional integration within all blocs, so that common decision-makers control such weapons free from the veto of member-states.

In conclusion, it may be in order to relate the theoretical abstraction to substantive policy choices now facing this country. Much has been written about our alliances and especially NATO, but since there has been little analysis of the theoretical implications of regionalism, alternatives to the present bipolar network of alliances have rarely been offered. But if the multi-polar system appears to be potentially viable as a world order, it may be legitimate to orient policies toward that end. Of course, even if the model suggested above is considered as a realistic and desirable objective, it may be impossible for this country to influence trends in favor of its emergence. But granted the limits on America's ability to alter the structure of the international system single-handed, the choice of an objective in terms of a concept of "world order" (*i.e.*, as a structure of power rather than as a *state* of a structure, such as "peace" or "freedom") remains both prudent and desirable. It is prudent because our Communist rivals have such a goal and the willingness to exploit our indecision; it is desirable because *without* such a goal the United States loses whatever influence it *might* have among other nations.⁸⁵ Moreover, if power is the ability to influence, there is something absurdly contradictory in the tendency to assert the limits of America's capacity to alter future world developments (real though it be) while simultaneously accepting a "containment" policy which requires military "forces-in-being" which the United States seems to be unwilling (though capable) to provide.

If the multi-bloc system were adopted as a long-run (50 to 100 year) goal, the United States would face two supremely difficult choices: first, are we willing to surrender our "sovereignty" to a highly integrated "American" regional bloc; and second, are we willing to withdraw our commitment from Europe and NATO, exchanging our troop withdrawal for the unification of Germany inside a European region? Such a European bloc would have to be

in the possession of an independent nuclear capability, in order to avoid the trap of a "disengagement" in Europe which would open a power vacuum to Soviet exploitation. The advantage of this type of development is that our commitments could then be brought into a closer balance with our available forces. The disadvantage is that to reunify Germany in a European bloc (and, ideally, to attract the Soviet satellites into such a regional organization), the Soviets would have to be convinced that: (a) they had no chance to advance in Europe by other means, and that (b) the new region would be "neutral" in the East-West conflict. This in turn would be completely unacceptable to the West, unless the Sino-Soviet axis was split, so that the two Communist colossi could potentially be aligned against each other.⁸⁶ Since the conditions for mutual acceptability are unlikely, the most promising approach to the model suggested here may well be a Western European regional bloc and an American bloc, tied in a rather close alliance, as a counter-weight to the Sino-Soviet axis. Such a system of four major "actors" divided two-against-two might be described as "bi-axial,"⁸⁷ and could well be the prelude to a broader multi-bloc system as new regions attained world power status.⁸⁸ Of course, the model presented here may be weak in theory or utopian in policy, but it seems absolutely necessary that, at least in academic circles, the search be begun for long run alternatives to the dilemmas which our overextended commitment to mere containment threaten to cause in the next decades.

⁸⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 29.

⁸⁷ Cf. the general pattern of mid-Eighteenth Century diplomacy, in which the Anglo-Austrian alliance opposed France and Prussia prior to the "Diplomatic Revolution."

⁸⁸ Such a "bi-axial" system is rendered all the more likely (at least in the short run) by current weapons technology, in which the United States and the USSR seem likely to maintain a considerable superiority both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Nonetheless, the bi-axial alignment need not be taken as the only possible form of a multi-bloc system; the present model has been conceived in highly abstract, long run terms (*i.e.*, as a possibility for the next 100 years).

⁸⁵ Cf. the argument of Nitze, "Coalition Policy and the Concept of World Order."

THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A REFORM CAUCUS IN ACTION

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Over the last century and a half, the work of the Constitutional Convention and the motives of the Founding Fathers have been analyzed under a number of different ideological auspices. To one generation of historians, the hand of God was moving in the assembly; under a later dispensation, the dialectic (at various levels of philosophical sophistication) replaced the Deity: "relationships of production" moved into the niche previously reserved for Love of Country. Thus in counterpoint to the *Zeitgeist*, the Framers have undergone miraculous metamorphoses: at one time acclaimed as liberals and bold social engineers, today they appear in the guise of sound Burkean conservatives, men who in our time would subscribe to *Fortune*, look to Walter Lippmann for political theory, and chuckle patronizingly at the antics of Barry Goldwater. The implicit assumption is that if James Madison were among us, he would be President of the Ford Foundation, while Alexander Hamilton would chair the Committee for Economic Development.

The "Fathers" have thus been admitted to our best circles; the revolutionary ferocity which confiscated all Tory property in reach and populated New Brunswick with outlaws has been converted by the "Miltown School" of American historians into a benign dedication to "consensus" and "prescriptive rights." The Daughters of the American Revolution have, through the ministrations of Professors Boorstin, Hartz, and Rossiter, at last found ancestors worthy of their descendants. It is not my purpose here to argue that the "Fathers" were, in fact, radical revolutionaries; that proposition has been brilliantly demonstrated by Robert R. Palmer in his *Age of the Democratic Revolution*. My concern is with the further position that not only were they revolutionaries, but also they were democrats. Indeed, in my view, there is one fundamental truth about the Founding Fathers that every generation of *Zeitgeisters* has done its best to obscure: they were first and foremost superb democratic politicians. I suspect that in a contemporary setting, James Madison would be Speaker of the House of Representatives and Hamilton would be the *eminence grise* dominating (pace Theodore Sorenson or Sherman Adams) the Executive Office of the President. They were, with their colleagues, *political men*—not metaphysicians,

disembodied conservatives or Agents of History—and as recent research into the nature of American politics in the 1780s confirms,¹ they were committed (perhaps willy-nilly) to working within the democratic framework, within a universe of public approval. Charles Beard and the filiopietists to the contrary notwithstanding, the Philadelphia Convention was not a College of Cardinals or a council of Platonic guardians working within a manipulative, pre-democratic framework; it was a *nationalist* reform caucus which had to operate with great delicacy and skill in a political cosmos full of enemies to achieve the one definitive goal—popular approbation.

Perhaps the time has come, to borrow Walton Hamilton's fine phrase, to raise the Framers from immortality to mortality, to give them credit for their magnificent demonstration of the art of democratic politics. The point must be reemphasized; they *made* history and did it within the limits of consensus. There was nothing inevitable about the future in 1787; the *Zeitgeist*, that fine Hegelian technique of begging causal questions, could only be discerned in retrospect. What they did was to hammer out a pragmatic compromise which would both bolster the "National interest" and be acceptable to the people. What inspiration they got came from their collective experience as professional politicians in a democratic society. As John Dickinson put it to his fellow delegates on August 13, "Experience must be our guide. Reason may mislead us."

In this context, let us examine the problems they confronted and the solutions they evolved. The Convention has been described picturesquely as a counter-revolutionary junta and

¹ The view that the right to vote in the states was severely circumscribed by property qualifications has been thoroughly discredited in recent years. See Chilton Williamson, *American Suffrage from Property to Democracy, 1760-1860* (Princeton, 1960). The contemporary position is that John Dickinson actually knew what he was talking about when he argued that there would be little opposition to vesting the right of suffrage in freeholders since "The great mass of our Citizens is composed at this time of freeholders, and will be pleased with it." Max Farrand, *Records of the Federal Convention*, Vol. 2, p. 202 (New Haven, 1911). (Henceforth cited as *Farrand*.)

the Constitution as a *coup d'état*,² but this has been accomplished by withdrawing the whole history of the movement for constitutional reform from its true context. No doubt the goals of the constitutional elite were "subversive" to the existing political order, but it is overlooked that their subversion could only have succeeded if the people of the United States endorsed it by regularized procedures. Indubitably they were "plotting" to establish a much stronger central government than existed under the Articles, but only in the sense in which one could argue equally well that John F. Kennedy was, from 1956 to 1960, "plotting" to become President. In short, on the fundamental *procedural* level, the Constitutionals had to work according to the prevailing rules of the game. Whether they liked it or not is a topic for spiritualists—and is irrelevant: one may be quite certain that had Washington agreed to play the De Gaulle (as the Cincinnati once urged), Hamilton would willingly have held his horse, but such fertile speculation in no way alters the actual context in which events took place.

I

When the Constitutionals went forth to subvert the Confederation, they utilized the mechanisms of political legitimacy. And the roadblocks which confronted them were formidable. At the same time, they were endowed with certain potent political assets. The history of the United States from 1786 to 1790 was largely one of a masterful employment of political expertise by the Constitutionals as against bumbling, erratic behavior by the opponents of reform. Effectively, the Constitutionals had to induce the states, by democratic techniques of coercion, to emasculate themselves. To be specific, if New York had refused to join the new Union, the project was doomed; yet before New York was safely in, the reluctant state legislature had *sua sponte* to

take the following steps: (1) agree to send delegates to the Philadelphia Convention; (2) provide maintenance for these delegates (these were distinct stages: New Hampshire was early in naming delegates, but did not provide for their maintenance until July); (3) set up the special *ad hoc* convention to decide on ratification; and (4) concede to the decision of the *ad hoc* convention that New York should participate. New York admittedly was a tricky state, with a strong interest in a *status quo* which permitted her to exploit New Jersey and Connecticut, but the same legal hurdles existed in every state. And at the risk of becoming boring, it must be reiterated that the *only* weapon in the Constitutionalist arsenal was an effective mobilization of public opinion.

The group which undertook this struggle was an interesting amalgam of a few dedicated nationalists with the self-interested spokesmen of various parochial bailiwicks. The Georgians, for example, wanted a strong central authority to provide military protection for their huge, underpopulated state against the Creek Confederacy; Jerseymen and Connecticuters wanted to escape from economic bondage to New York; the Virginians hoped to establish a system which would give that great state its rightful place in the councils of the republic. The dominant figures in the politics of these states therefore cooperated in the call for the Convention.³ In other states, the thrust towards national reform was taken up by opposition groups who added the "national interest" to their weapons system; in Pennsylvania, for instance, the group fighting to revise the Constitution of 1776 came out four-square behind the Constitutionals, and in New York, Hamilton and the Schuyler *ambiance* took the same tack against George Clinton.⁴ There was, of course, a large element of personality in the affair: there is reason to suspect that Patrick Henry's opposition to the Convention and the

² The classic statement of the *coup d'état* theory is, of course, Charles A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (New York, 1913), and this theme was echoed by Vernon L. Parrington, Merrill Jensen and others in "populist" historiographical tradition. For a sharp critique of this thesis see Robert E. Brown, *Charles Beard and the Constitution* (Princeton, 1956). See also Forrest McDonald, *We the People* (Chicago, 1958); the trailblazing work in this genre was Douglas Adair, "The Tenth Federalist Revisited," *William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, Vol. VIII (1951), pp. 48-67.

³ A basic volume, which, like other works by Warren, provides evidence with which one can evaluate the author's own opinions, is Charles Warren, *The Making of the Constitution* (Boston, 1928). The best brief summary of the forces behind the movement for centralization is Chapter 1 of Warren (as it will be cited hereafter).

⁴ On Pennsylvania see Robert L. Brunhouse, *Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania* (Harrisburg, 1942) and Charles P. Smith, *James Wilson* (Chapel Hill, 1956), ch. 15; for New York, which needs the same sort of microanalysis Pennsylvania has received, the best study is E. Wilder Spaulding, *New York in the Critical Period, 1783-1789* (New York, 1932).

Constitution was founded on his conviction that Jefferson was behind both, and a close study of local politics elsewhere would surely reveal that others supported the Constitution for the simple (and politically quite sufficient) reason that the "wrong" people were against it.

To say this is not to suggest that the Constitution rested on a foundation of impure or base motives. It is rather to argue that in politics there are no immaculate conceptions, and that in the drive for a stronger general government, motives of all sorts played a part. Few men in the history of mankind have espoused a view of the "common good" or "public interest" that militated against their private status; even Plato with all his reverence for disembodied reason managed to put philosophers on top of the pile. Thus it is not surprising that a number of diversified private interests joined to push the nationalist public interest; what would have been surprising was the absence of such a pragmatic united front. And the fact remains that, however motivated, these men did demonstrate a willingness to compromise their parochial interests in behalf of an ideal which took shape before their eyes and under their ministrations.

As Stanley Elkins and Eric McKittrick have suggested in a perceptive essay,⁵ what distinguished the leaders of the Constitutionalist caucus from their enemies was a "Continental" approach to political, economic and military issues. To the extent that they shared an institutional base of operations, it was the Continental Congress (thirty-nine of the delegates to the Federal Convention had served in Congress⁶), and this was hardly a locale which inspired respect for the state governments. Robert de Jouvenal observed French politics half a century ago and noted that a revolutionary Deputy had more in common with a non-revolutionary Deputy than he had with a revolutionary non-Deputy;⁷ similarly one can surmise that membership in the Congress under the Articles of Confederation worked to establish a continental frame of reference, that a Congressman from Pennsylvania and one from South Carolina would share a universe of discourse which provided them with a conceptual common denominator *vis à vis* their respective state legislatures. This was particularly true with respect to external affairs: the average

state legislator was probably about as concerned with foreign policy then as he is today, but Congressmen were constantly forced to take the broad view of American prestige, were compelled to listen to the reports of Secretary John Jay and to the dispatches and pleas from their frustrated envoys in Britain, France and Spain.⁸ From considerations such as these, a "Continental" ideology developed which seems to have demanded a revision of our domestic institutions primarily on the ground that only by invigorating our general government could we assume our rightful place in the international arena. Indeed, an argument with great force—particularly since Washington was its incarnation—urged that our very survival in the Hobbesian jungle of world politics depended upon a reordering and strengthening of our national sovereignty.⁹

Note that I am not endorsing the "Critical Period" thesis; on the contrary, Merrill Jensen seems to me quite sound in his view that for most Americans, engaged as they were in self-sustaining agriculture, the "Critical Period" was not particularly critical.¹⁰ In fact, the great achievement of the Constitutionalist was their ultimate success in convincing the elected representatives of a majority of the white male population that change was imperative. A small group of political leaders with a Continental vision and essentially a consciousness of the United States' *international* impotence, provided the matrix of the movement. To their standard other leaders rallied with their own parallel ambitions. Their great assets were (1) the presence in their caucus of the one authentic American "father figure," George Washington, whose prestige was enormous;¹¹ (2) the energy and talent of their leadership (in which one must include the towering intellectuals of the

⁸ See Frank Monaghan, *John Jay* (New York, 1935), ch. 13.

⁹ "[T]he situation of the general government, if it can be called a government, is shaken to its foundation, and liable to be overturned by every blast. In a word, it is at an end; and, unless a remedy is soon applied, anarchy and confusion will inevitably ensue." Washington to Jefferson, May 30, 1787, *Farrand*, III, 31. See also Irving Brant, *James Madison, The Nationalist* (New York, 1948), ch. 25.

¹⁰ Merrill Jensen, *The New Nation* (New York, 1950). Interestingly enough, Prof. Jensen virtually ignores international relations in his laudatory treatment of the government under the Articles of Confederation.

¹¹ The story of James Madison's cultivation of Washington is told by Brant, *op. cit.*, pp. 394-97.

⁵ Stanley Elkins and Eric McKittrick, "The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the Revolution," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 76, p. 181 (1961).

⁶ Warren, p. 55.

⁷ In *La Republique des Camarades* (Paris, 1914).

time, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, despite their absence abroad), and their communications "network," which was far superior to anything on the opposition side;¹² (3) the preemptive skill which made "their" issue The Issue and kept the locally oriented opposition permanently on the defensive; and (4) the subjective consideration that these men were spokesmen of a new and compelling credo: *American* nationalism, that ill-defined but nonetheless potent sense of collective purpose that emerged from the American Revolution.

Despite great institutional handicaps, the Constitutionalists managed in the mid-1780s to mount an offensive which gained momentum as years went by. Their greatest problem was lethargy, and paradoxically, the number of barriers in their path may have proved an advantage in the long run. Beginning with the initial battle to get the Constitutional Convention called and delegates appointed, they could never relax, never let up the pressure. In practical terms, this meant that the local "organizations" created by the Constitutionalists were perpetually in movement building up their cadres for the next fight. (The word organization has to be used with great caution: a political organization in the United States—as in contemporary England¹³—generally consisted of a magnate and his following, or a coalition of magnates. This did not necessarily mean that it was "undemocratic" or "aristocratic," in the Aristotelian sense of the word: while a few magnates such as the Livingstons could draft their followings, most exercised their leadership without coercion on the basis of popular endorsement. The absence of organized opposition did not imply the impossibility of competition any more than low public participation in elections necessarily indicated an undemocratic suffrage.)

The Constitutionalists got the jump on the "opposition" (a collective noun: oppositions would be more correct) at the outset with the demand for a Convention. Their opponents were caught in an old political trap: they were not being asked to approve any specific program of reform, but only to endorse a meeting to

discuss and recommend needed reforms. If they took a hard line at the first stage, they were put in the position of glorifying the *status quo* and of denying the need for *any* changes. Moreover, the Constitutionalists could go to the people with a persuasive argument for "fair play"—"How can you condemn reform before you know precisely what is involved?" Since the state legislatures obviously would have the final say on any proposals that might emerge from the Convention, the Constitutionalists were merely reasonable men asking for a chance. Besides, since they did not make any concrete proposals at that stage, they were in a position to capitalize on every sort of generalized discontent with the Confederation.

Perhaps because of their poor intelligence system, perhaps because of over-confidence generated by the failure of all previous efforts to alter the Articles,¹⁴ the opposition awoke too late to the dangers that confronted them in 1787. Not only did the Constitutionalists manage to get every state but Rhode Island (where politics was enlivened by a party system reminiscent of the "Blues" and the "Greens" in the Byzantine Empire)¹⁵ to appoint delegates to Philadelphia, but when the results were in, it appeared that they dominated the delegations. Given the apathy of the opposition, this was a natural phenomenon: in an ideologically non-polarized political atmosphere those who get appointed to a special committee are likely to be the men who supported the movement for its creation. Even George Clinton, who seems to have been the first opposition leader to awake to the possibility of trouble, could not prevent the New York legislature from appointing Alexander Hamilton—though he did have the foresight to send two of his henchmen to dominate the delegation. Incidentally, much has been made of the fact that the delegates to Philadelphia were not elected by the people; some have adduced this fact as evidence of the "undemocratic" character of the gathering.

¹⁴ The Annapolis Convention, called for the previous year, turned into a shambles: only five states sent commissioners, only three states were legally represented, and the instructions to delegates named varied quite widely from state to state. Clinton and others of his persuasion may have thought this disaster would put an end to the drive for reform. See Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pp. 362–67; Brant, *op. cit.*, pp. 375–87.

¹⁵ See Hamilton M. Bishop, *Why Rhode Island Opposed the Federal Constitution* (Providence, 1950) for a careful analysis of the labyrinthine political course of Rhode Island. For background see David S. Lovejoy, *Rhode Island Politics and the American Revolution* (Providence, 1958).

¹² The "message center" being the Congress; nineteen members of Congress were simultaneously delegates to the Convention. One gets a sense of this coordination of effort from Broadus Mitchell, *Alexander Hamilton, Youth to Maturity* (New York, 1957), ch. 22.

¹³ See Sir Lewis Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III*, 2d ed. (New York, 1957); *England in the Age of the American Revolution* (London, 1930).

But put in the context of the time, this argument is wholly specious: the central government under the Articles was considered a creature of the component states and in all the states but Rhode Island, Connecticut and New Hampshire, members of the national Congress were chosen by the state legislatures. This was not a consequence of elitism or fear of the mob; it was a logical extension of states'-rights doctrine to guarantee that the national institution did not end-run the state legislatures and make direct contact with the people.¹⁶

II

With delegations safely named, the focus shifted to Philadelphia. While waiting for a quorum to assemble, James Madison got busy and drafted the so-called Randolph or Virginia Plan with the aid of the Virginia delegation. This was a political master-stroke. Its consequence was that once business got underway, the framework of discussion was established on Madison's terms. There was no interminable argument over agenda; instead the delegates took the Virginia Resolutions—"just for purposes of discussion"—as their point of departure. And along with Madison's proposals, many of which were buried in the course of the summer, went his major premise: a new start on a Constitution rather than piecemeal amendment. This was not necessarily revolutionary—a little exegesis could demonstrate that a new Constitution might be formulated as "amendments" to the Articles of Confederation—but Madison's proposal that this "lump sum" amendment go into effect after approval by nine states (the Articles required unanimous

state approval for any amendment) was thoroughly subversive.¹⁷

Standard treatments of the Convention divide the delegates into "nationalists" and "states'-righters" with various improvised shadings ("moderate nationalists," etc.), but these are *a posteriori* categories which obfuscate more than they clarify. What is striking to one who analyzes the Convention as a case-study in democratic politics is the lack of clear-cut ideological divisions in the Convention. Indeed, I submit that the evidence—Madison's *Notes*, the correspondence of the delegates, and debates on ratification—indicates that this was a remarkably homogeneous body on the ideological level. Yates and Lansing, Clinton's two chaperones for Hamilton, left in disgust on July 10. (Is there anything more tedious than sitting through endless disputes on matters one deems fundamentally misconceived? It takes an iron will to spend a hot summer as an ideological *agent provocateur*.) Luther Martin, Maryland's bibulous narcissist, left on September 4 in a huff when he discovered that others did not share his self-esteem; others went home for personal reasons. But the hard core of delegates accepted a grinding regimen throughout the attrition of a Philadelphia summer precisely because they shared the Constitutionalist goal.

Basic differences of opinion emerged, of course, but these were not ideological; they were *structural*. If the so-called "states'-rights" group had not accepted the fundamental purposes of the Convention, they could simply have pulled out and by doing so have aborted the whole enterprise. Instead of bolting, they returned day after day to argue and to compromise. An interesting symbol of this basic homogeneity was the initial agreement on secrecy: these professional politicians did not want to become prisoners of publicity; they wanted to retain that freedom of maneuver which is only possible when men are not forced to take public stands in the preliminary stages of negotiation.¹⁸ There was no legal means of binding the tongues of the delegates: at any

¹⁶ The terms "radical" and "conservative" have been bandied about a good deal in connection with the Constitution. This usage is nonsense if it is employed to distinguish between two economic "classes"—e.g., radical debtors versus conservative creditors, radical farmers versus conservative capitalists, etc.—because there was no polarization along this line of division; the same types of people turned up on both sides. And many were hard to place in these terms: does one treat Robert Morris as a debtor or a creditor? or James Wilson? See Brown, *op. cit.*, *passim*. The one line of division that holds up is between those deeply attached to states'-rights and those who felt that the Confederation was bankrupt. Thus, curiously, some of the most narrow-minded, parochial spokesmen of the time have earned the designation "radical" while those most willing to experiment and alter the *status quo* have been dubbed "conservative"! See Cecelia Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith," *William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 12, p. 3 (1955).

¹⁷ Yet, there was little objection to this crucial modification from any quarter—there almost seems to have been a gentlemen's agreement that Rhode Island's *liberum veto* had to be destroyed.

¹⁸ See Mason's letter to his son, May 27, 1787, in which he endorsed secrecy as "a proper precaution to prevent mistakes and misrepresentation until the business shall have been completed, when the whole may have a very different complexion from that in which the several crude and indigested parts might in their first shape appear if submitted to the public eye." *Farrand*, III, 28.

stage in the game a delegate with basic principled objections to the emerging project could have taken the stump (as Luther Martin did after his exit) and denounced the convention to the skies. Yet Madison did not even inform Thomas Jefferson in Paris of the course of the deliberations¹⁹ and available correspondence indicates that the delegates generally observed the injunction. Secrecy is certainly uncharacteristic of any assembly marked by strong ideological polarization. This was noted at the time: the *New York Daily Advertiser*, August 14, 1787, commented that the "... profound secrecy hitherto observed by the Convention [we consider] a happy omen, as it demonstrates that the spirit of party on any great and essential point cannot have arisen to any height."²⁰

Commentators on the Constitution who have read *The Federalist* in lieu of reading the actual debates have credited the Fathers with the invention of a sublime concept called "Federalism."²¹ Unfortunately *The Federalist* is probative evidence for only one proposition: that Hamilton and Madison were inspired propagandists with a genius for retrospective symmetry. Federalism, as the theory is generally defined, was an improvisation which was later promoted into a political theory. Experts on "federalism" should take to heart the advice of David Hume, who warned in his *Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences* that "... there is no subject in which we must proceed with more caution than in [history], lest we assign causes which never existed and reduce what is merely contingent to stable and universal principles." In any event, the final balance in the Constitution between the states and the nation must have come as a great disappointment to Madison, while Hamilton's unitary views are too well known to need elucidation.

It is indeed astonishing how those who have glibly designated James Madison the "father" of Federalism have overlooked the solid body of fact which indicates that he shared Hamilton's quest for a unitary central government. To be specific, they have avoided examining the clear import of the Madison-Virginia Plan,²²

and have disregarded Madison's dogged inch-by-inch retreat from the bastions of centralization. The Virginia Plan envisioned a unitary national government effectively freed from and dominant over the states. The lower house of the national legislature was to be elected directly by the people of the states with membership proportional to population. The upper house was to be selected by the lower and the two chambers would elect the executive and choose the judges. The national government would be thus cut completely loose from the states.²³

The structure of the general government was freed from state control in a truly radical fashion, but the scope of the authority of the national sovereign as Madison initially formulated it was breathtaking—it was a formulation worthy of the Sage of Malmesbury himself. The national legislature was to be empowered to disallow the acts of state legislatures,²⁴ and the central government was vested, in addition to the powers of the nation under the Articles of Confederation, with plenary authority wherever "... the separate States are incompetent or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the

irreconcilable with the idea of an aggregate sovereignty," Madison to Randolph, cited in Brant, *op. cit.*, p. 416.

²³ The Randolph Plan was presented on May 29, see *Farrand*, I, 18–23; the state legislatures retained only the power to *nominate* candidates for the upper chamber. Madison's view of the appropriate position of the states emerged even more strikingly in Yates' record of his speech on June 29: "Some contend that states are sovereign when in fact they are only political societies. There is a gradation of power in all societies, from the lowest corporation to the highest sovereign. The states never possessed the essential rights of sovereignty The states, at present, are only great corporations, having the power of making by-laws, and these are effectual only if they are not contradictory to the general confederation. The states ought to be placed under the control of the general government—at least as much so as they formerly were under the king and British parliament." *Farrand*, I, 471. Forty-six years later, after Yates' "Notes" had been published, Madison tried to explain this statement away as a misinterpretation: he did not flatly deny the authenticity of Yates' record, but attempted a defense that was half justification and half evasion. Madison to W. C. Rives, Oct. 21, 1833. *Farrand*, III, 521–24.

²⁴ Resolution 6 gave the National Legislature this power subject to review by the Council of Revision proposed in Resolution 8.

¹⁹ See Madison to Jefferson, June 6, 1787, *Farrand*, III, 35.

²⁰ Cited in Warren, p. 138.

²¹ See, e.g., Gottfried Dietze, *The Federalist, A Classic on Federalism and Free Government* (Baltimore, 1960); Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York, 1948); and John P. Roche, "American Liberty," in M. Konvitz and C. Rossiter, eds., *Aspects of Liberty* (Ithaca, 1958).

²² "I hold it for a fundamental point, that an individual independence of the states is utterly

exercise of individual legislation."²⁵ Finally, just to lock the door against state intrusion, the national Congress was to be given the power to use military force on recalcitrant states.²⁶ This was Madison's "model" of an ideal national government, though it later received little publicity in *The Federalist*.

The interesting thing was the reaction of the Convention to this militant program for a strong autonomous central government. Some delegates were startled, some obviously leery of so comprehensive a project of reform,²⁷ but nobody set off any fireworks and nobody walked out. Moreover, in the two weeks that followed, the Virginia Plan received substantial endorsement *en principe*; the initial temper of the gathering can be deduced from the approval "without debate or dissent," on May 31, of the Sixth Resolution which granted Congress the authority to disallow state legislation "... contravening in its opinion the Articles of Union." Indeed, an amendment was included to bar states from contravening national treaties.²⁸

The Virginia Plan may therefore be considered, in ideological terms, as the delegates' Utopia, but as the discussions continued and became more specific, many of those present began to have second thoughts. After all, they were not residents of Utopia or guardians in Plato's Republic who could simply impose a philosophical ideal on subordinate strata of the population. They were practical politicians in a democratic society, and no matter what their private dreams might be, they had to take home an acceptable package and defend it—and their own political futures—against predictable attack. On June 14 the breaking point between dream and reality took place. Apparently realizing that under the Virginia Plan, Massachusetts, Virginia and Pennsylvania could virtually dominate the national government—and probably appreciating that to sell this program to "the folks back home" would be impossible—the delegates from the small

states dug in their heels and demanded time for a consideration of alternatives. One gets a graphic sense of the inner politics from John Dickinson's reproach to Madison: "You see the consequences of pushing things too far. Some of the members from the small States wish for two branches in the General Legislature and are friends to a good National Government; but we would sooner submit to a foreign power than . . . be deprived of an equality of suffrage in both branches of the Legislature, and thereby be thrown under the domination of the large States."²⁹

The bare outline of the *Journal* entry for Tuesday, June 14, is suggestive to anyone with extensive experience in deliberative bodies. "It was moved by Mr. Patterson [*sic*, Paterson's name was one of those consistently misspelled by Madison and everybody else] seconded by Mr. Randolph that the further consideration of the report from the Committee of the whole House [endorsing the Virginia Plan] be postponed til tomorrow. and before the question for postponement was taken. It was moved by Mr. Randolph seconded by Mr. Patterson that the House adjourn."³⁰ The House adjourned by obvious prearrangement of the two principals: since the preceding Saturday when Brearley and Paterson of New Jersey had announced their fundamental discontent with the representational features of the Virginia Plan, the informal pressure had certainly been building up to slow down the streamroller. Doubtless there were extended arguments at the Indian Queen between Madison and Paterson, the latter insisting that events were moving rapidly towards a probably disastrous conclusion, towards a political suicide pact. Now the process of accommodation was put into action smoothly—and wisely, given the character and strength of the doubters. Madison had the votes, but this was one of those situations where the enforcement of mechanical majoritarianism could easily have destroyed the objectives of the majority: the Constitutionalists were in quest of a qualitative as well as a quantitative consensus. This was hardly from deference to local Quaker custom; it was a political imperative if they were to attain ratification.

III

According to the standard script, at this point the "states'-rights" group intervened in

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 242. Delaware's delegates had been instructed by their general assembly to maintain in any new system the voting equality of the states. *Farrand*, III, 574.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

²⁵ Resolution 6.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ See the discussions on May 30 and 31. "Mr. Charles Pinkney wished to know of Mr. Randolph whether he meant to abolish the State Governments. . . . Mr. Butler said he had not made up his mind on the subject and was open to the light which discussion might throw on it . . . Genl. Pinkney expressed a doubt . . . Mr. Gerry seemed to entertain the same doubt." *Farrand*, I, 33-34. There were no denunciations—though it should perhaps be added that Luther Martin had not yet arrived.

²⁸ *Farrand*, I, 54. (Italics added.)

force behind the New Jersey Plan, which has been characteristically portrayed as a reversion to the *status quo* under the Articles of Confederation with but minor modifications. A careful examination of the evidence indicates that only in a marginal sense is this an accurate description. It is true that the New Jersey Plan put the states back into the institutional picture, but one could argue that to do so was a recognition of political reality rather than an affirmation of states'-rights. A serious case can be made that the advocates of the New Jersey Plan, far from being ideological addicts of states'-rights, intended to substitute for the Virginia Plan a system which would both retain strong national power and have a chance of adoption in the states. The leading spokesman for the project asserted quite clearly that his views were based more on counsels of expediency than on principle; said Paterson on June 16: "I came here not to speak my own sentiments, but the sentiments of those who sent me. Our object is not such a Governmt. as may be best in itself, but such a one as our Constituents have authorized us to prepare, and as they will approve."³¹ This is Madison's version; in Yates' transcription, there is a crucial sentence following the remarks above: "I believe that a little practical virtue is to be preferred to the finest theoretical principles, which cannot be carried into effect."³² In his preliminary speech on June 9, Paterson had stated "... to the public mind we must accommodate ourselves,"³³ and in his notes for this and his later effort as well, the emphasis is the same. The *structure* of government under the Articles should be retained:

2. Because it accords with the Sentiments of the People

- [Proof:] 1. Coms. [Commissions from state legislatures defining the jurisdiction of the delegates]
2. News-papers—Political Barometer. Jersey never would have sent Delegates under the first [Virginia] Plan—

Not here to sport Opinions of my own. Wt. [What] can be done. A little practicable Virtue preferable to Theory.³⁴

This was a defense of political acumen, not of states'-rights. In fact, Paterson's notes of his speech can easily be construed as an argument

for attaining the substantive objectives of the Virginia Plan by a sound political route, *i.e.*, pouring the new wine in the old bottles. With a shrewd eye, Paterson queried:

Will the Operation and Force of the [central] Govt. depend upon the mode of Representn.—No—it will depend upon the Quantum of Power lodged in the leg. ex. and judy. Departments—Give [the existing] Congress the same Powers that you intend to give the two Branches, [under the Virginia Plan] and I apprehend they will act with as much Propriety and more Energy . . .³⁵

In other words, the advocates of the New Jersey Plan concentrated their fire on what they held to be the *political liabilities* of the Virginia Plan—which were matters of institutional structure—rather than on the proposed scope of national authority. Indeed, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution first saw the light of day in Paterson's Sixth Resolution; the New Jersey Plan contemplated the use of military force to secure compliance with national law; and finally Paterson made clear his view that under either the Virginia or the New Jersey systems, the general government would "... act on individuals and not on states."³⁶ From the states'-rights viewpoint, this was heresy: the fundament of that doctrine was the proposition that any central government had as its constituents the states, not the people, and could only reach the people through the agency of the state government.

Paterson then reopened the agenda of the Convention, but he did so within a distinctly nationalist framework. Paterson's position was one of favoring a strong central government in principle, but opposing one which in fact *put the big states in the saddle*. (The Virginia Plan, for all its abstract merits, did very well by Virginia.) As evidence for this speculation, there is a curious and intriguing proposal among Paterson's preliminary drafts of the New Jersey Plan:

Whereas it is necessary in Order to form the People of the U. S. of America in to a Nation, that the States should be consolidated, by which means all the Citizens thereof will become equally intitled to and will equally participate in the same Privileges and Rights . . . it is therefore resolved, that all the Lands contained within the Limits of each state individually, and of the U. S. generally

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 275-76.

³⁶ "But it is said that this national government is to act on individuals and not on states; and cannot a federal government be so framed as to operate in the same way? It surely may." *Ibid.*, pp. 182-83; also *ibid.* at p. 276.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 258.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 274.

be considered as constituting one Body or Mass, and be divided into thirteen or more integral parts.

Resolved, That such Divisions or integral Parts shall be styled Districts.³⁷

This makes it sound as though Paterson was prepared to accept a strong unified central government along the lines of the Virginia Plan if the existing states were eliminated. He may have gotten the idea from his New Jersey colleague Judge David Brearley, who on June 9 had commented that the only remedy to the dilemma over representation was "... that a map of the U. S. be spread out, that all the existing boundaries be erased, and that a new partition of the whole be made into 13 equal parts."³⁸ According to Yates, Brearley added at this point, "... then a government on the present [Virginia Plan] system will be just."³⁹

This proposition was never pushed—it was patently unrealistic—but one can appreciate its purpose: it would have separated the men from the boys in the large-state delegations. How attached would the Virginians have been to their reform principles if Virginia were to disappear as a component geographical unit (the largest) for representational purposes? Up to this point, the Virginians had been in the happy position of supporting high ideals with that inner confidence born of knowledge that the "public interest" they endorsed would nourish their private interest. Worse, they had shown little willingness to compromise. Now the delegates from the small states announced that they were unprepared to be offered up as sacrificial victims to a "national interest" which reflected Virginia's parochial ambition. Caustic Charles Pinckney was not far off when he remarked sardonically that "... the whole [conflict] comes to this": "Give N. Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Natl. system."⁴⁰ What he rather unfairly did not add was that the Jersey delegates were not free agents who could adhere to their private convictions; they had to take back, sponsor and risk their reputations on the reforms approved by the Convention—and in New Jersey, not in Virginia.

Paterson spoke on Saturday, and one can surmise that over the weekend there was a good deal of consultation, argument, and caucusing among the delegates. One member at least prepared a full length address: on Monday

Alexander Hamilton, previously mute, rose and delivered a six-hour oration.⁴¹ It was a remarkably apolitical speech; the gist of his position was that both the Virginia and New Jersey Plans were inadequately centralist, and he detailed a reform program which was reminiscent of the Protectorate under the Cromwellian *Instrument of Government* of 1653. It has been suggested that Hamilton did this in the best political tradition to emphasize the moderate character of the Virginia Plan,⁴² to give the cautious delegates something *really* to worry about; but this interpretation seems somehow too clever. Particularly since the sentiments Hamilton expressed happened to be completely consistent with those he privately—and sometimes publicly—expressed throughout his life. He wanted, to take a striking phrase from a letter to George Washington, a "strong well mounted government";⁴³ in essence, the Hamilton Plan contemplated an elected life monarch, virtually free of public control, on the Hobbesian ground that only in this fashion could strength and stability be achieved. The other alternatives, he argued, would put policy-making at the mercy of the passions of the mob; only if the sovereign was beyond the reach of selfish influence would it be possible to have government in the interests of the whole community.⁴⁴

From all accounts, this was a masterful and compelling speech, but (aside from furnishing John Lansing and Luther Martin with ammunition for later use against the Constitution) it made little impact. Hamilton was simply transmitting on a different wave-length from the rest of the delegates; the latter adjourned after his great effort, admired his rhetoric, and then returned to business.⁴⁵ It was rather as if they had taken a day off to attend the opera. Hamilton, never a particularly patient man or much of a negotiator, stayed for another ten days and then left, in considerable disgust, for New York.⁴⁶ Although he came back to Phila-

⁴¹ J. C. Hamilton, cited *ibid.*, p. 293.

⁴² See, e.g., Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

⁴³ Hamilton to Washington, July 3, 1787, *Farrand*, III, 53.

⁴⁴ A reconstruction of the Hamilton Plan is found in *Farrand*, III, 617-30.

⁴⁵ Said William Samuel Johnson on June 21: "A gentleman from New-York, with boldness and decision, proposed a system totally different from both [Virginia and New Jersey]; and though he has been praised by every body, he has been supported by none." *Farrand*, I, 363.

⁴⁶ See his letter to Washington cited *supra* note 43.

³⁷ *Farrand*, III, 613.

³⁸ *Farrand*, I, 177.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

delphia sporadically and attended the last two weeks of the Convention, Hamilton played no part in the laborious task of hammering out the Constitution. His day came later when he led the New York Constitutionalists into the savage imbroglio over ratification—an arena in which his unmatched talent for dirty political infighting may well have won the day. For instance, in the New York Ratifying Convention, Lansing threw back into Hamilton's teeth the sentiments the latter had expressed in his June 18 oration in the Convention. However, having since retreated to the fine defensive positions immortalized in *The Federalist*, the Colonel flatly denied that he had ever been an enemy of the states, or had believed that conflict between states and nation was inexorable! As Madison's authoritative *Notes* did not appear until 1840, and there had been no press coverage, there was no way to verify his assertions, so in the words of the reporter, "... a warm personal altercation between [Lansing and Hamilton] engrossed the remainder of the day [June 28, 1788]."⁴⁷

IV

On Tuesday morning, June 19, the vacation was over. James Madison led off with a long, carefully reasoned speech analyzing the New Jersey Plan which, while intellectually vigorous in its criticisms, was quite conciliatory in mood. "The great difficulty," he observed, "lies in the affair of Representation; and if this could be adjusted, all others would be surmountable."⁴⁸ (As events were to demonstrate, this diagnosis was correct.) When he finished, a vote was taken on whether to continue with the Virginia Plan as the nucleus for a new constitution: seven states voted "Yes"; New York, New Jersey, and Delaware voted "No"; and Maryland, whose position often depended on which delegates happened to be on the floor, divided.⁴⁹ Paterson, it seems, lost decisively;

⁴⁷ *Farrand*, III, 338.

⁴⁸ *Farrand*, I, 321.

⁴⁹ Maryland's politics in this period were only a bit less intricate than Rhode Island's: the rural gentry, in much the same fashion that Namier described in England, divided up among families—Chases, Carrolls, Pacas, Lloyds, Tilghmans, etc.—and engaged in what seemed, to the outsider, elaborate political Morris dances. See Philip A. Crowl, *Maryland During and After the Revolution* (Baltimore, 1943). The Maryland General Assembly named five delegates to the Convention and provided that "the said Deputies or such of them as shall attend . . . shall have full Power to represent this State," *Farrand*, III, 586. The

yet in a fundamental sense he and his allies had achieved their purpose: from that day onward, it could never be forgotten that the state governments loomed ominously in the background and that no verbal incantations could exorcise their power. Moreover, nobody bolted the convention: Paterson and his colleagues took their defeat in stride and set to work to modify the Virginia Plan, particularly with respect to its provisions on representation in the national legislature. Indeed, they won an immediate rhetorical bonus; when Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut rose to move that the word "national" be expunged from the Third Virginia Resolution ("Resolved that a *national* Government ought to be established consisting of a *supreme* Legislative, Executive and Judiciary"⁵⁰), Randolph agreed and the motion passed unanimously.⁵¹ The process of compromise had begun.

For the next two weeks, the delegates circled around the problem of legislative representation. The Connecticut delegation appears to have evolved a possible compromise quite early in the debates, but the Virginians and particularly Madison (unaware that he would later be acclaimed as the prophet of "federalism") fought obdurately against providing for equal representation of states in the second chamber. There was a good deal of acrimony and at one point Benjamin Franklin—of all people—proposed the institution of a daily prayer; practical politicians in the gathering, however, were meditating more on the merits of a good committee than on the utility of Divine intervention. On July 2, the ice began to break when

interesting circumstance was that three of the delegates were Constitutionalists (Carroll, McHenry and Jenifer), while two were opposed (Martin and Mercer); and this led to an *ad hoc* determination of where Maryland would stand when votes were taken. The vote on equality of representation, to be described *infra*, was an important instance of this eccentricity.

⁵⁰ This formulation was voted into the Randolph Plan on May 30, 1787, by a vote of six states to none, with one divided. *Farrand*, I, 30.

⁵¹ *Farrand*, I, 335–36. In agreeing, Randolph stipulated his disagreement with Ellsworth's rationale, but said he did not object to merely changing an "expression." Those who subject the Constitution to minute semantic analysis might do well to keep this instance in mind; if Randolph could so concede the deletion of "national," one may wonder if any word changes can be given much weight.

through a number of fortuitous events⁵²—and one that seems deliberate⁵³—the majority against equality of representation was converted into a dead tie. The Convention had reached the stage where it was “ripe” for a solution (presumably all the therapeutic speeches had been made), and the South Carolinians proposed a committee. Madison and James Wilson wanted none of it, but with only Pennsylvania dissenting, the body voted to establish a working party on the problem of representation.

The members of this committee, one from each state, were elected by the delegates—and a very interesting committee it was. Despite the fact that the Virginia Plan had held majority support up to that date, neither Madison nor Randolph was selected (Mason was the Virginian) and Baldwin of Georgia, whose shift in position had resulted in the tie, was chosen. From the composition, it was clear that this was not to be a “fighting” committee: the emphasis in membership was on what might be described as “second-level political entrepreneurs.” On the basis of the discussions up to that time, only Luther Martin of Maryland could be described as a “bitter-ender.” Admittedly, some divination enters into this sort of analysis, but one does get a sense of the mood of the delegates from these choices—including the interesting selection of Benjamin Franklin, despite his age and intellectual wobbliness, over the brilliant and incisive Wilson or the sharp, polemical Gouverneur Morris, to repre-

sent Pennsylvania. His passion for conciliation was more valuable at this juncture than Wilson’s logical genius, or Morris’ acerbic wit.

There is a common rumor that the Framers divided their time between philosophical discussions of government and reading the classics in political theory. Perhaps this is as good a time as any to note that their concerns were highly practical, that they spent little time canvassing abstractions. A number of them had some acquaintance with the history of political theory (probably gained from reading John Adams’ monumental compilation *A Defense of the Constitutions of Government*,⁵⁴ the first volume of which appeared in 1786), and it was a poor rhetorician indeed who could not cite Locke, Montesquieu, or Harrington in support of a desired goal. Yet up to this point in the deliberations, no one had expounded a defense of states’-rights or the “separation of powers” on anything resembling a theoretical basis. It should be reiterated that the Madison model had no room either for the states or for the “separation of powers”: effectively all governmental power was vested in the national legislature. The merits of Montesquieu did not turn up until *The Federalist*; and although a perverse argument could be made that Madison’s ideal was truly in the tradition of John Locke’s *Second Treatise of Government*,⁵⁵ the

⁵² According to Luther Martin, he was alone on the floor and cast Maryland’s vote for equality of representation. Shortly thereafter, Jenifer came on the floor and “Mr. King, from Massachusetts, valuing himself on Mr. Jenifer to divide the State of Maryland on this question . . . requested of the President that the question might be put again; however, the motion was too extraordinary in its nature to meet with success.” Cited from “The Genuine Information, . . .” *Farrand*, III, 188.

⁵³ Namely Baldwin’s vote for equality of representation which divided Georgia—with Few absent and Pierce in New York fighting a duel, Houston voted against equality and Baldwin shifted to tie the state. Baldwin was originally from Connecticut and attended and tutored at Yale, facts which have led to much speculation about the pressures the Connecticut delegation may have brought on him to save the day (Georgia was the last state to vote) and open the way to compromise. To employ a good Russian phrase, it was certainly not an accident that Baldwin voted the way he did. See *Warren*, p. 262.

⁵⁴ For various contemporary comments, see *Warren*, pp. 814–818. On Adams’ technique, see Zoltan Haraszti, “The Composition of Adams’ *Defense*,” in *John Adams and the Prophets of Progress* (Cambridge, 1952), ch. 9. In this connection it is interesting to check the Convention discussions for references to the authority of Locke, Montesquieu and Harrington, the theorists who have been assigned various degrees of paternal responsibility. There are no explicit references to James Harrington; one to John Locke (Luther Martin cited him on the state of nature, *Farrand*, I, 437); and seven to Montesquieu, only one of which related to the “separation of powers” (Madison in an odd speech, which he explained in a footnote was given to help a friend rather than advance his own views, cited Montesquieu on the separation of the executive and legislative branches, *Farrand*, II, 34). This, of course, does not prove that Locke and Co. were without influence; it shifts the burden of proof, however, to those who assert ideological causality. See Benjamin F. Wright, “The Origins of the Separation of Powers in America,” *Economica*, Vol. 13 (1933), p. 184.

⁵⁵ I share Willmoore Kendall’s interpretation of Locke as a supporter of parliamentary supremacy and majoritarianism; see Kendall, *John Locke and*

Locke whom the American rebels treated as an honorary president was a pluralistic defender of vested rights,⁵⁶ not of parliamentary supremacy.

It would be tedious to continue a blow-by-blow analysis of the work of the delegates; the critical fight was over representation of the states and once the Connecticut Compromise was adopted on July 17, the Convention was over the hump. Madison, James Wilson, and Gouverneur Morris of New York (who was there representing Pennsylvania!) fought the compromise all the way in a last-ditch effort to get a unitary state with parliamentary supremacy. But their allies deserted them and they demonstrated after their defeat the essentially opportunist character of their objections—using “opportunist” here in a non-pejorative sense, to indicate a willingness to swallow their objections and get on with the business. Moreover, once the compromise had carried (by five states to four, with one state divided), its advocates threw themselves vigorously into the job of strengthening the general government’s substantive powers—as might have been predicted, indeed, from Paterson’s early statements. It nourishes an increased respect for Madison’s devotion to the art of politics, to realize that this dogged fighter could sit down six months later and prepare essays for *The Federalist* in contradiction to his basic convictions about the true course the Convention should have taken.

V.

Two tricky issues will serve to illustrate the later process of accommodation. The first was the institutional position of the Executive. Madison argued for an executive chosen by the National Legislature and on May 29 this had been adopted with a provision that after his seven-year term was concluded, the chief magistrate should not be eligible for reelection. In late July this was reopened and for a week the matter was argued from several different points of view. A good deal of desultory speech-making ensued, but the gist of the problem was the opposition from two sources to election by the legislature. One group felt that the states

should have a hand in the process; another small but influential circle urged direct election by the people. There were a number of proposals: election by the people, election by state governors, by electors chosen by state legislatures, by the National Legislature (James Wilson, perhaps ironically, proposed at one point that an Electoral College be chosen by lot from the National Legislature!), and there was some resemblance to three-dimensional chess in the dispute because of the presence of two other variables, length of tenure and re-eligibility. Finally, after opening, reopening, and re-opening the debate, the thorny problem was consigned to a committee for resolution.

The Brearley Committee on Postponed Matters was a superb aggregation of talent and its compromise on the Executive was a masterpiece of political improvisation. (The Electoral College, its creation, however, had little in its favor as an *institution*—as the delegates well appreciated.) The point of departure for all discussion about the presidency in the Convention was that in immediate terms, the problem was non-existent; in other words, everybody present knew that under any system devised, George Washington would be President. Thus they were dealing in the future tense and to a body of working politicians the merits of the Brearley proposal were obvious: everybody got a piece of cake. (Or to put it more academically, each viewpoint could leave the Convention and argue to its constituents that it had *really* won the day.) First, the state legislatures had the right to determine the mode of selection of the electors; second, the small states received a bonus in the Electoral College in the form of a guaranteed minimum of three votes while the big states got acceptance of the principle of proportional power; third, if the state legislatures agreed (as six did in the first presidential election), the people could be involved directly in the choice of electors; and finally, if no candidate received a majority in the College, the right of decision passed to the National Legislature with each state exercising equal strength. (In the Brearley recommendation, the election went to the Senate, but a motion from the floor substituted the House; this was accepted on the ground that the Senate already had enough authority over the executive in its treaty and appointment powers.)

This compromise was almost too good to be true, and the Framers snapped it up with little debate or controversy. No one seemed to think well of the College as an *institution*; indeed, what evidence there is suggests that there

the Doctrine of Majority Rule (Urbana, 1941). Kendall’s general position has recently received strong support in the definitive edition and commentary of Peter Laslett, *Locke’s Two Treatises of Government* (Cambridge, 1960).

⁵⁶ The American Locke is best delineated in Carl Becker, *The Declaration of Independence* (New York, 1948).

was an assumption that once Washington had finished his tenure as President, the electors would cease to produce majorities and the chief executive would usually be chosen in the House. George Mason observed casually that the selection would be made in the House nineteen times in twenty and no one seriously disputed this point. The vital aspect of the Electoral College was that it got the Convention over the hurdle and protected everybody's interests. The future was left to cope with the problem of what to do with this Rube Goldberg mechanism.

In short, the Framers did not in their wisdom endow the United States with a College of Cardinals—the Electoral College was neither an exercise in applied Platonism nor an experiment in indirect government based on elitist distrust of the masses. It was merely a jerry-rigged improvisation which has subsequently been endowed with a high theoretical content. When an elector from Oklahoma in 1960 refused to cast his vote for Nixon (naming Byrd and Goldwater instead) on the ground that the Founding Fathers intended him to exercise his great independent wisdom, he was indulging in historical fantasy. If one were to indulge in counter-fantasy, he would be tempted to suggest that the Fathers would be startled to find the College still in operation—and perhaps even dismayed at their descendants' lack of judgment or inventiveness.⁵⁷

The second issue on which some substantial practical bargaining took place was slavery. The morality of slavery was, by design, not at issue;⁵⁸ but in its other concrete aspects, slavery colored the arguments over taxation, commerce, and representation. The "Three-Fifths Compromise," that three-fifths of the slaves would be counted both for representation and for purposes of direct taxation (which was drawn from the past—it was a formula of Madison's utilized by Congress in 1783 to establish the basis of state contributions to the Confederation treasury) had allayed some Northern fears about Southern over-representation (no one then foresaw the trivial role that

direct taxation would play in later federal financial policy), but doubts still remained. The Southerners, on the other hand, were afraid that Congressional control over commerce would lead to the exclusion of slaves or to their excessive taxation as imports. Moreover, the Southerners were disturbed over "navigation acts," *i.e.*, tariffs, or special legislation providing, for example, that exports be carried only in American ships; as a section depending upon exports, they wanted protection from the potential voracity of their commercial brethren of the Eastern states. To achieve this end, Mason and others urged that the Constitution include a proviso that navigation and commercial laws should require a two-thirds vote in Congress.

These problems came to a head in late August and, as usual, were handed to a committee in the hope that, in Gouverneur Morris' words, "... these things may form a bargain among the Northern and Southern states."⁵⁹ The Committee reported its measures of reconciliation on August 25, and on August 29 the package was wrapped up and delivered. What occurred can best be described in George Mason's dour version (he anticipated Calhoun in his conviction that permitting navigation acts to pass by majority vote would put the South in economic bondage to the North—it was mainly on this ground that he refused to sign the Constitution):

The Constitution as agreed to till a fortnight before the Convention rose was such a one as he would have set his hand and heart to. . . . [Until that time] The 3 New England States were constantly with us in all questions . . . so that it was these three States with the 5 Southern ones against Pennsylvania, Jersey and Delaware. With respect to the importation of slaves, [decision-making] was left to Congress. This disturbed the two Southernmost States who knew that Congress would immediately suppress the importation of slaves. Those two States therefore struck up a bargain with the three New England States. If they would join to admit slaves for some years, the two Southern-most States would join in changing the clause which required the $\frac{2}{3}$ of the Legislature in any vote [on navigation acts]. It was done.⁶⁰

On the floor of the Convention there was a virtual love-feast on this happy occasion. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina attempted to overturn the committee's decision, when the compromise was reported to the Convention, by

⁵⁹ *Farrand*, II, 374. Randolph echoed his sentiment in different words.

⁶⁰ Mason to Jefferson, cited in *Warren*, p. 584.

⁵⁷ See John P. Roche, "The Electoral College: A Note on American Political Mythology," *Dissent* (Spring, 1961), pp. 197–99. The relevant debates took place July 19–26, 1787, *Farrand*, II, 50–128, and September 5–6, 1787, *ibid.*, pp. 505–31.

⁵⁸ See the discussion on August 22, 1787, *Farrand*, II, 366–375; King seems to have expressed the sense of the Convention when he said, "the subject should be considered in a political light only." *Ibid.* at 373.

insisting that the South needed protection from the imperialism of the Northern states. But his Southern colleagues were not prepared to rock the boat and General C. C. Pinckney arose to spread oil on the suddenly ruffled waters; he admitted that:

It was in the true interest of the S [outhern] States to have no regulation of commerce; but considering the loss brought on the commerce of the Eastern States by the Revolution, their liberal conduct towards the views of South Carolina [on the regulation of the slave trade] and the interests the weak Southn. States had in being united with the strong Eastern states, he thought it proper that no fetters should be imposed on the power of making commercial regulations; *and that his constituents, though prejudiced against the Eastern States, would be reconciled to this liberality.* He had himself prejudices agst the Eastern States before he came here, but would acknowledge that he had found them as liberal and candid as any men whatever. (Italics added)⁶¹

Pierce Butler took the same tack, essentially arguing that he was not too happy about the possible consequences, but that a deal was a deal.⁶² Many Southern leaders were later—in the wake of the “Tariff of Abominations”—to rue this day of reconciliation; Calhoun’s *Disquisition on Government* was little more than an extension of the argument in the Conven-

tion against permitting a congressional majority to enact navigation acts.⁶³

VI

Drawing on their vast collective political experience, utilizing every weapon in the politician’s arsenal, looking constantly over their shoulders at their constituents, the delegates put together a Constitution. It was a make-shift affair; some sticky issues (for example, the qualification of voters) they ducked entirely; others they mastered with that ancient instrument of political sagacity, studied ambiguity (for example, citizenship), and some they just overlooked. In this last category, I suspect, fell the matter of the power of the federal courts to determine the constitutionality of acts of Congress. When the judicial article was formulated (Article III of the Constitution), deliberations were still in the stage where the legislature was endowed with broad power under the Randolph formulation, authority which by its own terms was scarcely amenable to judicial review. In essence, courts could hardly determine when “. . . the separate States are incompetent or . . . the harmony of the United States may be interrupted”; the National Legislature, as critics pointed out, was free to define its own jurisdiction. Later the definition of legislative authority was changed into the form we know, a series of stipulated powers, *but the delegates never seriously reexamined the jurisdiction of the judiciary under this new limited formulation.*⁶⁴

⁶¹ August 29, 1787, *Farrand*, II, 449–50.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 451. The plainest statement of the matter was put by the three North Carolina delegates (Blount, Spaight and Williamson) in their report to Governor Caswell, September 18, 1787. After noting that “no exertions have been wanting on our part to guard and promote the particular interest of North Carolina,” they went on to explain the basis of the negotiations in cold-blooded fashion: “While we were taking so much care to guard ourselves against being over reached and to form rules of Taxation that might operate in our favour, it is not to be supposed that our Northern Brethren were Inattentive to their particular Interest. A navigation Act or the power to regulate Commerce in the Hands of the National Government . . . is what the Southern States have given in Exchange for the advantages we Mentioned.” They concluded by explaining that while the Constitution did deal with other matters besides taxes—“there are other Considerations of great Magnitude involved in the system”—they would not take up valuable time with boring details! *Farrand*, III, 83–84.

⁶³ See John C. Calhoun, *A Disquisition on Government* (New York, 1943), pp. 21–25, 38. Calhoun differed from Mason, and others in the Convention who urged the two-thirds requirement, by advocating a functional or interest veto rather than some sort of special majority, *i.e.*, he abandoned the search for quantitative checks in favor of a qualitative solution.

⁶⁴ The Committee on Detail altered the general grant of legislative power envisioned by the Virginia Plan into a series of specific grants; these were examined closely between August 16 and August 23. One day only was devoted to the Judicial Article, August 27, and since no one raised the question of judicial review of *Federal* statutes, no light was cast on the matter. A number of random comments on the power of the judiciary were scattered throughout the discussions, but there was another variable which deprives them of much probative value: the proposed Council of Revision which would have joined the Executive with the judges in *legislative* review. Madison and Wilson, for example, favored this

All arguments on the intention of the Framers in this matter are thus deductive and *a posteriori*, though some obviously make more sense than others.⁶⁵

The Framers were busy and distinguished men, anxious to get back to their families, their positions, and their constituents, not members of the French Academy devoting a lifetime to a dictionary. They were trying to do an important job, and do it in such a fashion that their handiwork would be acceptable to very diverse constituencies. No one was rhapsodic about the final document, but it was a beginning, a move in the right direction, and one they had reason to believe the people would endorse. In addition, since they had modified the impossible amendment provisions of the Articles (the requirement of unanimity which could always be frustrated by "Rogues Island") to one demanding approval by only three-quarters of the states, they seemed confident that gaps in the fabric which experience would reveal could be reweoven without undue difficulty.

So with a neat phrase introduced by Benjamin Franklin (but devised by Gouverneur Morris)⁶⁶ which made their decision sound unanimous, and an inspired benediction by the Old Doctor urging doubters to doubt their own infallibility, the Constitution was accepted and signed. Curiously, Edmund Randolph, who had played so vital a role throughout, refused to sign, as did his fellow Virginian George Mason and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts. Randolph's behavior was eccentric, to say the least—his excuses for refusing his signature have a factitious ring even at this late date; the best explanation seems to be that he was afraid

that the Constitution would prove to be a liability in Virginia politics, where Patrick Henry was burning up the countryside with impassioned denunciations. Presumably, Randolph wanted to check the temper of the populace before he risked his reputation, and perhaps his job, in a fight with both Henry and Richard Henry Lee.⁶⁷ Events lend some justification to this speculation: after much temporizing and use of the conditional subjunctive tense, Randolph endorsed ratification in Virginia and ended up getting the best of both worlds.

Madison, despite his reservations about the Constitution, was the campaign manager in ratification. His first task was to get the Congress in New York to light its own funeral pyre by approving the "amendments" to the Articles and sending them on to the state legislatures. Above all, momentum had to be maintained. The anti-Constitutionalists, now thoroughly alarmed and no novices in politics, realized that their best tactic was attrition rather than direct opposition. Thus they settled on a position expressing qualified approval but calling for a second Convention to remedy various defects (the one with the most demagogic appeal was the lack of a Bill of Rights). Madison knew that to accede to this demand would be equivalent to losing the battle, nor would he agree to conditional approval (despite wavering even by Hamilton). This was an all-or-nothing proposition: national salvation or national impotence with no intermediate positions possible. Unable to get congressional approval, he settled for second best: a unanimous resolution of Congress transmitting the Constitution to the states for whatever action they saw fit to take. The opponents then moved from New York and the Congress, where they had attempted to attach amendments and conditions, to the states for the final battle.⁶⁸

technique—which had nothing in common with what we think of as judicial review except that judges were involved in the task.

⁶⁵ For what it may be worth, I think that judicial review of congressional acts was logically on all fours with review of state enactments and that it was certainly consistent with the view that the Constitution could not be amended by the Congress and President, or by a two-thirds vote of Congress (overriding a veto), without the agreement of three-quarters of the states. *External* evidence from that time supports this view, see Charles Warren, *Congress, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court* (Boston, 1925), pp. 41–128, but the debates in the Convention prove nothing.

⁶⁶ Or so Madison stated, *Farrand*, II, 643. Wilson too may have contributed; he was close to Franklin and delivered the frail old gentleman's speeches for him.

⁶⁷ See a very interesting letter, from an unknown source in Philadelphia, to Jefferson, October 11, 1787: "Randolph wishes it well, & it is thought would have signed it, but he wanted to be on a footing with a popular rival." *Farrand*, III, 104. Madison, writing Jefferson a full account on October 24, 1787, put the matter more delicately—he was working hard on Randolph to win him for ratification: "[Randolph] was not inveterate in his opposition, and grounded his refusal to subscribe pretty much on his unwillingness to commit himself, so as not to be at liberty to be governed by further lights on the subject." *Ibid.*, p. 135.

⁶⁸ See Edward P. Smith, "The Movement Towards a Second Constitutional Convention in

At first the campaign for ratification went beautifully: within eight months after the delegates set their names to the document, eight states had ratified. Only in Massachusetts had the result been close (187-168). Theoretically, a ratification by one more state convention would set the new government in motion, but in fact until Virginia and New York acceded to the new Union, the latter was a fiction. New Hampshire was the next to ratify; Rhode Island was involved in its characteristic political convulsions (the Legislature there sent the Constitution out to the towns for decision by popular vote and it got lost among a series of local issues);⁶⁹ North Carolina's convention did not meet until July and then postponed a final decision. This is hardly the place for an extensive analysis of the conventions of New York and Virginia. Suffice it to say that the Constitutionals clearly outmaneuvered their opponents, forced them into impossible political positions, and won both states narrowly. The Virginia Convention could serve as a classic study in effective floor management: Patrick Henry had to be contained, and a reading of the debates discloses a standard two-stage technique. Henry would give a four- or five-hour speech denouncing some section of the Constitution on every conceivable ground (the federal district, he averred at one point, would become a haven for convicts escaping from state authority!);⁷⁰ when Henry subsided, "Mr. Lee of Westmoreland" would rise and literally poleaxe him with sardonic invective (when Henry complained about the militia power, "Lighthorse Harry" really punched below the belt: observing that while the former Governor had been sitting in Richmond during the Revolution, he had been out in the trenches with the troops and thus felt better qualified to discuss military affairs).⁷¹ Then the gentlemanly Constitutionals (Madison, Pendleton and Marshall) would pick up the matters at issue and examine them in the light of reason.

Indeed, modern Americans who tend to think

of James Madison as a rather desiccated character should spend some time with this transcript. Probably Madison put on his most spectacular demonstration of nimble rhetoric in what might be called "The Battle of the Absent Authorities." Patrick Henry in the course of one of his harangues alleged that Jefferson was known to be opposed to Virginia's approving the Constitution. This was clever: Henry hated Jefferson, but was prepared to use any weapon that came to hand. Madison's riposte was superb: First, he said that with all due respect to the great reputation of Jefferson, he was not in the country and therefore could not formulate an adequate judgment; second, no one should utilize the reputation of an outsider—the Virginia Convention was there to think for itself; third, if there were to be recourse to outsiders, the opinions of George Washington should certainly be taken into consideration; and finally, he knew from privileged personal communications from Jefferson that in fact the latter *strongly favored* the Constitution.⁷² To devise an assault route into this rhetorical fortress was literally impossible.

VII

The fight was over; all that remained now was to establish the new frame of government in the spirit of its framers. And who were better qualified for this task than the Framers themselves? Thus victory for the Constitution meant simultaneous victory for the Constitutionals; the anti-Constitutionals either capitulated or vanished into limbo—soon Patrick Henry would be offered a seat on the Supreme Court⁷³ and Luther Martin would be known as the Federalist "bull-dog."⁷⁴ And irony of ironies, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison would shortly accumulate a reputation as the formulators of what is often alleged to be our political theory, the concept of "federalism." Also, on the other side of the ledger, the arguments would soon appear over what the Framers "really meant"; while these disputes have assumed the proportions of a big scholarly business in the last century, they

1788," in J. F. Jameson, ed., *Essays in the Constitutional History of the United States* (Boston, 1889), pp. 46-115.

⁶⁹ See Bishop, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

⁷⁰ See *Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution* (Washington, 1836), Vol. 3, pp. 436-438.

⁷¹ This should be quoted to give the full flavor: "Without vanity, I may say I have had different experience of [militia] service from that of [Henry]. It was my fortune to be a soldier of my country. . . . I saw what the honorable gentleman did not see—our men fighting. . . ." *Ibid.*, p. 178.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 329.

⁷³ Washington offered him the Chief Justiceship in 1796, but he declined; Charles Warren, *The Supreme Court in United States History* (Boston, 1947), Vol. 1, p. 139.

⁷⁴ He was a zealous prosecutor of seditions in the period 1798-1800; with Justice Samuel Chase, like himself an alleged "radical" at the time of the Constitutional Convention, Martin hunted down Jeffersonian heretics. See James M. Smith, *Freedom's Fetters* (Ithaca, 1956), pp. 342-43.

began almost before the ink on the Constitution was dry. One of the best early ones featured Hamilton versus Madison on the scope of presidential power, and other Framers characteristically assumed positions in this and other disputes on the basis of their political convictions.

Probably our greatest difficulty is that we know so much more about what the Framers *should have meant* than they themselves did. We are intimately acquainted with the problems that their Constitution should have been designed to master; in short, we have read the mystery story backwards. If we are to get the right "feel" for their time and their circumstances, we must in Maitland's phrase, "... think ourselves back into a twilight." Obviously, no one can pretend completely to escape from the solipsistic web of his own environment, but if the effort is made, it is possible to appreciate the past roughly on its own terms. The first step in this process is to abandon the academic premise that because we can ask a question, there must be an answer.

Thus we can ask what the Framers meant when they gave Congress the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, and we emerge, reluctantly perhaps, with the reply that (Professor Crosskey to the contrary notwithstanding)⁷⁵ they may not have known what

they meant, that there may not have been any semantic consensus. The Convention was not a seminar in analytic philosophy or linguistic analysis. Commerce was *commerce*—and if different interpretations of the word arose, later generations could worry about the problem of definition. The delegates were in a hurry to get a new government established; when definitional arguments arose, they characteristically took refuge in ambiguity. If different men voted for the same proposition for varying reasons, that was politics (and still is); if later generations were unsettled by this lack of precision, that would be their problem.

There was a good deal of definitional pluralism with respect to the problems the delegates did discuss, but when we move to the question of extrapolated intentions, we enter the realm of spiritualism. When men in our time, for instance, launch into elaborate talmudic exegesis to demonstrate that federal aid to parochial schools is (or is not) in accord with the intentions of the men who established the Republic and endorsed the Bill of Rights, they are engaging in historical Extra-Sensory Perception. (If one were to join this E. S. P. contingent for a minute, he might suggest that the hard-boiled politicians who wrote the Constitution and Bill of Rights would chuckle scornfully at such an invocation of authority: obviously a politician would chart his course on the intentions of the living, not of the dead, and count the number of Catholics in his constituency.)

The Constitution, then, was not an apotheosis of "constitutionalism," a triumph of architectonic genius; it was a patch-work sewn together under the pressure of both time and events by a group of extremely talented democratic politicians. They refused to attempt the establishment of a strong, centralized sovereignty on the principle of legislative supremacy for the excellent reason that the people would not accept it. They risked their political fortunes by opposing the established doctrines of state sovereignty because they were convinced that the existing system was leading to national impotence and probably foreign domination. For two years, they worked to get a convention established. For over three

⁷⁵ Crosskey in his sprawling *Politics and the Constitution* (Chicago, 1953), 2 vols., has developed with almost unbelievable zeal and intricacy the thesis that the Constitution was designed to establish a centralized unitary state, but that the political leadership of the Republic in its formative years betrayed this ideal and sold the pass to states'-rights. While he has unearthed some interesting newspaper articles and other material, it is impossible for me to accept his central proposition. Madison and the other delegates, with the exceptions discussed in the text *supra*, did *want* to diminish the power of the states and create a vigorous national government. But they were not fools, and were, I submit, under no illusions when they departed from Philadelphia that this end had been accomplished. The crux of my argument is that *political realities* forced them to water down their objectives and they settled, like the good politicians they were, for half a loaf. The basic difficulty with Crosskey's thesis is that he knows *too much*—he assumes that the Framers had a perfectly clear idea of the road they were taking; with a semantic machete he cuts blandly through all the confusion on the floor of the meeting to the *real* meanings. Thus, despite all his ornate research apparatus, there is a fundamentally non-empirical quality about Crosskey's work: at cru-

cial points in the argument he falls back on a type of divination which can only be described as Kabbalistic. He may be right, for example, in stating (without any proof) that Richard Henry Lee did *not* write the "Letters from a Federal Farmer," but in this country spectral evidence has not been admissible since the Seventeenth Century.

months, in what must have seemed to the faithful participants an endless process of give-and-take, they reasoned, cajoled, threatened, and bargained amongst themselves. The result was a Constitution which the people, in fact, by democratic processes, did accept, and a new and far better national government was established.

Beginning with the inspired propaganda of Hamilton, Madison and Jay, the ideological build-up got under way. *The Federalist* had little impact on the ratification of the Constitution, except perhaps in New York, but this volume had enormous influence on the image of the Constitution in the minds of future generations, particularly on historians and political scientists who have an innate fondness for theoretical symmetry. Yet, while the shades of Locke and Montesquieu *may* have been hovering in the background, and the delegates *may* have been unconscious instruments of a transcendent *telos*, the careful observer of the day-to-day work of the Convention finds no over-arching principles. The "separation of powers" to him seems to be a by-product of suspicion, and "federalism" he views as a *pis*

aller, as the farthest point the delegates felt they could go in the destruction of state power without themselves inviting repudiation.

To conclude, the Constitution was neither a victory for abstract theory nor a great practical success. Well over half a million men had to die on the battlefields of the Civil War before certain constitutional principles could be defined—a baleful consideration which is somehow overlooked in our customary tributes to the farsighted genius of the Framers and to the supposed American talent for "constitutionalism." The Constitution was, however, a vivid demonstration of effective democratic political action, and of the forging of a national elite which literally persuaded its countrymen to hoist themselves by their own boot straps. American pro-consuls would be wise not to translate the Constitution into Japanese, or Swahili, or treat it as a work of semi-Divine origin; but when students of comparative politics examine the process of nation-building in countries newly freed from colonial rule, they may find the American experience instructive as a classic example of the potentialities of a democratic elite.

IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF COMMUNITY POWER

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In an exchange of perennial delight to the Holmesian, the pauky Sherlock, pitting wits against a government detective, condescends to remark on the unusualness of the usual:

"Is there any point to which you would draw my attention?"

"To the curious incident of the dog in the night time."

"The dog did nothing in the night time."

"That was the curious incident."

And in asymptotic fashion, the student of politics, intrigued by the burgeoning literature of community power now emerging from the hands of sociologists, searches for the contributions that these writings can make to the study of local government.¹ The political scientist readily discovers that this literature is approaching metaphorical indeterminacy: like an expanding universe, it threatens to outrun his gaze. It contains the substance of competing conceptual schemes, the power elite *vs.* the pluralism of power. It offers comparative studies, both domestic and cross-cultural, and studies built upon historical dimensions. It even possesses studies designed to torture original hypotheses by invoking the test of predictability. And yet, in reviewing this freshet of publication, the political scientist finds himself asking whether there is, for his discipline, anything unusual in this outpouring.

As he reads, he finds underscored and "discovered" many of the propositions that are stock to his own lumber room: he learns that there is often discontinuity between the real and the nominal holders of political power; and that social values can affect the utilization of that power. He learns that economic power often determines political power, that technology affects the structure as well as the use of power; and that there are varieties of political power ranging from the monolith to the dispersed. All these propositions and several more

are contained in the literature of community power; and the political scientist, if he is not careful, may find himself dismissing as the usual that which may be significantly unusual.

I

To examine this body of work with a political eye, it may be useful to begin by separating it from its siblings.² In one sense, of course, nearly all studies of community and social life therein are studies of community power. When Charles Booth completed his massive survey of laboring classes in 19th century London he documented, even if inferentially, the impotence for social action of those who, in today's parlance, would be called the "non-influentials."³ When the Lynds unloaded their anthropological perspectives and encamped in darkest Indiana, they found themselves eventually unravelling the network of relations among the influentials and between the influentials and government policy.⁴ And when William Whyte, with a sociometric vantage, charted the comings and goings and the pecking order of his Corner Boys, he too found himself stalking the holders of power in that community.⁵ Ecological studies and stratification studies have also helped untangle the web of community power;⁶

² Rossi, "Community Decision Making," *op. cit.*, surveys the general patterns of community studies and the various forms of community power studies.

³ A recent appreciation of Booth is to be found in Pauline Young, *Scientific Social Surveys and Research*, 3d ed. (1956), pp. 9-14.

⁴ Robert S. and Helen Lynd, *Middletown* (1929) and *Middletown in Transition* (1937).

⁵ William F. Whyte, *Street Corner Society* (1943), esp. ch. 6.

⁶ As major research areas for sociology, the literatures of ecology and stratification are more than extensive. Of special pertinence to this essay are: Paul Hatt and Albert Reiss, Jr., *Cities and Society* (1957), esp. parts IV-VI; Leonard Broom, "Social Differentiation and Stratification," in Robert Merton *et al.*, *Sociology Today* (1959); Gordon Blackwell, "Community Analysis," in R. Young (ed.), *Approaches to the Study of Politics* (1958); R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset (eds.), *Class, Status, and Power* (1953), esp. sections II, III, V; S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (1959); W. Lloyd Warner

¹ Useful bibliographic guides to this literature are to be found in Peter Rossi, "Community Decision Making," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 1 (1956), pp. 415-43; Rossi, "Power and Community Structure," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 4 (1960), pp. 390-401; and Raymond Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of 'Community Power,'" *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 25 (1960), pp. 636-644.

but the literature that concerns us here most directly comes from Floyd Hunter and his (by now) numerous followers.

Hunter's originating work⁷ is built of familiar brick. Others before and since have attempted to examine the power structure of an entire community,⁸ in contrast to those studies that have examined that structure in only a portion of a community. Other studies have concerned themselves, too, with decisions that embrace the entire community, including decisions that represent—in Easton's terms—authoritative (i.e., governmental) allocations of values.⁹ Again, common both to Hunter and to others is the attempt to correlate social class and political power and to adduce the existence of a power elite from popular acknowledgment of that elite and from the disposition of issues that concern this elite.¹⁰ The elements, then, are familiar; and in this structuring of the usual, wherein lies the unusual? Two levels of answers suggest themselves: the methodological and the substantive. And, in these terms, the question is then turned so as to inquire into Hunter's contribution on each of these levels.

i

To begin with the methodological, there is first to be noted Hunter's Alexandrian swipe at the definitional tangle that has traditionally surrounded the concepts of community, political power, and power elite. Refusing to beweb himself in the process of choosing, *a priori*, a logical and empirically satisfactory definition of community (one recent count places the num-

ber of extant definitions at 94!)¹¹ Hunter makes common camp with political science and identifies his community as a legally defined unit of government. And for his identification of power leaders, he uses the tools of the operationalist, letting the "elite" define itself.

This operationalist perspective, as we shall later notice, is not without its limitations; but its use by Hunter is both direct and far-reaching. For operationalism, by practice, if not by principle, involves the utilization of determinate and measurable units.¹² And thus, where his predecessors had perceived community power relations by insight and rough inference, Hunter is able to specify his techniques of measurement; and in this fashion, to hand them over to others for employment in replicative studies. Where prior studies, by their methods, were essentially single-case studies, whose variety of technique made comparisons both tenuous and dangerous, Hunter has made possible the emergence of a unified and comparable battery of studies.¹³

But if Hunter has founded a comparative literature by standardizing the tools of production, he has further encouraged this output by organizing his production line so as to accommodate the part-time laborer and the semi-skilled worker. Like Henry Ford, Hunter has found the secret of mass production; and today's builder of community power models no longer need build each model over an attenuated time period, beginning labor with a refining of the raw materials. Unlike Hollingshead who was forced to live nearly two years with Elmtown's youth,¹⁴ or Vidich and Bensman who spent three years in "Small Town," piecing together one of the most fascinating of the recent power structure portrayals,¹⁵ Hunter's

(ed.), *Democracy in Jonesville* (1949); W. L. Warner and P. S. Lunt, *The Status System of a Modern Community* (1947); and an enlightening exchange in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 64 (1958), pp. 132-146; 146 ff. by O. D. Duncan and L. F. Schnore, "Cultural, Behavioral and Ecological Perspectives in the Study of Social Organization," and "Comment" by Peter Rossi.

⁷ Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (1953).

⁸ For example, the Lynds, *op. cit.*, and James West, *Plainville, USA* (1945).

⁹ Of special interest is the excellent study by M. Meyerson and Edward Banfield, *Politics, Planning, and The Public Interest* (1955), dealing with the choice of public housing sites in Chicago.

¹⁰ The most celebrated is probably C. W. Mills, *The Power Elite*. Also, his "The Middle Classes in Middle Sized Cities," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 11 (1946), pp. 520-529.

¹¹ G. A. Hillery, "Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement," *Rural Sociology*, Vol. 20 (1955), pp. 111-123.

¹² See Gideon Sjoberg, "Operationalism and Social Research," in L. Gross (ed.), *Symposium on Sociological Theory* (1959). Sjoberg offers an insightful analysis of the development of the operationalist concept, from its first formulations by Bridgman to its present day use.

¹³ This point is also made by Peter Rossi, "Power and Community Structure," *op. cit.*

¹⁴ August Hollingshead, *Elmtown's Youth* (1949).

¹⁵ Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Anchor Edition, 1960). Of special interest to political science is the blending of categories from Keynesian theory with a general theory of the psychology of social classes, to provide thereby a basis for examining the political

technicians are freed both from the need of residence in their community and from the need to create holistic studies. As commuters to their place of employment, their commitment and immersion may remain only partial. And, freed too from the time-span of participant-observation (or Dewey's "natural experiments") they can contribute to the growing literature by means of intermittent or short-term engagement, rather than full-time employment.

Like his area of concern, Hunter's tools are also forged from traditional materials. Essentially, they begin as a variant of the reporter's common and leading question: Who runs things around here? But where the journalist is concerned primarily with the here and now, the social scientist is concerned (among other things) with the *patterns* of the here and now; and for patterns to be perceived, considerable attention must be devoted to specification and possible replication. Thus, Hunter begins with the traditional question, compiling from obvious sources a large and preliminary list of putative community leaders: he relies for his information upon newspaper editors, political and civic leaders and the like. He then submits his basic list to a sample of knowledgeable persons and from their judgments identifies top community leaders. These leaders are then interviewed about their relations with other leaders, about their participation in community affairs, about the issues that concern them, etc. From their replies, and guided in part by concepts developed by the sociometrists, Hunter then pieces together his model of the community power structure.

The model, it must be admitted, is far from startling. It would be readily understood by a Lincoln Steffens or a John Gunther and might, in fact, have considerable congruence with one of their own construction.¹⁶ But a reporter and a social scientist have each his own method; and where the reporter, like an Indian in the forest, prides himself on being able to traverse ground without leaving footprints, it is the essence of Hunter's method that he makes each

of his steps sufficiently distinct to invite both disciples and critics to follow in hot pursuit.

ii

Hunter's critics, especially if they be political scientists, have several vantage points for fusillade. His definition of power (as operationally it must be) is fairly straightforward. Essentially, it is defined as the ability to move (or stop) men, goods, and services.¹⁷ This definition, while manageable for purposes of research, cannot but offend a discipline whose disputations over the meanings of that term are nourished by a literature that extends at least as far back as Plato's *Gorgias*.¹⁸ But even if the definition be taken on its own terms, Hunter's use of it is marred by several flaws. In the first place, Hunter himself is not completely faithful to the definition that he has married. For the phenomenon that he examines most directly in his study is not the *ability* to move men and goods, but public reputation as regards this ability. Here, Hunter is as methodologically vulnerable as the anthropologist who comes to study magic and ends by asking the village folk to point out the magicians. More precisely put, there is discontinuity in Hunter's method between the study of phenomena and epiphenomena, and though this gap will be examined more fully in later context, we note here that for many critics it stands as a chasm that can never be bridged.

Another flaw that attends Hunter's definition of power springs from the fact that his attempts at discovering the holders of power (the community power structure) smack of the self-fulfilling prophecy. For Hunter initially isolates those outwardly clothed with a reputation for power; and then, with scant surprise, discovers that this group adjudges its peers to possess the qualities of power. More, when the power leaders are then interviewed, it is even less of a surprise to discover that they are hard pressed to enumerate either issues or community action that they themselves have not disposed of effectively. And finally, given factors such as the "newsworthiness" of businessmen and their capacity for efficient voluntary

structure of the town and consequent political action. Among the dimensions of this action are the consequences of a small-town outlook for upstate-downstate political rivalry; and the development of psychological jurisdictions that supersede the legal.

¹⁶ See the incisive critique of Hunter by Victor Jones and Herbert Kaufman, "The Mystery of Power," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 19 (1954), pp. 205-212.

¹⁷ Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 2; see also his further analysis of his concepts and method, "Studying Association and Organization Structures," in R. Young (ed.), *op. cit.*

¹⁸ For a critique of three recent writers who define power see Charles S. Hyneman, *The Study of Politics* (1959), ch. 8; and for an examination of political consequences entailed in various definitions of power see David Spitz, *Democracy and the Challenge of Power* (1958).

organization, it is almost no surprise at all to discover—after the reputedly influential have reported on themselves—that there is remarkable continuity between the holders of political and economic power.

In this fashion, Hunter unveils a structure of community power that is essentially pyramidal, economic and—given the consensus, interaction and almost total control at the top—monolithic.^{18a} To political scientists, nourished on the traditions of pluralism, this pyramid does not readily articulate with their perception of the realities of power;¹⁹ nor, in fact, does the autarchy perceived by Hunter fit easily into the facts of the “new Federalism” and its outward spread of political and economic power.²⁰ Indeed, as Nelson Polsby suggests, if Hunter were to begin his power search with the perspectives of the pluralist, he might well have asked not, Who runs things here?, but instead, Does any-

one run things here?²¹ And having asked that question, he might have discovered that there are not one but several centers of power within the community. One such center of power might well be that of the formal political structure, and Hunter's failure to incorporate that structure in the upper reaches of his pyramid is regarded as one of the basic weaknesses of his model and the method that creates it.

Another basic weakness, and again, one that makes the model seem to slip the moorings of political reality, is Hunter's conception of power flowing from the top downward. There is little accommodation here for a Lewinian “field”²² of power, or for a sophisticated formulation of reciprocal influence.^{22a} In Hunter's pyramid, leaders lead, and followers follow; and if the model thus corresponds neither to the *apercus*

^{18a} More precisely, Hunter's pyramid is a coalition (or fusion) of leaders of several more specialized pyramids or “crowds”: economic, civic, etc.

¹⁹ See the informative and delightfully written critique of metropolitan analysis by Norton Long, “The Local Community as an Ecology of Games,” *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 64 (1958), pp. 251–261. Long is especially pithy when he sees community power studies, with their representations of a power elite, as satisfying man's urge for a demonic universe, in which worlds are made right by devils being in heaven's obverse. Robert Dahl has also attacked the general concept of a power elite; but his target is more Mills' than Hunter's; for Mills' elite is akin to the metaphysical ghosts that haunt both Bentley and T. D. Weldon, with no corporeal manifestations to be identified and measured in the manner required by the strictures of systematic social science. Robert Dahl, “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model,” this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (June, 1958), pp. 463–469. Dahl also transfers much of this same criticism to Hunter's later attempt to apply to the national “community” the methods that he developed for the study of local government. See *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22 (Feb. 1960), pp. 148–153.

²⁰ Cf. the *Report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations* (G.P.O., 1955); also, Arthur Maas (ed.), *Area and Power* (1959). Especially pertinent in the Maas volume is the view of an areal distribution of power corresponding to the value systems of a society. Cf. the theory of the nationalization of American politics by E. E. Schattschneider, “United States: The Functional Approach to Party Government,” in S. Neumann (ed.), *Modern Political Parties* (1956).

²¹ “Three Problems in the Analysis of Community Power,” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 24 (1959), pp. 796–803; and Polsby, “How to Study Power: The Pluralist Alternative,” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22 (August, 1960), pp. 474–484. Polsby and Wolfinger (op. cit.) are perhaps the most prolific and persuasive of Hunter's critics. The tightness of their argument is buttressed by their participation in the power study of New Haven undertaken under the direction of Robert Dahl. For a preview of the range of questions being asked about power leadership see Dahl, “Business and Politics: A Critical Appraisal of Political Science,” this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (March, 1959), pp. 1–34.

²² Hunter's refusal (in the interest of methodological clarity) to utilize related theoretical schemes makes for a barrenness and lack of serendipity that, happily, is disappearing from the work of a few of his followers. Thus the reader finds Hunter moving down Lewin's road but then refusing to exploit the possibilities inherent in such concepts as “field” (“Life Space”) cognitive structuring; and reference-group behavior. See Kurt Lewin, *Field Theory in Social Science* (1951); Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts* (1948); Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz, *Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences* (1953), esp. Part I. A very lucid overview of Lewin's several contributions is Morton Deutsch, “Field Theory in Social Psychology,” in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. I.

^{22a} See, for example, James March's formulation of closed and open loop systems, “An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence,” this REVIEW, Vol. 49 (June, 1955), pp. 431–451 and, of course, the writings of Harold Lasswell, in particular *Power and Society* (1950) (with Abraham Kaplan), esp. chs. 4–7.

of politics^{22b} nor the formulations of related theoretical systems (e.g., small group behavior, communications analysis²³) then the model and its method stand in serious difficulty.

These and other difficulties, in fact, cause several critics to deny outright that Hunter possesses an efficient rod for divining power structures; and, as a consequence of this denial, alternative methods of power-investigation continue to be created and put into use. But for all its flaws, Hunter's method has two ineluctably attractive qualities: its transportability and (as Madison Avenue might have it) its economy of operation. Thus, studies in the fashion of Hunter continue to appear, opening for view an expanded power-structure universe.

iii

It is reasonable to ask, therefore, given the criticism of the original study, whether this expanded universe does not also risk distorting the realities of the political process. Strict logic would have it so; but dialectic and empirical proofs are sometimes worlds apart,²⁴ and one (perhaps unanticipated) consequence²⁵ of these replicating studies is to produce empirical data that brace the methodological foundations of the original inquiry.

Thus, where the original study might readily be viewed as ahistorical, offering a view of the power structure that is both static and without the corroborating data of genetic explanation, one of Hunter's followers has circumvented

^{22b} On *apercus* of politics, Wolfinger, *op. cit.*, makes a telling point: that reputation for power is wed to the perceptive abilities of respondents and that man's perceptive vision is notoriously weak. The point, of course, is reinforced by a considerable body of psychological literature, especially that dealing with cognition: it being subject to distortion by the value structure of the perceiver and of the group whose norms he shares. Cf. Leon Festinger, *When Prophecy Fails* (1956) and footnote 22, above.

²³ See Paul Hare *et al.*, *Small Groups* (1955), esp., Part III, "The Group as a System of Social Interaction"; John Thibaut and Harold Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (1959), esp. Part II.; T. M. Newcomb, "Communicative Behavior," in R. Young (ed.), *op. cit.*; J. W. and M. W. Riley, "Mass Communication and the Social Structure," in Robert Merton *et al.*, *Sociology Today*, *op. cit.*

²⁴ See Daniel Lerner, *Evidence and Inference* (1959), esp. the Introduction by Lerner.

²⁵ On the political sociology of "unanticipated consequences" see Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (1949).

these methodological limitations by completing a developmental analysis of the power structure of an Ohio town. Using documents and interviews Robert Schulze²⁶ has approximated the power structures of the present and of the recent past, and essentially concludes that the class basis and the political effectiveness of the power structure have been drastically altered as a result of the town's integration into a 'nationalized' economy and the resultant appearance of absentee ownership and a new managerial class that bears strong resemblance (in its rootlessness) to Whyte's "Organization Man." Where the local capitalism of an earlier period created a strong contiguity between political and economic power, today's centralized capital has created divergent types of power holders. Economic power holders become oriented (and subservient) to the outside business structure, and community political power comes to rest in the hands of the local professionals and small businessmen.

This study, for all its intrinsic fascination, does more than extend through historical analysis the explanatory power of Hunter's method. The study also evokes an increased confidence in the method itself by demonstrating the compatibility of its findings with several of the theories and concepts now extant in the social sciences: for example, the changing structure of business power as suggested by writers as diverse as Berle and Means and William Whyte.²⁷

This theoretical congruence shows itself again in studies that attempt to add cultural, ideological, and constitutional (governmental) dimensions to the original framework of inquiry. Where the absence of these dimensions weakens the original inquiry, Delbert Miller (for example) builds into his comparative study of an English and an American town a concern for society's traditional values and government

²⁶ "The Role of Economic Determinants in Community Power," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 23 (1958), pp. 3-9.

²⁷ Adolph Berle and Gardner Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (1932); William F. Whyte, *The Organization Man* (1956). Cf. Robert Brady, *Business as a System of Power* (1943). Somewhat out of the discourse of political science, but far more significant for suggesting theoretical congruence is the relationship of Schulze's study to the theory of structural differentiation that lies within the larger frame of functional analysis. See Alvin Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory," in I. Gross, *op. cit.*

structure.²⁸ Where the American power structure is largely business dominated, and employs government institutions to ratify its decisions, the English structure (with its relative absence of business domination) reflects that society's greater deference to the man of humane letters, and also tends to operate within the power margins of the formal machinery of government, a 112-member council whose numerous committees are the font of all political action.

And again, where the original Hunter study is made vulnerable by its monolithic power structure, Miller helps ease this difficulty by building into his conceptual scheme a "layering" of influential persons, distinguishing between the fairly numerous top (or potential) influentials and the key influentials: those of the larger group who are consistent leaders or who are galvanized into action by a particular issue and whose activity-tenure then corresponds to the life of the issue.²⁹ With this distinction between influentials, Miller also helps deflect criticism that might arise from those sociologists who would question the compatibility of Hunter's original inquiry with the flow of the theory generally regarded as central to

contemporary sociology: functional analysis.³⁰ More specifically, Hunter might well find himself lumped with political scientists, whose model of power is regarded as distorted by several sociologists, including Talcott Parsons. Parsons, in fact, suggests that the current political science view of power is a model of scarcity whose central tenet is that one man's gain of power is another's loss. As an alternative to this scarcity (or zero-sum) model, Parsons suggests that power be viewed functionally, in terms of its being employed (*ad hoc*) to maintain or disrupt the ongoing political system.³¹ And in shortest phrases, it is this same conception of power that seems to emerge from Miller's reconstitution of Hunter.

This list of empirical contributions to Hunter's method sweeps in several further directions. The compass will not be boxed, however, and only two of these further points will now be scanned. One of them concerns the testing of Hunter's model by invoking the yardstick of prediction. Imaginative researchers have approximated the power structures of at least two communities and have then sought to verify the accuracy of this power profile by using it to predict a future community decision.³² Working within the hypothetico-deductive process that frames modern empiricism, they have sought to explore phenomena not directly accessible to examination by probing epiphenomena.³³ Central to this probe is the

²⁸ "Industry and Community Power Structure: A Comparative Study of an American and an English City," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 23 (1958), pp. 9-15; and "Decision-Making Cliques in Community Power Structures: A Comparative Study of an American and an English City," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 64 (1958), pp. 299-310. The political scientist may incline toward restiveness here, for these studies omit several of the bricks and wattles of political analysis. For example, the possible relationship between the British (unitary) system of government and the activities of town government is overlooked. More sensitive to the dimension of power-centralization is a study of a Mexican town, O. Klapp and V. Padgett, "Power Structure and Decision Making in a Mexican Border City," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 65 (1960), pp. 400-406. A special concern for the effects of values on the power structure is also found in a comparative study of an American and a Mexican city by William Form and William D'Antonio, "Integration and Cleavage among Community Influentials in Two Border Cities," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 24 (1959), pp. 804-814.

²⁹ Miller, *op. cit.* This layering is akin to what Peter Rossi describes as a caucus type of power structure; see his *Power and Community Structure*, *op. cit.*

³⁰ This judgment of the centrality of functional analysis comes from several sources, for example, Gideon Sjoberg in an illuminating study: *The Preindustrial City* (1960). Pertinent to the present essay are chapters 5, 7, 8, dealing with social class, economic structure, and political structure.

³¹ This, and a considerable range of problems significant to political science, are explored in S. M. Lipset, "Political Sociology," in Merton, *op. cit.* For Parsons directly on the problems of political science, see his essays: "Some Highlights of the General Theory of Action," in R. Young (ed.) *op. cit.*; and "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Political System," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur Broadbeck (eds.), *American Voting Behavior* (1959). Also, William Mitchell, "The Polity and Society: A Structural-Functional Analysis," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. II (Nov. 1958), pp. 403-420.

³² See Robert C. Hanson, "Predicting a Community Decision: A Test of the Miller-Form Theory," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 24 (1959), pp. 662-671.

³³ The problem of finding examinable indexes (or manifestations) of social processes becomes increasingly important to the social sciences as

creation of a chain of extrapolated hypotheses which, in the case at hand, logically proceeded as follows: *If* power structure does determine community action; and *if* this structure reflects the wishes of top influentials; and *if* these influentials (identified by Hunter's method) can be sounded as to their views and their degree of involvement; and if these views (and attendant intensity) can be measured . . . [and so on, down the corridors of interior monologue, until an operational hypothesis is finally framed]: *then*, a specified degree of demand by top influentials will result in a specific political decision (approved by a specified proportion of the voters). In both of these studies (carried out, by the way, independently) the predicted community response was borne out with remarkable accuracy—in one study, within only one percentage point. And in this fashion, the accuracy of the original power structure is affirmed in the crucible of prediction.

they move from a study of institutions whose empirical referents are closer at hand, and thus more "concrete," to patterns of behavior whose empirical referent is increasingly abstracted. (For example, as sociology has moved from a study of family, church, etc. to problems such as stratification; and as political science has moved from what Leiserson describes as a reification of the state to the *processes* of politics. Avery Leiserson, *Parties and Politics* (1958), esp. chs. 1-3.)

The physical sciences have a long tradition of epiphenomenal examination, as James Conant demonstrates in several of his historical studies of science. See, for example, his reconstruction of Pascal's attempt to demonstrate by hypothetico-deduction that air has weight: If air has weight, it will be less heavy above the earth than close to it; if it is less heavy above, then it ought not to move a column of mercury on a mountain as high as it moves the barometric column at sea-level. And so on, down the chain of extrapolations, until the now celebrated experiment in which a tube of mercury is carried to the top of the Puy de Dome. James B. Conant, *On Understanding Science* (Mentor Ed., 1958), pp. 41-73; *Modern Science and Modern Man* (1952). Also see Hans Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy* (1951) and N. R. Hanson, *Patterns of Scientific Discovery* (1958).

Lest the method of the extrapolated hypotheses be discounted for use in political science, it might be noted here that much of the success of V. O. Key's demonstration of ideological, historical and other relationships within southern politics proceeds by use (*sub silentio*) of this method. The chain of extrapolations is especially strong in chapter 3. See V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (1950).

And finally, the Hunter model is strengthened by evidence that helps deny the charge that its conceptual frame is self-fulfilling. Were this so, then subsequent studies should have uncovered only similar structures of community power. But the hard facts are that the findings are mixed. Hunter's own subsequent study of power in Salem fulfills the critic's prediction of a "covert determination of community policies by a politically homogeneous economic and social elite."³⁴ So too, within a reasonable degree, do studies of a Texas and a Pacific city.³⁵ But other studies have found no such pyramid.³⁶ Robert Schulze finds none for present-day Cibola.³⁷ A Negro subcommunity reveals no pyramid; nor does a Mexican border town.³⁸ And in each of two comparative studies, one community is observed to contain the familiar power structure, while its mate does not.³⁹

iv

Perhaps this methodological controversy can be brought to bay by noting that much of the

³⁴ Floyd Hunter, *et al.*, *Community Organization: Action and Inaction* (1956). The quotation, directed as a criticism of Hunter, is from Nelson Polsby, "Three Problems in the Analysis of Community Power," *op. cit.*, p. 803.

³⁵ Form and D'Antonio, *op. cit.*; Miller, *op. cit.*

³⁶ Form and D'Antonio, *op. cit.*, suggest the possibility that the "shape" of the power structure may be a response to the value structure of the community. (See note 39, below) And with this suggestion, the game is once again afoot. Can the power profiles of specific studies be checked against the "style" of community life? Hunter's regional city is set in a section of the country where hierarchy is traditional; so too, his study of New England. Texas, with its oil and cattle baron traditions, is consonant with our check list; but Pacific city is not. Etc.

³⁷ Schulze, *op. cit.*

³⁸ E. T. A. Barth and B. Abu-Laban, "Power Structure and the Negro Subcommunity," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 24 (1959), pp. 69-76; Klapp and Padgett, *op. cit.*

³⁹ Form and D'Antonio, *op. cit.*, and Miller, *op. cit.* Also, Klapp and Padgett, *op. cit.* These studies, dealing with English, Mexican and American communities, reinforce the proposition that such pyramidal aspects of American power structures (as do exist) reflect the American business ideology and pattern of political decentralization; while the nationalization of political life in Mexico and England, plus a lesser concern for the business ethic there are integrated with non-economic power structures.

critics' quarrel with Hunter lies not so much with his method as with the conceptual linkage that girds it: (a) power for Hunter is social action, but given the difficulties of measuring that action directly, it is to be investigated by examining reputation for social action (*i.e.*, it is to be investigated through its manifestations, through epiphenomena); (b) social action is a response to a confluence of influential persons; and (c) influentials can be catalogued both by outsiders and themselves. From this perspective, the question addressed to Hunter becomes a question common to all empirical research: to what degree does a conceptual apparatus distort the reality with which it purports to deal?

Any answer requires acknowledging the proposition that every conceptual scheme (as a device for ordering and gathering data) distorts, necessarily and intentionally. There can be no perfectly valid conceptual schemes; only those whose distorting action is lesser rather than greater, or is more or less useful for the analytical purpose in view.⁴⁰ More than this, any answer must also acknowledge that all empirical research utilizes some form of epiphenomena (*i.e.*, manifestations, indexes) of the central phenomena, whether it involves the use of voting statistics to reveal the existence of a

(one-, two-, etc.) party system or the use of bubbles in a liquid to reveal atomic construction. In fact, as political science has sought to move from description of more or less concrete institutions to an examination of political processes, it has been increasingly forced to rely upon examinable indexes of these processes. And in so using these indexes, the problem arises as to how fully representative and reliable they are of the phenomena being probed.⁴¹

In these terms, then, the question of Hunter's critics is two-fold: First, how valid is the relationship between power in possession and power by ascription? And second, as a device for gathering data significant to the phenomena under study, how efficient is Hunter's conceptual scheme? That is, how complete a range of significant data does it sweep before it, and what variables significant to power structure escape the conceptual net?

The charge of Hunter's critics, of course, is that his conceptual scheme provides insufficient linkage between phenomena and epiphenomena (*i.e.*, between power in possession and power by ascription); and that this linkage, even if tightened, would not be sufficient to probe the full range of data connected with community power. In sum, the Hunter scheme is to be rejected: first, for its narrowness of scope;⁴² second, by reason of the concepts that it offers as equivalents and manifestations of community power; and third, by the weakness of the logical chain (*i.e.*, extrapolated hypotheses) that seeks to connect power in possession with power by ascription.

Here then, and in terms of a conceptual scheme, is the ground of argument that separates Hunter's followers from his critics. But unfortunately for the argument the validation of conceptual schemes is rarely direct. Sometimes competing schemes can be compared for the "fit" of the results to other patterns of knowledge.⁴³ More often, however, validation must take place over time, as succeeding re-

⁴⁰ The problems of distortion and scope are perennial and persistent. They have probably been most fully fought over in historical explanation, especially since the advent of Ranke's historicism. When, for example, the conceptual scheme utilizes Weberian "ideal types" the attendant problem becomes that of determining to what degree the types are concrete and to what degree analytic. See the treatment of this problem by Don Martindale, "Sociological Theory and the Ideal Type," in Gross, *op. cit.* Cf. the discussion of concrete and analytic structures in Richard Snyder, "A Decision-Making Approach to the Study of Political Phenomena," in R. Young, *op. cit.* When the conceptual scheme is no more than a metaphor, these problems are not more easily disposed of: they are merely brought more readily to the forefront of discussion. See the informative introduction to Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (Vintage ed., 1952). Cf. the "styles" of history laid out in Hans Meyerhoff, *The Philosophy of History in Our Time* (1959). Perhaps the most aphoristic statement of the problem, however, is contained in the evocation and caveat of Pollock and Maitland: "Such is the unity of all history that anyone who endeavors to tell a piece of it must feel that his first sentence tears a seamless web. . . ." On the place of the conceptual scheme in political science see Vernon Van Dyke, *Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis* (1960), chs. 6, 9.

⁴¹ On testing of epiphenomena, see footnote 33, above, and its related text.

⁴² See note 21, above, and Polsby's references to the attempt of the Dahl study to encompass the fullest possible range of significant variables.

⁴³ Processing the same data through competing conceptual schemes is, surprisingly, a rare operation in political science. A highly interesting example is Roland Young's two books on Congress. The first is a relatively unstructured description; the second, an attempt to examine Congress through the lenses of systems analysis and equilibrium processes. Roland Young, *This is Congress* (1946); and *The American Congress* (1958).

search seeks for the ability of a central conceptual scheme to generate an increasing range of hypotheses for which disproof is not available, and to offer theories that relate to the phenomena being probed.⁴⁴ In some measure, and as suggested earlier, this developmental validation of Hunter is now taking place. Moreover, the possibility also exists that the chain of extrapolated hypotheses can be tightened, both for completed and future "Hunter" studies. For example, given the charge of weak linkage between the initial and terminal concepts (*i.e.*, between reputation for power and power), it may be possible to clarify some "midway" concepts (such as capacity for power) and then attempt to discover corroborating evidence of this capacity. And in similar fashion, it seems quite feasible to bolster several aspects of the conceptual scheme by seeking for such corroborating evidence as might be found through election data and the disposition of political issues.^{44a}

⁴⁴ The controlling reference is Karl Mannheim's concept of the sociology of knowledge as found, mainly, in *Ideology and Utopia* (Harvest ed., 1936). See also John Madge, *The Tools of Social Science* (1953), esp. ch. 1; and Sidney Hook, "Naturalism and First Principles," in Sidney Hook (ed.), *American Philosophers at Work*. Mannheim's central concerns are the social processes. Using the perspectives of quantum mechanics and Cambridge philosophy, Norwood Hanson, *op. cit.*, presents a lucid examination of developmental validation for the physical sciences. See especially his chapter V on the validation of the theories of Newtonian mechanics. For an anthropologist's view of this matter see Leslie White, *The Science of Culture* (1949), esp. chs. 1 and 5.

^{44a} Hunter's original study, in fact, contains data that constitute corroborating evidence for his power structure. The study, for example, treats the disposition of political issues; the relationship of status to power; and further builds an anecdotal chain that reinforces basic conclusions. Admittedly, neither Hunter nor many of his followers exploit the full possibilities of such data; but it also must be said that they are in the presence of a mode of verification that, while traditional to the social sciences, demands the most careful use of inference. This mode of verification, familiar to historians and lawyers as the "weight of evidence," has severe limitations; but it does occupy an honorable place in the broad spectrum of verification. It is separated in degree, but not absolutely, from such methods as the laboratory experiment (cell design) and concomitant variation. And essentially, this separation is marked by the degree of probability that

At the moment, and given the controversy that embroils the Hunter studies, an ultimate conclusion as to their merits is not readily reached. The possibilities for their developmental validation do not, by any means, overturn the arguments of the critics, but this potential does nevertheless suggest that community power studies are not now to be written off because of methodological failure. Indeed, for political scientists, accustomed as they are to working with epiphenomena, there may be a considerable reluctance to deny the connection between a structure of power and a structure of power reputation. Or, to put the matter in more positive vein, the power data now being accumulated by Hunter's method ought be viewed as a mound of smelter's ore, offering promise of further refinement and use.

II

But if these studies are not to be rejected on methodological grounds, how shall they be received on substantive grounds? To repeat an earlier query: do they merely restate the commonplace, rediscovering land already charted; or do they extend the boundaries of our political map? Several levels of answers suggest themselves.⁴⁵

On the first level, consider the proposition (presumably more widely accepted by sociologists than political scientists) that documentation of the commonplace is far from a commonplace accomplishment: rather, it represents an important first victory in the battle to impose on data some system and order. And more, as the authors of the *American Soldier* demonstrate, the rewards of testing the commonplace are often uncommon rewards; for a presumably governing rule, once examined, may emerge as the deviant case.⁴⁶ Robert Merton, in fact, gives the matter of the misplaced commonplace some fairly neat dimensions, when he writes of the systematic investigator:

binds the association of factors being examined—with the highest probability generally assigned to association emerging from cell design verification. Thus, it may be possible for a sympathetic critic to re-work Hunter (and some of his followers), attempting to bolster his "sociometrics" with the evidence that lies within his more general community description.

⁴⁵ On the problems of extending the map of political knowledge see Harold Lasswell, "Strategies of Inquiry: The Rational Use of Observation," in Daniel Lerner, ed.; *The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences* (1959).

⁴⁶ See the trenchant essay by Paul Lazarsfeld in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 13 (1949).

Should his systematic inquiry only confirm what had been widely assumed . . . he will of course be charged with 'laboring the obvious.' He becomes tagged as a bore, telling only what everybody knows. Should investigation find that widely held social beliefs are untrue . . . he is a heretic, questioning value-laden verities. If he ventures to examine socially implausible ideas that turn out to be untrue, he is a fool, wasting effort on a line of inquiry not worth pursuing in the first place. And finally, if he should turn up some implausible truths, he must be prepared to find himself regarded as a charlatan, claiming as knowledge what is patently false.⁴⁷

i

Closer to the hand of political science however, is the possibility that while any single one of these power studies may seem only to pile a stone on Pelion, a battery of these and related studies may offer an opportunity for laying out a range of specified and determinate forms of community power. Sociologists, especially those who have been making community power studies, have been fairly slow in exploiting this opportunity; but political scientists, trained in a different tradition, may have a more ready use for data that suggest the development of an area of comparative local government. Thus, as empirical instances multiply, it becomes possible to create a typology of community power, ranging from the monolith to the polyolith. And, as data accumulate regarding the context into which these power types are embedded, it also may become possible to relate, with considerable specificity, a power structure type to a specified political (and social) nexus.

To say, however, that Power Structure, type A, is generally associated with a particular cluster of other social patterns is not, of course, to lay claim to the facile isolation of efficient cause. Causality, in truth, is a word all but banished from the discourse of science.⁴⁸ As the physical scientist now speaks in terms of a universe of probabilities,⁴⁹ the political scientist—largely through familiarity with concomitant variation—accustoms himself to speak of

association and correlation; and the sociologist, with richer methodological apparatus, makes use of functional analysis: a specifying of determinate relationships in terms of the contribution that one range of phenomena makes to the maintenance of a total phenomenal system.⁵⁰ But however this structuring of social patterns is viewed, one comment emerges with considerable clarity: that with this structuring we approach one of political science's quintessential goals, the discovery of significant (and reciprocal) relations between political institutions and their larger social context.

A concern for these relationships is, of course, one of the oldest traditions of political science, stretching through time from contemporaries such as MacIver back to Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* and Aristotle's *Politics*. But to the degree that these attempts may be held to represent only a limited success, it was in terms of their inability or refusal to move from broadly conceived patterns to a series of specified and determinate relationships. This refusal may, in fact, explain why a range of modern textbooks in comparative government—seeking specification of determinate relationships—abandoned the "grand tradition" and contented themselves with trying to squeeze inferences out of a somewhat simplistic (and misshapen) application of J. S. Mill's cell

⁵⁰ The literature on functional analysis is extensive. An originating exposition is Robert Merton, "Manifest and Latent Functions," in his *Social Theory and Social Structure* (1949). See also the essay by Alvin Gouldner, *op. cit.*; and the treatment given in Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff (eds.), *Modern Sociological Theory* (1957). Related theories are systems analysis and equilibrium analysis. Two especially useful essays are: James G. Miller, "A General Theory for Behavioral Science," *American Psychologist*, Vol. 10 (1955); and David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, Vol. 9 (1957), pp. 383-400.

For critical comments on functionalism see Carl Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in Gross, *op. cit.*, and Kingsley Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 24 (1959), pp. 757-772.

Of special pertinence to political science is the potential of functional analysis for offering a mode of verification for relationships that are not quantifiable. Talcott Parsons goes so far as to suggest that functional analysis may stand as a substitute for the mathematics that makes possible "simultaneous dynamic analysis of several variables in a complex system." See his *Essays in Sociological Theory* (1949), ch. 2.

⁴⁷ Robert Merton, "Notes on Problem Finding in Sociology," in *Sociology Today*, *op. cit.*, pp. xv-xvi.

⁴⁸ See the argument in Robert MacIver, *Social Causation* (1942). On physical science's abandonment of questions framed as "why," see E. N. Andrade, *An Approach to Modern Physics* (1957); cf. the chapter on causality in Hanson, *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ See Morris Cohen, *A Preface to Logic* (1956), esp. chs. 6-8.

design.⁵¹ And the restricted value in both the grand tradition and the attempt at "cell comparisons," may further explain why more recent writings in the field of comparative national government have attempted to break new ground by creating typologies similar to those suggested here, and by proceeding to correlations and functional connections again in a fashion similar to that suggested here for the study of local government.⁵²

Thus, the possibility emerges that the comparative study of both domestic local govern-

⁵¹ Cf. Mill's method of difference, and (by way of example) the suggestion that party differences in England and the French Third Republic are to be accounted for by the instrument of dissolution in England (and not in France). See J. S. Mill, *A System of Logic* (1842); and the glosses to be found in Ernest Greenwood, *Experimental Sociology* (1945), especially ch. 1; and Paul Hatt and William Goode, *Methods in Social Research* (1952), chs. 6 and 7.

⁵² For example, Fred Riggs' useful attempt to proceed to analysis by way of Weber's ideal types, "Agraria and Industria—Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," in William Siffin (ed.), *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration* (1957); and David Apter's "box-filling" structural-functional analysis, "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 64 (1958), pp. 221-237. The enlightening essays of Gabriel Almond are especially pertinent here. See for example, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18 (1956), pp. 391-409. A recent textbook using a form of functional analysis is Samuel Beer, Adam Ulam, et al., *Patterns of Government* (1958).

Richly suggestive is the comparative method used by anthropological linguists who can play a kind of "twenty questions" game designed to identify certain basic linguistic characteristics; and then, on the basis of known correspondences ("patterns of structural associations") can usually explain (i.e., predict) the remaining language features with considerable accuracy. See a description of this comparative method by Clyde Kluckhohn, "Common Humanity and Diverse Cultures," in Daniel Lerner, *The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences* (1959); also, Roger Brown, *Words and Things* (1960).

To suggest still another theoretical congruence: to develop power-structure syndromes by utilizing comparative perspectives would also create certain interesting parallels with theories of art form (and styles) developed by art historians. See, for example, Erwin Panofsky, *Meaning in the Visual Arts* (1957), esp. ch. 2.

ment and national systems of government may now proceed upon similar methodological dimensions. And for a discipline that seeks to stretch itself taut on the principle of parsimony, this continuity of subject and method, between the molar and molecular units of political science, emerges as an emancipating prospect.⁵³

ii

Given the typology of power types inchoate in the literature, it is possible even now—if one proceeds in simple Baconian fashion—to attempt retroductive leaps from a variety of power types to a laying out of the social situations that support each of these power forms.⁵⁴ Thus, by way of example, the monolithic structure seems generally associated with the relatively small, socially homogeneous community. But for a more systematic structuring of social patterns, it will probably be necessary to create not one but at least two typological sets: one representing the range of power types and the other, the range of community structures. Like scales imprinted on a slide rule, these typological sets may then be matched and manipulated and their (putative) relationships hypothesized. And if the present data be insufficient to support the supposed relationships, then additional data can be sought and gathered. The use of these typological sets can, in fact, serve one of the important purposes of any theoretical system: that of pointing to gaps in knowledge and thus serving as a fairly efficient tool for gathering new data.⁵⁵

But if this slide rule metaphor suggests an efficient hypothetical tool, it also suggests that the community power literature may not now be sufficiently rich to yield a full-blown typology of community contexts (as contrasted with a typology of power structure). To aid in overcoming this poverty, the political scientist might bring into play data that, by their cen-

⁵³ Political scientists striving for reductionism would not consider a unit of government as molecular. Their concerns for the "atoms" of politics lead them to conceptual frameworks such as power, decision-making, and group bases. On parsimony in general see R. B. Braithwaite, *Scientific Explanation* (1953), p. 67.

⁵⁴ On retroduction, see Hanson, *op. cit.*, pp. 85ff.

⁵⁵ Cf. William Goode and Paul Hatt, *op. cit.*, p. 12: "Since theory summarizes the known facts and predicts facts which have not yet been observed, it must also point to areas which have not yet been explored . . . the simple fact of prediction suggests where to test our knowledge."

trality to his discipline, have been richly worked. Thus, the political scientist can offer both extensive description and some systematic generalization of party types, ranging from the one-party community to the multi-party community, with points between corresponding to party types such as the boss-dominated machine or a system of factions within the single party system.⁵⁶

Another and related typological scale readily offered by political science might be constructed upon a dimension of democratic participation, ranging from "closed" communities (i.e., those that deny access to the political process) to those of free and open participation. A third such typological scale might be ranged upon a metropolitan dimension, from communities constituting part of a metropolitan grouping to "isolated" rural towns. And a fourth, and very obvious scale, might move upon one of the dimensions of political institutions: for example, a scale of concentrated executive power, moving from city manager, short-ballot towns to weak-mayor, long ballot cities.

This listing of typological scales is, of course, only suggestive; much needs to be done to refine them and rid them of residual crust. Moreover, the list will be made more meaningful and systematic as it is stretched to include sociological data, especially those dealing with social stratification. One of the most insightful students of community power literature, Peter Rossi, has in fact already constructed a loose set of typological scales that lays types of community power over against data pertaining to social stratification, role-taking (of public officials) and selected political arrangements, such as the short ballot and non-partisan elections.⁵⁷ And while it would be unfair to impoverish Rossi's insights by summary, three of his

hypotheses may serve to illustrate the potential of typological analysis for developing this sought-for range of specified and determinate relationships:

1. A homogeneous middle class community will have a monolithic power structure, inasmuch as a class basis does not exist for organizing a structure of countervailing power.

2. Polythitic power structures will be found to reflect a heterogeneous community, in which higher status groups have historically resorted to developing voluntary (civic) organizations as a device for playing off the political power of lower status groups.

3. Prescriptive structuring of political institutions (e.g., the short ballot, non-partisan elections) is associated with sociologically heterogeneous communities, whose lower-class numerical predominance is politically thwarted by use of these prescriptive arrangements.

Rossi's propositions (especially as limned here) are not wholly satisfying, for they blend too smoothly *explicans* and *explicandum*. Any further analysis, however, would require cutting into their intervening hypotheses; but if nothing else, they further illustrate the proposition that any laying out of a range of reciprocally associated variables also purveys a level of explanation.

Of the making of explanations, of course, there is no end; especially if we adopt the view increasingly held by physical and social scientists that explanation is merely that which causes the inquiring mind to come, temporarily, to rest.⁵⁸ And with this perspective, the chain of the present essay can be severed with a penultimate comment: that the pattern of community power studies gives promise of following the development of voting behavior studies.

Those studies first burst upon us by way of identifying a series of fairly constant relationships between voting patterns and socio-economic categories. At first, the studies were criticized as doing little more than restating the political behavior familiar to every salt-earning politician. Later, as the categorical relationships were increasingly made more specific and determinate, they passed from folk lore into fact, carrying with them a fair level

⁵⁶ J. Leiper Freeman builds an interesting typology of party systems in "Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations and a Case Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 64 (1958), pp. 282-289. His basic dimensions are stability and cohesion.

⁵⁷ Peter Rossi, "Power and Community Structure," *op. cit.*

Another and highly interesting typological series is developed by E. T. A. Barth and S. D. Johnson, "Community Power and a Typology of Social Issues," *Social Forces*, Vol. 38 (1957), pp. 29-33. This typology, growing out of a pilot study, employs five dimensions of social issues: uniqueness, saliency to political leaders, saliency to publics, possibilities for effective action, cosmopolitan qualities of the issue.

⁵⁸ See Harvey C. Mansfield, "Research in Public Administration," in Dwight Waldo (ed.), *The Research Function of University Bureaus and Institutes for Government-Related Research* (1960), p. 20. Cf. Hanson, *op. cit.*, ch. 3, for a physicist's view; and Gardner Murphy, *Human Potentialities* (1958), Part III, for a psychologist's view of "The Yen to Discovery."

of explanatory power.⁵⁹ However, it is only a temporary rest that is upon us, for the next level of analysis is already well under way: that of narrowing the residual content of the literature's categories by way of a search for intervening variables of political, psychological, and ideological dimensions.⁶⁰

III

For the student of local government, however, perhaps the most arresting dimension of community power studies may lie in the promise they hold for providing new answers to some very old questions. These are the questions thrust at the political scientist by an interested citizenry seeking reform of local government: What are the advantages of the manager form of government over the mayor form? Should a city council be large or small? Should it be elected at large or by wards? Which is better, partisan or non-partisan elections? Shall local elections coincide with national elections? Etc. The list of questions is extensive; their form is specific.

The political scientist of local government yearns to follow the prescription of Lasswell that he be a policy scientist;⁶¹ and he yearns

too, to emulate his brethren in the White House and the Pentagon. If hard pressed by a waiting community he may attempt to build for it a generalized decision-making model, using, for example, the blueprints of Karl Popper.⁶² The value parts of the model are more or less known; so too, the ultimate goals. But the ability to project the consequences of specific reforms, the central mechanism, is nowhere available, for the evidence that would support such projection is largely unobtainable. At best, and if the community persists, he can do no more than stretch what evidence he does have beyond the grounds of safe inference.

With the coming of community power studies, however, this ineffectuality may change—providing, of course, that the political scientist learns to ask of this literature its proper questions. And to this end, he might do well to follow the advice of another creator of detective stories, the historian R. G. Collingwood, who suggests that we shall never know who killed John Doe if we merely ask that self-same question over and over again.⁶³ Instead, he cautions, we must ask new and related questions whose answers increasingly narrow the range of possible answers to the central question. In these terms, and with reference to community power studies, our central question now becomes: What are the functional consequences of institutional reform for the local power structure? If the manager form is generally associated with a homogeneous community and an attendant pyramid of power, will the introduction of this form work to

⁵⁹ In addition to the by-now familiar studies themselves, there are several excellent summaries and analyses: Peter Rossi, "Four Landmarks in Voting Research," in Burdick and Broadbeck, *op. cit.*; S. M. Lipset, P. Lazarsfeld, *et al.*, "The Psychology of Voting: Analysis of Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey, *op. cit.*, Vol. II; Clinton Rossiter, *Politics and Parties in America* (1960).

⁶⁰ See Robert Lane, *Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics* (1960); Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (1959) and the essays, largely of psychological dimension, in Burdick and Broadbeck, *op. cit.* For an outrageously witty, and *vice versa*, review by an anti-positivist, see the essay by Walter Berns in the *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 3 (August 1957). Stimulating essays on the directions being taken by those who are now emptying residual categories are to be found in Waldo, *op. cit.*, especially the articles by Peter Odegard, Avery Leiserson, and Frank Pinner. See also the latest voting study by Angus Campbell, Philip Converse *et al.*, *The American Voter* (1960); and some cautionary advice by V. O. Key, "The Politically Relevant in Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (Spring, 1960), pp. 54-61.

⁶¹ See, for example, Harold Lasswell's presidential address, "The Political Science of Science," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (Dec. 1956), pp. 961-977; and Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner

(eds.), *The Policy Sciences* (1951). Cf. Max Millikan, "Inquiry and Policy: The Relation of Knowledge to Action," in Daniel Lerner (ed.), *The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences* (1959).

⁶² Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies* (1952), Vol. II, pp. 96 ff. For another generalized model, see Harold Lasswell, "Technic of Decision Seminars," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 14 (Aug. 1960), pp. 213-236.

⁶³ R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Galaxy ed., 1956), pp. 266 ff. Collingwood writes a delightful pastiche of the detective story, using it to suggest that historical evidence is akin to the detective's evidence; and that answers to historical questioning proceed by asking "a new question every time" (p. 273).

That proper questioning is a requisite of proper knowledge is explored more fully by the logical positivists and their related schools; see, for example, A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic* (Dover ed.) and Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge* (1956).

change that structure? Or, will the structure prove dysfunctional to the form and render it impotent? Is council election by wards functional to a fragmented power structure and perhaps heterogeneous community; and if so, what will be the consequences for that structure of election at large? Will a system of non-partisan elections work to fortify a waning structure of pyramidal power; and will the introduction of a greater degree of professionalization (*i.e.*, merit system) within the government serve that same end?⁶⁴ These questions can be multiplied; at the moment, however,

⁶⁴ It is suggested that these questions will be answered most fully through the manipulative typologies described above. They will also get partial and highly useful answers simply from the amassing of the evidence that pertains to them. This conclusion is, in fact, buttressed by a reading of three recent and stimulating publications: Eugene Lee, *The Politics of Nonpartisanship* (1960); Robert Salisbury, "St. Louis Politics: Relationships Among Interests, Parties and Governmental Structure," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 13 (June, 1960), pp. 498-507; and Robert Wood, *Suburbia* (1959). Wood's study helps document the range of relationships between integrated power structures and community social integration; Lee's study suggests some of the relationships between non-partisan elections and upper-class political domination; and Salisbury helps document the relationship between power structure and a particular institutional structure (city-county quasi-consolidation).

they are only suggestive and heuristic. But if community power studies be carefully followed, an elusive quarry may yet be caught.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ The language employed in the text above is deliberately traditional. To speak of the introduction of a manager system as "working" change is seemingly to turn one's back upon prior strictures against assuming an easy chain of causation. More precise language would require some statement to the effect that a change in one institution may reveal some concomitant changes in other institutions, changes that are associated with a network of intervening variables. But the problem raised here is only partially that of language: to "banish" causality from discourse is not to hide from the fact that changes do take place, *i.e.*, that a system is thrown out of equilibrium. Nor does this banishment dissolve the fact that in a situation of change, certain factors are more proximate to the change than are others. The problem, for the social scientist who would also be policy advisor, is: (a) to work with the recognition that any mechanistic view of change requires a mode of proof that is impossibly rigorous; but (b) to make such reasonable inferences from his patterns of association as will satisfy the needs of social action. In the familiar example of infinite regression John Doe shoots Mary Roe. What shall be identified as the "cause" of her death: A ruptured spleen? A wad of lead? A pervious skin? A gun? or John Doe's trigger finger? Etc. A political scientist who votes to hang the finger might, at very least, find future demand for his services considerably diminished.

THE ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT IN METROPOLITAN AREAS: A THEORETICAL INQUIRY

VINCENT OSTROM, CHARLES M. TIEBOUT AND ROBERT WARREN*

Allusions to the "problem of metropolitan government" are often made in characterizing the difficulties supposed to arise because a metropolitan region is a legal non-entity. From this point of view, the people of a metropolitan region have no general instrumentality of government available to deal directly with the range of problems which they share in common. Rather there is a multiplicity of federal and state governmental agencies, counties, cities, and special districts that govern within a metropolitan region.

This view assumes that the multiplicity of political units in a metropolitan area is essentially a pathological phenomenon. The diagnosis asserts that there are too many governments and not enough government. The symptoms are described as "duplication of functions" and "overlapping jurisdictions." Autonomous units of government, acting in their own behalf, are considered incapable of resolving the diverse problems of the wider metropolitan community. The political topography of the metropolis is called a "crazy-quilt pattern" and its organization is said to be an "organized chaos." The prescription is reorganization into larger units—to provide "a general metropolitan framework" for gathering up the various functions of government. A political system with a single dominant center for making decisions is viewed as the ideal model for the organization of metropolitan government. "Gargantua" is one name for it.¹

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¹ The term is taken from Robert C. Wood, "The New Metropolis: Green Belts, Grass Roots or Gargantua," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (March, 1958), pp. 108-122. Wood defines gargantua as "the invention of a single metropolitan government or at least the establishment of a regional

The assumption that each unit of local government acts independently without regard for other public interests in the metropolitan community has only a limited validity. The traditional pattern of government in a metropolitan area with its multiplicity of political jurisdictions may more appropriately be conceived as a "polycentric political system."² "Polycentric" connotes many centers of decision-making which are formally independent of each other. Whether they actually function independently, or instead constitute an interdependent system of relations, is an empirical question in particular cases. To the extent that they take each other into account in competitive relationships, enter into various contractual and cooperative undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflicts, the various political jurisdictions in a metropolitan area may function in a coherent manner with consistent and predictable patterns of interacting behavior. To the extent that this is so, they may be said to function as a "system."

The study of government in metropolitan areas conceived as a polycentric political system should precede any judgment that it is pathological. Both the structure and the behavior of the system need analysis before any reasonable estimate can be made of its performance in dealing with the various public problems arising in a metropolitan community. Better analysis of how a metropolitan area is

superstructure which points in that direction." We do not argue the case for big units *vs.* small units as Wood does in his discussion of gargantua *vs.* grass roots. Rather, we argue that various scales of organization may be appropriate for different public services in a metropolitan area.

² We use this term for want of a better one. An alternative term might be "multinucleated political system." We do not use "pluralism" because it has been preempted as a broader term referring to society generally and not to a political system in particular.

Polycentric political systems are not limited to the field of metropolitan government. The concept is equally applicable to regional administration of water resources, regional administration of international affairs, and to a variety of other situations.

governed can lead in turn to more appropriate measures of reorganization and reform.³

This paper is an initial effort to explore some of the potentialities of a polycentric political system in providing for the government of metropolitan areas. We view the "business" of governments in metropolitan areas as providing "public goods and services." The first section of the paper will examine the special character of these public goods and services.

We shall then turn to an analysis of the problems of scale in constituting the public organizations which provide them. This discussion seems relevant to an analysis of any political structure in a metropolitan area, and equally applicable to gargantua or to a polycentric political system. A brief reference will then be made to the problems of public organization in gargantua. Finally, patterns of organization in a polycentric political system will be analyzed with particular regard to the experience of the Los Angeles metropolitan area.

I. THE NATURE OF PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES

The conditions which give rise to public rather than private provision of certain goods and services are examined in this section. Three views of these conditions can usefully be distinguished: (1) public goods arising from efforts to control indirect consequences, externalities or spillover effects; (2) public goods provided because some goods and services cannot be packaged; and (3) public goods consisting of the maintenance of preferred states of community affairs.

The Control of Indirect Consequences as

³ By analogy, the formal units of government in a metropolitan area might be viewed as organizations similar to individual firms in an industry. Individual firms may constitute the basic legal entities in an industry, but their conduct in relation to one another may be conceived as having a particular structure and behavior as an industry. Collaboration among the separate units of local government may be such that their activities supplement or complement each other, as in the automobile industry's patent pool. Competition among them may produce desirable self-regulating tendencies similar in effect to the "invisible hand" of the market. Collaboration and competition among governmental units may also, of course, have detrimental effects, and require some form of central decision-making to consider the interests of the area as a whole. For a comprehensive review of the theory of industrial organization see Joe S. Bain, *Industrial Organization* (New York, 1959).

Public Goods. The basic criterion traditionally offered for distinguishing between public and private affairs was formulated some years ago by John Dewey: "... the line between private and public is to be drawn on the basis of the extent and scope of the consequences of acts which are so important as to need control whether by inhibition or by promotion."⁴ The indirect consequences of a transaction, which affect others than those directly concerned, can also be described as "externalities" or "spillover effects." Those indirectly affected are viewed as being external to the immediate transaction. Some externalities are of a favorable or beneficial nature; others are adverse or detrimental.

Favorable externalities can frequently be recaptured by the economic unit that creates them. The builder of a large supermarket, for example, may create externalities for the location of a nearby drugstore. If the builder of the supermarket also controls the adjacent land, he can capture the externalities accruing to the drugstore through higher rents or by common ownership of the two enterprises. From the builder's point of view he has "internalized"⁵ the externalities.⁶

Where favorable externalities cannot be internalized by private parties, a sufficient mechanism to proceed may be lacking, and public agencies may be called upon to provide a good or service. A privately owned park, even with an admission charge, may not be able to cover costs. If the externalities in the form of the dollar value of a better neighborhood could be captured, such a park might be profitable.

Unfavorable spillovers or externalities are another matter. The management of a refinery which belches out smoke has little incentive to install costly equipment to eliminate the smoke. Control or internalization of diseconomies usually falls upon public agencies. A function of government, then, is to internalize the externalities—positive and negative—for

⁴ John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York, 1927), p. 15.

⁵ John V. Krutilla and Otto Eckstein, *Multiple Purpose River Development: Studies in Applied Economic Analysis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), p. 69 ff. Krutilla and Eckstein develop the concept of "internalizing" external economies as a criterion for determining scale of a management unit in the administration of water resources.

⁶ In practice, shopping centers may also give favorable rents to large supermarkets as "traffic generators." This recognizes the externalities they create.

those goods which the producers and consumers are unable or unwilling to internalize for themselves, and this process of internalization is identified with the "public goods."

Not all public goods are of the same scale. Scale implies both the geographic domain and the intensity or weight of the externality. A playground creates externalities which are neighborhoodwide in scope, while national defense activities benefit a whole nation—and affect many outside it. Thus, for each public good there corresponds some "public." As John Dewey has formulated the definition, "the public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically provided for."⁷ The concept of the public is important to later considerations in determining the criteria of scale appropriate to public organizations.

Packageability. Public goods and services and, in turn, the functions of governments in metropolitan areas can be distinguished from private goods by a criterion commonly used by economists. A private good must be "packageable", i.e., susceptible of being differentiated as a commodity or service before it can be readily purchased and sold in the private market. Those who do not pay for a private good can then be excluded from enjoying its benefits. This notion is formulated by economists as the "exclusion principle."⁸ In contrast with Dewey's formulation of the nature of public goods, the exclusion principle focuses attention on the practicability of denying benefits. National defense, for example, will not be provided by private firms because, among other reasons, the citizen who did not pay would still enjoy the benefits. Furthermore, if citizens understate their preferences for defense—as by failing to build bomb shelters—on the assumption that it will be paid for by others, the result will be an inadequate provision for defense.

Most municipal public goods such as fire and police protection, or the abatement of air pollution, are not easily packageable, either; they cannot be sold only to those individuals who are willing to pay.⁹ This suggests two problems for public organizations.

First, private goods, because they are easily packageable, are readily subject to measure-

ment and quantification. Public goods, by contrast, are generally not so measurable. If more police are added to the force, output will presumably increase. But how much, is a question without an exact answer. Moreover, when factors of production can be quantified in measurable units of output, the production process can be subject to more rigorous controls. A more rational pricing policy is also possible. With quantifiable data about both input and output, any production process can be analyzed and the performance of different modes of production can be compared for their efficiency. Rational control over the production and provision of public goods and services therefore depends, among other things, upon the development of effective standards of measurement; this gets into the allocation of joint costs as well as of joint benefits.

A second, closely related, problem arises in the assessment of costs upon persons who can benefit without paying directly for the good. Only public agencies with their taxing powers can seek to apportion the costs of public goods among the various beneficiaries. The scale criterion of political representation, discussed below, takes account of how this difference between private and public goods affects the organization of public agencies.

Public Goods as the Maintenance of Preferred States of Community Affairs. The exclusion principle provides a criterion for distinguishing most public goods from private, but it does not, as commonly stated, clarify or specify the conditions which determine the patterns of organization in the public service economy. However, by viewing public goods as "the maintenance of preferred states of community affairs," we may introduce a modified concept of packageability, one that is amenable to some measurement and quantification, and that therefore may be more helpful in clarifying criteria for the organization of public services in metropolitan areas. The modification consists in extending the exclusion principle from an individual consumer to all the inhabitants of an area within designated boundaries.

The concept can be illustrated on a small scale in the operation of a household heating system which uses conveniently measurable units of inputs. However, the household temperature it maintains is a joint benefit to the family and a marginal change in family size will have no material effect upon the costs of maintaining this public good for the family. Yet since the family good derived from it is effectively confined to the household, outsiders are excluded and there are no substantial spillover effects or externalities for them. The

⁷ John Dewey, *op. cit.*, pp. 15–16.

⁸ Richard Musgrave, *The Theory of Public Finance* (New York, 1959), esp. ch. 1.

⁹ Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 64 (October, 1956), pp. 416–24.

family good is not a public good in the larger community. So household heating is treated as a private good in most communities. Similarly, a public good on a neighborhood or community scale can be viewed as "packaged" within appropriate boundaries so that others outside the boundaries may be excluded from its use. In this way, in some communities adjacent to New York City, for example, the use of parks and beaches is restricted to local residents whose taxes presumably support these recreation facilities.

Wherever this is practicable, the analogy of a household as a "package" for an atmosphere with a controlled temperature may be generalized and applied to the maintenance of a desired state of affairs within particular local government boundaries. Just as the temperature and the cost of heating can be measured, so it may be possible to develop direct or closely approximate measures both of a given state of community affairs resulting from the production of many public goods and services and also of the costs of furnishing them. An air pollution abatement program, for example, may be measured by an index of quantities of various pollutants found in air samples. Given costs of abatement, some preferred tolerance levels may then be specified.

Similarly, any community has a "fire loss potential," defined as the losses to be expected if no provision for fire protection is made. The difference between this potential and the actual fire losses is then the output or "production" of the fire protection service, and the net fire loss can be termed the "state of affairs" in that community with respect to fire losses. Fire protection, of course, does not eliminate but only reduces fire losses. Any effort at complete elimination would probably be so expensive that the costs would greatly exceed the benefits. The "preferred" state of affairs is some optimal level of performance where benefits exceed costs. The provision of a community fire department as a public good can thus be viewed as the maintenance of a preferred state of affairs in fire protection for that community, and the benefits can ordinarily be confined to its residents.

Police protection can be regarded in the same way. The traffic patrol, for example, operates to optimize the flow of traffic while reducing the losses to property and injury to persons. Even if perfect control were possible, the costs would be so great that the preferred state of affairs in police protection would be something less.

It must be acknowledged, however, that in

the case of police protection and many other public services, in contrast, say, with garbage collection or air pollution abatement, the performance level or net payoff is much more difficult to measure and to quantify. Proximate measures such as the gross number of arrests for different types of offenses per month or per 10,000 population annually have little meaning unless considered in relation to various conditions existing in the community. Decision-makers consequently may be forced, for want of better measurements, to assume that the preferred state of affairs is defined as a balance between the demands for public services and the complaints from taxpayers.

While the output of a public good may not be packaged this does not of course mean that its material inputs cannot be. The preferred state of affairs produced by mosquito spraying is enjoyed by the whole community, while spraying supplies and equipment are readily packageable. Mosquito spraying, that is to say, can be produced by a private vendor under contract to a public agency.

This illustrates an important point, that the *production* of goods and services needs to be distinguished from their *provision* at public expense. Government provision need not involve public production—indeed, at some stage in the sequence from raw materials to finished products virtually every public good, not already a natural resource, is of private origin. So, a public agency by contractual arrangements with private firms—or with other public agencies—can provide the local community with public services without going into the business of producing them itself.

When the desired performance level or the net payoff can be specified by a measurable index, an element of rigor can be introduced to assure substantial production controls in providing a public good, even where the production itself is the function of a separate agency or entrepreneur. The producer can be held accountable for maintaining affairs within certain tolerances, and the agency responsible for providing the service can ascertain the adequacy of performance. Advances in the measurement and quantification of performance levels in the public service economy will consequently permit much greater flexibility in the patterns of organization for the production and provision of public goods and services.

If Dewey's definition is extended to include "events" generally rather than being limited to "acts" or to "transactions" among actors, his formulation is consistent with the conception of public goods as the maintenance of preferred

states of affairs.¹⁰ Public control seeks to internalize those events, viewed as consequences which impinge directly and indirectly upon diverse elements in a community, in such a way that adverse consequences will be inhibited and favorable consequences will be promoted.

In the final analysis, distinctions between private and public goods cannot be as sharply made in the world of human experience as this analysis might imply. In part, the technical character of specific goods influences the degree of differentiation or isolability that characterizes their distribution and utilization. Vegetables and landscapes cannot be handled in the same way. Many private goods have spillover effects such that other members of the community bear some portion of the benefits and losses, whatever the degree of public regulation. In every large community most people philosophically accept some of the costs of bigness—air pollution, traffic congestion, noise, and a variety of inconveniences—on the assumption that these are inevitable concomitants of the benefits that derive from living in a metropolis.

II. SCALE PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATION

Viewing the boundaries of a local unit of government as the "package" in which its public goods are provided,¹¹ so that those outside the boundaries are excluded from their use, we may say that where a public good is adequately packaged within appropriate boundaries, it has been successfully internalized. Where externalities spill over upon neighboring communities, the public good has not been fully internalized.

In designing the appropriate "package" for the production and provision of public goods several criteria should be considered. Among these are control, efficiency, political representation and self-determination. Needless to say, they are sometimes in conflict.

The Criterion of Control. The first standard applicable to the scale of public organization for the production of public services requires

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 4-5. Dewey's use of the terms "acts" and "transactions" implies that only social behavior is contemplated in public action. But physical events, e.g., floods, may also become objects of public control.

¹¹ See the discussion of "district boundaries and the incidence of benefits" in Stephen C. Smith, "Problems in the Use of the Public District for Ground Water Management," *Land Economics*, Vol. 32 (August, 1956), pp. 259-269.

that the boundary conditions¹² of a political jurisdiction include the relevant set of events to be controlled. Events are not uniformly distributed in space; rather, they occur as sets under conditions such that boundaries can be defined with more or less precision. Rivers flow in watershed basins, for example. Patterns of social interaction are also differentially distributed in space and boundaries can generally be defined for them too. In other words, all phenomena can be described in relation to specifiable boundary conditions and the criterion of control requires that these be taken into account in determining the scale of a public organization. Otherwise the public agency is disabled in regulating a set of events in order to realize some preferred state of affairs. If the boundaries cannot be suitably adjusted, the likely result is a transfer of the governmental function to a unit scaled to meet the criterion of control more adequately.

Pasadena, for example, is subject to severe smog attacks, but the city's boundary conditions do not cover an area sufficient to assure effective control of the appropriate meteorological and social space that would include the essential variables constituting the "smogisphere" of Southern California. None of the separate cities of southern California, in fact, can encompass the problem. Instead, county air pollution control districts were organized for the Los Angeles metropolitan community. The failure even of these counties to meet adequately the criterion of effective control has led the California state government to assume an increasingly important role in smog control.

The Criterion of Efficiency. The most efficient solution would require the modification of boundary conditions so as to assure a producer of public goods and services the most favorable economy of scale, as well as effective control. Two streams with different hydrologic characteristics, for example, might be effectively controlled separately; but, by being managed together, the potentialities of one may complement the other. This has certainly been the case in Los Angeles' joint management of the Owens River and the Los Angeles River by making one the tributary of the other through the 300-mile Los Angeles Aqueduct, skirting the Sierras. Joint management permits a greater

¹² The boundary conditions of a local unit of government are not limited to the legally determined physical boundaries but should include reference to extra-territorial powers, joint powers, etc.

joint payoff in recreational facilities and water and power production.

Other factors such as technological developments and the skill or proficiency of a labor force can bear upon efficiency as a criterion of the scale of organization needed. If machinery for painting center stripes on city streets can only be efficiently used on a large scale, special arrangements may be required to enable several small cities to act jointly in providing such a service. The same may be true in the utilization of uncommon and expensive professional skills; and it accounts for the fact that mental institutions and prisons are apt to be state rather than municipal undertakings.

The Criterion of Political Representation. Another criterion for the scale of public organization requires the inclusion of the appropriate political interests within its decision-making arrangements. The direct participants in a transaction are apt to negotiate only their own interests, leaving the indirect consequences or spillover effects to impinge upon others. Third-party interests may be ignored. Public organizations seek to take account of third-party effects by internalizing the various interests in rendering public decisions and in controlling public affairs. Specification of the boundary or scale conditions of any political jurisdiction is important in determining the set of interests which are to be internalized within the organization.

In considering the political design of a public organization three elements of scale require consideration. The *scale of formal organization* indicates the size of the governmental unit which provides a public good. The *public*, as noted above, consists of those who are affected by its provision. The *political community* can be defined as those who are actually taken into account in deciding whether and how to provide it. Those who are affected by such a decision may be different from those who influence its making. An ideal solution, assuming criteria of responsibility and accountability consonant with democratic theory, would require that these three boundaries be coterminous. Where in fact the boundary conditions differ, scale problems arise.

If both the direct and indirect beneficiaries of a public transaction are included within the domain of a public organization, the means are in principle available for assessment of the cost of public control upon the beneficiaries. Except where a re-distribution of income is sought as a matter of public policy, an efficient allocation of economic resources is assured by the capacity to charge the costs of providing public goods

and services to the beneficiaries.¹³

The public implicated in different sets of transactions varies with each set: the relevant public for one set is confined to a neighborhood, while for another the relevant public may be most of the population of the globe. Between these two extremes are a vast number of potential scales of public organizations. Given certain levels of information, technology, communication, and certain patterns of identification, a scheme might be imagined which had an appropriate scale of public organization for each different public good. As these conditions and circumstances change, the scale of the public for any set of transactions should be altered correspondingly. If it is not, what then?

Where the political community does not contain the whole public, some interests may be disregarded. A city, for instance, may decide to discharge its sewage below its boundaries, and the affected public there may have no voice in the decision. On the other hand, where the political community contains the whole public and, in addition, people unaffected by a transaction, the unaffected are given a voice when none may be desired. Capricious actions can result. The total political community in a city of three million population may not be an appropriate decision-making mechanism in planning a local playground.

Nevertheless, the statement that a government is "too large (or too small) to deal with a problem" often overlooks the possibility that the scale of the public and the political community need not coincide with that of the formal boundaries of a public organization. Informal arrangements between public organizations may create a political community large enough to deal with any particular public's problem. Similarly, a public organization may also be able to constitute political communities within its boundaries to deal with problems which affect only a subset of the population. It would be a mistake to conclude that public organizations are of an inappropriate size until the informal mechanisms, which might permit larger or smaller political communities, are investigated.

Seen in relation to the political community, the scale of formal public organizations merely specifies the formal boundaries. Since the feasible number of governmental units is

¹³ This factor might be separately characterized as a criterion of equitable distribution of costs and benefits, but we have chosen to consider it here in the context of political representation.

limited when compared to the number of public goods to be provided, a one-to-one mapping of the public, the political community and the formal public organization is impracticable. Moreover, the relevant public changes. Even if, at one time, formal public organizations, political communities and the publics were coterminous, over time they would become dislocated. As a result, public organizations may (1) reconstitute themselves, (2) voluntarily cooperate, or, failing cooperation, (3) turn to other levels of government in a quest for an appropriate fit among the interests affecting and affected by public transactions:

The Criterion of Local Self-Determination. The criteria of effective control, of efficiency and of the inclusion of appropriate political interests, can be formulated on general theoretical grounds, but their application in any political system depends upon the particular institutions empowered to decide questions of scale. The conditions attending the organization of local governments in the United States usually require that these criteria be controlled by the decisions of the citizenry in the local community, *i.e.*, subordinated to considerations of self-determination.

The patterns of local self-determination manifest in incorporation proceedings usually require a petition of local citizens to institute incorporation proceedings and an affirmative vote of the local electorate to approve. Commitments to local consent and local control may also involve substantial home rule in determining which interests of the community its local officials will attend to and how these officials will be organized and held responsible for their discharge of public functions.

Local self-government of municipal affairs assumes that public goods can be successfully internalized. The purely "municipal" affairs of a local jurisdiction, presumably, do not create problems for other political communities. Where internalization is not possible and where control consequently, cannot be maintained, the local unit of government becomes another "interest" group in quest of public goods or potential public goods that spill over upon others beyond its borders.

The choice of local public services implicit in any system of self-government presumes that substantial variety will exist in patterns of public organization and in the public goods provided among the different local communities in a metropolis. Patterns of local autonomy and home rule constitute substantial commitments to a polycentric system.

III. PUBLIC ORGANIZATION IN GARGANTUA

Since all patterns of organization are less than perfectly efficient, responsive or representative, some consideration should be given to the problem of organizing for different types of public services in gargantua, in contrast to the problems in a polycentric political system. This brief discussion will only touch on theoretical considerations involved in organizing diverse public services in the big system.

Gargantua unquestionably provides an appropriate scale of organization for many huge public services. The provision of harbor and airport facilities, mass transit, sanitary facilities and imported water supplies may be most appropriately organized in gargantua. By definition, gargantua should be best able to deal with metropolitan-wide problems at the metropolitan level.

However, gargantua with its single dominant center of decision-making, is apt to become a victim of the complexity of its own hierarchical or bureaucratic structure. Its complex channels of communication may make its administration unresponsive to many of the more localized public interests in the community. The costs of maintaining control in gargantua's public service may be so great that its production of public goods becomes grossly inefficient.

Gargantua, as a result, may become insensitive and clumsy in meeting the demands of local citizens for the public goods required in their daily life. Two to three years may be required to secure street or sidewalk improvements, for example, even where local residents bear the cost of the improvement. Modifications in traffic control at a local intersection may take an unconscionable amount of time. Some decision-makers will be more successful in pursuing their interests than others. The lack of effective organization for these others may result in policies with highly predictable biases. Bureaucratic unresponsiveness in gargantua may produce frustration and cynicism on the part of the local citizen who finds no point of access for remedying local problems of a public character. Municipal reform may become simply a matter of "throwing the rascals out." The citizen may not have access to sufficient information to render an informed judgment at the polls. Lack of effective communication in the large public organization may indeed lead to the eclipse of the public and to the blight of the community.

The problem of gargantua, then, is to recognize the variety of smaller sets of publics that may exist within its boundaries. Many of the

interests of smaller publics might be properly negotiated within the confines of a smaller political community without requiring the attention of centralized decision-makers concerned with the big system. This task of recognizing the smaller publics is a problem of "field" or "area" organization. The persistence of bureaucratic unresponsiveness in the big system, however, indicates it is not easily resolved. Large-scale, metropolitan-wide organization is unquestionably appropriate for a limited number of public services, but it is not the most appropriate scale of organization for the provision of all public services required in a metropolis.

IV. PUBLIC ORGANIZATION IN A POLYCENTRIC POLITICAL SYSTEM

No *a priori* judgment can be made about the adequacy of a polycentric system of government as against the single jurisdiction. The multiplicity of interests in various public goods sought by people in a metropolitan region can only be handled in the context of many different levels of organization. The polycentric system is confronted with the problem of realizing the needs of wider community interests or publics beyond the functional or territorial bounds of each of the formal entities within the broader metropolitan region. The single jurisdiction, in turn, confronts the problem of recognizing and organizing the various subsidiary sets of interests within the big system. It is doubtful that sub-optimization in gargantua is any easier to accomplish than supra-optimization in a polycentric political system.

The performance of a polycentric political system can only be understood and evaluated by reference to the patterns of cooperation, competition and conflict that may exist among its various units. Cooperative arrangements pose no difficulty when joint activities produce a greater return to all parties concerned, if the appropriate set of public interests are adequately represented among the negotiators. A contractual arrangement will suffice. As a result, this discussion of the behavior of a polycentric political system will focus upon the more difficult problems of competition, of conflict and its resolution. If a polycentric political system can resolve conflict and maintain competition within appropriate bounds it can be a viable arrangement for dealing with a variety of public problems in a metropolitan area.

*Competition.*¹⁴ Where the provision of public

goods and services has been successfully internalized within a public jurisdiction, there are no substantial spill-over effects, by definition. In such circumstances there need be no detrimental consequences from competition in the municipal services economy. Patterns of competition among producers of public services in a metropolitan area, just as among firms in the market, may produce substantial benefits by inducing self-regulating tendencies with pressure for the more efficient solution in the operation of the whole system.

Variety in service levels among various independent local government agencies within a larger metropolitan community may give rise to a quasi-market choice for local residents in permitting them to select the particular community in the metropolitan area that most closely approximates the public service levels they desire. Public service agencies then may be forced to compete over the service levels offered in relation to the taxes charged. Such competition, however, would only be appropriate for those public goods which are adequately internalized within the boundaries of a given political jurisdiction.

Conditions amenable to competition normally exist among local units of government where a number of units are located in close proximity to each other and where information about each other's performance is publicly available. Information can lead to comparison and comparison can lead to pressure for performances to approximate the operations of the more efficient units. Where more than one public jurisdiction is capable of rendering service in a single area, further competitive tendencies may develop. Contractual arrangements among public jurisdictions for the provision of specific public services have long provided a competitive alternative to each jurisdiction which might otherwise produce its own services.

The separation of the *provision* of public goods and services from their *production* opens up the greatest possibility of redefining economic functions in a public service economy. Public control can be maintained in relation to performance criteria in the provision of services, while allowing an increasing amount of competition to develop among the agencies that produce them.

With the incorporation of the City of Lake-

ence to competitive forces within a unit of government. Competition among pressure groups, factions and political parties is a fundamental feature of the democratic political process, but is not within the primary focus of this paper and its concern with the polycentric system.

¹⁴ This analysis is confined to competition between units of government and makes no refer-

wood in 1954, Los Angeles County, for example, expanded its system of contracting for the production of municipal services to a point approaching quasi-market conditions. Newly incorporated cities, operating under the so-called Lakewood Plan, contract with the county or other appropriate agencies to produce the general range of municipal services needed in the local community.

Each city contracts for municipal services for the city as a whole. Services beyond the general level of performance by county administration in unincorporated areas are subject to negotiation for most service functions. Each city also has the option of producing municipal services for itself. Private contractors too have undertaken such services as street sweeping, engineering, street maintenance and repair, and related public works. Some contracts have been negotiated with neighboring cities. As the number of vendors increases, competition brings pressures toward greater responsiveness and efficiency.

By separating the production from the provision of public goods it may be possible to differentiate, unitize and measure the production while continuing to provide undifferentiated public goods to the citizen-consumer. Thus Los Angeles County has, under the Lakewood Plan, unitized the production of police services into packages, each consisting of a police-car-on-continuous-patrol with associated auxiliary services. A price is placed on this police-car-on-continuous-patrol package, and a municipality may contract for police service on that basis. Within the local community, police service is still provided as a public good for the community as a whole.

Problems of scale arising from possible conflicts between criteria of production and criteria of political representation may be effectively resolved in this way. Efficient scales of organization for the production of different public goods may be quite independent of the scales required to recognize appropriate publics for their consumption of public goods and services. But competition among vendors may allow the most efficient organization to be utilized in the production, while an entirely different community of interest and scale of organization controls the provision of services in a local community.

The separation of production from provision may also have the consequence of turning local governments into the equivalents of associations of consumers. While Sidney and Beatrice Webb viewed local governments as associations of consumers, the dominance of production criteria in American municipal administration

has largely led to the subordination of consumer interests.¹⁵ However, cities organized to provide the local citizenry with public services produced by other agencies may be expected to give stronger representation to consumer interests. Among the so-called Lakewood Plan cities in Los Angeles County, for example, the local chief administrative officer has increasingly become a spokesman or bargainer for local consumer interests.

In this role, the chief administrative officer is similar to a buyer in a large corporation. Recognizing that the greater the number of vendors of public services, the greater the competition, the local chief administrative officer may seek to expand the number of his potential suppliers. As competition increases, vendors become more sensitive to the consumer demands he negotiates.

The production of public goods under the contract system in Los Angeles County has also placed considerable pressure upon the county administration to become more responsive to demands of the public service clientele organized through their local cities. Important changes in operating procedures and organizational arrangements have been introduced into the county's administration of police protection, fire protection, library services, street maintenance, building inspection and engineering services in order to increase efficiency and responsiveness.

Under these circumstances, a polycentric political system can be viable in supplying a variety of public goods with many different scales of organization and in providing optimal arrangements for the production and consumption of public goods. With the development of quasi-market conditions in production, much of the flexibility and responsiveness of market organization can be realized in the public service economy.

Several difficulties in the regulation of a competitive public service economy can be anticipated. Economic pricing and cost allocation are dependent upon the development of effective measurement of municipal services. Since the preferred states of affairs in a community cannot be converted to a single scale of values such as dollar profits in a private enterprise, it may be more difficult to sustain an objective competitive relationship in a public service economy. Although costs of contract services from different vendors of a public

¹⁵ Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *English Local Government: Statutory Authorities for Special Purposes* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1922), p. 437 ff.

good may be the same, objective standards for determining the value of the benefits are needed, and may be hard to come by; otherwise the latitude of discretion available to the negotiators may limit the competitive vitality of the system and shift the competition to side-payoffs.

Without careful control of cost allocations and pricing arrangements, funds from non-competitive welfare functions might be used to subsidize the more competitive service areas. In Los Angeles County, close scrutiny of cost accounting practices and pricing policies by the grand jury has helped to prevent funds from being so transferred.

Any long-term reliance upon quasi-market mechanisms in the production of public goods and services no doubt will require more of such careful scrutiny, control and regulation than has been applied toward maintaining the competitive structure of the private market economy. The measurement of cost and output performance may become an essential public function of the state in the administration of metropolitan affairs if continued reliance is placed primarily upon a polycentric system in the government of metropolitan areas.

Reliance upon outside vendors to produce public services may also reduce the degree of local political control exercised. The employee is subject to the control of the vendor and not directly to the control of the municipality. In contrast to the more immediate lines of responsibility and communication between local municipal employees and city officials, reliance upon vendors to provide municipal services may also restrict the quality and quantity of information about community affairs that are provided to the city's decision-makers. This constraint on information might reduce the degree of their control over public affairs.

This discussion merely indicates some of the considerations to be examined in an analysis of the effects of competitive arrangements in providing public services. As long as the particular contracting agencies encompass the appropriate sets of public interests no absolute impediment to their use need exist. With appropriate public control, competitive arrangements may afford great flexibility in taking advantage of some of the economies of scale for the production of public services in a metropolitan area, while, at the same time, allowing substantial diversity in their provision for the more immediate communities, based upon political responsibility within local patterns of community identification.

Conflict and Conflict Resolution. More difficult problems for a polycentric political system

are created when the provision of public goods cannot be confined to the boundaries of the existing units of government. These situations involving serious spill-over effects are apt to provoke conflict between the various units in the system. Arrangements must be available for the resolution of such conflicts if a polycentric political system is to solve its problems. Otherwise, competition and conflict are apt to become acute.

No community, on its own initiative, has much incentive to assume the full costs of controlling adverse consequences which are shared by a wider public. The competitive disadvantage of enforcing pollution abatement regulations, for example, against individuals and firms within a single community, when competitors in neighboring communities are not required to bear such costs, leads each community to excuse its failure to act by the failure of other similarly situated communities to act. In a polycentric system this is especially serious where many of the public "goods" involve the costly abatement of public nuisances.

Concerted action by the various units of government in a metropolitan area is easier to organize when costs and benefits are fairly uniformly distributed throughout the area. By way of example, this has been done under contractual agreements for mutual aid to assure the mobilization of greater fire-fighting capability in case of serious conflagrations. The random and unpredictable nature of such fires causes them to be treated as a uniform risk that might occur to any community in the larger metropolitan area.

Similar considerations apply to efforts to control mosquito infestations or air pollution. Leagues of cities, chambers of commerce and other civic associations have frequently become the agencies for negotiating legislative proposals for the creation of mosquito abatement districts, air pollution control districts and the like.

More difficult problems for the polycentric political system arise when the benefits and the costs are not uniformly distributed. Communities may differ in their perception of the benefits they receive from the provision of a common public good. In turn, a community may be unwilling to "pay its fair share" for providing that good simply because its demands for provision are less than in neighboring communities. These situations call for effective governmental mechanisms which can internalize the problem. If necessary, sanctions must be available for the enforcement of decisions.

The conflicting claims of municipal water supply systems pumping water from the same

underground basins in Southern California, for example, have uniformly been resolved by recourse to legal actions in the state courts. The courts have thereby become the primary authorities for resolving conflicts among water supply agencies in Southern California; and their decisions have come to provide many of the basic policies of water administration in the Southern California metropolitan region. The state's judiciary has played a comparable role in conflicts among other local government agencies in such diverse fields as public health, incorporation and annexation proceedings, law enforcement, and urban planning.

The heavy reliance upon courts for the resolution of conflicts among local units of government unquestionably reflects an effort to minimize the risks of external control by a superior decision-maker. Court decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis. The adversaries usually define the issues and consequently limit the areas of judicial discretion. This method also minimizes the degree of control exercised following a judgment. California courts, in particular, have accepted the basic doctrines of home rule and are thus favorably disposed to the interests of local units of government in dealing with problems of municipal affairs.

The example of municipal water administration may be pursued further to illustrate other decision-making arrangements and their consequences which bear upon the resolution of conflict in a polycentric political system.¹⁶

While litigation may be an appropriate means for resolving conflicts over a given supply of water, local water administrators in Southern California have long recognized that law suits never produced any additional water. Organization for the importation of new water supplies was recognized as the only means for solving the long-term problem.

Los Angeles built the first major aqueduct to import water into the area on its own initiative. This water supply was used to force adjoining areas to annex or consolidate to the City of Los Angeles if they wished to gain access to the new supply. The condition for the provision of water required adjoining areas to sacrifice their identities as separate political communities. To get that one public good they were forced to give up other public goods. This provoked sufficient opposition to block any new developments which were not based upon consent and co-

operation. The mechanisms for the resolution of subsequent conflicts were required to take on new forms.

The importation of Colorado River water was later undertaken by a coalition of communities in Southern California formed through the agency of the southern section of the League of California Cities. The League afforded a neutral ground for the negotiation of the common interests of the City of Los Angeles and the other cities in the metropolitan area which shared common water problems. After satisfactory arrangements had been negotiated, including provision for the formation of a new metropolitan water district and endorsement of the Boulder Canyon project, a Boulder Dam Association was formed to realize these objectives. In due course a new agency, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, was formed; and the Colorado River aqueduct was constructed and put into operation by this new district.

More recently, the Southern California Water Coordinating Conference, meeting under the auspices of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, has been the agency for negotiating regional interests in the development of the California Water Program. The Metropolitan Water District was not able to represent areas in Southern California which did not belong to that district; and the rise of a variety of special municipal water districts precluded the League of California Cities, which represents cities only, from again serving as the agency for the negotiation of metropolitan interests in municipal water supply.

These illustrations suggest that a variety of informal arrangements may be available for negotiating basic policies among local government agencies in a metropolitan area. Such arrangements are vital in negotiating common interests among them. The larger public is taken into account in an informally constituted political community. These arrangements work effectively only so long as substantial unanimity can be reached, for formal implementation of such decisions must be ratified by each of the appropriate official agencies, including the state government when changes in state law or administrative policies are involved.

Higher levels of government may also be invoked in seeking the resolution of conflict among local governments in metropolitan areas. Again recourse is sought to a more inclusive political community. Under these circumstances, conflict tends to centralize decision-making and control. The danger is that the more inclusive political community will not give appropriate recognition to the particular

¹⁶ For further detail see: Vincent Ostrom, *Water and Politics* (Los Angeles, Haynes Foundation, 1953), esp. chs. 3, 6 and 7.

public interests at issue and tend to inject a variety of other interests into settlements of local controversies.

Appeal to central authorities runs the risk of placing greater control over local metropolitan affairs in agencies such as the state legislature, while at the same time reducing the capability of local governments for dealing with their problems in the local context. Sensitivity over the maintenance of local control may produce great pressure for the subordination of differences while conflicting parties seek a common position approximating unanimity. A substantial investment in informal negotiating and decision-making arrangements can be justified from the perspective of the local authorities if such arrangements can prevent the loss of local autonomy to higher levels of government.

Ironically but logically, this effort to avoid recourse to conflict and the consequent centralization of decision-making tends also to reduce the local autonomy or degree of independence exercised by the local governing boards. Pressure for agreement on a common approach to some metropolitan problem limits the choices available to any particular local government. However, this range of choice may still be greater than that which would result from a settlement by a central authority. Negotiation among independent agencies allows the use of a veto against any unacceptable position. Agreement must be negotiated within the limits of the various veto positions if the alternative of recourse to an external authority at a higher level of political jurisdiction is to be avoided.

To minimize the costs of conflict to their power positions, administrators of local government agencies in metropolitan areas have tended to develop an extensive system of communication about each other's experience and to negotiate standards of performance applicable to various types of public services. Professional administrative standards may, thus, operate to constrain the variety of experience in local government agencies. Information about areas of difference and of potential conflict tend to be repressed under these circumstances. The negotiations about common problems through informal agencies are apt to be conducted in secrecy, and careful control may be developed over sensitive information.

These pressures to avoid the costs of conflict and seek agreement about metropolitan problems reflect the importance to local governments of resolving general public problems by negotiation at the local level in a metropolitan community. To the extent that these pressures are effective, the patterns of local government in a metropolitan area can only be understood by attention to the variety of formal and informal arrangements that may exist for settling area-wide problems.

Contrary to the frequent assertion about the lack of a "metropolitan framework" for dealing with metropolitan problems, most metropolitan areas have a very rich and intricate "framework" for negotiating, adjudicating and deciding questions that affect their diverse public interests. Much more careful attention needs to be given to the study of this framework.

POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION AND JUDGES' DECISIONS*

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Several scholars within the public law field of political science have compiled data on differences in the backgrounds of American judges, but without attempting to correlate these characteristics with differences in the decisions of the judges.¹ Other scholars have compiled data on the different decisional tendencies of American judges, but again without correlating these tendencies with differences in the backgrounds of the judiciary.²

The first purpose of this paper is to explore the empirical relationships between one background characteristic and fifteen areas of judicial decision-making. Political party affiliation was chosen as the one background characteristic because it is of particular interest to political scientists, and is an especially useful indicator for predicting how judges on bipartisan appellate courts will divide when they do not agree. The second purpose is to explore empirically the effectiveness of three judicial reforms (judicial appointment, non-partisan ballot, and long term of office) which are frequently advocated as means of decreasing partisan influences in judicial decisions.

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¹ John Schmidhauser, "The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 3 (1958), pp. 1-57; Cortez M. Ewing, *The Judges of the Supreme Court, 1789-1937* (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press, 1938); Rodney Mott, "Judicial Personnel," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 167 (1933), pp. 143-155.

² Glendon Schubert, *Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959); C. Herman Pritchett, *The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937-1947* (New York, 1948); S. Sydney Ulmer, "The Analysis of Behavior Patterns on the United States Supreme Court," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22 (November, 1960), pp. 629-653.

I. THE RESEARCH DESIGN³

The judges covered in this study consist of the 313 state and federal supreme court⁴ judges listed in the 1955 *Directory of American Judges*⁵ except for 15 of them who left the court before the end of the year—a net total of 298. Their party affiliation was determined by consulting the *Directory*, *Who's Who in America*,⁶ and the governmental directories published by many of the states. Those supreme court judges who gave no party affiliation in any of the sources consulted probably do not closely identify themselves with any political party.⁷

The cases analyzed consist of the full-court cases in the 15 fields listed in Table I which these 298 judges heard in 1955.⁸ "Full-court" cases mean those on which all the judges in the sample sat who were on the court involved. The table excludes courts that were solidly Democratic or solidly Republican, since in these situations intra-court comparisons between judges from the two parties cannot be made. The table also excludes cases decided unanimously, because these shed no light on differences in the behavior of individual judges. The

³ For a more detailed analysis and defense of the research design than can be given here see S. Nagel, "Testing Relations between Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision-Making" (mimeographed, presented at the 1961 Midwest Conference of Political Scientists). Copies available on request from the writer.

⁴ The term is used here as a synonym for "highest court" or "court of last resort."

⁵ Charles Liebman, ed., Chicago, American Directories; sometimes referred to below as the *Directory*.

⁶ Wheeler Sammons, ed., Chicago, Marquis, 1954, 1956, 1958.

⁷ For an analysis of the distribution of political party affiliation among the judges, see S. Nagel, "Unequal Party Representation on the State Supreme Court," *Journal of the American Jurisprudence Society*, Vol. 45 (August, 1961), pp. 62-65. Only 11 per cent of 313 judges gave no party affiliation.

⁸ For a more exact description of each field of law included, see S. Nagel, *Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision-Making*, Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, 1961.

TABLE I. DIFFERENCES IN DECISIONS OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC JUDGES, BY TYPES OF ISSUES
(USING THE DIVIDED DECISIONS OF STATE AND FEDERAL SUPREME COURTS OF 1955 ON WHICH
BOTH POLITICAL PARTIES WERE REPRESENTED)

Type of issue	Number of Judges Involved		Republican judges above their court average (%)	Democratic judges above their court average (%)	Difference (in % pts.)	Probability of the difference being due to chance
	Rep.	Dem.				
PUBLIC LAW						
<i>Criminal Law</i>						
For the defense in criminal cases	45	40	31	55	+24	.01 to .02½
<i>Administrative Law</i>						
For the administrative agency in business regulation cases	35	25	23	68	+45	less than .01
For the private party in regulation of non-business entities	11	13	55	77	+22	.10 to .15
For the claimant in unemployment compensation cases	15	7	0	57	+57	less than .01
<i>Civil Liberties Law</i>						
For broadening free speech	5	7	40	71	+31	.15 to .20
For finding a constitutional violation in criminal cases	27	24	26	54	+28	.01 to .02½
<i>Tax Law</i>						
For the government in tax cases	22	19	41	68	+27	.02½ to .05
PRIVATE LAW						
<i>Family Law</i>						
For the divorce seeker in divorce cases	6	4	17	75	+58	.05 to .10
For the wife in divorce settlement cases	10	13	30	54	+24	.10 to .15
<i>Business Relations Law</i>						
For the tenant in landlord-tenant cases	13	11	38	73	+35	.02½ to .05
For the labor union in labor-manage- ment cases	19	14	26	50	+24	.05 to .10
For the debtor in creditor-debtor cases	14	7	43	71	+28	.10 to .15
For the consumer in sales-of-goods cases	20	10	25	60	+35	.02½ to .05
<i>Personal Injury Law</i>						
For the injured in motor vehicle ac- cident cases	41	33	36	61	+25	.01 to .02½
For the employee in employee injury cases	34	28	35	68	+33	less than .01

15 categories of cases present typical issues drawn from the major fields of law which are covered in the courts on both the trial and appellate levels. These fields are not mutually exclusive, and thus a case may fall into more than one category.

Each judge was given a "decision score" for each field of law. These scores represent the proportion of times the judge voted for the party listed in the left-hand column of Table I, out of the total number of times he voted in the type of case involved. Thus in the 21 Pennsylvania criminal cases,⁹ Justice Arnold voted

three times for the defense, giving him a decision score of .14. Sometimes a judge did not vote clearly for the prosecution or the defense, particularly if he concurred in part and dis-

Pa. 352 (1955); Commonwealth v. LaRue, 381 Pa. 113 (1955); Commonwealth v. Lane, 381 Pa. 293 (1955); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 381 Pa. 299 (1955); Commonwealth v. Mason, 381 Pa. 309 (1955); Commonwealth v. Cisneros, 381 Pa. 447 (1955); Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Matthews v. Day, 381 Pa. 617 (1955); Commonwealth v. Farrow, 382 Pa. 61 (1955); Commonwealth v. Capps, 382 Pa. 72 (1955); Commonwealth v. Wable, 382 Pa. 80 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Taylor v. Superintendent of the County Prison, 382 Pa. 181 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Bishop v. Maroney, 382 Pa. 324 (1955); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639 (1955); Commonwealth v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18 (1955).

⁹ Commonwealth v. Burdell, 380 Pa. 43 (1955); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 380 Pa. 52 (1955); Commonwealth v. Mackley, 380 Pa. 70 (1955); Commonwealth v. Grays, 380 Pa. 77 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Dunn v. Ruch, 380 Pa. 152 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Lane v. Baldi, 380 Pa. 201 (1955); Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 380

sented in part. In one of the 21 Pennsylvania criminal cases,¹⁰ Justice Musmanno cast such a half-way vote, giving him a decision score of 11.5 out of 21, or .55.

The data were analyzed to determine what party affiliation, if any, went consistently with a decision score above the average of each court in each type of case. For example, the question was asked whether being a Democratic rather than a Republican judge tends to go with being above the average decision score for each court in criminal cases. The answer to this and similar questions for the data used are given in Table I.

The probability at the right of each row represents the likelihood of finding the observed difference purely by chance, given the number of judges involved in each group.¹¹ If the probability is less than .05 (*i.e.*, less than 5 out of 100), then it is conventional to call the observed difference statistically significant.

II. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PARTY AFFILIATION AND DECISIONAL PROPENSITIES

Table I shows that in all 15 types of cases the Democratic judges were above the average decision score of their respective courts (in what might be considered the liberal direction) to a greater extent than the Republican judges. Democratic judges sitting on the same supreme courts with Republican judges were more prone to favor (1) the defense in criminal cases, (2) the administrative agency in business regulation cases, (3) the private party in regulation of non-business entities, (4) the claimant in unemployment compensation cases, (5) the broadening position in free speech cases, (6) the finding of a constitutional violation in criminal-constitutional cases, (7) the government in tax cases, (8) the divorce seeker in divorce cases, (9) the wife in divorce settlement cases, (10) the tenant in landlord-tenant cases, (11) the labor union in labor-management cases, (12) the debtor in creditor-debtor cases, (13) the consumer in sales-of-goods cases, (14) the injured party in motor vehicle accident cases, and (15) the employee in employee injury cases, than were the Republican judges.

Nine of these 15 differences are statistically significant below the 5 out of 100 degree of chance probability (groups 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, and 15). Three of these are statistically significant below .01, namely those relating to

administrative regulation of business, unemployment compensation cases, and employee injury cases. These three relationships are worth illustrating in detail.

In 1955 ten full-bench bipartisan state supreme courts heard administrative regulation of business cases which they decided by split votes. The cases included questions of zoning regulation, price regulation, franchise grants and product regulation. As shown in the second row of Table I, the ten courts comprised 60 judges who gave a political party affiliation in the sources consulted. Two-thirds of the 25 Democrats were above the average of their respective courts on the decision score, whereas less than a quarter of the 35 Republicans were above the average of their respective courts. As a specific example, the seven judges of the Ohio Supreme Court sitting together heard and divided their votes on three business regulation cases.¹² There were four Republicans and three Democrats on the court. In the first case, the court held for the administrative agency in a matter involving the regulation of an independent telephone company. The only dissent in favor of the telephone company came from one of the four Republicans. In the second case, involving the zoning of power company facilities, the court in a 4-to-3 decision held for the zoning board, but three of the four Republicans dissented in favor of the utility. The third case involved the zoning of a gas station and the majority of the court decided in favor of the gas station. The dissenters in this case, unlike the previous two, included both Republicans and Democrats. Overall, the Democrats averaged a decision score in the three cases of 78 per cent for the administrative agency position, whereas the Republicans averaged only 50 per cent. Other supreme courts on which the Democrats had a higher average decision score for the administrative agency than the Republicans include those of Illinois, Michigan, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Utah. Of the ten courts involved only the California and Idaho supreme courts went contrary to this pattern. On the New Jersey Supreme Court, the known Democrats and the known Republicans both had the same average decision score.

Four bipartisan state supreme courts in 1955 heard unemployment compensation cases and divided their votes on them, with all their listed judges present. As shown in the fourth

¹⁰ *Commonwealth v. Edwards*, 380 Pa. 52 (1955).

¹¹ Harold Yuker, *A Guide to Statistical Calculations* (New York, 1958), pp. 64-66; and Sidney Siegel, *Non-Parametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York, 1956), pp. 13-14.

¹² *Chillicothe Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio*, 163 Ohio 398 (1955); *State ex rel. Kearns v. Ohio Power Co.*, 163 Ohio 451 (1955); *State ex rel. Selected Properties v. Gottfried*, 163 Ohio 469 (1955).

row of Table I, these courts comprised 22 judges who acknowledged a party affiliation. Four of the seven Democrats were above the average of their respective courts on the decision score, whereas none of the fifteen Republicans were. The Michigan Supreme Court illustrates the general finding. Sitting as a full court it heard and divided on two unemployment compensation cases.¹³ In both, the only dissenter for the claimant was Justice Smith, one of the two Democrats on the court. On all of the other three supreme courts involved—Idaho, Minnesota and New Jersey—the Democratic judges had a considerably higher average decision score for the claimant than the Republican judges.

Eleven bipartisan full-bench state and federal supreme courts in 1955 heard and divided their votes on employee injury cases. The issues were raised under workmen's compensation statutes and in common-law suits by employees against employers. As shown in the last row of Table I, 62 judges participated, for whom a party affiliation was available. Two-thirds of the 28 Democrats were above the average of their respective courts on the decision score, whereas only a dozen of the 34 Republicans were above the average of their respective courts. The New Jersey Supreme Court is a good example of the relationship in employee injury cases. Of its seven judges, Brennan, Heher, and Wachenfeld indicated they were Democrats; and Oliphant and Vanderbilt, Republicans. Burling gave no party affiliation in the post-1950 sources consulted, but he was listed as a Republican member of the New Jersey Senate in the Legislative Manual of 1937. He may have dropped or changed his party identification since then, and therefore was not classified as a partisan in the analysis. Jacobs also listed no party affiliation. It was common knowledge too that Chief Justice Vanderbilt sought to promote a non-partisan atmosphere in the court. When the court divided in employee injury cases, however, it clearly divided along party lines. In 1955 the court decided seven such cases.¹⁴

¹³ *Cassar v. Appeal Board of the Michigan Employment Security Commission*, 343 Mich. 380 (1955); *Pazan v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission*, 343 Mich. 587 (1955).

¹⁴ *Piantanida v. Bennett*, 17 N.J.2d 291 (1955); *Morris v. Hermann Forwarding Co.*, 18 N.J.2d 195 (1955); *DeMonaco v. Renton*, 18 N.J.2d 352 (1955); *Lester v. Elliot Bros. Trucking Co.*, 18 N.J.2d 434 (1955); *Green v. DeFuria*, 19 N.J.2d 290 (1955); *Secor v. Penn Service Garage*, 19 N.J.2d 315 (1955); *Buccheri v. Montgomery Ward and Co.*, 19 N.J.2d 594 (1955).

Republican Vanderbilt voted for the employee in only one of these, as did Republican Oliphant; and putative Republican Burling voted for the employee in only two of them. On the other hand Democrats Brennan and Heher voted for the employee in six of the seven; and Democrat Wachenfeld voted for the employee in three of the cases. The known Republicans thus had an average decision score of only 14 per cent for the employee, against 72 percent for the known Democrats.

Split votes in employee injury cases in general seem to correlate especially well with divisions along party lines on bipartisan courts. On the United States Supreme Court in 1955 Republican Warren and Democrat Reed frequently voted with members of the other party when splits occurred, thereby disrupting party-correlated divisions somewhat. In the divided votes on four employee-injury certiorari petitions which were filed with the Court,¹⁵ however, the Democrats¹⁶ had an average decision score of 55 per cent for the employee, in comparison with only 17 per cent for the Republicans, in spite of the voting records of both Warren and Reed. Other supreme courts on which the Democrats had a higher average decision score for the employee than the Republicans include those of California, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, New York, Minnesota, and Michigan. Of the eleven supreme courts involved, only those of Missouri and Ohio failed to follow this pattern.

III. EXPLAINING THE RELATIONSHIPS

All of the relationships found can be attributed in some degree to chance. But where that degree is less than 5 per cent it is reasonable to look to other factors for explanation. The propensities observed in each of the nine statistically significant relations all appear to be a part of a general affinity for the "liberal" as contrasted to the "conservative" position. In this context the term "liberal" labels the viewpoint associated with the interests of the lower or less privileged economic or social groups in one's society and (to a less extent) with acceptance of long-run social change; and the term "conservative" refers to the viewpoint associ-

¹⁵ *Schwartz v. Kansas City Southern R. Co.*, 349 U.S. 931 (1955); *Anderson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.*, 350 U.S. 807 (1955); *Zientek v. Reading Co.*, 350 U.S. 346 (1955); *Cahill v. New York, New Haven, and Hartford R. Co.*, 350 U.S. 898 (1955).

¹⁶ Frankfurter was classified as an independent; he gives no party affiliation in any recent biographical directory.

ated with the interests of the upper or dominant groups and with resistance to long-run social change.¹⁷

Through a detailed analysis of congressional roll-call votes in three sessions of Congress over a 23-year period, Turner found that Democratic congressmen favored the interests of labor and the needy more than Republican congressmen did, to a statistically significant extent.¹⁸ He also found that in the regulation of business and finance, Republican congressmen regularly favored the business position more often than Democratic congressmen did.¹⁹ Through a nationwide opinion survey in 1952, Campbell, Gurin, and Miller found that those who preferred the Democratic candidate for President also favored governmental social welfare activity and opposed the Taft-Hartley Act more, to a statistically significant degree, than did those who preferred the Republican candidate for President.²⁰ Thus the differences found between the decisions of Democratic and Republican judges are consistent with differences in partisan attitudes expressed elsewhere.²¹

The relationships between political party affiliation and judicial decision-making that have been shown in Table I are not meant to imply that some judges consciously vote for or against a party line. It is more likely that in some cases judges rely on their personal standards of value in reaching a decision, and these same personal standards also frequently account for their party affiliation. That is to say that party affiliation and decisional propensity for the liberal or conservative position correlate with each other because they are frequently

effects of the same cause.²² Indirectly, party affiliation may be responsible for some decisional propensity by virtue of the fact that a judge's party affiliation may have a feedback reinforcement on his value system which in turn determines his decisional propensities.

Although definite correlations are shown in Table I, several factors tend to make them imperfect. First, judges on the same court may have similar value systems, although they are members of different political parties; and conversely, judges on the same court may have different value systems although they are members of the same political party. The attitudes of a judge on social issues, that is, may be an important factor, but not always the sole or determining one in his choice of party affiliation. Like other people, a judge may join one party rather than another—or stay with it—in spite of its stands on issues, either because it is the dominant party in his area, because his parents were members of it, or for ethnic or other reasons, not necessarily involving a congruence between his values and the general values of the party. Chief Justice Warren may be a Republican not because he shared the views characteristic of the Republican Party nationally, but rather because the Republican Party was dominant in California when he was an aspiring young politician; and the same for Justice Reed as a Democrat.

Another factor making for imperfect correlations between party affiliation and decisional propensity is the influence of particular personal experiences in the backgrounds of the judges. Attitudes on social issues that are commonly found associated in a syndrome of "liberalism" or "conservatism" are not invariably so linked together; and deviations from them may govern votes in particular legal areas. One judge, for instance, who in general has

¹⁷ Robert MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York, 1951), pp. 215-19.

¹⁸ Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1951), p. 60.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

²⁰ Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, 1954), pp. 118-19.

²¹ The 313 judges studied in this paper were mailed attitudinal questionnaires based on the "liberalism" test of Hans Eysenck's *The Psychology of Politics* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), pp. 122-24. The data compiled for the 119 judges who responded tended to show that on bipartisan courts having both high-scoring (liberal) judges and low-scoring (conservative) judges, there is a positive correlation between (1) being a Democratic judge as contrasted to being a Republican judge, and (2) being a high-scoring judge.

²² The mailed questionnaire survey just mentioned tends to show that the difference between the decisional propensities of Democrats and Republicans decreases when liberalism is held constant. Thus when only liberal Democrats and liberal Republicans were matched, there was virtually no correlation between (1) being a Democrat as contrasted to being a Republican and (2) being above rather than below the average decision score of one's bipartisan court in criminal cases. Likewise when only conservative Democrats and conservative Republicans were compared, there was also virtually no correlation between (1) being a Democrat and (2) being above the average decision score of one's bipartisan court in criminal cases. The sample sizes involved in these analyses were, however, exceedingly small.

strong liberal sympathies, may have been a prosecuting attorney before becoming a judge, and as a result his liberal sympathies may not extend to criminal cases. Another may once have been an insurance company lawyer, and as a result his liberal sympathies may not extend to personal injury cases; and so on.

A third factor disrupting perfect correlations relates to technical difficulties in the measurement of the variables. When a judge's political party affiliation is not publicly disclosed, some arbitrariness in determining the sources to consult is inevitable. The content analysis of decisions and dissents also may not always yield unambiguous results. But the principal difficulty lies in the vagaries of the sample of cases—the highly accidental nature of the arrival of particular law suits before particular appellate courts in a particular year. The number of cases in a given field before a given court is small enough so that a few shifts in timing, or out-of-court settlements, for instance, may materially affect computations for that court and that field. So variations in correlations between fields are not surprising.

A final disruptive factor in the correlations is attributable to differences among judges in the intensity of their feelings even when they share the same general outlook or belong to the same party. This may result in one judge dissenting frequently without being joined by his less vigorous associate of the same party. Nevertheless, despite these several factors, most of the propensities shown in Table I are statistically significant; they are logically consistent with each other; and they are consistent also with studies of differences between Democrats and Republicans who are not judges.

IV. DECREASING THE RELATIONSHIPS

Judicial appointment, a non-partisan ballot, and long terms of office have been proposed or defended as devices for decreasing the role of partisan influences on judicial decisions. Judges selected or holding office where these devices are operative possibly have a greater tendency to vote contrary to their party pattern than other judges. To test these hypotheses, a measure of "voting contrary to one's party pattern" is needed.

I have attempted such a test, using three types of cases, namely administrative regulation of business, unemployment compensation, and employee injury cases. These were selected because in the decisions on them one can most confidently say that political party patterns emerged. Some of the judges did not hear all three types of cases. For purposes of this study,

however, a judge was considered to have voted contrary to the pattern of his party if he was a Republican who was above (or a Democrat who was below) the average of his court on the decision score on all three or two out of three or—if he did not vote on all three—then on both of the two, or on the one, of the types of cases he heard. A judge was considered to have voted in accordance with the pattern of his party, conversely, if he was a Republican who was below (or a Democrat who was above) the average of his court on the decision score in all three, two out of three, two out of two, or the one of these types of cases he voted on. Judges who fell between these limits, *i.e.*, whose decision scores departed from their court averages in one of two of the case types, were not counted either way. Using these definitions, 65 judges serving through 1955 on bipartisan state and federal supreme courts were counted as having voted either contrary to or in accordance with the pattern set by their respective parties.

Table II shows the relationships between being a judge who operated under each of the various arrangements listed and being a judge who voted contrary to his party pattern. It includes all those judges who could be assigned a voting position contrary to or in accordance with their party pattern. According to row one of Table II, seven of the 18 appointed judges voted contrary to their party patterns, whereas only seven of the 47 elected judges did so.²³ This was the most striking of the several differences that emerged, and it was statistically significant slightly below the .05 level of chance probability.²⁴ The non-partisan versus partisan ballot comparison showed an insignificant negative relation between being a judge elected by a non-partisan ballot and being a judge who voted contrary to his party pattern.²⁵ As for length of term, eight years was the median

²³ Elected and appointed judges were sorted out from the entries and the designation table in the *Directory*.

²⁴ These probabilities were calculated by using a chi-square formula with a Yates correction in view of the skew toward voting in accordance with party patterns. See J. P. Guilford, *Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and Education* (New York, 1956), pp. 207–208, 228–239.

²⁵ Judges elected on a non-partisan ballot were identified by first determining, through the *Directory* entries, in what year the most recent term (prior to 1955) of each judge began and then checking the judicial election law for his state in that year in the *Book of the States* (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1938–1955).

TABLE II. JUDICIAL TENURE, METHODS OF SELECTION AND CONFORMITY TO PARTY VOTING PATTERNS, 1955

Group 1	Group 2	Number of judges in each group		% in Group 1 who voted contrary to their party pattern	% in Group 2 who voted contrary to their party pattern	Probability of the positive difference being due to chance
		(1)	(2)			
Appointed judges	Elected judges	18	47	39	15	.02½ to .05
Judges elected by a non-partisan ballot	Judges elected by a partisan ballot	29	18	14	17	*
Judges with terms longer than 8 years	Judges with terms of 8 or less years	37	28	27	14	.15 to .20
Elected judges with terms longer than 8 years	Elected judges with terms of 8 or less years	20	27	15.0	14.8	*
Appointed judges with terms longer than 8 years	Elected judges with terms longer than 8 years	17	20	41	15	.02½ to .05

* Negative or negligible difference.

term in 1955 for supreme court judges.²⁶ A greater proportion of the judges with terms longer than this median voted contrary to their party pattern than of the judges with shorter terms. This difference, however, disappears when long-term judges are compared with short-term judges while the method of selection is held constant as is shown on the fourth row of Table II. On the other hand, if length of term is held constant, as in the fifth row, the difference between appointed and elected judges still remains strong. Thus the method of selection can account for the difference between the long- and short-term groups, but the length of term cannot account for the difference between the appointed and elected groups.

What is there about appointed judges, in contrast to elected judges, which might account for the significantly higher percentage of them who voted contrary to their party patterns? Appointed judges probably reflect their personal values in their decisions just as much as elected judges.²⁷ The difference may lie in

²⁶ The terms of office were traced through the same sources as the methods of selection.

²⁷ This hypothesis was partially tested by using the attitudinal data mentioned in footnote 21 to see if any correlation existed between (1) being an appointed rather than an elected judge and (2) voting contrary to rather than in accordance with

the possibility that the values of appointed judges are less clearly correlated with their party affiliation than the values of elected judges. In other words, appointed judges who are Democrats possibly tend to be non-typical Democrats in their values, and appointed judges who are Republicans likewise possibly non-typical Republicans—at least more so than elected judges. In terms of liberalism and conservatism, appointed judges serving on bipartisan courts are possibly more likely to be conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans. Two considerations support this hypothesis.

First, appointive systems for choosing state supreme court judges generally provide for a non-partisan or bipartisan body which nominates or approves the executive appointments to the court. In Missouri and California, for example, there is a special nominating commission composed of distinguished members of the bar, the judiciary, and the lay public. Such a nominating commission is less likely to consider party consistency in picking judges than the nominators for an elected court at a party caucus, convention or primary. It is somewhat more debatable whether a prospective judge on the federal or the New Jersey supreme court is

one's value position in criminal cases. The correlation, as hypothesized, was practically zero with a sample of 65 judges.

helped toward a bipartisan senate confirmation if he is not too closely identified with a political party; but evidently that might handicap him in a partisan election system.

Second, appointive systems for choosing supreme court justices may provide by tradition or law that the executive should occasionally appoint judges not of his own party to the court. The appointed courts covered in Table II were the supreme courts of California, Missouri, New Jersey, and the United States. From 1910 to 1960 nine of the 33 judges appointed to the United States Supreme Court were not of the president's party.²⁸ In a survey of state supreme courts conducted by the Council of State Governments the question was asked as to what attempts, if any, were made by each state to obtain supreme courts of a bipartisan composition.²⁹ The responses and subsequent checking indicated that the appointive court systems of California, Missouri, New Jersey, Delaware, and New Hampshire made such attempts by tradition or law, whereas no elective court system did so. If a Democratic governor or president appoints a Republican, he is likely to appoint a Republican with values closer to the relatively liberal wing than to the relatively conservative wing of that party. Likewise, a Republican governor or president who appoints a Democrat will probably choose one with values closer to the relatively conservative wing than to the relatively liberal wing of the Democratic Party. Electorates, on the other hand, are never required to choose judges of the party opposite to their own.³⁰

²⁸ Glendon Schubert, *Constitutional Politics: The Political Behavior of Supreme Court Justices and the Constitutional Policies that They Make* (New York, 1960), pp. 37, 711-712.

²⁹ *Courts of Last Resort of the Forty-Eight States* (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1955), Table 4.

³⁰ The mailed questionnaire survey mentioned in footnote 21 showed no positive correlation between (1) being an appointed judge rather than an elected judge on a bipartisan court and (2) being a conservative Democrat or a liberal Republican rather than a liberal Democrat or a conservative Republican. The slightly negative correlation, however, was only a $-.04$ phi coefficient and was only based on 25 judges.

The reason for the near-zero correlation with regard to the non-partisan ballot hypothesis is probably the near-meaninglessness of non-partisan ballots where there are organized and competing political parties running the elections behind the scenes. Three states—Michigan, Tennessee, and Arizona—have non-partisan ballots for supreme court elections, but openly recognize the role of political parties by providing partisan primaries or party conventions to pick the judges who run on the non-partisan ballot.³¹ Even non-partisan elections preceded by non-partisan primaries may have partisan influences behind the formalities of the election and nomination procedure. If party affiliation does make a difference in judicial behavior, as the data from Table I tend to show, then non-partisan ballots only deprive the voter of information useful to him in intelligently voting for judges, assuming he does not learn their party affiliation by some other means.

The reason for the zero correlation with regard to the length-of-term hypothesis is probably that a long term does not cause a judge's value system and his party affiliation to become inconsistent if they were formerly consistent. A long term of office may well make a judge more independent of a party boss. Judges on state supreme courts, however, as previously stated, probably vote in accordance with their party pattern because their value system determines both their voting behavior in certain cases and their party affiliation, not because some party boss asked them to do so.

Regardless of judicial tenure and modes of selection, there probably will always be a residue of party-correlated judicial subjectivity so long as political parties are at least partly value-oriented and so long as court cases involve value-oriented controversies. Ultimately the problem becomes not how to remove this irreducible residue of judicial subjectivity, but rather what direction it take should. If judges should have value positions that are representative of the public at large, then it seems arguable that judges (at least on the higher court levels) should be elected, since presumably a judge elected at large will tend to have more representative values than a judge chosen in any other manner.

³¹ *Courts of Last Resort of the Forty-Eight States*, *op. cit. supra*, note 29.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICAL FICTION*

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C. P. SNOW, in his Rede Lecture on the scientific and literary worlds as separate cultures,¹ lists four groups needed by a country if it is to "come out top" in the scientific revolution. First, as many top scientists as it can produce; second, a larger group trained for supporting research and high class design; third, educated supporting technicians; and "fourthly and last, politicians, administrators, an entire community, who know enough science to have a sense of what the scientists are talking about."

It seems increasingly clear that the growing army of "political" scientists—meaning natural scientists in politics—is more likely to be aided by students of politics prepared to understand the effects of science in political terms than by most of the recent efforts to understand politics in scientific terms. When one looks over the journals in political science, and in related areas of public opinion and social psychology, searching for significant conclusions in articles where much time has been spent on the elaboration of method, it is difficult to avoid V. O. Key's conclusion "that a considerable proportion of the literature commonly classified under the heading of 'political behavior' has no real bearing on politics, or at least that its relevance has not been made clear."² Political scientists preoccupied with the natural sciences for techniques they can borrow, for what they can do to give their data a scientific form, for concepts that comfort them with a similarity of possessions, may, like the passionate devotees of an alien culture, not have the best sense either for the unique and unattainable or for the common

denominators of human endeavor in what they admire.

I. POLITICAL SCIENCE: IS IT A FICTION?

From their uneasy academic ground between the sciences and the humanities, it is both natural and commendable for social scientists to wish to serve as a communicating link between the two. Devotion to method as ritual, however, serves neither science nor humanity. This is not to depreciate statistics or questionnaires as such. The question is whether the analyst makes an effort to relate these to what he knows about larger patterns of historical development, institutional structure, and political action. Method becomes ritual when the analyst concentrates on an elaborate or rigid "conceptual framework," and limits his interpretive role to the internal structure of the data, as if he believed that only so far as he is able to neutralize his own judgment will his study be scientific and thus, by definition, meaningful. He may arrive at conclusions that others will find significant or stimulating (whether they accept them or not) only at the price of interposing himself as a filter, or subjective synthesizer of the data. The alternative is to serve the data up raw, and leave the concluding to someone else.

Thus it is that when methodologists have something significant to say about a substantive political problem, they are repeatedly forced to transcend the limits of their method, to the profit of their listeners and the confusion of their disciples.³ The novelist Merejkowski depicts a similar confusion among the pupils of Leonardo da Vinci who attempted to use the master's mechanical aids to art:

Marco d'Oggione is the most diligent, and conscientious of all the pupils of Leonardo. He works like an ox, he carries out with exactitude all of the master's rules; but the more he works, the less he

* From a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 10, 1960.

Suggestions that political fiction is worth serious attention from those engaged in political study include Dwight Waldo, *Perspectives on Administration* (Univ. of Alabama Press, 1956), ch. 4; Rowland Egger, "The Administrative Novel," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (1959), pp. 448-55; Morton Kroll, "Politics in Literature," *PROD*, Vol. 3, No. 5 (1960), pp. 3-6; Edwin A. Bock, "P I & E," in *Public Administration Review*, Vols. 17-18 (1957-8).

¹ *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1959), pp. 39-40.

² "The Politically Relevant in Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (1960), p. 54.

³ Cf. Austin Ranney's review of Leiserson's *Parties and Politics* in the *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 3 (1959), pp. 108-9; Heinz Eulau, "H. D. Lasswell's 'Developmental Analysis,'" *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 11 (1958), pp. 229-42; and especially Murray C. Havens' review of David Truman's *The Congressional Party: A Case Study* in the *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22 (1960), pp. 545-6.

succeeds. Marco is obstinate: whatever he gets into his head you could not drive out with a stake. He is convinced that "patience and labour will all things conquer"—and does not lose hope of becoming a great artist. More than all of us does he rejoice over those inventions of the master which reduce art to mechanics. The other day, having taken along the little book with figures for remembering faces, he set off for the Piazza Broletto, chose some faces in the crowd, and noted them down with the marks corresponding to those of the tables. But when he returned home, no matter how much he struggled, he could not, in any way, unite the separate parts into a living face. He came to similar grief with the little spoon for measuring the black pigment; despite the fact that in his work he observes mathematical exactitude, the shadings remain untransparent and unnatural, just as his faces are wooden and devoid of all beauty. Marco explains this by his not having carried out all of the master's rules, and redoubles his effort.⁴

It is not without significance that the splintering of enthusiasm for a "real science" of politics can be sharply traced in public administration.⁵ This field grew with the need for it. The hope for scientific management expanded along with the government agencies that seemed to demand it as an alternative to total confusion. The depression environment, moreover, and the ensuing war environment, tended to make objectives clear. Anyone could see the job to be done: the thing was to get on with it. Ultimate values could be assumed, while disputes over them seemed relics of a bygone day, and a waste of precious time. Like economic studies with sights always set on sustained maximum production, political studies could be devoted to means in the belief that knowledge of means, refined and reduced to certainty, was the thing most needed.⁶

⁴ Dmitri Merejkowski, *The Romance of Leonardo da Vinci* (Random House, 1931), pp. 143-45.

⁵ See John C. Honey, "Research in Political Science: A Further Note," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 17 (1957), p. 239; Wallace S. Sayre, "Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging," *ibid.*, Vol. 18 (1958), pp. 102-5; Emmette Redford, *Ideal and Practice in Public Administration* (University of Alabama Press, 1958), pp. ix-x, and ch. 1.

⁶ Cf. the discussion of the practical impulse in the origins of American political science as a whole, and its shortcomings, in Hans Morgenthau, "Reflections on the State of Political Science," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 17 (1955), pp. 433-45. A

Add to this the natural desire of practicing administrators to escape the harassment of human vagaries. This may not be the "passion for anonymity" ascribed to the ideal presidential assistant; but it sometimes amounts to a passionate wish that *everyone* could be anonymous, identified only by function and directed with certainty according to function, with no reproaching encounters in the flesh. Then, like the conductor of an orchestra, the administrator might use his knowledge of the administrative "score," plus his own interpretations (well, the conductor can't be anonymous), to draw out of his organization the effect that he wants and always, somehow, misses. Add also the need some administrators feel for a linguistic ritual to make them equal to the job, or to make the job seem as big as they wish it were. The sum is a powerful impulse towards a science of public administration specializing in the design of models for the machinery of government.

The check to this scientific impulse has been the proximity of public administrators to their subject. True, the literature does not always reflect this proximity; and sometimes has been as helpful to administration as the contributions of some educationists to education. Yet as a group among political scientists, a relatively high proportion of students of public administration have been involved at some time or other with the thing itself. Theory has been subjected to a considerable pressure of practice. This may account for a prevalence of irony among the practitioners, genial or cynical according to occasion and temperament.⁷ It un-

more recent critique of the development and nature of American political science, from a perspective outside it, is found in Bernard Crick, *The American Science of Politics* (University of California Press, 1959).

⁷ "It was hard to separate the elements or fix the blame. It was the early New Dealers' scorn for established procedures, without the sense of social purpose which gave administrative integrity to their experiments. It was the war-time attitude that all means must be used toward the end, without the steadying pressure of one overriding end. It was the disillusioned liberal insisting on Machiavellianism, with all the bitter worldliness of a disappointed lover covering and assuaging painful memories with a pride in his hard-bought wisdom. Perhaps, too, there was a kind of final devotion to the vanished vision in proving that, if it has not been real, nothing real was good." James F. Davidson, "The Public Servant," *Antioch Review*, (Summer, 1956) p. 217.

Cf. C. Wright Mills on the transition from

doubtedly accounts for recognized modifications and changes of direction in administrative theory.

The usefulness of the concept of administration as separate from politics has been questioned, and so has the possibility of universal principles of administration sufficient to sustain a claim to science. Experience with the complexities of administration has been reflected in an increasing attention to analysis of particular institutions and situations, notably in the form of the case study. One of the accompanying effects has been an increased interest in fictional representations of administrative and political situations.⁸

At the same time, another group of critics has taken traditional administrative theory to task for not displaying *enough* scientific rigor; for producing principles that are at bottom only "proverbs," since they are not drawn from empirical research. Oriented toward the behavioral approach and the study of groups, these critics⁹ minimize the value of the case approach and other problem-oriented research because it does not produce general propositions or transferrable concepts which can be used and tested. Instead, they call for a concentration on the production of concepts which will make a real science possible. A science, they argue, requires both a subject matter of its own and a language of its own to express the concepts by which the subject matter is to be

understood. In political study we have a subject matter but, except for a few specialized terms like "state" which aren't adequate and should be replaced, we have no language of our own and no concepts which explain what a science ought to explain about its subject matter. The thing to do, therefore, is to begin making concepts, building language, and thus work our way toward a science.

Esperanto is a reminder that language is not made in this way. The concepts of the natural sciences were developed, not to "have" them, but as a means of explaining phenomena that could not otherwise be accounted for. They had a use in themselves, and continued in the language just so long as they had a use. Such new concepts as have been suggested for political science, however, have not been notably successful in explaining anything that cannot be explained more simply in the extant language.¹⁰ It is useless to talk of cumulative effect unless there is something effective to accumulate: the sum of zeros is zero.

An inconclusive exercise or elaborated truism can always invoke the future with a reminder of the time it has taken to bring the natural sciences to their present level. Some faith and hope in this direction is commendable, but not the request for charity toward the results produced. The "infant disciplines" argument in defense of attempts to bring science to social study is rapidly taking its place with the infant industries argument for the tariff. Each new concept in the natural sciences has had to be justified in itself as providing new meaning, not as a concept possibly leading to other concepts which might in the future be meaningful; and in the process of acceptance or rejection the natural scientists have not been particularly charitable towards each other's concepts or demonstrations.

In addition to the refractory nature of politics as a subject matter, and the familiar difficulty of applying scientific methods of verification in social inquiry, some of the trouble comes from having got the wrong "fix" on science. Misconceptions of science have led some of those bent on a science of society, political or otherwise, to rule out in the name of science ap-

liberal to illiberal practicality, *The Sociological Imagination* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1959), pp. 88-92. Crick, *op. cit.*, speaks of "the cult of realism in the Progressive Era" (ch. 5), and treats scientism as a refuge taken by American liberals; see comments by Oliver Garceau and H. Mark Roelofs in this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (1959), pp. 1117-19, and Vol. 54 (1960), pp. 496-7, respectively.

⁸ Sayre, *op. cit.*, p. 103; Waldo, *op. cit.*, pp. 13, 18; Herbert Kaufman, "The Next Step in Case Studies," *Public Administration Review*, vol. 18 (1958), p. 58. On administrative fiction see Waldo, Egger, and Bock, as cited in the title note to this article. Other references to fiction have appeared from time to time in articles in the *Public Administration Review*.

⁹ Herbert Simon: *Administrative Behavior* (Macmillan, 1947), pp. 43-4, and *Organizations*, with James G. March (John Wiley & Sons, 1958), pp. 5, 30; Avery Leiserson, "Problems of Methodology in Political Research," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 68 (1953), pp. 558-84. See also the exchange between Simon and Edward C. Banfield, *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 17 (1957), pp. 78-85, and Vol. 18 (1958), pp. 60-66.

¹⁰ Cf. Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 3 (1956), pp. 408-9; David G. Smith, "Political Science and Political Theory," this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (1957), pp. 737-40; John P. Roche, "Political Science and Science Fiction," *ibid.*, Vol. 52 (1958), pp. 1026-9; Charles B. Stauffacher, "Organizations: An Executive's View," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 19 (1959), pp. 124-5.

proaches peculiarly helpful in understanding the complex phenomena they have to deal with; approaches which are not at all alien to the natural sciences.

In physics Robert J. Oppenheimer says that "the use of analogy—adapting a familiar mode of description to a new situation, finding the points of difference, and ultimately determining whether anything remains to the analogy—seems essential to the progress of understanding."¹¹ C. A. Coulson, Oxford mathematician, in discussing the fictions on which modern physics depends, refers to physical laws as "convenient ways of talking." The classical interpretation of scientific method—fact-collecting, hypothesis, experimental verification—is, he says, "at best a half-truth, and at worst a travesty of the way scientists themselves do their work."¹² Ernest Nagel, Columbia logician, urges that students be brought to recognize scientific concepts as "intellectual

creations, often suggested by the data . . . products of a creative imagination."¹³ Physicist R. B. Lindsay goes even further: "Without imagination there could be no science. The intuitive power of the mind in dreaming dreams is the essential basis for the advance of science."¹⁴

"Fiction," "creative imagination," "intuitive power": if these are important to understanding in fields where a high degree of reliable quantification obtains, how much more so in those where it does not. Analogy does not provide verification, but as a source of powerful and directive suggestion it is inseparable from the comparative method to which social scientists turn inevitably and productively in their efforts to comprehend social complexities that lie beyond exact verification.¹⁵ If the multiplicity of factors in any social situation are all to be considered in analysis and comparison, the social scientist must "filter" his material to such an extent that his imagination and intuitive power have to be reckoned as a part of any pattern he comes up with. Nor is historical inquiry free from the necessity of abstraction. Beginning with the very use of language, and continuing on through organizing ideas to the employment of ideal types (like "the Puritan mind"), the historian is doing more than sorting "gross subject matter" which can automatically determine the truth-content of the abstractions of social science. "Indeed, . . . some of the most interesting and fruitful generalizations that historians have employed are abstractions of a particularly pure sort, resembling the chemist's concept of a pure gas."¹⁶

¹¹ "The Mystery of Matter," *Adventures of the Mind*, ed. Thruelsen and Kobler (Knopf, 1959), p. 67. See also "Analogy in Science," *The American Psychologist*, Vol. 11, No. 3, March, 1960, in which Oppenheimer declares that analogy is "an indispensable and inevitable tool for scientific progress," and that "monism is the born enemy of analogy." Surely this gives us a clue as to why one-cause and one-concept explanations of politics are essentially unscientific, and why one-method fixations about science are uncreative.

"If the scientist has during the whole of his life observed carefully, trained himself to be on the look out for the analogy, and possessed himself of relevant knowledge, then the 'instrument of feeling' . . . will become a powerful divining rod . . . in creative science feeling plays a leading part." Harding, quoted in W. I. B. Beveridge, *The Art of Scientific Investigation* (Modern Library, 1957), p. 78. See also chs. 5-8, on "Imagination," "Intuition," and "Reason."

Waldo, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30, discusses analogies or idioms in the study of administration, and includes a reference to Stephen Pepper, *World Hypothesis: A Study in Evidence*, on analogies and root metaphors in philosophy. In making a qualified defense of political science as science, Waldo stresses (pp. 1-25) the necessity for a loose rather than a strict construction of the word "science," to avoid both feelings of inferiority and blind alleys in social science.

¹² "Fact and Fiction in Physics," *Bucknell Review*, Vol. 9 (1960), pp. 1, 9. Cf. Hannah Arendt, "The Modern Concept of History," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 20 (1948), pp. 577-8; and the earlier discussion of scientism in Hans Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (University of Chicago Press, 1946), ch. 5.

¹³ In Blanshard (ed.), *Education in the Age of Science* (Basic Books, 1959), pp. 204-5.

¹⁴ "[In] the theory of relativity, the quantum theory, and to a certain extent also in the theories of biology . . . we can see the similarity between the actions of the humanist who works with intuition or imagination and the creativeness of science. The creation of a scientific theory, to my mind, is ultimately just as much a work of art as the painting of a great picture or the composition of a piece of music. It represents the same kind of mental activity." *Ibid.*, p. 211. For a further roll call of distinguished scientists on science as "a strange voyage where imagination, beauty and pattern are our signposts," see Coulson, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

¹⁵ James W. Fesler, "Asphalt vs. Concrete, and Other Comparisons," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 19 (1959), p. 75; Leslie Lipson, "The Comparative Method in Political Studies," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 27 (1957), pp. 372-82.

¹⁶ Charles Frankel, "Philosophy and History," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 72 (1957), pp. 353-6. "The historical fact is in someone's mind

The problem of communication between observers inevitably arises, and here Alfred Cobban's conclusion regarding the language of social history can be applied also to political science:

Since every social situation is unique, it may be asked how we can ever find a common vocabulary to describe them. We have to resort to ordinary concrete language, says Seignobos [Charles Seignobos, *Etudes de politique et d'histoire*], adding, 'I knew that it is not elegant. It is very humiliating to be reduced to speaking like everyone else'; but despite the attraction of scientific terminology, there is no alternative . . . [Cobban says that this is a counsel of despair:] Rejecting both the attempt at an abstract scientific vocabulary and vague everyday language, does not leave us with no solution. The terminology necessary for the writing of social history is likely to arise, and can only arise, I suggest, out of an extensive examination of the relevant historical data.¹⁷

Cobban is concerned with historically accurate usage of individual terms like "feudalism," as opposed to the loose meaning given them in the current vocabulary. Political scientists have a similar interest in rescuing certain terms, beginning with "politics" itself, from the looseness of common vocabulary, and defining the limits of their meaning more carefully. Effective definition of this kind can only arise out of an extensive examination of the relevant political data which make the limits of useful employment of the word clear. Such a definition will stick in the language only if the meaning is acceptable to those equally acquainted with the relevant data. It cannot arise from language-building undertaken primarily to provide a separate and specialized vocabulary in which to discuss politics. The more the specialized vocabulary parallels the common vocabulary, the more time will be invested in translation

or it is nowhere. . . . How can the historian deal with vanished realities? He can deal with them because these vanished realities give place to pale reflections, impalpable images or ideas of themselves, and these pale reflections and impalpable images which cannot be touched or handled are all that is left of the actual occurrence. . . . He has to be satisfied with these, for the very good reason that he has nothing else." Carl Becker, "What are Historical Facts?" (1926), published in *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 8 (1955), p. 331. See also Tom Burns' comments on social concepts as fictions, in "The Idea of Structure in Sociology," *Human Relations*, Vol. 11 (1958), pp. 217-18.

¹⁷ "The Vocabulary of Social History," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 71 (1956), pp. 13-15.

and the smaller the dividend of meaning.¹⁸ Except where the common terms are clearly inadequate to the data, we ought to reconcile ourselves to speaking like everyone else, as far as usage goes.

As for style, "sciencing" in politics has taken its toll as in other areas of social study. Against the view that style is entirely an attribute of *belles-lettres*, hence a liability to anyone running down facts in pursuit of science, it is worthwhile quoting Alfred North Whitehead:

The most austere of all mental qualities . . . [is] the sense for style. It is an aesthetic sense, based on admiration for the direct attainment of a foreseen end, simply and without waste. Style in art, style in literature, style in science, style in logic, style in practical execution have fundamentally the same aesthetic qualities, namely, attainment and restraint. The love of a subject in itself and for itself, where it is not the sleepy pleasure of pacing a mental quarter-deck, is the love of style as manifested in that study.¹⁹

Political science is a fiction, then, and none the worse for that. In using fictions, whether as institutional descriptions (separation of powers, political/administrative dichotomy), institutional comparisons (parliamentary government, dictatorship), or in abstracted configurations of political behavior (group, authoritarian personality), political science follows a procedure found also in the natural sciences, with the differences required by a different subject matter. The role of the political observer as scientist is also a fiction, and a useful one insofar as it leads him to discipline himself toward the limits of possible objectivity. If, on the other hand, he conceives of science as a method of data-handling rather than a habit of mind, and undertakes to pattern his work on the natural sciences accordingly; if he is led to strain for an objectivity beyond the limits of possibility, and to reduce his judgments below the level required for significant meaning; then the fiction of political science is revealed in its unuseful form: in the elaborate inconsequence of its work, or its distance from political reality.

¹⁸ Cf. the "translations" of Talcott Parsons in Mills, *op. cit.*, ch. 2. The same sort of operation can be performed—in fact, has to be performed in the pursuit of significant meaning—on too much of the writing in political science. The tendency to prop conclusions with verbiage has been particularly noticeable in opinion studies.

¹⁹ In Blanshard, *op. cit.*, p. 229. See also Beveridge, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-8, on "scientific taste"; and Mills, *op. cit.*, Appendix, on "intellectual craftsmanship," especially pp. 217-22, on style.

II. POLITICAL FICTION: WHAT USE TO THE POLITICAL SCIENTIST?

The designation of fiction as "political" involves both its content and the analysis made of it. A literary critic, even one with political interests,²⁰ is not likely to want to treat a work of fiction from a political standpoint unless there is a substantial amount of politics in it to treat. A political scientist, on the other hand, may be led by his interests to trace political elements which are much less apparent, or play a much smaller part in the work. This is all right, understood as political rather than literary criticism, but there are limits. The recent volleys of Shakespearean criticism in this REVIEW,²¹ for example, are not the sort of thing being discussed here. By "political fiction" is meant novels, stories or plays, or parts thereof, where political processes or political views are reasonably close to the surface, and where the pearls—if any—do not all have to be dredged from the vasty deeps.

Fiction can be political either in the intent of the author to persuade the reader of a particular political view by means of his story, or in his selection of characters who move in a political setting or under political pressure for the sake of the story itself. The two types may be combined, but if the propaganda element predominates, characterization and plot inevitably suffer. The soapbox novel, along with the author who mounts it, can be taken as one form of data in the study of past or present opinion.²² It is likely to have literary value only with an exceptionally talented writer, and then below what he could achieve without the polemics. Partly in reaction to this kind of politics in the fiction of the 'thirties, political problems and subjects faded markedly in American literature for about fifteen years thereafter.²³

²⁰ E.g., Irving Howe, *Politics and the Novel* (Horizon Press, 1957), pp. 11, 16–17. The first chapter is an excellent short treatment of "The Idea of the Political Novel." See also Joseph L. Blotner, *The Political Novel* (Doubleday, 1955), pp. 1–2.

²¹ Harry V. Jaffa, "The Limits of Politics: An Interpretation of *King Lear*, Act I, scene i," Vol. 51 (1957), pp. 405–27; Allan D. Bloom, "Cosmopolitan Man and the Political Community: An Interpretation of *Othello*," Vol. 54 (1960), pp. 130–57; Sigurd Burkhardt, "English Bards and APSR Reviewers," *ibid.*, pp. 158–66; and the Bloom-Burkhardt exchange, *ibid.*, pp. 457–73.

²² E.g., Walter Rideout, *The Radical Novel in the United States, 1900–54* (Harvard Univ. Press, 1956).

²³ Richard C. Snyder's description of fictional characters as "dummies," in his introduction to

Descriptive fiction which is not directly intended as propaganda can also be used as social data, tracing the prevalence of customs and character types, and popular fiction can be used as one test of the currency and acceptability of political attitudes and political concepts. In this vein, some years ago, a president of the British Civil Service Authors' Society summarized fictional portrayals of civil servants; and more recently economist Howard R. Smith has analyzed the businessman in American novels.²⁴ Similar studies have been made by sociologists and by literary scholars.²⁵ Where

Blotner, *op. cit.*, applies mainly to didactic fiction. The best authors testify that successful characters must take on an individuality which is real to them, and which they cannot violate without weakening their whole effect. Cf. Miriam Allott (ed.), *Novelists on the Novel* (Columbia Univ. Press, 1959), pp. 285–91; also the contrast of American and English political novels in Morris E. Speare, *The Political Novel* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1924), pp. 334–6, written at a time when the American novels were primarily concerned with reform. On later writers who found "a special virtue in not writing about political and social problems," see Granville Hicks in the *New York Times Book Review*, August 12, 1956, p. 5.

²⁴ Humbert Wolfe, "Some Public Servants in Fiction," *Public Administration*, Vol. 2 (1924), pp. 39–57 (I am indebted to Professor Charles S. Ascher for this reference). Howard R. Smith, "The American Businessman in the American Novel," *Southern Economic Journal*, Vol. 25 (1959), pp. 265–302, presented as the presidential address to the Southern Economic Association in 1958, and an admirably systematic treatment which concludes (p. 301) that those who think the businessman has been dealt special punishment in fiction are wrong. See also Warren G. French, "Timothy Shay Arthur: Pioneer Business Novelist," *American Quarterly*, Vol. 10 (1958), pp. 55–65; Van R. Halsey, "Fiction and the Businessman: Society Through All Its Literature," *ibid.*, Vol. 11 (1959), pp. 391–402; and the articles on this subject in *Fortune*, November 1948, December 1952, January 1955, and August 1959.

²⁵ Milton C. Albrecht, "The Relationship of Literature and Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 59 (1953–54), pp. 425–36; and "Does Literature Reflect Common Values?" *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 21 (1956), pp. 722–29; also B. H. Gelfant, *The American City Novel* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1954); and O. W. Coan and R. G. Lillard, *America in Fiction: An Annotated List of Novels That Interpret Aspects of Life in the United States* (Stanford Univ. Press,

writers of fiction develop sufficiently coherent ideas of history or philosophy, these may become the object of a deeper analysis, as in Isaiah Berlin, *The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History*. More likely, they will be used only as starting-points in the scholar's exploration.²⁶

Works of fiction can be used in the teaching of politics and administration to supply some vicarious experience where real experience is impossible. This device goes a step beyond the case study, forsaking factual authenticity for what the teacher judges to be authenticity of atmosphere or "feel" for the problem treated. Various suggestions along these lines have appeared in print,²⁷ and the advantages and limitations should be fairly clear.

Unfortunately, all political fiction is not useful political instruction either as to facts or atmosphere. On the whole, American writing falls shorter of this standard than European. The superiority of European political novels over American has been ascribed to the more complex political heritage on which the former draw, and to a more limited and politically sophisticated group of readers. For C. P. Snow, this is the deciding advantage of England over the United States as a place for the writer: "Do your politicians, civil servants, schoolteachers,

read as ours do? If they do, it seems to me that your writers do not feel their response."²⁸ As a group, certainly, our public men do not read as much as their British or European counterparts; and when they do, their habitual mode of public expression prevents writers from feeling their response. In addition to the intellectual gulf between—to take extremes—the world of Dwight Eisenhower and the world of Albert Camus,²⁹ I would say that the American politician who does read political fiction expects less of it in terms of what he knows about politics, and tends to judge it more by what he thinks a constituent reading it will think about politics.

To invoke a Lasswellian proverb, "Political symbols circulating among the power holders correspond more closely to the power facts than do the symbols presented to the domain," and the power holders prefer to communicate to the domain with its own symbols. So do many American novelists of politics. Their accuracy is a matter of externals—sights, sounds, procedures, terms of the trade, that give a sense of *exposé*. Virginia Woolf acknowledged the skill required for external accuracy, even as she dismissed its significance: "To know the outside of one's age, its dresses and its dances and its catchwords, has an interest and even a value . . . if you have a mind that way, may even instruct. But (the) work passes . . . and in three years' time looks dowdy and dull as any other fashion which has served its turn and gone its way."³⁰

Here, the political scientist may find both a use for and a service to literature. For in spite of Plato, the poet banishes hard. Every regime that has tried it, either literally or through the exile of the mind which is censorship, has been the worse for it. In the "lie" of fiction is also its truth, if it has any. If it has none, the "bad lie" deserves not the censorship of law, but the censure of informed opinion. And if political scientists are as informed about politics as they ought to be, they have a critical role to play in correcting misinformation and distorted emphasis in fiction dealing with politics, whether these proceed from reasons of politics, or reasons of literary expediency.

None of the uses mentioned thus far—as signals of opinion, as aids to teaching, or as

1945). More directly political examples include Susanne Howe, *Novels of Empire* (Columbia Univ. Press, 1949); J. M. van der Kroef, "The Colonial Novel in Indonesia," *Comparative Literature*, Vol. 10 (1958), pp. 215-31. Two political comments on currently identified literary groups are Eugene Burdick, "The Politics of the Beat Generation," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 12 (1959), pp. 553-5; and Morton Kroll, "The Politics of Britain's Angry Young Men," *ibid.*, pp. 555-57.

²⁶ Andrew Hacker, "Dostoevsky's Disciples: Man and Sheep in Political Theory," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 17 (1955), pp. 590-613; and Martin Kessler, "Power and the Perfect State: A Study in Disillusionment as Reflected in Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and Huxley's *Brave New World*," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 72 (1957), pp. 569-77.

²⁷ Waldo, *op. cit.*; Bock, *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 17 (1957), p. 285. The series of case stories published by the American Foundation for Political Education represents an attempt to combine the case study method with some of the techniques of the short story. See also Austin L. Porterfield, "Some Uses of Literature in Teaching Sociology," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 41 (1957), pp. 421-26; and Josephine Strode, *Social Insight Through Short Stories* (Harper, 1946).

²⁸ "Which Side of the Atlantic?" *Harpers*, October 1959, pp. 163-66. See also Blotner, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

²⁹ Cf. Glenn Tinder, "Human Estrangement and the Failure of the Political Imagination," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 21 (1959), p. 612.

³⁰ *Granite and Rainbow* (Harcourt, Brace, 1959), pp. 46-7.

misrepresentation to be corrected—approaches fiction as the author intended the reader should. Taking political fiction as it can be and sometimes is, rather than as the output of every writer who decides to try a political setting, what relation has it to the political scientist's own thinking? According to a number of writers, critics, and teachers of literature, not very much. The writer, after all, wants to tell his story and sell his book. If he lectures, he bores all but the few who came to hear a lecture. If the editorial stuffing sticks out of his characters, he risks making both the characters and the views offensive or ridiculous. Hence Somerset Maugham's insistence that the aim of art is to please, and that anything aimed to instruct is not art.³¹

As for the critics, they are naturally interested in form: in the whole work and the relation of all its parts. Most literary critics recognize social and ideological background as parts to be considered, many having an acute interest in these parts; but any attempt to treat the politics or social criticism separately from the whole work usually pains them to some degree. The more that structure is stressed as the standard for criticism, the more the phrase "novel of ideas" becomes anathema,³² the sharper becomes the insistence that subject matter, that reality, is entirely beside the point. The test is whether the author's skill can make us believe what he says without wanting to confront it with reality.

Our willingness to suspend disbelief in entering a world of fiction, however, depends on what the author promises as well as on his skill. If he says, "Come with me to an enchanted land where the heroes are true and the villains get their due," we should expect only to be enchanted. In terms of the traditional distinction, he is writing a romance, not a novel. If he says, "Come with me to the United States Senate," and walking along ways with which we are more or less familiar he suddenly turns us down a corridor of fantasy, we are less likely to be pleased. And art, in Maugham's sense, will not have been served. It is always possible that

we won't know a wrong turn when it comes, of course, but significant authors do not rely on the ignorance or inexperience of their readers. They convey the sense of an actual world, and if that world is not a fantastic or a completely personal world (in which case the skill at making it "actual" tends to be poetic rather than narrative), there must be a correspondence with the real world that intelligent and informed readers can recognize.

Satire might seem to be an exception, but it cannot exist without the contrast of an implicit view of reality which satire mocks by deliberate exaggeration, in fun, in hope of reform, or in simple malice. The humor, light or bitter depending on how much the author cares, lies in the distorted image produced when reality is highlighted by absurdities. As a caricature is more telling the closer it approximates a portrait, the level of success of political satire depends on the sophistication with which the writer comprehends what he ridicules: compare Hollywood's funny politicians with Washington's Gridiron scripts. The world of experience is still the test, although the correspondence is of a different kind for satire than for realistic writing.

In describing what the novelist does to the real world to create his world, Emile Zola reflected the hopes of the early partisans of naturalism for a new scientific realism:

The novelist is equally an observer and experimentalist. . . . The whole operation consists in taking facts from nature, then in studying the mechanism of these facts, acting upon them, by the modification of circumstance and surroundings, without deviating from the laws of nature. Finally, you possess knowledge of man, scientific knowledge of him, in both his individual and social relations. . . . The question of method and the question of rhetoric are separate. . . . Let us first establish the method—which must become universal—then accept in literature all those kinds of rhetoric that emerge; let us regard them as an expression of the writer's literary temperament.³³

Political scientists should ponder this view and contrast it with the following in *Art and Real-*

³¹ *Ten Novelists and Their Novels* (Wm. Heinemann, Ltd., 1954), pp. 6-8. Cf. Egger, *op. cit.*, p. 448.

³² *E.g.*, Caroline Gordon, *How to Read a Novel* (Viking, 1957), ch. 1. For a discussion which is also of interest to political scientists as an attempt to achieve a more scientific literary discipline through rigorous analysis of structure, see Manfred Kridl, "The Integral Method of Literary Scholarship," *Comparative Literature*, Vol. 3 (1951), pp. 18-34.

³³ *Roman Experimental*, quoted in Allott, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-9, 316-17. Maupassant's dissent stressed the same point as the quotation from Cary: "Selection is . . . necessary and that is the first blow to the theory of 'the whole truth.' . . . To make true, then, one must give a complete illusion of truth by following the ordinary logic of events and not by slavishly transcribing them in the haphazard way they come." *Ibid.*, p. 71.

ity by Joyce Cary, who knew something of art and a good deal about political reality:

Actual life . . . doesn't have a total meaning, it is simply a wild confusion of events from which we have to select what we think significant for ourselves. Look at any morning paper. It makes no sense at all—it means nothing but chaos. We read only what we think important; that is to say, we provide our own sense to the news. We have to do so because otherwise it wouldn't be there. . . .

This selection, this tone, this emphasis, is art. All communication . . . that not only gives the facts, but puts some valuation on the facts, is art. There is no other means by which the feeling about a fact can be conveyed.³⁴

The problem of selection is what links the otherwise disparate activities of writing fiction and studying politics. It is present in the selection of case studies, where a balance is needed between what is so typical as to be dull and what is too unique to represent instructively.³⁵ It is present even in studies that attempt simply to read the dials, to let the facts speak for themselves, for if significant conclusions follow from them it will be found that the author (or someone else) has gathered up certain strands of information in his own hands and woven them together with his own knowledge of the subject to make a meaningful pattern. Meaningful to whom? To persons of equal knowledge of the subject who either find it "actual" for them or else reject it because it leaves too many facts acting out of character. The problem of selection is present above all in comparing and analyzing institutions and theories of government, where the scholar must stand more squarely between his material and his readers, selecting and patterning, hoping for a judgment of his peers that he has imposed a meaningful order on the chaos of events.

What the social scientist instinctively mistrusts in the writer of fiction is the peculiar way in which he acts as agent between his facts and his readers, and the possibility that his very skill may allow him to put something over on them. The same sort of mistrust prompts occasional warnings that a scholar possessing literary skill must be watched "like a novelist," and that in the face of "imagination and genu-

ine brilliance . . . it is difficult for the reader not to relax the standards of verification to which less talented writers are held."³⁶ One of its duties which the scholarly community performs fairly well, however, is to overcome this difficulty in regard to each others' work. We are better off with writers of imagination and genuine brilliance producing errors for which they can be called to account, than without them.

The writer of fiction does not do something so utterly different from the writer of the treatise that there is no possible comparison. He does select and pattern with a far greater freedom, and before a far wider and less uniform audience. Like the metaphysician who establishes his own terms and cannot be finally refuted in them, he creates a world "beyond physics" which cannot be refuted. But it can be rejected as implausible.³⁷

In looking to fiction for insights political scientists have a right to expect the politics they encounter there to be plausible, and to criticize it when it is not. The literary experts are right to remind us that we often do violence to a whole work when we abstract one aspect of it to call political. Yet this is what we do to life, in order to have a study at all. The natural scientist typically abstracts a segment of reality in order to understand the whole better through it. The poet concentrates on the particular to communicate something about the world of total experience. The writer of fiction falls between the two and, at a different point, so does the political scientist. Just as he should avoid pseudo-science, the latter should also avoid pseudo-criticism—the claim that a political standard is the whole measure of literature.³⁸

³⁶ Andrew M. Scott on Richard Hofstadter in "The Progressive Era in Perspective," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 21 (1959), pp. 685–701.

³⁷ "What makes one find a metaphysical theory implausible is . . . a feeling that it fails to cover the facts. . . . Those whose business is with the humanities, and who know how hard it is to produce knock-down arguments to support a literary reading or even a large-scale historical interpretation, may recognize the metaphysician's predicament here as their own." W. H. Walsh in *Philosophy*, Vol. 35 (1960), p. 141.

³⁸ On the abstractions of the scientist and the poet, see Robert Boynton, "A Poetic Approach to Politics: A Study of the Political Philosophy of George Santayana," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 4 (1958), 689–92, 694. On the literary objection to abstracting from fiction, see Aerol Arnold, "Why Structure in Fiction: A Note to Social Scientists," *American Quarterly*, Vol. 10 (1959), 325–37.

³⁴ Cambridge Press (1958), pp. 5, 9–10. On the nature of fiction, see also Percy Lubbock, *The Craft of Fiction* (Viking, 1957), and E. M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (Harcourt, Brace, 1927).

³⁵ Cf. F. M. G. Wilson, "Cases and Case Study: American and British," *Public Administration*, Vol. 38 (1960), p. 66.

The honest writer of fiction says, "Out of my whole being and experience, this is what I know of these people at this instant." If his craft is great enough, we believe him while he is saying it. Therein lies the pleasure. If his insight is significant, we remember it afterwards. Therein lies instruction, whether Maugham will have it or not. When the insight no longer accommodates the facts of our experience, we reject it. At this end of the spectrum, the question raised in passing from belief for pleasure to a pursuit of the instruction suggested is, "Are you sure that's true?" At the other end, to the tabulators and recorders of uncolored fact, the question is, "So what?" Each is a valid undertaking which needs to be checked by the question most difficult for it to answer. Between these two extremes there is no barrier or break, but a merging of one kind of knowledge into another.

The arguments which this paper has been intended to support may be summarized as follows:

1. Reasonable loyalty to the term "political science" in no way excludes consideration of fictional writing bearing on politics. On the contrary, the compulsion toward a science of politics has in the recent past led to a concentration on methods inappropriate to, or insufficient for, the production of significant meaning. Efforts toward a more exact knowledge of politics through a refinement of technique are to be encouraged, but they must also be challenged to produce conclusions meaningful to experienced observers.

2. Creative imagination plays a vital role in establishing conceptual relationships within the natural sciences and, necessarily, an even broader role in areas of study where experimental verification is impossible or of doubtful reliability. There are elements of similarity in the process of selection and "casting" of worthwhile works in creative writing and in creative scholarship. If the fictional form is deceptive so, in their own ways, are the theoretical models of political science.

3. Political scientists, as such, should criticize fictional treatments of politics, with a caution varying inversely with the degree to

which politics dominates the work. Political analysis should not be confused with a total evaluation of the work as literature, although the two will be connected.

4. Literary fiction may serve as opinion data and as teaching aids, with care for the useful limits. The relation of such material to the political scientist's own thinking can be suggestive, never conclusive.

5. At its best, fiction illuminates politics as it illuminates all of life: by imposing an order sufficient to give meaning and flexible enough to impart the sense of vital confusion. If an attention to political fiction did nothing more than remind us of the extent to which we fictionalize in all analysis, or restore the critical role of the writer, or give greater vitality to the language in which we discuss politics, it would be justified.

Professor Frankel has written of the tension, the sense of pathos or irony, with which any great historian moves from the grand view to look at events through the eyes of those who took part in them. What he says of history is instructive for political science:

Philosophical history need not be callous or inhuman; but if it is not to be, it needs something that only the historian can bring it, and something philosophy cannot by itself give him—compassion, the story-teller's eye, and the conviction that if we do not measure the meaning of events in terms of the actual, private, short-term values men have, then in the end nothing in history has any meaning at all.³⁹

The subject is politics. The end is communicable understanding. The means ought to be any that contribute. There is no substitute for the experienced observer, disciplined by the facts and professing the possibility of some meaning in them. We need experience, insight, and correction, wherever we can get them. In that, there should be enough of a discipline, enough of a profession, for all of us.

³⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 369. Cf. Berlin's discussion of Tolstoy's dilemma, *op. cit.*

THE LOYALTY OATH ISSUE IN IOWA, 1951*

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When the political scientist attempts to assess the state of civil liberties in America following World War II, he confronts a voluminous record of episodes and events. Most of the books, articles, and other documents so far available suggest that the fear of communist subversion carried Americans very far from the spirit, if not the letter, of the Bill of Rights. Indeed, it is possible to conclude that the hysteria associated with the name of Joseph R. McCarthy permeated almost every state, city and hamlet in America, and that McCarthy himself, in the words of Richard H. Rovere, "held two Presidents captive, or as nearly captive as any Presidents of the United States have ever been held . . ." The political scientist may therefore be persuaded that the label *McCarthy Era* better fits the Nineteen Fifties than the alternative designation, *Eisenhower Era*.

It may be hoped, however, that his research will not overlook those incidents, however rare, which suggest that fear and suspicion did not entirely dominate the national scene. One such incident, of more than ordinary interest, occurred in Iowa during the early months of 1951. By April, 1951, more than one year had elapsed since the late junior Senator from Wisconsin had produced his famous if elusive "list" of card-carrying communists in the State Department. The Korean War, moving toward the end of its first winter, promoted a mood which was, on the whole, favorable to the Senator's activities. Nevertheless, in April, 1951, the Iowa Senate overwhelmingly rejected a loyalty oath measure which was much less stringent than those that had previously been approved in almost half the states.¹ The action of the Iowa Senate,

moreover, was not merely unusual or exceptional in 1951; it appears to be without precedent in recent history. So far as is known, Iowa was the only state in which a loyalty oath measure was defeated by vote in the legislature.²

But while the loyalty oath controversy has significance for civil liberties during the post-World War II period, its import for students of the legislative process is less easy to delineate. As Wahlke and Eulau have indicated,

legislators engage in many actions not accounted for in simple formal or legal descriptions of the legislature as an institution. In particular, the choices they make (of which the choice to vote 'aye' or 'nay' is no doubt the chief one) are left wholly unexplained by formal and legal study. Explanation of such choices is essential to ex-

compilation by The Fund for the Republic, loyalty oaths and pledges are required of teachers in twenty-one states: California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. In all but three of these (Colorado, South Dakota, and Tennessee), loyalty oath or pledge requirements were instituted during or after World War II. Loyalty oath provisions have made their appearance in eight states since 1950. The Fund for the Republic, *Digest of the Public Record of Communism in the United States*, (New York, 1955). But in Walter Gellhorn, *The States and Subversion* (Cornell, 1952), it is stated that twenty-seven states have "prescribed teacher's oaths of various types." (p. 410).

² In a number of states, bills incorporating loyalty oaths for teachers have "died" in legislative committees or been vetoed by governors. The most recent instance of such action—and one of particular interest considering the governor involved—occurred in Arkansas in early 1957. Governor Orval E. Faubus, vetoing a loyalty oath bill which had passed the Arkansas Senate 32-0 and House 81-6, declared that the bill was "unnecessary" and would pose a possible threat to the innocent in its provisions. American Civil Liberties Union, *Weekly Bulletin* 1906, June 10, 1957.

* This study was made possible by a grant from The Fund for the Republic, Inc. I wish to thank the twenty-four members of the 1951 Iowa Senate who consented to be interviewed or who filled out questionnaires. I am also grateful for the cooperation of individuals associated with the State University of Iowa, Iowa State College, Iowa State Teachers College, American Association of University Professors, and the Iowa Civil Liberties Union. No statement can adequately express my gratitude to Sidney Jones and Kenneth McLean, who rendered indispensable research assistance.

¹ The number of states without loyalty oaths is differently reported in two sources. According to a

planation of the decisions made by the legislature as an institutionalized group of persons. And it is this latter explanation that is of concern to students of politics.³

Here, the effort to explain the Iowa Senate's "choice" is beset by a variety of difficulties. To begin with, the present study was made some years after the loyalty oath controversy. Many of the senators questioned had some trouble remembering how they had voted, or by whom, or what, their votes had been influenced; almost all denied that their votes had been affected by political party affiliations, interest groups, newspapers, or individuals.⁴ An outside observer cannot attribute the Senate's decision to points scored in the debate, since the debate was not recorded in the official journal. Moreover, none of the senators involved in the study indicated that he had been influenced by the debate. For these reasons, and others that will become apparent, my attempt to explain the Iowa Senate's "choice" in April, 1951, must be tentative, even cautious. Nevertheless, I will make it in due course, on the assumption that what the Senate did will matter to those who are concerned about civil liberties and interested in the legislative process.

I

The Iowa loyalty oath debate began on February 20, 1951, when Senator Alden L. Doud (Rep., Douds) introduced his first bill ostensibly designed to alert Iowans to the menace of communism in the state government. Senator Doud's bill, which was co-sponsored by eleven other senators, required all of Iowa's government agencies, courts, and schools to determine whether any employee was a subversive person. Subversive persons would be denied employment in all branches of the state government, and no state agency could receive public funds until it had filed a report on measures taken to identify subversives in its employment. All state employees and candidates for public office would be required to sign written declarations of loyalty to the United States and

the state of Iowa. Anyone convicted of teaching or conspiring to teach the overthrow of the government, or of committing the overthrow of the government, could be fined up to \$10,000 and imprisoned up to twenty years. Persons becoming or remaining members of subversive organizations after the effective date of the act would be subject to \$1,000 fine, or a year in prison, or both.

Senator Doud was, in many respects, a representative member of the 1951 Iowa Senate. Fifty-four years of age, he was serving his second term in the Senate, and had served previously in the lower house of the state legislature. A Methodist, lawyer, and small town resident, he had obtained his education at Iowa Wesleyan. He also enjoyed some political prominence as a member of the Republican Party's State Central Committee. In one particular, he differed from a majority of his Senate colleagues, and it was well known that he was extremely sensitive about that difference. Staunchly patriotic and emotionally dedicated to the promotion of Americanism, Doud had been unable to serve in the two World Wars by virtue of a physical disability.

The Iowa Senate to which he introduced his bill was largely composed of veteran legislators like himself. Forty-one of the total of fifty senators were members of the Republican Party, and the remaining nine were Democrats. Forty-two senators were drawn from the occupational ranks of farming, the law, and small business. All but three senators were affiliated with Protestant churches, and especially the Methodist and Lutheran denominations. Thirty-nine senators were native-born Iowans, and the entire Senate membership averaged fifty-six years of age. In all respects, the composition of the upper body of the Fifty-fourth Iowa General Assembly in 1951 was not noticeably different from the composition of those Senates which had preceded it, or for that matter, which were to follow.

The Doud measure, which was immediately referred to the Senate's Judiciary Committee No. 1, received front-page notice from most Iowa newspapers. But no newspaper printed the text of the bill, and few commented editorially on the measure at any point in its legislative career.⁵ Of those newspapers which did

³ John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, eds., *Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1959), p. 3.

⁴ Although there was no roll-call of votes, the *Des Moines Register* reported that forty-seven of the full Senate membership of fifty were present and voted when the loyalty oath measure was defeated. But one Senator who participated in the study insisted that the loyalty oath issue had never been voted upon, and another was certain that the measure had passed the Senate.

⁵ Most of the newspapers published in college communities avoided editorial discussion. In at least one case, involving a newspaper published in the locale of a major state educational institution, the "silent treatment" was a compromise between the views of the newspaper publisher, who favored the bill, and the views of the university community which the newspaper serves.

discuss the bill in editorials, none dealt with it the day following its introduction.

Iowa's leading newspaper, the *Des Moines Register*, headed its page-one news story on February 21: "IOWA LOYALTY BILL PROVIDES 20-YEAR TERM / Check required on all teachers." Following its summary of the bill's provisions, the *Register* reported that the bill was favored by state leaders of the American Legion. It quoted State Legion Commander Robert Bush to the effect that the proposed loyalty oath was similar to the one taken by all employees of the federal government.

The *Iowa City Press-Citizen*, published in the home community of the State University of Iowa, also gave the bill front-page space, and more background treatment than the *Register* had accorded it. If the Doud bill is adopted, the *Press-Citizen* story began, "All public employees will be required to sign written statements that they do not have any subversive designs against constitutional government." The *Iowa City* newspaper recalled a statement by an Iowa FBI agent earlier that week that "There were 50 to 70 Communists" in the state, and it also mentioned that the Attorney General's office had its own list of Iowans believed to be communists or communist sympathizers. The *Press-Citizen* further reported that the Executive Committee of the State American Legion had taken a stand favoring the signing of loyalty oaths by all public servants, including teachers. Finally, the newspaper noted that Senate Majority Leader Leo Elthon (Rep., Fertile) was among the bill's sponsors, and it referred to Doud's interest in introducing the bill as follows:

Senator Doud said that the bill was aimed, in part, at educational institutions where the teaching of Communistic theories might be allowed to go unnoticed. "If the Communists are going to do anything about furthering their propaganda they will depend upon doing it in the grass roots, among our youngsters," Doud said. "That's where we want to stop it."

Senator Doud did not reveal that the bill was introduced "by request." Although Doud has never publicly identified the anonymous sponsors of the measure, he subsequently stated in writing that the "source" of the "request" was a "government agency" that did not want its interest in the bill to be generally known. Most members of the Senate, and the public at large, consequently, were never informed. The principal purpose of the bill, Doud later recalled,

so far as I and others were concerned, was not so much to secure its passage which could have been

pressed harder, but to "draw flies" which was successful. [We sought] to discover the pattern of opposition in Iowa to loyalty oath legislation.

All letters he received opposing the bill were turned over to the FBI for checking, and according to Doud, it was determined that a number of them had been written by communists or suspected communists. An editorial writer for a major state newspaper was investigated at the time, and it was found that "he was closely associated with the (Communist) movement." As a result, he ceased to be employed by the newspaper in question.

A further purpose of the bill was to provide a basis for perjury prosecution of communists. 1951 was a time of emergency, in Doud's opinion. An Iowa Senate sub-committee had reported that World War III could begin at any time, and that the United States could be bombed by Russia or China. It was therefore urgent to remove any possibility of internal subversion. While the bill would not have prevented communists from working for the state, it would have rendered them liable to perjury charges if they sought or held state jobs.

A final purpose of the measure, according to Doud, was to insure the loyalty of teachers in the state schools. Good Americans were not likely to object to taking a loyalty oath; only "Communist-type" professors would be extreme in their opposition to one. While it was a good idea to teach about communism, "Communist-type" professors were inclined to go beyond such teaching to outright advocacy of communism. They were fanatical zealots who were more concerned with propagating their own peculiar brand of political philosophy than with educating their students.

The principal or "draw flies" purpose of the Doud measure, as reported by Doud himself, was not articulated during the Senate debate. Nor was it mentioned that Governor William Beardsley intended to veto the bill if passed.⁶ Subsequent discussion in the Senate and elsewhere focused mainly on the teacher loyalty oath provisions and their relationship to academic-freedom civil liberties, and on the the internal threat of Communism.

II

The first major public comment on the Doud measure appeared in the *Des Moines Sunday Register*, February 25, 1951. In a lengthy editorial in the Women's Section headed, "TIME

⁶ Apparently Governor Beardsley, who died in office, did not reveal his intention to more than one or two sponsors of the bill.

FOR A LITTLE COMMON SENSE," the *Sunday Register* observed that the McCarran Act and the Doud bill were both based on the assumption that "there is a 'clear and present danger' from Communism, which justifies emergency measures." But during recent years, the *Register* suggested, "the whole character of the danger changed. Externally, it has become much more acute. Internally, it has faded away rapidly." The real need, continued the editorial, is for a continued strengthening of our armed forces and alliances, increasing our propaganda abroad, and helping non-Communist countries improve their economies. "Our red-hunters," it concluded,

would be doing far more for the cause they cherish if they buckled down to understanding and supporting *these goals*—rather than looking under schoolroom desks for Communists.

The pitiful handful of 54 actual Communists (by F.B.I. count) in this whole state of 2½ million souls is not a good reason for mobilizing a vast, intrusive, and expensive machinery of oaths, and threats of penitentiary sentences against public servants and ordinary citizens.

A generally similar point of view was presented in the influential *Cedar Rapids Gazette*. On February 26, under the title, "THAT 'LOYALTY' BILL," the *Gazette* commented:

We surmise that the real purpose of this bill is to get at certain faculty people of our state-supported schools, whom some of those whose names are on the bill have suspected of having Red leanings. This is a serious indictment and this is a clumsy way of pressing it. For our part, we place our faith in the judgment of those charged with operation of the institution to rout out Communist sympathizers if they are there. The real danger in this bill is not only that it may fail in its purpose but that, in addition, it may lose the state some of its highly respected public servants of unquestioned loyalty, simply because they may refuse to go along with what they consider a form of coercion.

Of the major Iowa newspapers which supported the Doud legislation, the two most outspoken were the *Sioux City Journal* and the *Council Bluffs Nonpareil*. The *Journal*, in an editorial of April 9, commented that taking a loyalty oath "should not be difficult for anyone who has the right attitude toward his state and his country. Normal, common sense persons whose loyalty is full and complete should not have any objection to signing an oath to that effect."

On April 10, the *Council Bluffs Nonpareil* editorialized about communications it had received from various American Association of

University Professors' chapters protesting the Doud legislation. The professors, declared the *Nonpareil*, "are barking up the wrong tree." They should be required to sign a loyalty oath "for the simple reason that they ARE teachers, charged with the duty of educating children and instructing them in the duties of citizenship. No other public employees have this responsibility." The newspaper's editor added that he himself would volunteer to sign any oath which teachers were required to sign.

The teachers themselves, meanwhile, were working through a variety of organizations in their effort to defeat the Doud bill. Spokesmen of the Iowa State Education Association appeared in Des Moines to urge Senate opposition to the measure. The presidents or other officials of the major state educational institutions informed key senators that there was no communist problem in the schools, and that the Doud legislation was, in their opinion, unnecessary and possibly harmful. Chapters of the AAUP at private colleges which would not be affected by the bill joined those of the state institutions in opposing it; AAUP branches at Grinnell, Cornell, and Coe Colleges were especially active in this respect. Finally, a number of senators received letters and occasional visits from individual educators, college and university professors, almost all of whom were opposed to the bill.

The Iowa Civil Liberties Union, a branch of the American Civil Liberties Union, took a strong stand against the Doud bill. A few trade unions, or their legislative representatives, also expressed opposition to the measure. There is no evidence, however, that the State Federation of Labor became involved in the controversy, nor did any of the major Iowa religious and ethnic organizations. No comment on the Doud legislation ever appeared in the *Cedar Rapids Tribune*, a labor newspaper, or in the *Iowa Bystander*, a Negro publication.

Ranged in support of the loyalty oath measure were the American Legion and other veterans' organizations. Spokesmen representing the Daughters of the American Revolution and Sons of the American Revolution lent support to the Doud bill either as individuals or as representatives of local chapters. Although the Iowa Manufacturers' Association took no official position, it was known to favor the measure.

There can be no question that the opposition to the loyalty oath was better organized and more vocal than the support. The anti-oath groups lobbied actively against the measure in a variety of ways; on the day of the final vote, for example, the visitors' gallery of the Senate chamber was almost entirely occupied by a

delegation of teachers from the Des Moines schools. The pro-oath organizations largely confined themselves to releasing statements. They did not make the oath a foremost issue in their legislative programs, nor did they make a determined effort to communicate their views to all senators or to the state at large. Most senators and Iowa citizens, as a result, were much more aware of sentiment against the oath than of sentiment for it.

It is also probable that public opinion throughout the state was ranged against the Doud bill. Although the *Iowa Poll*, a public opinion survey conducted regularly by the *Des Moines Register*, did not deal with the Doud measure at any point in its career, there is considerable reason to believe that the loyalty oath proposal did not receive much public support. Indeed the threat of communism has always seemed remote to most Iowa citizens. At the height of the post-World War I anti-communist surge, for example, at least six bills promoting "loyalty" were introduced in the Iowa legislature. During the 1920-21 legislative session measures were presented which would have established censorship of movies, loyalty oaths for teachers, compulsory Bible reading in the schools, and exclusion of aliens as teachers in public, private and parochial schools. Only one of the bills introduced was reported out of committee, and in that instance (alien exclusion) the committee recommended that action on the measure be indefinitely postponed. Thus far the postponement has lasted forty years.

Concurrent resolutions have fared better in the legislature, but without exception these recommend or encourage, rather than require or prohibit, certain policies and actions. The 1953 session of the legislature called attention to a provision of Iowa law which states:

The Bible shall not be excluded from any public school or institution in the state, nor shall any child be required to read it contrary to the wishes of his parents and guardians.

The concurrent resolution was intended to "encourage every public school in Iowa to avail itself of this statutory provision and give the Bible a prominent place in its library and a proper place in its course of study . . . mindful, of course, that such procedure be in accord with public sentiment and in harmony with appropriate educational procedure." In the course of consideration by the House, a section of the resolution which read

we call attention to the fact that atheism has no recognition in this state . . .

was amended to read

we call attention to the fact that belief in a Supreme Being has recognition in this state . . .

Such resolutions may not be entirely innocuous, but they can hardly be said to have been inspired by the late Senator McCarthy.

In fact, the deceased junior Senator from Wisconsin did not arouse much support in Iowa at any point in his career. Almost three years after the famous speech in West Virginia which launched his anti-communist career, the *Iowa Poll* conducted by the *Des Moines Register* asked Iowans in all parts of the state the following question:

As you know, Senator McCarthy was renominated in Wisconsin as the Republican candidate for United States Senator. Have you heard or read anything about Senator McCarthy?

Thirty-six percent of those questioned in October, 1952, replied in the negative. The 64 percent who had some knowledge of Senator McCarthy were then asked:

What are some of the things that you remember about Senator McCarthy that you think are good or of which you approve?

The results follow:

	Total %	Men %	Women %
Fights communism in government	26	28	22
Aggressively investigates	10	10	10
Fights corruption in government	6	5	6
Everything is good	3	3	3
Honest, good American	1	2	1
Indefinite and miscellaneous	7	6	8
Approve nothing	15	17	11
No opinion	35	31	42

In other words, at the height of the national anti-communist ferment, more than two Iowans in three either had not heard of Senator McCarthy, had no opinion about him, or approved nothing he did.

III

Perhaps the public indifference to McCarthy accounts in part for the fate of the Doud measure. On March 14, 1951, or approximately three weeks after it was introduced, the "anti-subversive" bill (as it was popularly termed) was recommended for passage by the Senate's Judiciary Committee No. 1. Under the rules of the Iowa Senate, the bill was then forwarded to

the Senate's so-called Sifting Committee, of which Doud was a member, for placement on the Legislative Calendar.

Much to his surprise and that of numerous others, Doud was never able to get his bill out of his own committee. Opinion within the committee—which proved to be an accurate reflection of Senate opinion as a whole—was hostile to the measure on a variety of grounds. Some members were opposed to the bill on principle, and also did not believe that it would pass the Senate. Others were convinced that it conflicted with the Iowa Constitution, and if passed would be declared unconstitutional by the Iowa Supreme Court. Another view in the committee was that the bill, relative to other legislative business, was unimportant. This opinion, which held that the measure would neither deal adequately with the problem of subversion nor harm the schools, regarded the bill as an unwelcome interruption in the Senate's consideration of more important issues. Doud was never able to persuade the committee to release his bill, and it was therefore never brought before the full Senate.

IV

On April 4, however, Doud made a second try; he introduced a loyalty oath amendment to the civil defense bill which the Senate was then debating. The oath provision in the amendment, considerably watered down from the version in the original bill, would have required Iowa state employees to file "written statements" that

he or she does not advocate and is not a member of any organization which engages in or advocates, abets, or advises, activities intended to overthrow, destroy, or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction, or alteration of, the constitutional form of government of the United States or of the State of Iowa, or of any political subdivision thereof, or either of them, by revolution, force or violence.

Unlike the original bill, which provided penalties of a jail sentence or a fine, or both, the amendment called only for the removal from state employment of persons who refused to file loyalty oath statements, or who were found to be subversive. It is puzzling why this amendment was introduced at all, if to "draw flies" was the only motive for the original bill, since that purpose had presumably been by now accomplished.

As was the case with the original Doud bill, the initial Senate action was again favorable. On April 6, a point of order challenging the relevance of the Doud amendment to the civil defense bill was overruled by the presiding officer of the Senate, Lieutenant Governor

William H. Nicholas. Nicholas—who read his ruling which had been prepared in advance—held that the amendment was pertinent in that its effect was to strengthen the civil defense bill. An appeal from his ruling was defeated by a vote of 30-9 (11 absent or not voting).

Encouraged by this development, Doud took the floor of the Senate to make what the *Des Moines Register* called a "hard-hitting" defense of his amendment. Pointing to a "bulging file of subversives in Iowa" which was on his desk, Doud declared that he had the support of the American Legion and other authorities "supporting our forces on the home front behind the men in the battle lines against Communist undermining."⁷ Assailing a recent anti-oath editorial in the *Register*, Doud stated:

I have received threatening letters. I have been shadowed. One person came to my room under subterfuge, and I was glad to be able to have him withdrawn. The files in that incident are locked up in my home.

The pattern of (*Des Moines Register*) editorials comes from the wearers of the cloth and a small segment of teachers in our institutions of higher learning. They make no objection to the loyalty oath for civil defense workers in this bill. But . . . they cry about restricting academic freedom.

Sometimes I wonder why I was so milk-toasty as to soften the penalty for disloyalty by public employees to discharge from their positions.

We have heard on this floor for two days, in support of the civil defense bill, that we are in a time of crisis in national defense.

Nothing is more critical than permitting the rats of Communism to undermine what we are trying to do in the civil defense bill.

All my amendment does is require teachers, janitors, and other public employees to stand up and be counted as not associated with traitorous activities.

The judge who sentenced the Rosenbergs yesterday was free to comment that they actively brought about the Korean crisis.

If we expose only one Alger Hiss in Iowa who could sell us out or one Rosenberg who gave atomic bomb secrets to Russia, we could save the lives of thousands of our sons called to serve our country.

Anyone who has the temerity to say academic freedom is being taken away from him by a

⁷ Debates in the Iowa Senate are not recorded in the official record, the *Senate Journal*. Quotations and other references to the loyalty oath debate are based on newspaper accounts.

declaration that he is loyal and uses the excuse of academic freedom is skating on thin ice.

Communism and atheism are Godless. If we are providing for defenses against sneak attacks, we must also protect ourselves against people who would sell their souls for 30 dirty pieces of silver and to traitorism.⁸

At the conclusion of Doud's remarks the Senate proceeded to other business.

The final action on the amendment, and on the whole loyalty oath issue, came almost a week later. The debate began with a reference to certain events at the State University of Iowa. Senator Herman B. Lord (Rep., Muscatine), an amendment supporter, cited as "a subversive instance" a speech given on the State University campus by Professor H. J. Phillips, formerly of the University of Washington. According to Lord, Phillips had appeared on the campus in May, 1949, in an effort to raise funds to appeal his discharge as a communist from the University of Washington. He had spoken at a meeting of the Young Progressives of America, and he himself had been sponsored by the National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions. Furthermore, he had been introduced at the meeting, which "200 students" had attended, by Professor Bernard Baum of the S.U.I. Department of English.⁹

⁸ In an editorial titled REFLECTION ON IOWA'S COMMUNITY LEADERS, the *Des Moines Register* of April 9 castigated Doud for what it termed "the inference that there are 'Alger Hisses' and 'Rosenbergs' stacked a mile deep around Iowa." Referring to Doud's remarks as a "bogey story calculated to frighten legislators and induce them to vote in hysteria," the *Register* editorial held that "county officers and school teachers in Iowa are not the possessors of State department secrets, as Alger Hiss was, and . . . the Rosenbergs got their secrets from a United States army sergeant *who had taken the most profound oath that an American can take.*"

⁹ Interviewed in Iowa City, Baum was sharply critical of Lord's interpretation of the S.U.I. meeting. "Mr. Lord's statement," he told a reporter, "is a good example of a *non-sequitur*—it does not follow that a person who introduces a speaker affiliated with the Communist party is himself a Communist or disloyal. I happen to believe in democracy, which means that everyone should have the right to express his opinion. I would as readily introduce an opponent of communism as I would a proponent of communism." *The Daily Iowan*, April 10, 1951. Baum ceased to be associated with the State University of Iowa sometime after 1951, but his departure, apparently, was not connected with the Phillips episode or its use by supporters of the oath.

Baum, said Lord, had described Phillips' firing as a "sign of progressive decay of freedom in America."

As for Phillips, he had kept secret his Communist Party membership, Lord declared, was proud of it now, and believed that communists on college faculties should conceal the fact that they were communists in order to accomplish their ulterior purposes. "For emphasis," Lord continued, "Phillips often thanked God," and added he should say, "thanked Stalin." The S.U.I. incident, he suggested, demonstrated a clear need for a loyalty oath to check the "subversive danger." Supporters of the oath, he insisted, "don't care about the details of the loyalty oath so much as they do about requiring the oath."

Lord was followed by Senator Elmer E. Bekman (Rep., Ottumwa), an opponent of the amendment. Bekman, disagreeing with Lord's view of the Phillips-Baum "incident" in 1949, remarked:

My daughter has heard the yakkity-yak of Communists in the same tenor as attributed to Phillips. All she and her fellow students do when such speakers finish is squelch them by devastating silence.

Neither Bekman nor any other speaker defended Phillips' right to appear on the S.U.I. campus.

The most acrimonious exchange in the debate occurred in the middle of a speech by Senator Thomas J. Dailey (Dem., Burlington). Dailey, an oath opponent, mentioned early in his speech that he was a veteran of World War II. He went on to refer to an earlier statement of Doud's to the effect that Doud had been invited by an agent, not identified, to attend a recent Communist Party meeting in Des Moines. It was Doud's duty, Dailey said, to report the invitation to the Attorney General.

Doud, who was "white with rage," according to the *Des Moines Register*, rose to protest "an insinuation" that he was "fighting with words and engaging in a witch hunt." The invitation to the communist meeting, he revealed, came from an Army Intelligence Officer in G-2, not from any communists or the Communist Party. He also reminded Dailey that he had been rejected by the Army in World War I. "It is grossly unfair," he said heatedly, "to twist remarks into a personal affront. I deeply resent insinuations against my loyalty and my patriotism."

Dailey attempted to remove the misunderstanding by telling Doud, "I respect you, and I agree that you have served your country well." But, he added, "I have a right to disagree with you on legislation." Doud was hardly mollified, however, and he insisted that Dailey had en-

gaged in "disparagement by insinuation." He repeated, "I was physically unable to give my services to the army of my country in two wars."

In a calmer mood, Doud replied to a number of questions concerning the possible relationship of the recent California loyalty oath decision to his amendment. Senator Frank C. Byers (Rep., Cedar Rapids), pointing out that the California court had ruled unconstitutional a loyalty oath for teachers in addition to an oath of allegiance required of all state employees, queried Doud as to whether that decision did not also nullify, in effect, the Doud amendment. Doud replied that the California Constitution was "more limited" than the Iowa Constitution. While his amendment, he agreed, would probably not be constitutional in California, it was likely to survive a court test in Iowa.

Doud's reply did not convince Byers or a number of other senators that the oath amendment was constitutional or, if constitutional, a necessary and desirable enactment. Senators disposed to vote against the oath were influenced not merely by loyalty oath issues elsewhere, including questions of constitutionality, but by the almost unanimous opposition of Iowa educators. Several educational authorities had warned that one effect of the oath might well be to lower teacher morale and encourage some teachers to leave the Iowa schools for teaching jobs elsewhere. This was a telling argument against the Doud amendment, in the context of widespread concern about the relative status of Iowa's schools in the nation's educational system.

It is also true that Doud and his supporters failed to make a convincing case for the need to impose a loyalty oath requirement on teachers and other state employees. As one Senator later put it:

There is no basis or experience in Iowa with public employees to justify singling them out for a loyalty oath as a prerequisite for employment. The legislature had no knowledge of any actual cases . . . of disloyalty.

Doud's alarm over the possibility of Iowa Hisses and Rosenbergs simply did not communicate itself to any large number of his colleagues.

A further factor influencing senators against the oath was the widely held belief that loyalty oaths and related measures are ineffectual against those who are bent on disloyalty and subversion. Communists, as one senator commented, "can't be stopped that way." There was some awareness that the incidence and control of communism relates more to economic

and social conditions than to restrictive legislation or legal actions.

Finally, Doud's personality and conduct during the debate did not bring much support to his amendment. Active personal dislike for Doud was a contributing source of the "No" vote, as was a suspicion that Doud's interest in the oath measure was (mistakenly) designed to advance his political career.¹⁰ Doud's super-patriotic tone during the debate, which was regarded by some senators as based on a "holier than thou" attitude, was strongly resented in certain quarters.¹¹

On the other hand, a number of Senators disposed to favor the oath were led to do so by friendship with Doud; and, paradoxically, the view of the proposed oath as ineffectual also contributed to its support. One senator, for example, supported the amendment because

No loyal American should have any objection to signing a loyalty oath. That's why I voted for it. But in my opinion, such measures tend to be useless. They have the effect of making internal Communism, which isn't very important, seem important. They take up valuable time of the legislature. . . . Another reason I supported Doud is that I knew he would be soundly defeated. I wasn't greatly interested myself, because I don't see such bills as a serious threat either to freedom of belief or to Communism.

The opinion best expressed as "it's unnecessary but harmless, so let's pass it and get on with other things" was well represented in the pro-Doud faction.

Civil liberties as such were rarely mentioned during the debate, and there is no evidence that they played an important role in the final determination of the oath issue. To be sure, the McCarthyite senators and the extreme conservative ideologists were largely allied with Doud, but they were a very small percentage in the total number of senators. Although most of the Republican moderates were hostile to the amendment, a few nominal liberals in both parties supported it. The Republican and Democratic Senate leaders remained indifferent toward the outcome; the disposition of the oath amendment was never discussed, much less decided, in either the Republican or Democratic caucuses.

¹⁰ Doud himself is no longer a member of the Senate. In 1952 he failed in a bid for the Republican nomination for Lieutenant Governor. At the present time he practices law in Douds, Iowa.

¹¹ These circles also believe that the Doud-Dailey exchange, in particular, "hurt Doud's standing all over the state."

Denied support by his own party, Doud knew on April 9, even before his final defense of the oath, that his amendment as introduced had little chance of passage. He therefore did not oppose a last-minute effort of his supporters to compromise the differences between the pro- and anti-oath forces. In an amendment to the Doud amendment, Senators Rex R. Bateson (Rep., Eldora) and Ralph W. Zastrow (Rep., Charles City) proposed that all Iowa state employees, other than those covered by an oath of office, take the same oath required of all civil officials, namely, to support and defend the constitution of the United States and of the State of Iowa. The Bateson-Zastrow amendment carried on a standing vote which was never announced, but which the reporters present counted as 24-21. Doud himself did not vote on the amendment, although he declared that he did not oppose it.

The Doud amendment, as amended, then proceeded to a final vote. By a standing vote, also unannounced but tallied by the press, it was defeated 32-15. The Senate went on to pass the civil defense bill (41-9) and adjourned for the day. Dailey and others crossed the chamber to talk with Doud after the session, and Senator Bekman, in a comment to the press, attributed their clash to "emotional exhaustion."

So ended the loyalty oath debate in the Iowa Senate, and with it the loyalty oath issue in Iowa. No serious effort was made after 1951 to revive the oath. Iowa, therefore, remains one of the twenty-one states without a loyalty oath for teachers.

V

Although the data do not fully explain either the introduction of the oath measure or account for its final defeat, it is possible to relate the Senate's decision to certain factors operating within and without the legislative arena. To begin with, the entire issue lacked saliency for the majority of senators and for the state as a whole. It is also beyond doubt that the opposition to the oath was more organized and more vocal than the support. Assuming that Doud was encouraged to introduce a loyalty oath bill by a "government agency," it is certain that the "draw flies" purpose of the measure did not impress the majority of his colleagues as purpose enough. Of course, if Doud is correct about this purpose, his efforts were successful in the face of ostensible failure. There was no dearth of "flies" buzzing around the Senate chamber in Des Moines during the debate, and some of them may have ended up in the files.

Perhaps of all factors involved in the Senate's behavior, those involving Doud's personality were among the most important. Had Doud

been less insistent and less emotionally involved, it is doubtful that he would have pushed his measure to an inevitable defeat. While Doud's personality worked for as well as against the measure, on balance it is certain that the personality factor hurt him much more than it helped him. Many of his Senate friends, for example, were convinced that his advocacy of a loyalty oath was calculated, in the context of national concern about subversion, to bring him political advantage. A few attributed his sponsorship to an extreme sensitivity about his inability, on physical grounds, to take an active part in the two World Wars. And even those rejecting these explanations refused to believe that internal communism was the foremost issue facing Iowans in 1951.

The Senate's refusal to support Doud also owes much to the general character of Iowa political and social life. Thus far, Iowa has experienced few of the tensions that elsewhere have generated major controversies about loyalty and subversion. Political, economic, and social homogeneity have been more characteristic of Iowa than of a large number of other states. The agricultural section of the population, which is heavily represented in the legislature, enjoys a substantial measure of economic security, social influence, and political dominance. The urban-rural division, while it is increasing, has not yet become a major factor in Iowa politics. The AFL-CIO is relatively insignificant compared with the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, or even the Iowa Manufacturers Association. Even the usual rich man-poor man distinctions are more difficult to make; the extremes of wealth and poverty are not as visible in Iowa as elsewhere in the nation. There are no large numbers of recent immigrants to assimilate, and the state's non-white population has remained small. Political differences exist, but they exist less between the parties than within the parties, and within the parties they tend more to be personal or factional than ideological. At any given moment, therefore, the political mood of the state is likely to be conservative, cautious, and "standpat."

It should not be concluded, however, that the loyalty oath issue has been resolved once and for all. One residue of the 1951 controversy is a continuing fear in some educational circles that a loyalty oath proposal may make its appearance at any time. It is not beyond possibility that the original number of oath supporters has remained approximately the same, or has even increased. A rising incidence of social tensions and conflicts, or a genuine revival of radicalism, on or off the campuses, might well demonstrate that the loyalty question is an abiding, if temporarily inactive, concern.

APPORTIONMENT OF THE NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATURE

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[What follows below is the substance of a document Miss Silva prepared, which was filed on June 6, 1961, with the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, as an Appendix to the petitioners' complaint in the case of *W.M.C.A., Inc. et al. v. Caroline K. Simon, Secretary of the State of New York, et al.* (61 Civil No. 1559, 1961). The suit seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and alleges that the apportionment and districting provisions of the New York Constitution deny the petitioners and others similarly situated both due process and the equal protection of the laws, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution. Miss Silva had been employed in 1959-60 as special consultant on legislative apportionment by the State of New York Temporary Commission on Revision and Simplification of the Constitution, which reproduced in two volumes as *Staff Report No. 33* (April, 1960) the study she made for it.

Litigation in the federal courts concerning legislative apportionments, from *Colegrove v. Green*, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) to *Baker v. Carr*, the Tennessee case pending in the Supreme Court at this writing, has been largely preoccupied with questions of federal jurisdiction. The document

below does not touch this issue, but rather is confined to the practical effects of the apportionment and districting provisions of the New York Constitution. MAN. ED.]

APPENDIX

1. *Senatorial apportionment.* The two following provisions of the New York Constitution deprive citizens in New York's six most populous counties (Bronx, Erie, Kings, Nassau, New York, and Queens) of equitable representation in the Senate of the State of New York and, consequently, of an equal vote in state senatorial elections:

No county shall have four or more senators unless it shall have a full ratio¹ for each senator. N.Y. Const., Art. III, § 4 (1894) . . . except that if any county having three or more senators at the time of any appor-

¹ One ratio equals 1/50th of the State's total citizen population. Therefore, a county can not have a fourth Senator unless such county has at least eight percent of the State's total citizen population.

TABLE I. SENATE-SEAT REMAINDERS IN ALL COUNTIES HAVING THREE OR MORE FULL RATIOS^a

Area	1892	1905	1915	1925	1930	1940	1950	1960 ^b
New York City	92,444	153,874	182,839	373,618	558,945	515,837	435,652	511,427
Bronx	—	—	9,564	146,914	177,803	1,134	241,905	82,231
Kings	58,264	48,702	151,701	58,148	161,306	175,241	38,566	277,797
New York	34,180	105,172	21,574	103,599	142,421	127,818	91,312	20,051
Queens	—	—	—	64,957	77,415	211,644	63,869	131,348
Remainder of state	—	14,797	23,413	57,265	40,988	20,992	26,295	350,983
Erie	—	14,797	23,413	57,265	40,988	20,992	26,295	57,750
Nassau	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	293,233
Constitutional ratio for apportioning senators*	115,817	141,260	161,190	193,356	221,811	248,027	284,069	335,646

^a Computed on basis of citizen population 1892-1950. *Legislative Document (1950) No. 31* at 77-91; *Legislative Document (1953) No. 98* at 14A-14B.

^b Based on total, rather than citizen, population since the 1960 tabulations of citizen population are not yet completed. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1960 Census of Population Advance Reports, Final Population Counts*, New York PC(A1)-34 at 3 (1960). Because the ratio between citizens and aliens is now approximately the same in every county, the inclusion of aliens in the apportionment base is a matter of no practical consequence. See Table XV *infra*.

* The New York Constitution provides that the ratio for apportioning Senators shall be obtained by dividing the State's total citizen population by fifty. Consequently, a county that has three full ratios has six percent of the State's citizen population.

tionment shall be entitled on such ratio to an additional senator or senators, such additional senator or senators shall be given to such county in addition to the fifty senators, and the whole number of senators shall be increased to that extent. N.Y. Const., Art. III, § 4 (1894).

2. *The full-ratio rule.* As shown in Table I, the full-ratio rule requires the State's six most populous counties to have large unrepresented populations.

3. *The provision for enlarging the Senate.* Since the State's six most populous counties are required to have a full ratio (2% of the State's total citizen population) for each Senator, the average citizen population per Senator in these counties must exceed the ratio. Under the 1960 census, the ratio will be 335,646 but the average population per Senator in the six most populous counties (Bronx, Erie, Kings, Nassau, New York, and Queens) will be 367,587. Moreover, because Senators are apportioned to the six most populous counties on the basis of a fifty-member Senate while the actual Senate is larger, arithmetic necessity requires Senators to be apportioned to the other counties on a second ratio that is smaller than the constitutional ratio. Under the 1960 census, thirty of the State's fifty-seven Senators will be distributed to counties having only 6,857,452 inhabitants. This means that the average population for each of these thirty Senators will be only 228,582. Consequently, the second ratio (228,582) will be more than one-third smaller than the average population per Senator in the six most populous counties (367,587). If the Senate should be composed of only fifty members, however, there will be only twenty-three Senators to distribute among these less populous counties. Therefore, the second ratio would be 298,150—nineteen percent smaller than the average in the six most populous counties (367,587) and eleven percent smaller than the constitutional ratio (335,646). In other words, the larger the Senate, the greater the difference between the first and second ratios and the more under-represented the most populous counties are in relation to the less populous counties. (See Table II).

4. *The full-ratio rule combined with the enlarged Senate.* Under the 1960 census, the full ratio rule will permit Nassau to have only three Senators although Nassau has a population of 3.87 ratios. Therefore, the average senatorial district in Nassau County

will have 433,390 inhabitants. If the full-ratio rule of the New York Constitution be valid, the Legislature simply will have no discretion in creating districts in Nassau County which will be forty-seven percent more populous than the state-wide average of 294,426. Moreover, the second ratio will be only 228,582. If the ruling in the *Fay* case (291 N.Y. 198) be the only possible interpretation of the provision for enlarging the Senate, the Legislature will have no discretion about the size of the second ratio. Then when the Legislature attempts to conform to the various districting rules that are also prescribed by the New York Constitution, some of the districts will inevitably be less populous than the second ratio. In order to conform to these districting rules, the Legislature will probably have to re-create the Essex-Saratoga-Warren (now the 39th) District, which is and will be the State's least populous senatorial district with only 168,398 inhabitants or more than forty percent less than the state-wide average. Therefore, the range of variation between the most and the least populous districts will be at least ninety percent.² That is, the population in an average Nassau district will be more than two and one-half times the population of the Essex-Saratoga-Warren District. Even if the districting rules would allow the Legislature to make the smallest district one having 228,582 inhabitants, the district would still be forty-seven percent less populous than the average district in Nassau. Therefore, even if all the districting rules were deleted from the New York Constitution, the two apportionment rules mentioned above would still require the least populous district to have no more than 228,582 inhabitants and the most populous district to have at least 433,390 under the census of 1960.

5. *Consistent discrimination.* Not only do the full-ratio rule and the provision for enlarging the Senate create large variations between the most and least populous senatorial districts, but they also discriminate consistently against the most populous metropolitan counties (now Bronx, Erie, Kings, Nassau, New York, and Queens) and allow the least populous counties to elect a senatorial majority.

6. *Uniform discrimination caused by both pro-*

² 433,390 minus 168,398 equals 264,992, which, divided by 294,426, equals 90 percent. (Table III.)

TABLE II. SENATE RATIOS AND AVERAGES

Year	Counties	Citizen Population	÷	Number of Senators	=	Population per Senator
1960*	Six largest counties	9,924,852		27		367,587
	All other counties	6,857,452		30		228,582 ^a
	Entire State	16,782,304		57		294,426
	Constitutional ratio	16,782,304		50		335,646 ^b
1953	Five largest counties	8,131,810		27		301,178
	All other counties	6,071,639		31		195,859 ^a
	Entire State	14,203,449		58		244,887
	Constitutional ratio	14,203,449		50		284,069 ^b
1943	Five largest counties	7,233,558		27		267,910
	All other counties	5,167,771		29		178,199 ^a
	Entire State	12,401,329		56		221,452
	Constitutional ratio	12,401,329		50		248,027 ^b
1917	Four largest counties	3,913,622		23		170,157
	All other counties	4,145,893		28		148,068 ^a
	Entire State	8,059,515		51		158,030
	Constitutional ratio	8,059,515		50		161,190 ^b
1907	Three largest counties	3,417,651		23		148,594
	All other counties	3,645,337		28		130,191 ^a
	Entire State	7,062,988		51		138,490
	Constitutional ratio	7,062,988		50		141,260 ^b
1894	Two largest counties	2,292,967		19		120,682
	All other counties	3,497,898		31		112,835 ^a
	Entire State	5,790,865		50		115,817 ^b

^a = second ratio; ^b = first ratio. 1894-1953, computed from statistics published in *Legislative Document (1950) No. 31* at 77-91 and *Legislative Document (1953) No. 98* at 14A-14B.

* For 1960, computed from 1960 census of total, rather than citizen, population. See note b at the end of Table I *supra*.

visions. It would be incorrect to think that the full-ratio rule is responsible for all of the disparity between the senatorial representation of the most populous counties and that of the other counties. For, as shown in Table V, even if the full-ratio rule were retained, the disparity between the senatorial representation of the most populous counties and that of the other counties could have been reduced if there had been no provision for enlarging the Senate.

The provision for enlarging the Senate means that the greater the population of a

metropolitan county becomes, the more overrepresented the less populous counties become. This is a matter of elementary arithmetic. Whenever the population of one of the most populous counties increases so that it is entitled to more Senators than it was given in 1894, these additional senate seats are not taken from the less populous counties, although these counties' percentage of the State's citizen population may actually have declined. Instead, the number of seats held by these less populous counties not only remains con-

TABLE III. SENATE DISTRICTS UNDER CONSTITUTION OF 1894:
IN CITIZEN POPULATION PER SEAT^a

Explanation	1894	1906 ^b	1907	1917 ^c	1935 ^d	1943	1953
Largest District	156,748	246,187	202,650	194,470	272,614	300,938 ^e	344,545 ^f
Smallest District	86,507	97,717	106,103	115,575	141,631	129,666	146,666
Difference ^g	70,241	148,470	96,547	78,895	130,983	171,272	197,879
Average ^h	115,817	138,489	138,489	158,030	213,280	221,452	244,887
Percent of Variation ⁱ	60.6	107.2	69.7	49.9	61.4	77.3	80.8

^a Tabulated from statistics published in *Legislative Document (1950) No. 31* at 77-91, and *Legislative Document (1953) No. 98* at 14A-14B.

^b Held invalid as was the Act of 1916 for reasons relating to districting rather than to apportionment.

^c Same as under the Act of 1916, which was held invalid. See b, *supra*.

^d Proposed but not passed.

^e Queens, which had a citizen population of 1,203,752 and was given four seats, making a citizen population of 300,938 per seat.

^f Bronx, which had a citizen population of 1,378,181 and was given four seats, making a citizen population of 344,545 per seat.

^g The smallest district subtracted from the largest district.

^h State's total citizen population divided by number of Senators.

ⁱ The difference divided by the average.

stant regardless of their loss of population but their number of seats actually increases whenever New York, Bronx, Kings, or Erie becomes entitled to fewer seats

TABLE IV. PERCENTAGE OF CITIZEN
POPULATION AND SENATORS

Appor- tion- ment	Counties having:			
	Three or more ratios		Less than three ratios	
	Popula- tion %	Senators %	Popula- tion %	Senators %
1960*	59.1	47.4	40.9	52.6
1953	57.3	46.6	42.7	53.4
1943	58.3	48.2	41.7	51.8
1935**	57.4	50.0	42.6	50.0
1917	48.6	45.1	51.4	54.9
1907	48.4	45.1	51.6	54.9
1894	39.6	38.0	60.4	62.0

* The computations for 1960 are based on total, rather than citizen, population. See note b at the end of Table I *supra*. All other computations were made on the basis of citizen population statistics published in *Legislative Document (1950) No. 31* at 77-91 and *Legislative Document (1953) No. 98* at 14A-14B.

** The 1935 reapportionment was proposed but not passed.

than such county was given in 1894. Thus, seven new senatorial seats are created to give representation to the increased population of Nassau and Queens while New York County's loss of population means the transfer of three of New York County's senatorial seats to the upstate. Consequently, abolition of the provision for enlarging the Senate would make the most populous counties' senatorial representation more nearly commensurate with their citizen population. If the next reapportionment creates a Senate of fifty rather than fifty-seven members, the six counties hav-

TABLE V. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CITIZEN
INHABITANTS PER SENATOR

Appor- tion- ment	Counties having three or more ratios	Remainder of State	
		In a 50- member Senate	In actual Senate
1960*	367,587	298,150	228,582
1953	301,178	263,984	195,859
1943	267,910	224,686	178,199
1935*	244,885	196,814	181,674
1917	170,157	153,552	148,068
1907	148,595	135,012	130,191
1894	120,682	112,835	112,835

* See notes to Table IV.

TABLE VI. PERCENT OF CITIZEN POPULATION AND PERCENT OF SENATORS IN ALL COUNTIES HAVING THREE OR MORE RATIOS

Apportionment	Total Number of Senators in State	Proportions in three-ratio counties		
		Population %	Senators in a 50-member Senate %	Senators in Actual Senate %
1960*	57*	59.1	54.0	47.4*
1953	58	57.3	54.0	46.6
1943	56	58.3	54.0	48.2
1930*	56*	57.4	52.0	46.4*
1925*	54*	54.5	50.0	46.3*
1917	51	48.6	46.0	45.1
1907	51	48.4	46.0	45.1
1894	50	39.6	38.0	38.0

* No reapportionment act passed. Apportioned on the basis of the census in conformity with *In re Fay*, 291 N. Y. 198 (1943). Citizen population used in all cases except 1960, for which total population was used. See note b to Table I.

ing more than 59 percent of the State's population (Bronx, Erie, Kings, Nassau, New York, and Queens) will have 54 percent rather than 47.4 percent of the State's senators. (See Table VI and Figure 1.)

7. *Assembly apportionment and districting.* The two following provisions of the New York Constitution deprive the citizens in New York's thirteen most populous counties (Albany, Bronx, Erie, Kings, Monroe, Nassau, New York, Niagara, Oneida, Onondaga, Queens, Suffolk, and Westchester) of equitable representation in the Assembly of the State of New York and, consequently, of an equal vote in the election of Assemblymen:

The quotient obtained by dividing the whole number of inhabitants of the state, excluding aliens, by the number of members of assembly [150], shall be the ratio for apportionment, which shall be made as follows: One member of assembly shall be apportioned to every county, including Fulton and Hamilton as one county, containing less than the ratio and one-half over. Two members shall be apportioned to every other county. The remaining members of assembly shall be apportioned to the counties having more than two ratios

according to the number of inhabitants, excluding aliens. Members apportioned on remainders shall be apportioned to counties having the highest remainders in the order thereof respectively. . . . N.Y. Const., Art. III, §5, Para. 2 (1894).

In counties having more than one senate district, the same number of assembly districts shall be put in each senate district, unless the assembly districts cannot be evenly divided among the senate districts of any county, in which case one more assembly district shall be put in the senate district in such county having the largest, or one less assembly district shall be put in the senate district in such county having

TABLE VII. NUMBER OF SENATORS ON BASIS OF 1960 CENSUS OF TOTAL POPULATION^a

County	Population	Senators ^b	Population per Senator
Bronx	1,424,815	4	356,204
Erie	1,064,688	3	354,896
Kings	2,627,319	7	375,331
Nassau	1,300,171	3	433,390
New York	1,698,281	5	339,656
Queens	1,809,578	5	361,916
Subtotal	9,924,852	27	367,587

On basis of second ratio ^c			
Albany	272,926	1	272,926
Monroe	586,387	3 ^d	195,462
Niagara	242,269	1	242,269
Oneida	264,401	1	264,401
Onondaga	423,028	2 ^d	211,514
Suffolk	666,784	3 ^d	222,261
Westchester	808,891	4 ^d	202,223
Subtotal	3,364,686	15	224,312
All other counties	3,492,766	15	232,851
Entire State	16,782,304	57	294,426

^a U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1960 Census of Population Advance Reports, Final Population Counts*, New York PC(A1)-34 at 3 (1960).

^b Constitutional ratio = 335,646.

^c Second ratio = 228,582. *Sherrill v. O'Brien*, 188 N. Y. 185 at 209 (1907); *In re Fay*, 291 N. Y. 198 at 213, 218 (1943). *Report of the [New York] Attorney General 1926* at 85-86.

^d Since 1894, it has been the practice in each of the five apportionments to give an additional Senator for a major fraction of a second ratio. *Legislative Document (1960) No. 31* at 77-91; *Legislative Document (1953) No. 98* at 14A-14B. Under each of the five apportionments from the time single-member senatorial districts were first adopted in 1846 until 1894, it was the practice to give an additional Senator for every major fraction of a constitutional ratio—the one and only ratio under the Constitution of 1846. 3 Lincoln, *The Constitutional History of New York* 182-190 (1906); *Legislative Document (1960) No. 31* at 92-101.




FIGURE 1. All counties having three or more full senate ratios†

———— Percent of citizen population according to last census
 — — — Percent of senate seats
 — · — · — Percent of seats if Senate had only fifty members

The vertical distance between the lower and middle curves for any year measures the under-representation caused by enlarging the Senate; that between the middle and upper curves the under-representation caused by the full-ratio rule.

* No reapportionment act passed. See note to Table VI.

† Counties having three or more full senate ratios (*i.e.*, 6% or more of the State's citizen population): Kings, New York (including Bronx) since 1894; Erie since 1905; Queens since 1925; and Nassau since 1960.

the smallest number of inhabitants, excluding aliens, as the case may require. . . . N. Y. Const. Art. III, §5, Para. 4 (1894).

8. *Discriminatory classification.* The second paragraph of Article III, section 5 divides the State's counties into three classes, which are hereafter referred to as First, Second, and Third class counties:

First. Counties having less than $1\frac{1}{2}$ ratios, *i.e.*, those having less than one percent of the State's total citizen population.

Second. Counties having from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 ratios, *i.e.*, those having from one to one and one-third percent of

the State's total citizen population.

Third. Counties having more than two ratios, *i.e.*, those having more than one and one-third percent of the State's total citizen population.

This three-class system now discriminates against citizens living in the State's thirteen most populous counties. Under the 1960 census, the ratio will be 111,882. One and a half ratios will equal 167,823. One Assemblyman will be apportioned to each of the forty-four counties (with Fulton and Hamilton combined) having less than 167,823 inhabitants. Two Assemblymen will then be apportioned to each of the

TABLE VIII. AVERAGE CITIZEN POPULATION
PER ASSEMBLYMAN, BY COUNTY CLASSES*

Census	Constitutional Ratio	First Class Counties	Second Class Counties	Third Class Counties
1960	111,882	63,599	99,299	134,589
1950	94,690	57,648	87,390	112,477
1940	82,676	52,187	76,046	97,366
1930	73,937	45,383	64,544	88,606
1925	64,452	45,677	59,502	73,884
1915	53,730	41,424	44,660	60,998
1905	47,087	41,602	40,385	50,657
1893	38,606	36,010	32,452	40,733

* Computed from statistics published in *Legislative Document (1942) No. 59* at 32-33 and *Legislative Document (1953) No. 98* at 14. No apportionment act was passed on the basis of the census of 1925 or 1930 or 1960. Citizen population used in all cases except 1960, for which the above apportionment was based on total (rather than citizen) population, because the tabulations of 1960 citizen population are not yet completed. U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1960 Census of Population Advance Reports, Final Population Counts*, New York PC(A1)-34 at 3 (1960). Since the ratio of citizens to aliens is now approximately the same in every county, the inclusion of aliens in the apportionment base is no longer a matter of practical consequence. See Table XV.

seventeen other counties. This will leave 72 seats to be distributed among the thirteen Third Class counties. This means that forty-four seats will be apportioned to First Class counties, which have a population of 2,798,372 or 63,599 inhabitants per seat. Eight seats will be apportioned to four Second Class counties, representing 99,299 inhabitants per seat. The remaining ninety-eight will be apportioned to the thirteen Third Class counties, which have a total population of 13,189,538 or 134,589 inhabitants per seat.

9. *Increased number of First Class counties.* The real cause for the Third Class counties' growing under-representation is the increased number of First Class counties falling below the ratio. In 1894, the First Class counties were apportioned only two seats more than was commensurate with their proportion of the State's representative population, because only 21 were below the ratio while 15 had unrepresented remainders. Today, however, there are 39 counties below the ratio and only five First Class counties with unrepresented remainders. Consequently, at the next apportionment, the First Class counties will receive 19 seats more than is commensurate with their share of the State's population.
10. *Fixed number of Assemblymen.* Because the size of the assembly is limited to 150 members and because each county is guaranteed

TABLE IX. DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTIES, BY
ASSEMBLY RATIOS

Census	Number of counties having assembly ratios equal to				Total
	Less than one	From 1 to 1.5	From 1.5 to 2	Two or more	
1960*	39	5	4	13	61
1950	40	5	4	12	61
1940	38	7	4	12	61
1930*	37	5	8	11	61
1925*	34	8	8	11	61
1915	31	8	10	12	61
1905	29	12	8	11	60
1892	21	15	9	14	59

* See note at end of Table VIII.

at least one seat, arithmetic necessity requires the counties falling below the ratio to receive their over-representation at the expense of the Third Class counties. Therefore, as the number of counties falling below the ratio increases, the more under-represented the Third Class counties become in relation to the other counties.

11. *"Remaining Members."* The under-representation of the Third Class counties is quite unrelated to the controversy about which of eight or more formulae should be used for apportioning "remaining Members" (*Legislative Document (1935) No. 85* at 18-27). These formulae relate *only* to the apportionment of assembly seats after one seat has been assigned to each county having less than $1\frac{1}{2}$ ratios and two have been apportioned to all other counties. Under the 1960 census, these formulae would relate only to the distribution of 72 seats among the Third Class counties. For

TABLE X. PERCENT OF CITIZEN INHABITANTS
AND OF ASSEMBLY SEATS, BY
COUNTY CLASSES

Census	First Class Counties		Second Class Counties		Third Class Counties	
	Population	Seats	Population	Seats	Population	Seats
1960*	16.7	29.3	4.7	5.3	78.6	65.3
1950	18.3	30.0	4.9	5.3	76.8	64.7
1940	18.9	30.0	4.9	5.3	76.2	64.7
1930*	17.2	28.0	9.3	10.7	73.5	61.3
1925*	19.8	28.0	9.9	10.7	70.3	61.3
1915	20.0	26.0	11.1	13.3	68.9	60.7
1905	24.2	27.3	9.1	10.7	66.7	62.0
1892	22.4	24.0	10.1	12.0	67.5	64.0

* See note at end of Table VIII.

TABLE XI. DISTRIBUTION OF ASSEMBLY SEATS ACCORDING TO THE CENSUS OF 1960*

All Counties Having More than two Constitutional Ratios	Number of Constitutional Ratios	Number of Assembly Seats Under Various Formulae				
		Cullen	Using Second Ratio			Major Fractions or Equal Proportions
			Tuttle	Brown	McQuade	
Albany	2.44	2	2	2	4	2
Bronx	12.73	11	11	11	10	11
Erie	9.52	8	8	8	8	8
Kings	23.48	22	19	19	16	19
Monroe	5.24	3	4	5	5	4
Nassau	11.62	10	10	10	9	10
New York	15.18	13	13	12	11	13
Niagara	2.17	2	2	2	3	2
Oneida	2.36	2	2	2	4	2
Onondaga	3.78	2	3	3	4	3
Queens	16.17	14	13	13	12	13
Suffolk	5.96	4	5	5	6	5
Westchester	7.23	5	6	6	6	6
Total	117.88	98	98	98	98	98

* See note at end of Table VIII. See also *Legislative Document (1935) No. 85* at 18-27.

all practical purposes, the selection of the equal proportions or major-fractions formula instead of the Brown formula will mean shifting one seat from Monroe County to New York County. These formulae have nothing to do with the apportionment of Assemblymen to the First and Second Class counties. The choice of an apportionment formula for distributing "remaining Members" under the present New York Constitution simply determines which of the thirteen Third Class counties will suffer the greatest inequity.

12. *Three alternatives.* Equitable representation in the New York Assembly can be given to the State's thirteen most populous counties in only one of three ways: (1) greatly enlarging the total number of Assemblymen, (2) abolishing the guarantee of separate representation to each of the State's thirty-nine counties that are below the ratio, or (3) electing the State's 150 Assemblymen in the state at-large.
13. *The districting rule.* The fourth paragraph of Article III, section 5, which requires an assembly district to lie wholly in the same senatorial district, produces even greater population differentials between assembly districts than appear in Tables VIII and X *supra*. Onondaga, for example, now has two Senators and three Assemblymen. This

means that one Assemblyman is elected in one of Onondaga's senatorial districts while Onondaga's other senatorial district has been divided into two assembly districts. Since Onondaga's two senatorial districts each have the same number of citizen inhabitants, as required by the New York Constitution,³ one of Onondaga's assembly districts contains twice as many citizen inhabitants as either of the other two does. Moreover, this rule, which precludes dividing an assembly district between two senatorial districts, required similar population inequalities between assembly districts in Erie, Kings, New York, and Queens counties as well as in Onondaga County under the apportionment of 1953 (Table XII *infra*) and will require even more population inequalities between assembly districts under the next reapportionment (Table XIII and Table XIV *infra*).

³ "... nor shall any [senate] district contain a greater excess in population over an adjoining district in the same county, than the population of a town or block therein adjoining such district. Counties, towns or blocks which, from their location, may be included in either of two districts, shall be so placed as to make said districts most nearly equal in number of inhabitants, excluding aliens." N. Y. Const., Art. III, §4, Para. 1 (1894).

TABLE XII. ASSEMBLY DISTRICTS IN ALL COUNTIES HAVING TWO OR MORE SENATE DISTRICTS
UNDER APPORTIONMENT OF 1953

County	Total Number of Senate Districts	Total Number of Assembly Districts	Number of Senate Districts	Number of Assembly Districts in Each Senate District	1950 Citizen Population in Each Assembly District†		
					Range		Average
					From	To	
Bronx	4	12	4	3	114,832	114,857	114,848
Erie	3	8	—	—	97,610	146,423	109,813
			2	3	97,610	97,613	97,612
			1	2	146,408	146,423	146,416
Kings	9	22	—	—	96,114	144,182	117,963
			4	3	96,114	96,123	96,119
			5	2	144,171	144,182	144,176
Monroe	2	4	2	2	118,753	118,766	118,759
Nassau	3	6	3	2	81,361	137,201*	109,282
New York	6	16	—	—	99,755	149,655	112,233
			4	3	99,755	99,770	99,763
			2	2	149,630	149,655	149,643
Onondaga	2	3	—	—	83,613	167,226	111,484
			1	2	83,613	83,614	83,613½
			1	1	167,226		167,226
Queens	5	13	—	—	98,947	148,421	114,170
			3	3	98,947	99,158	99,018
			2	2	148,107	148,421	148,264
Westchester	3	6	3	2	98,874	101,686*	100,280

* Differential caused by rule: "No town, except a town having more than a ratio of apportionment and one-half over . . . shall be divided in the formation of assembly district, . . ." N. Y. Const., Art. III, § 5, Para. 4. This means that no town can be divided unless it contains more than one and one-third percent of the State's total citizen population.

† Tabulated from statistics in *The [New York] City Record* (June 3, 1954) at 4082-4086, 4088-4093, and from those supplied by Mr. C. Burr Reed, former Executive Clerk to the Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment.

TABLE XIII. ASSEMBLY DISTRICTS IN ALL COUNTIES ENTITLED TO TWO OR MORE SENATE DISTRICTS
UNDER CENSUS OF 1960

County	Total Number of Senate Districts	Total Number of Assembly Districts ^a	Number of Senate Districts	Number of Assembly Districts in Each Senate District	Approximate 1960 Population in Each Assembly District ^b
Bronx	4	11	—	—	129,529
			3	3	118,735
			1	2	178,102
Erie	3	8	—	—	133,086
			2	3	118,299
			1	2	177,448
Kings	7	19	—	—	138,280
			5	3	125,110
			2	2	187,666
Monroe	3 ^c	5	—	—	117,277
			2	2	97,731
			1	1	195,462
Nassau	3	10	—	—	130,017
			2	3	144,463
			1	4	108,348
New York	5	12	—	—	141,523
			3	2	169,828
			2	3	113,219
Onondaga	2 ^c	3	—	—	141,009
			1	2	105,757
			1	1	211,514
Queens	5	13	—	—	139,198
			3	3	120,639
			2	2	180,958
Suffolk	3 ^c	5	—	—	133,357
			2	2	111,131
			1	1	222,261
Westchester	4 ^c	6	—	—	134,816
			2	2	101,112
			2	1	202,223

^a Apportioned according to the Brown formula. *Legislative Document (1953) No. 98* at 11-12; *Matter of Dowling*, 219 N.Y. 44 at 59 (1916).

^b U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1960 Census of Population Advance Reports, Final Population Counts*, New York PC(A1)-34 at 3 (1960).

^c Since 1894, it has been the practice in each of the five apportionments (excluding those of 1906 and 1916 which were held invalid) to give an additional Senator for a major fraction of a second ratio. *Legislative Document (1950) No. 31* at 77-91; *Legislative Document (1953) No. 98* at 14A-14B. Under the five apportionments from the time single-member senatorial districts were first adopted in 1846 until 1894, it was the practice to give an additional Senator for every major fraction of a constitutional ratio—the one and only ratio under the Constitution of 1846. 3 Lincoln, *The Constitutional History of New York* 182-190 (1906); *Legislative Document (1950) No. 31* at 92-101.

TABLE XIV. APPORTIONMENT OF ASSEMBLYMEN
ON BASIS OF 1960 CENSUS OF TOTAL
POPULATION*

Rank	County	1960 Population in Each Assembly District
1	Schuyler	15,044
2	Yates	18,614
3	Schoharie	22,616
4	Lewis	23,249
5	Greene	31,372
6	Putnam	31,722
7	Seneca	31,984
8	Orleans	34,159
9	Wyoming	34,793
10	Essex	35,300
11	Tioga	37,802
12	Cortland	41,113
13	Chenango	43,243
14	Delaware	43,540
15	Allegany	43,978
16	Warren	44,002
17	Livingston	44,053
18	Franklin	44,742
19	Sullivan	45,272
20	Columbia	47,322
21	Washington	48,476
22	Otsego	51,942
23	Genesee	53,994
24	Madison	54,635
25	Fulton & Hamilton	55,571
26	Montgomery	57,240
27	Tompkins	66,164
28	Herkimer	66,370
29	Wayne	67,989
30	Ontario	68,070
31	Clinton	72,722
32	Cayuga	73,942
33	Cattaraugus	80,187
34	Oswego	86,118
35	Jefferson	87,835
36- 37	Dutchess (2 districts)	approx. 88,004
38	Saratoga	89,096
39- 40	Orange (2 districts)	approx. 91,867
41	Steuben	97,691
42- 45	Monroe (4 districts)	approx. 97,731†
46	Chemung	98,706
47- 50	Westchester (4 districts)	approx. 101,112†
51- 52	Onondaga (2 districts)	approx. 105,757†
53- 54	Broome (2 districts)	approx. 106,331
55- 58	Nassau (4 districts)	approx. 108,348†
59- 60	Richmond (2 districts)	approx. 110,996
61- 64	Suffolk (4 districts)	approx. 111,131†
65	St. Lawrence	111,239
	NEW YORK STATE AVERAGE	111,882
66- 71	New York (6 districts)	approx. 113,219†
72- 77	Erie (6 districts)	approx. 118,299†
78- 86	Bronx (9 districts)	approx. 118,735†
87	Ulster	118,804
88- 96	Queens (9 districts)	approx. 120,639†

Rank	County	1960 Population in Each Assembly District
97- 98	Niagara (2 districts)	approx. 121,135†
99-113	Kings (15 districts)	approx. 125,110†
114-115	Oneida (2 districts)	approx. 132,201†
116-117	Albany (2 districts)	approx. 136,463†
118	Rockland	136,803
119	Rensselaer	142,585
120-125	Nassau (6 districts)	approx. 144,463†
126	Chautauqua	145,377
127	Schenectady	152,896
128-133	New York (6 districts)	approx. 169,828†
134-135	Erie (2 districts)	approx. 177,448†
136-137	Bronx (2 districts)	approx. 178,102†
138-141	Queens (4 districts)	approx. 180,958†
142-145	Kings (4 districts)	approx. 187,666†
146	Monroe (1 district)	approx. 195,462†
147-148	Westchester (2 districts)	approx. 202,223†
149	Onondaga (1 district)	approx. 211,514†
150	Suffolk (1 district)	approx. 222,261†

* U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1960 Census of Population Advance Reports, Final Population Counts*, New York PC(A1)-34 at 3 (1960). Assemblymen apportioned according to Brown formula. *Legislative Document (1953) No. 98*, at 11-12; Matter of Dowling, 219 N.Y. 44 at 59 (1916).

† Assembly districts distributed among senatorial districts in conformity with the requirement of N.Y. Const., Art. III, §5, Para. 4 (1894), quoted in section 7 of the text, *supra*. The population in districts in the multimember counties may vary due to the rule precluding the division of towns and blocks. *Ibid*.

14. *Citizen and total population.* Because the tabulations of New York's 1960 citizen population are not yet completed, all apportionment computations for 1960 are based on total (rather than citizen) population. Since the ratio between citizens and non-citizens is now approximately the same in every county,⁴ the inclusion of aliens in the apportionment base is a matter of no practical consequence. Yet, the State disbursed almost \$300,000 to have the citizen census tabulations made after the 1950 census and is now preparing to disburse approximately \$400,000 to have the 1960 citizen population tabulated. Inclusion of aliens in the apportionment base in 1953 however, would not have transferred a single Senator or Assemblyman from one county to another. The distribution of

⁴ According to the 1950 census the percentage of citizen population to total population was 95.8 for New York state as a whole; it ranged from a low of 91.6 for New York County to a high of 99.2 for Schuyler County. *Legislative Document (1953) No. 98*, p. 14.

Senators would have been precisely the same if total population rather than citizen population had been used for apportionment purposes in 1953.

TABLE XV. COMPARISON OF APPORTIONMENTS, BY CITIZEN POPULATION AND TOTAL POPULATION

All Third Class Counties Under the Census of 1950	Number of Assemblymen*		Number of Senate Ratios	
	Citizen	Total	Citizen	Total
	Popula- tion	Popula- tion	Popula- tion	Popula- tion
Bronx	12	12	4+	4+
Erie	8	8	3+	3+
Kings	22	22	9+	9+
New York	16	16	6+	6+
Queens	13	13	5+	5+

	Number of second ratios			
	Citizen	Total	Citizen	Total
	Popula- tion	Popula- tion	Popula- tion	Popula- tion
Albany	2	2	1.20	1.19
Monroe	4	4	2.43	2.43
Nassau	6	6	3.35	3.35
Oneida	2	2	1.11	1.11
Onondaga	3	3	1.71	1.70
Suffolk	3	3	1.33	1.37
Westchester	6	6	3.07	3.11

* Apportioned on basis of statistics published in *Legislative Document (1953) No. 88* at 14. Assemblymen apportioned according to the Brown formula. *Id.* at 11-12; Matter of Dowling, 219 N.Y. 44 at 59 (1916).

TABLE XVI. SENATORIAL APPORTIONMENT BASED ON TOTAL POPULATION IN 1960^a

County	Population ^b	Senators	Population per Senator
Bronx	1,424,815	4	356,204
Erie	1,064,688	3	354,896
Kings	2,627,319	7	375,331
Nassau	1,300,171	3	433,390
New York	1,698,281	5	339,656
Queens	1,809,578	5	361,916
Subtotal	9,924,852	27	367,587
All other counties	6,857,452	30 ^c	228,582
Entire State	16,782,304	57 ^c	294,426
			ratio = 335,646

^a See Table XV *supra*.
^b U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960 *Census of Population Advance Reports, Final Population Counts*, New York PC(A1)-34 at 3 (1960).
^c See note opposite, right-hand column.

TABLE XVII. ASSEMBLY APPORTIONMENT BASED ON TOTAL POPULATION IN 1960,^a BY COUNTY CLASSES

Counties	Population ^b	Assemblymen ^c	Population per Assemblyman
THIRD CLASS			
Albany	272,926	2	136,463
Bronx	1,424,815	11	129,529
Erie	1,064,688	8	133,086
Kings	2,627,319	19	138,280
Monroe	586,387	5	117,277
Nassau	1,300,171	10	130,017
New York	1,698,281	12	141,523
Niagara	242,269	2	121,135
Oneida	264,401	2	132,201
Onondaga	423,028	3	141,009
Queens	1,809,578	13	139,198
Suffolk	666,784	5	133,357
Westchester	808,891	6	134,815
Subtotal	13,189,538	98 ^c	134,589
SECOND CLASS			
Broome	212,661	2	106,331
Dutchess	176,008	2	88,004
Orange	183,734	2	91,867
Richmond	221,991	2	110,996
Subtotal	794,394	8	99,299
FIRST CLASS			
45 counties (including Hamilton)	2,798,372	44	63,599
NEW YORK STATE	16,782,304	150	ratio = 111,882

^a See Table XV *supra*.
^b U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960 *Census of Population Advance Reports, Final Population Counts*, New York PC(A1)-34 at 3 (1960).
^c 72 "remaining Members" apportioned to Third Class counties according to the Brown formula. *Legislative Document (1953) No. 98* at 11-12.

^c Total number of Senators determined in conformity with *In re Fay*, 291 N.Y. 198 (1943) as follows:

All counties now having three or more full ratios	Number of Senators apportioned by Convention of 1894	Number of Senators according to Census of 1960	Gain
Bronx	12	5	—
New York		4	
Erie	3	3	0
Kings	7	7	0
Nassau	1	3	+7
Queens		5	
Additional Senators			+7
Basic number of Senators			50
Total number of Senators			57

COMMUNICATIONS

CAN THE "OUTSIDER'S" ROLE BE LEGITIMATE?

TO THE EDITOR:

Ralph Huitt¹ brings unusual insight and experience to his effort ["The Outsider in the Senate: An Alternative Role," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (September, 1961), pp. 566-575] to revise and elaborate upon previous writings on the norms of the United States Senate. Nonetheless, his translation of my work¹ into role theory is at times based upon misconceptions of the meaning and implications of my analysis. And I fear that his reinterpretation of my ideas leads more to confusion than to clarity. For these reasons, I feel compelled to make a brief comment here.

The Senate "folkways" about which I have written are *normative expectations widely shared among senators*. They are not descriptions of overt behavior which, in some cases, varies widely from the norms. The existence of systematic deviations from these norms by a few senators is consistent with a widespread recognition of them. Senator Proxmire, for example, is fully aware of their existence as Huitt's case study clearly indicates. The other "Outsiders" in the Senate whom I interviewed were equally aware of the prevailing folkways. Moreover, the persistence of nonconformity in the history of the Senate does not diminish the importance of the norms. Prostitution has existed along with (and partly as a result of) more conventional standards of sexual morality throughout the history of mankind. Such institutionalized evasions of norms may, in fact, contribute to the smooth functioning of the norms they violate. Huitt is probably correct, for example, in suggesting that a few Outsiders are "functional" for the Senate and the larger political system of which it is a part.

But how "legitimate" is this kind of behavior considered to be *by senators*? "Acceptance and esteem" by the general public and scholars, which Huitt mentions, is entirely irrelevant for present purposes since we are concerned with the norms of the Senate group. "The evidence is strong," he argues, "that the Senate accepts as legitimate a wide range of behavior," including that of the Outsider. But what "strong evidence" does he present? He notes that the seniority rule is applied to Outsiders as well as to others; that personal relationships between Outsiders and their colleagues remain

reasonably smooth; that Senator Proxmire says that no sanctions have been imposed upon him; that very few Outsiders have been officially censured; and that pictures of Senators La Follette and Norris have been hung on the walls of the Reception room. This is very slim evidence indeed. By tolerating the idiosyncrasies of the Outsiders, the Senators are conforming to some of the strongest folkways of the chamber—the importance of courtesy, tolerance, "live and let live," and seniority. The fact that some Outsiders are—once safely dead—considered to be "great Senators" does not mean that their colleagues thought their behavior when alive was "legitimate." The "Senate man" seeks concrete, short-run, and necessarily limited objectives and his conformity to the unwritten rules of behavior in the chamber help him accomplish these goals. The Outsider, on the other hand, can and sometimes does think in far longer-range terms. His immediate and direct influence in the Senate is usually slight, but he may have an impact on mass attitudes outside the Senate which may lead to major legislative pay-offs over the long haul. The historians decide that those who succeed at this are "great," and future generations of Senators concur. But did his colleagues *at the time* consider his behavior legitimate or did they merely tolerate him? Huitt ignores the difference between legitimacy and tolerance.

If Huitt's "strong evidence" in support of the "legitimacy" of the Outsider role is unimpressive, what is the evidence to the contrary? In my interviews almost all the Senators were *morally indignant* at the behavior of Outsiders. They expressed exasperated tolerance, yes; but I uncovered no evidence that they granted Outsiders legitimacy. Moreover, the Outsiders I interviewed were extremely sensitive to questions about the folkways and constantly sought to justify their transgressions to themselves, to me, and to others. The Outsiders themselves seem to have a lurking doubt of the legitimacy of their own behavior.

In addition, there are theoretical and logical complications to Huitt's thesis. Can any group consider alienation from its norms "legitimate" and still survive? I think not. Yet Huitt makes the "conscious rejection" of the prevailing norms of the Senate the distinguishing characteristic of the Outsider.² Besides if the "role"

¹ Donald R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1960), especially ch. 5.

² In Senator Proxmire's case, Huitt gives two conflicting interpretations of this rejection: first, he argues that Proxmire's nonconformity to

is widely considered to be legitimate by *Senators*, why call those who play it "Outsiders"?

No one denies that some Senators behave in the fashion which Huitt labels that of the Outsider. But is this a "role"? The term is certainly one of the most elastic in the language of social science, but Huitt stretches it well beyond the breaking point. At various places he defines "role" as "... the dynamic, behavioral aspect of the official position," "the norms which define the rights and obligations of his

Senate folkways was a result of his personality and "compulsive independence" which more or less inevitably drove him into nonconformity; second, he argues that Proxmire exercised choice in the selection of his role.

position," "an 'ideal type,' " "an 'ideal pattern' of behavior," "the way the Senator relates himself generally to his colleagues and the obligations of his office, or better, the *style* of his performance," etc. Such a rubbery use of the role concept—sometimes meaning normative expectations, sometimes behaviors, sometimes both—is hardly likely to clarify our understanding. Until such time as role theory is *rigorously* applied to the behavior of Senators—and I hope the time is soon and believe that Professor Huitt is the logical man to do it—I suggest that less pretentious concepts drawn from group theory will be more fruitful in analyzing the Senate.

DONALD R. MATTHEWS

University of North Carolina

ON MENDELSON ON CONFLICT

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Tresolini's review of Wallace Mendelson's book, *Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict on the Court* (in the June issue, p. 403), gives the impression that this essay is a carefully balanced analysis of two conflicting views of the judicial function, in which Mendelson reluctantly lines up with Frankfurter. Yet I can find little in the substance of the text to support this characterization. To be sure, even Mendelson might take offense at being told that he has not already and definitively committed himself.

This monograph is concerned with conflict on the Court; but it apparently is a special sort of conflict in which one of the judges has been declared the winner by definition. Mendelson provides us with a very eloquent *defense* of a particular theory of jurisprudence which he shares with Frankfurter. But there is no serious attempt to match Frankfurter's arguments with Black's; rather the latter's position is continuously and contemptuously interpreted to be that of a "dedicated idealist in search of a dream." Clearly this is damning with faint praise, for in the context of the book, and indeed, in the context of much of the literature in the field, idealism is held, *a priori*, to be contrary to a "proper" judicial attitude, whereas the values which are attributed to Frankfurter—wise, humble, pragmatic, detached, and somewhat contemptuous of misplaced noble sentiment—are apparently indigenous to the ranks of the judicial elite. To further illustrate that Frankfurter belongs with the "goods" and Black with the "bads," Mendelson distorts the Black-Frankfurter conflict by equating it with the "philosopher king—rule of law" dichotomy. Frankfurter becomes heir of the great Aristotelian tradition of

Taney, Waite, Holmes, Brandeis, Learned Hand, Stone, and Cardozo, while Black is pictured as carrying out the Platonic machinations of Marshall, Field, Peckham, Fuller, and Sutherland. In *these* terms, is there *any* choice?

Fortunately, perhaps, the conflict between Justices Black and Frankfurter is amenable to scholarly treatment. What is required is that the case for Black be made in the same terms as that for Frankfurter. For example, Mendelson presents Frankfurter as one who weighs all of the relevant variables in deciding a case, while in contrast, Black finds "single issues" which control his responses despite the particular facts of a case. Yet, does not Frankfurter have a scale of values and priorities as well? How else can one explain his consistent philosophical deference to "the legislative will," or his preoccupation with federalism? To quote Justice Brennan in a recent monograph, "[neither should] federalism be raised to the plane of an absolute, nor the Bill of Rights reduced to a precatory trust." Even Mendelson himself has noted elsewhere that Frankfurter has special areas of sympathy where he tends to depart from his "norm" of self-restraint.

How, therefore, is one to differentiate objectively between Black's libertarian idealism and Frankfurter's federalistic vision? On what scale is *this* conflict to be measured? It is, quite clearly, an entirely different question when based on the assumption that both judges are responsive to personal priority values.

Furthermore, is it not possible, as Tresolini finally asks, that Frankfurter's conception of the legislative process does not square with the realities of modern politics? Is it entirely improbable that Black's conception of the Court as the prime defender of civil liberties is actually a very realistic doctrine? Any ob-

jective analysis of the conflict between these two judges would also have to consider the merits of Black's conception of the Supreme Court as the custodian of the morals of the political process. Here again, it is conceivable that the Black (Stone) view might prove to be the one more cognizant of the actualities of twentieth-century political life.

Failing even to raise these questions, let alone attempting to answer them, Mendelson could hardly be accused of studying a conflict situation. Perhaps he intended to write a defense of the Frankfurter position; if so this is all the more reason for a *reviewer* to indicate that his author is a protagonist in the struggle he is describing. The very fact that Mendelson has demonstrated exceptional insights here and elsewhere is all the more reason for expecting him to meet and not obfuscate challenging questions.

JOEL B. GROSSMAN

State University of Iowa

TO THE EDITOR:

In reply to Grossman's comments:

(1) I deeply regret that he has used the term "contemptuous" in relation to my attitude toward the efforts of any judge. Nothing could be farther from the mark.

(2) The language in quotation marks just below the middle of his second paragraph is not a quotation of anything that I have written.

(3) Justice Frankfurter does indeed have a "scale of values." He leans heavily toward the view that basic policy issues should be left for the politically responsible agencies of government. It is suggested that this "conception of the legislative process does not square with the realities of modern politics." Wasn't it on precisely this ground that the "old Court" ran amuck? Getting only half a loaf in the give-and-take of politics, conservatives then—like liberals now—demanded the whole loaf in court. When the "nine old men" complied in the name of "higher law," they went bankrupt. Shall we have a repeat performance in the name of "political morality"? Let us face it: the Court's only base of strength is public confidence. In the long run it defies the "realities of . . . politics" at its peril. For me these are still the basic considerations. That is why I have concentrated on them, rather than on matters which Grossman evidently finds more important.

(4) Of course, if I have posed the wrong issues, my conclusions must be faulty. But I suggest to those who are so understandably concerned with the "morals of the political process" that one does not get an accurate picture of Mr. Justice Black's jurisprudence by

concentrating on a handful of "free speech" cases, and ignoring the great bulk of his efforts. What is the value of free speech, if such political compromises as it produced in FELA and FLA, for example, are to be ignored on the bench? Surely the Congresses that adopted and amended FELA were not as overwhelmingly "pro-labor" as Justice Black's record in the FELA cases indicates. Are we really to believe that the embryo of FLA which Senator Black introduced in the Senate was not drastically watered down after businessmen had spoken freely against it? Ironically those who are least respectful of legislative judgment in the few free-speech cases are also least respectful of it in the many cases involving only economic interests. Just where, then, are the legislative fruits of free discussion to prevail? A burning "faith" in democracy and impatience with its results seems to be a characteristic of both judicial, and academic activists.

WALLACE MENDELSON

The University of Texas

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Grossman chastises me for not being more critical of Mendelson's book and for not pointing out that he is a "protagonist in the struggle he is describing." Grossman claims that Mendelson has already declared Frankfurter the winner. There is no doubt that Mendelson is favorably disposed to the Frankfurter position. But the book is much more balanced than Grossman would have us believe.

In passage after passage which Grossman has ignored, Mendelson reveals clearly that neither view is completely "right" or "wrong" and that neither has or should prevail over the other. For example, on page 8 he notes that the "Court oscillates from one view to the other. Yet neither has ever prevailed completely. While one dominates, the other normally finds expression in futile dissent; futile at least for the moment. The difficulty of the Court is that in the crisis of our time it has been torn—like the rest of us—between two great traditions." (Emphasis supplied.) On page 118 he notes that "while these two views are distinct at their cores, they fuse into one another at their peripheries. Both are deep in American culture. Neither prevails to the complete exclusion of the other even in the work of a single judge." In a concluding remark on Black at page 123 Mendelson notes that "be it, or not, a judge's function, Mr. Justice Black's dissenting struggle in the realm of civil liberty challenges the conscience of the crowd. His restless probing at the frontiers of freedom may help us to achieve more enlightened legal order."

Could such passages and others like them have been written by a scholar committed beyond doubt to the Frankfurter view? . . .

Unlike Grossman, I fail to see any Machiavellian purpose in Mendelson to obfuscate challenging questions so he could write a defense of Frankfurter under false pretenses. . . . In the last three sentences of my review I raised what I believe are the fundamental questions which must be answered by a supporter of Justice Frankfurter. Grossman saw fit to note only the first of these. . . . I believe Mendelson is seeking to stimulate rather than to foreclose discussion. It so happens that I am persuaded that in our time the Black view is more "right" than "wrong." *But I am not sure.* And, in any event, I am not entitled to read my own private notions into a book review.

Mendelson's book has qualities which Grossman evidently does not value very highly. In the welter of a discipline increasingly characterized by an unbelievably sterile jargon and

overly concerned with trivia and the bogus quantification of the obvious, Mendelson's book stands out like a jewel. It is a model of clarity and precision in the tradition of the best American writing in constitutional law.

Despite my compassionate heart, I am persuaded that Grossman's letter reveals clearly his attachment to the art of reviewmanship as depicted by Stephen Potter.¹ In its simplest form it is "How to Be One Up on the Author Without Actually Tampering With the Text." Or, in other words, "how, as critic, to show that it is really you yourself who should have written the book, if you had the time, and since you hadn't, you are glad that someone has, although it is obvious that it might have been done better."

ROCCO J. TRESOLINI

Lehigh University

¹ "The Art of Reviewmanship: Notes by Stephen Potter," *New York Times Book Review*, p. 1, May 8, 1955.

ON THE FALLACY OF "IDEA A"

TO THE EDITOR:

In a communication in the June, 1961, issue of the *REVIEW*, Stanley Rothman again argued for a distinction between "actors" and "abstractions from action." The distinction may be called Idea A. Rothman's argument must be challenged on two grounds, for Idea A is involved in an important way with the discipline's present hesitant leanings toward methodological change. This challenge refers only to empirical analysis, not to normative or ethical analysis.

Idea A, first, does not aid empirical analysis. For example, Idea A helped not a whit in the empirical study of social organization.¹ A basic notion implies why this had to be the case: all concepts are abstractions from action. A person, a soul, an electromagnetic field all qualify. Immediately apprehended reality cannot be reported. One interprets reality in terms of a theory of what it is important to observe. Any reported data, in short, are already (if often implicitly) conceptualized. Empirical research makes the best of this necessity. That is, the task of empirical analysis is to make these concepts ever more explicit and ever more comprehensive, so as to test the theory which was used as the original frame of reference for interpreting reality. At best, Idea A made a difficult problem more difficult by its neglect of this basic character of empirical work.

¹ Such an overview is contained in my *The Small Group* (Chicago, in process), especially chs. 1 and 2.

Idea A, second, has a history of positively inhibiting empirical work, as well as making it more difficult. The literature of sociology and psychology bears many evidences of this effect. The usual development of Idea A accorded "reality" only to "actors,"² or accorded a somehow lesser degree of reality to "abstractions from action."³ Either way, Idea A encouraged the neglect of many areas of importance in empirical analysis and (perhaps more significantly) triggered a polemic debate of monumental proportions and low payoff.

There is ample reason to fear that Rothman's development of Idea A will encourage the second consequence. Consider his argument that "groups should be regarded as political actors, and hence on a different analytical level" from concepts such as "status" and "role." He reacted to a challenge of this point in this way: Golembiewski's point is that all concepts are abstractions from reality and that, therefore, the distinction is 'fatuous.'

The first part of his statement is correct, and I am at fault for the sloppy use of language. However, the distinction I intended is far from fatuous.

² Floyd H. Allport most prominently, if not always consistently, took such a position. See his *Social Psychology* (New York, 1924), especially p. 4.

³ For example, this position was taken by David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield, *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology* (New York, 1948), pp. 391, 19.

Rothman went on, in sum, to argue that although all concepts are abstractions from reality, some concepts are grossly so and others not at all. Following Levy, Idea A is rebaptized in terms of "concrete structures" versus "analytic structures." The former, in Levy's subterranean phrasing, are "those patterns that define the character of units that are at least in theory capable of physical separation (in time and/or space) from other units of the same sort." Analytic structures, in apparent contrast, are "the patterned aspects of action that are not even theoretically capable of concrete separation from other patterned aspects of action."⁴

This argument is puzzling in some of its details. *E.g.*, how can "physical separation" be accomplished except in "time and/or space?" Similarly, one wonders how this "physical separation" occurs in "time and/or space" and yet need be possible only "at least in theory."

But to the heart of the matter. In the absence of reification of the most brutish sort, the argument (whatever its precise meaning) comes unstuck. Roughly, the developed position seems to be that a "group" can be isolated from other "groups" ("at least in theory," one probably must add), but that "status/role" structures would not exist except in a "group" and hence cannot be isolated. Neglect the implication, which was primitive in nineteenth century physics, that research "units" come nicely packaged for isolation.⁵ The argument still leans awkwardly on a jerry-built crutch. The compound presumption is that the contrasted concepts are "things," that the "things" are different, and that therefore the concepts and their underlying methodology are fundamentally different. A chronic reification alone permits these liberties.

The likelihood of the second consequence of Idea A is enhanced by the attractiveness of Rothman's argument. For Idea A supports the methodology which, by and large, has guided political scientists. And it is human to want to learn that one has been correct all along, es-

pecially when the clamor for change seems particularly insistent.

Such comfort will have a high cost. Idea A must encourage a low-level description and classification of "things." There is no need to disparage a taxonomy, and certainly political science requires much more skin-surface classification. But such classification is hardly the heart of any systematic theory, although it may provoke sophisticated empirical work. That is, it may help somewhat for scientific purposes to distinguish elephants and ants in terms of certain gross differences, but not much.

Moreover, there is no point in confusing the two types of work. A natural-science approach, in its advanced stages, concerns itself with the development of concepts and operations which permit the increasingly fine determination of what is related to what. The research objects are not "solid," and the methodology convenient for taxonomy is not appropriate for isolating the networks of relations which constitute empirical theory. Calling a "group" an "actor" encourages students to dig a little deeper in the rut of low-level description, and to avoid those "abstractions" and their associated methodology which will characterize work toward an empirical theory.

The present impasse in "pressure group" study sharply portrays the consequence of emphasizing the "actor" and the "hard facts." Bentley's insights led to a literature—and there is no denying its value—which made more realistic our view of the political process. But the literature is disparate, particularistic, and will remain so as long as Idea A underlies it. These studies may generate work toward an empirical theory, but only via a methodology which can support the effort. Idea A does not meet the test. Indeed, the "pressure group" literature is in its present static condition because of Idea A.

Certainly, most of us agree that it does not suffice to gather data—no matter how "hard"—in the fond expectation that something will come of it all. More is required. Operationally, this means penetrating further into the literature of the natural-science approach, especially in the physical sciences.

ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI

University of Illinois

ERRATA

Because of a miscarriage of proofs in the mails during the summer, two typographical errors survived in the Appendix to "Social Mobilization and Political Development," by Karl W. Deutsch, as published in Vol. 55 (September, 1961) of this REVIEW. In Table III-B, at p. 508, the entry for Pakistan in col. (7) should read 11, not 7. And in

Table IV-A, at p. 509, footnote d to the entry for Thailand in col. (4) should read c, and the remaining footnotes to that Table should be correspondingly relettered.

On p. 493, the German periodical referred to in the asterisk note to the title should be *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*.—MAN. ED.

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS

SOME CONTRIBUTIONS OF MATHEMATICAL REASONING TO THE STUDY OF POLITICS*

RICHARD R. FAGEN

Stanford University

The political scientist who ventures to glance at recent mathematical work in the social sciences will probably come away with one of two impressions of the literature:¹ either he may find it extremely complex and unapproachable, or, if some understanding is possible, he may see it as devoid of disciplinary relevance.

A certain difficulty in "learning the language" is to be expected. As Simon has said, "It is a common whimsy among mathematicians to preface their books with the statement that the reader needs no particular mathematical training as prerequisite to the work in question, but only a certain amount of 'mathematical maturity.' . . . 'Mathematical maturity,' it would seem, is acquired largely by studying mathematics."²

However, before the political scientist attempts to fit the study of mathematics into his busy schedule, he will want its relevance to his own discipline to be demonstrated. During the past decade there has been an accumulation of both theoretical and empirical work in some areas of political science which, when viewed systematically, seems capable of showing this relevance.

* The author wishes to thank the Social Science Research Council for support and encouragement in the form of a Fellowship in Political Theory and Legal Philosophy. A debt is also owed to Heinz Eulau of Stanford University who commented on an earlier draft of the manuscript. It should be made clear at the outset that this essay is concerned only with books and articles which use mathematical reasoning in presenting their theoretical arguments. The numerous projects in which statistical or scaling techniques are brought to bear *post facto* on the analysis of data will be excluded unless such projects had their genesis in a mathematical formulation of the original problem.

¹ Readers wishing to sample for themselves the mathematical "frontiers" of economics, psychology, and management science will find Kenneth J. Arrow, Samuel Karlin, and Patrick Suppes, eds., *Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, 1959* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1960), a convenient collection.

² Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York, 1957), p. ix.

This bibliography has accordingly been divided into two sections. The first consists of a listing of "background" readings for those who are not familiar with arguments about the place and possibilities of mathematics in social science. This section concludes with a brief reading course for political scientists who wish to acquire some familiarity with game theory but find themselves overwhelmed by the sheer bulk of the literature. The second section is organized around five continuing concerns of the discipline: (1) normative theory and the democratic process; (2) the study of power; (3) international politics and strategy; (4) organization theory and administration; and (5) judicial behavior. Here, specific works will be discussed in more detail and some attempt will be made to indicate the strengths, weaknesses, and research potentialities of various mathematical approaches to the study of political phenomena.

Throughout, technical items with "implications" for political science have been excluded. This has been done to limit the bibliography and encourage the reader, and also because most empirical and less technical works contain a fairly complete listing of their mathematical ancestors. Thus, it is entirely possible to move back from this essay into the mathematical literature. On the other hand, it is usually impossible (in the bibliographical sense) to work forward from the mathematical treatises into the literature of political science which uses mathematical reasoning.

I. INTRODUCTORY LITERATURE AND THE THEORY OF GAMES

Perhaps the most logical starting point for the interested reader would be several selections which set forth the "role" of mathematics and mathematical models in social science. A recent article by Rapoport includes a discussion of the uses of mathematics both in the exact sciences and in the behavioral sciences.³ Another discussion of verbal, mathematical, and analogical theories in social science has been

³ Anatol Rapoport, "Various Meanings of 'Theory'," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (December, 1958), pp. 972-988.

contributed by Simon and Newell.⁴ The authors cite the "psychological" advantages of mathematical theories, *i.e.*, their capacity to extract a far greater percentage of their logical content than verbal theories yield. A somewhat similar point has been made by Festinger, who draws on experimental sociology for his examples.⁵

The process by which empirical concerns can be translated or reformulated into mathematical language has been examined in another essay by Simon.⁶ On the same subject, a paper by Coombs, Raiffa, and Thrall is useful.⁷ The authors recommend a clear distinction between the concepts of "model" and "theory," and they also lead the reader through the logic of scale construction. Some necessary cautions concerning the uses and limitations of mathematical models in social science have been noted by Lazarsfeld who distinguishes between the several functions which such models may serve in the investigatory process.⁸

More historically oriented appraisals of the relationship between mathematics and social science have been written by Kaplan⁹ and Firey.¹⁰ Kaplan devotes considerable attention to the work of Dodd, Rashevsky, Zipf, Von Neumann, and the fathers of psychological scaling.¹¹ Firey adds brief evaluations of the

work of Menger and Bales to the above list. In a similar vein, Bernard reviewed the work of Firey, Zipf, Simon, Rashevsky, Rapoport, Deutsch, and Richardson, and related it to the sociology of conflict.¹² Perhaps the most critical appraisal of all has been written by Deutsch,¹³ who is particularly critical of Rashevsky and Zipf for the "naiveté" of the assumptions on which their systems are constructed.

Arrow has touched upon almost all of the themes suggested by the above authors.¹⁴ His essay discusses the usefulness of mathematical reasoning, the types of models offered by various theorists, and the concepts and possibilities of the theory of games. Although Arrow's essay is slanted toward the economist's interests, it provides a convenient "summing up" of such thought as it existed a decade ago.

As a transition to the literature which actually deals with political problems in mathematical terms, two articles are particularly useful. The earlier of the two, contributed by Lévi-Strauss, is the more historical and general.¹⁵ The later, written by Kemeny, is the more focused and offers four concrete examples of mathematical reasoning in social science.¹⁶ Both suggest that the future belongs largely to those who develop and exploit the newer branches of "mathematics without numbers," and both share a buoyant optimism concerning the prospects for mathematical reasoning in the social sciences. The following statement by Kemeny, an accomplished mathematician who is also extremely sensitive to the problems of

⁴ Herbert A. Simon and Allen Newell, "Models: Their Uses and Limitations," in Leonard D. White, ed., *The State of the Social Sciences* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956).

⁵ Leon Festinger, "The Relevance of Mathematics to Controlled Experimentation in Sociology," *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. 6 (1954), pp. 622-627.

⁶ Herbert A. Simon, "Some Strategic Considerations in the Construction of Social Science Models," in Paul F. Lazarsfeld, ed., *Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences* (Glencoe, 1954).

⁷ C. H. Coombs, H. Raiffa, and R. M. Thrall, "Some Views on Mathematical Models and Measurement Theory," in R. M. Thrall, C. H. Coombs, and R. L. Davis, eds., *Decision Processes* (New York, 1954).

⁸ Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Evidence and Inference in Social Research," in Daniel Lerner, ed., *Evidence and Inference* (Glencoe, 1959), pp. 132-137.

⁹ Abraham Kaplan, "Sociology Learns the Language of Mathematics," in James R. Newman, ed., *The World of Mathematics*, Vol. 2 (New York, 1956).

¹⁰ Walter Firey, "Mathematics and Social Theory," *Social Forces*, Vol. 29 (October, 1950), pp. 20-25.

¹¹ The major works of Zipf, Rashevsky, Menger, and Bales are not included in this bibliography. Those wishing to investigate their contributions

at first hand can follow the writings cited in the above critiques. A brief report and extensive bibliography of the recent work of Dodd, his colleagues, and his students will be found in Stuart Carter Dodd, "Formulas for Spreading Opinions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 22 (Winter, 1958), pp. 537-554.

¹² Jessie Bernard, "Mathematical Studies in the Sociology of Conflict," in *The Nature of Conflict* (Paris, UNESCO, 1957), pp. 64-73.

¹³ Karl W. Deutsch, "On Communication Models in the Social Sciences," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 16 (July, 1952), pp. 356-380.

¹⁴ Kenneth Arrow, "Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences," in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell, eds., *The Policy Sciences* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1951).

¹⁵ Cl. Lévi-Strauss, "The Mathematics of Man," *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. 6 (1954), pp. 581-590.

¹⁶ John G. Kemeny, "Mathematics Without Numbers," *Daedalus*, Vol. 88 (Fall, 1959), pp. 577-591.

social science, will indicate the strength of the latter conviction:

There is every reason to expect that the various social sciences will serve as incentives for the development of great new branches of mathematics and that some day the theoretical social scientist will have to know more mathematics than the physicist needs to know today.¹⁷

Before turning to the literature which deals more specifically with problem areas of political science, it is appropriate to comment briefly on the theory of games—one “new branch of mathematics” which already has left an impressive imprint on theoretical and experimental work in the social sciences. As is well known, widespread interest in the theory of games followed, with some time lag, the publication of the Von Neumann and Morgenstern classic.¹⁸ The literature generated directly or indirectly by this book is now immense. Several years ago Luce and Raiffa offered a more-than-300-item bibliography of which they said, “Its coverage of game theory proper is relatively complete, but of allied subjects it is less so.”¹⁹ In the years since 1957 the steady flow of literature has continued.

It thus seems useful to suggest a reading “strategy” for political scientists who wish to acquaint themselves with at least the implications of game theory for political theory and research. Such a course is outlined below. It will offend some purists who believe that one should first master the mathematics “in the abstract” and then move to substantive concerns. However, it should prove attractive to those who have neither the background nor the inclination to tackle the foundations without first learning “what’s in it for me?”

An essay by Snyder provides a non-technical introduction to the theory of games.²⁰ Snyder’s discussion is particularly valuable because it is addressed precisely to those political scientists who are asking “what’s in it for me?” In conjunction with Snyder, it is worthwhile to

examine a paper by Rapoport.²¹ The author is a leading spokesman for game theory and is able to cast into sharp relief the implications of a game theoretical approach for both the history and substance of social science. Part II of the same author’s recent book offers an extended and self-contained introduction to the concepts of game theory.²² Much of the literature subsequently mentioned in this bibliography is introduced, organized and discussed by Rapoport in a manner which should prove congenial to the political scientist.

Although the collection of papers edited by Shubik predates the above selections, it fits most naturally into our program at the present point because of its relative complexity and heterogeneity.²³ The contribution of Deutsch on “International Politics and Game Theory” and the Introduction by Shubik are particularly useful. One final article by Bernard deserves to be included,²⁴ since it offers a short critique of the “model of man” postulated and implied by game theory, and also discusses the relationship of this theory to the research process.

It is difficult to recommend specific sections of Von Neumann and Morgenstern, yet certainly all interested students of the subject ought to become familiar with this classic.²⁵

The final book included on this short list is the much admired survey by Luce and Raiffa of the game theoretical literature.²⁶ The authors have conscientiously attempted “to communicate the central ideas and results of game theory. It is a book about game theory, not a presentation of the theory itself.”²⁷ In the Preface, Luce and Raiffa provide alternative reading strategies geared to particular backgrounds and interests. Whenever possible the main argument incorporates relevant examples from social science, and the thought is generally carried along by what one reviewer has called “a great deal of good talk.” Certainly, whatever effort is required to read *Games and Deci-*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 578.

¹⁸ John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944, 1947, 1953).

¹⁹ R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York, 1957), p. 485.

²⁰ Richard Snyder, “Game Theory and the Analysis of Political Behavior,” in Stephen K. Bailey et al., *Research Frontiers in Politics and Government* (Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1955).

²¹ Anatol Rapoport, “Critiques of Game Theory,” *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 4 (January, 1959), pp. 49–66.

²² Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1960).

²³ Martin Shubik, ed., *Readings in Game Theory and Political Behavior* (Garden City, 1954).

²⁴ Jessie Bernard, “The Theory of Games of Strategy as a Modern Sociology of Conflict,” *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 59 (March, 1954), pp. 411–424.

²⁵ Von Neumann and Morgenstern, *op. cit.*

²⁶ Luce and Raiffa, *op. cit.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. vii.

sions will be well repaid in increased understanding and sophistication.

As the following pages will indicate, game theory has made the biggest disciplinary "splash" of the several mathematical tools currently in use. Moreover, there is an unusual consensus among the knowledgeable that the growing influence of game theory on theory and research in the social sciences will continue.²⁸ As Braithwaite has said at the close of his penetrating little study, "Perhaps in another three hundred years' time economic and political and other branches of moral philosophy will bask in radiation from a source—theory of games of strategy—whose prototype was kindled round the poker tables of Princeton."²⁹

II. FIVE CONTINUING CONCERNS OF THE DISCIPLINE

Normative Theory and the Democratic Process. Attempts to define and discuss the key concepts of traditional political theory in mathematical terms are certainly unusual. One such has been made by Gabor and Gabor in "An Essay on the Mathematical Theory of Freedom."³⁰ Although the title is slightly misleading and the authors are actually most concerned with independence of choice (as opposed to such concerns as "freedom of speech"), the essay, and the criticism by members of the Royal Statistical Society which follows, both offer rewarding insights into the mathematical approach to definition.

An essay of a quite different order, but equally dependent on a mathematical argument, has been written by Braithwaite.³¹ The author is concerned with the time-honored problem of determining an "equitable" solution when the preferences of two or more parties are in conflict. His presentation is game theoretical, extremely articulate, and highly suggestive. It is interesting to speculate on the implications of Braithwaite's work for empirical research: using the author's method of determining a "fair split" in a given conflict, it would then be possible to run experiments in which selected groups of persons made awards according to their "sense of justice." Cultural,

psychological, and political groups could be compared both with each other and with the "model" adjudicator. Those familiar with the original essay will realize that the matter chosen for adjudication could be one of genuine significance.

Although earlier readings should have laid to rest the notion that a mathematical argument must be crowded with numbers, some readers might still be surprised to find Anthony Downs's *An Economic Theory of Democracy* on our list.³² Yet it is possible to classify this among the "purer" examples of mathematical reasoning in the literature of political science, for it is rigorously deductive and "uncorrected" by empirical data. Downs is able to generate a complex, consistent and reasonable set of hypotheses from an extremely limited set of assumptions about political man and the political system. Substantively, his discussion covers a wide range of political processes. Those interested in research will find his chapter on "Testable Propositions Derived from the Theory" suggestive of a wealth of projects.

Social Choice and Individual Values, a Cowles Commission monograph by Kenneth Arrow, has probably stimulated more discussion in economics than in political science.³³ Yet Arrow's central concern and his primary conclusion both go right to the heart of a classical political problem—voting and consensus. Perhaps the formality of the symbolic logic and set theory employed has discouraged political scientists; however, perfect understanding of all proofs is not a prerequisite to following his clear and persuasive general argument. In simplest terms, Arrow asks this question: is it possible to aggregate individual choices (rankings) into a social ranking which does not violate some "reasonable" conditions (requirements) of such a ranking? No, concludes the author, unless one is willing either to relax the conditions which the social ranking must meet or to make some assumptions con-

²⁸ See for instance Arrow, *op. cit.*, Lévi-Strauss, *op. cit.*, and Kaplan, *op. cit.*

²⁹ R. B. Braithwaite, *Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1955), p. 55.

³⁰ Denis Gabor and André Gabor, in *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Series A, Vol. 117, Part I (1954), pp. 31-72.

³¹ Braithwaite, *op. cit.*

³² New York, 1957. Those interested in the polemical literature generated by this thoughtful book could begin with W. Hayward Rogers, "Some Methodological Difficulties in Anthony Downs's *An Economic Theory of Democracy*," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (June, 1959), pp. 483-485. Downs answers in "Dr. Rogers's Methodological Difficulties—A Reply to his Critical Note," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (December, 1959), pp. 1094-1097. A less rigorous follow-up to his original work is his "Why the Government Budget is too Small in a Democracy," *World Politics*, Vol. 12 (July, 1960), pp. 541-563.

³³ New York, 1951.

cerning the characteristics of the individual rankings.

Even if Arrow had terminated his monograph with the formal argument, it would still be a valuable contribution to the literature of political theory. However, he has included a final chapter in which his formal findings are related to social morality and consensus as discussed by Rousseau, Kant, and T. H. Green.³⁴ The crucial empirical question raised by Arrow's work is: how, in fact, *do* social groupings adjust aggregate and individual preferences in order to achieve a stable consensus? What is the range of processes by which individuals surrender their preferences to the "general will"?

A companion piece to Arrow's monograph is the recent book by Duncan Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections*.³⁵ Although not as demanding as *Social Choice*, it is equally insightful and even more consistently focussed on core problems of political theory. By making some simplifying (although not unreasonable) assumptions concerning the manner in which committee members (voters) order their preferences, Black is able to present a comparatively simple geometrical argument.

After developing in some detail a series of theorems about voting processes and arrangements, Black turns his attention in Chapter IX to the question, "Which Candidate *Ought* to be Elected?" Here he introduces and discusses the criteria of Condorcet and Borda, two early advocates of "rational" schemes of voting.³⁶ Chapters on proportional representation,

special majorities, and international agreements follow. An historical chapter on the electoral analyses of C. L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) closes the book.³⁷

It is manifestly impossible in brief compass to suggest the richness of Black's argument. Any reader interested in such dilemmas of democratic theory and practice as the rights of the passionate minority, "equitable" processes of legislative voting, or theories of representation will find here much food for thought. Most fortunately, Black's argument is as accessible as it is relevant. It awards either the mathematically oriented scholar who will extend the theory more systematically into such areas as proportional representation, or the empirically oriented one who will investigate such matters as the *actual* ordering of voters' preferences.

Probably neither the critics nor the defenders of Dahl's *A Preface to Democratic Theory* would claim that his argument is mathematical.³⁸ However, in his chapter on "Populistic Democracy" he leans so heavily on Arrow's *Social Choice* and the early work of Black that it seems proper to include at least this one chapter of *A Preface* in our bibliography.

A rereading of "Populistic Democracy" in conjunction with the above works serves two purposes. In the first place, Dahl's contribution suggests one manner in which highly abstract theoretical essays can be exploited by a sophisticated scholar confronting a set of more specific problems. Secondly, Dahl's discussion illustrates both the costs paid (in terms of rigor and completeness) and the gains achieved (in terms of disciplinary attractiveness) by one who inverts the sequence of argument found in Arrow and Black. Essentially, Dahl examines normative concerns which have been engendered by an historical experience. The rigorous argument is *subsequently* brought in to aid in exploring the possibilities of various policies and procedures. Arrow and Black, however, exhaust their formal arguments as completely as possible *before* turning to historical experience. The normative dilemmas are cast up by the argu-

³⁴ Those interested in the more technical aspects of Arrow's work will find Kenneth O. May, "A Set of Independent, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision," *Econometrica*, Vol. 20 (October, 1952), pp. 680-684, useful on the problem of simple majority decision. Readers more interested in the normative and moral implications of *Social Choice* will find value in I. D. M. Little, "Social Choice and Individual Values," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 60 (October, 1952), pp. 422-32.

³⁵ Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958. The work of Black was first published as a series of journal articles in 1948 and 1949. His book incorporates and enlarges upon this early work. Readers wishing to consult the original articles will find them listed under "Acknowledgements" in *The Theory of Committees and Elections*.

³⁶ In Part II of *The Theory*, Black discusses in some detail the contributions of Borda, Condorcet, Leplace, Nanson, and Galton to the mathematical theory of elections. A translation and critique of Borda's most relevant work can be found in Alfred de Grazia, "Mathematical Derivation of an

Election System," *Isis*, Vol. 44 (June, 1953), pp. 42-51.

³⁷ In the Appendix to *The Theory*, Dodgson's little known pamphlets are reprinted.

³⁸ Robert A. Dahl, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956). For one criticism of Dahl's work see Douglas N. Morgan, "A Postscript to Professor Dahl's 'Preface,'" this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (December, 1957), pp. 1040-1052. Dahl defends himself in "A Rejoinder," *ibid.*, pp. 1053-1061.

ments themselves, and *in retrospect* suffuse the mathematical arguments with political meaning.

In view of the relevance of the work of Black and Arrow, it is somewhat surprising that only one other political scientist seems to have published an article based on their arguments. In "The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments," William Riker has exposed the possibilities for irrational action which exist in actual legislatures.³⁹ Although he confines his discussion to examples drawn from Congress, he notes that the procedural rules of many actual legislatures allow such irrationalities to come about. Perhaps the most interesting feature of Riker's discussion is the easy manner in which he moves from a theoretical discussion to an empirical example and finally to a policy proposal (revision of the rules). Quite clearly the author throws into relief the dilemmas confronting those who would reform procedure in search of more "rational" outcomes. The elimination of irrationality would frequently cost the legislature much in terms of time, discipline, and simplicity. Thus, legislative rationality as a valued goal needs to be discussed in a larger, non-mathematical context.⁴⁰

The Study of Power. The importance of the concept of power for the study of politics has been debated pro and con for many years and this debate will not be reopened here. Rather, it is appropriate to notice several studies written during the last decade in which analysts have turned to mathematical arguments in their attempts to define and make operational this elusive concept. These attempts have clustered around three approaches to the problem. Each approach depends originally on a different branch of mathematics and each focuses ultimately on a different substantive concern.

The first approach, and the least productive in terms of subsequent political science literature, depends on the theory of directed graphs. The "seed" article, "A Formal Theory of Social Power," by John R. P. French, Jr., derives rather directly from the work of the late Kurt Lewin and the Research Center for Group

Dynamics.⁴¹ French's argument is supplemented by Frank Harary in "A Criterion for Unanimity in French's Theory of Social Power," and the pertinent early literature is noted in both.⁴²

The French-Harary approach to the study of power focuses on the small group and the processes by which opinion in this group reaches an equilibrium. Although the original (non-mathematical) listing of "types" of power developed by Group Dynamics was rather sophisticated, the graph theoretical approach collapses the typology as a necessary, simplifying assumption.⁴³ Thus, some favorite distinctions of political scientists are obscured.⁴⁴ Moreover, the small group focus of the theory and the emphasis on the dynamics of opinion change serve to insulate this approach from the central concerns of most political scientists. Perhaps these three factors, rather than the mathematical form of the argument, explain the failure of the French-Harary approach to excite the discipline.

The second approach to the study of power has concentrated on providing a definitional framework precise enough yet also generic enough to allow the concept to be used operationally in a range of political contexts. Clearly, any such endeavor casts up in dramatic form the problems associated with measuring empirical power relationships. Thus, it is not surprising that Simon's original article on the subject was titled "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power."⁴⁵ In a similar vein, James March has contributed "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement

⁴¹ *Psychological Review*, Vol. 63 (May, 1956), pp. 181-194.

⁴² In Dorwin Cartwright, ed., *Studies in Social Power* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1959).

⁴³ The original formulation differentiated power based on attraction, expertise, ability to reward, ability to coerce, and legitimation.

⁴⁴ See for instance the distinction between types of power which is so central to the argument of Richard Neustadt in *Presidential Power* (New York, 1960). It should be noted that the March-Simon-Dahl approach to the study of power, detailed below, also does not distinguish between "types" of power.

⁴⁵ Herbert Simon's article was originally published in the *Journal of Politics* in 1953, and has been reprinted in his *Models of Man*, cited above, (note 2). Other articles in *Models of Man*, particularly "Bandwagon and Underdog Effects of Election Predictions," would be of interest to political scientists concerned with the "Democratic Process."

³⁹ This REVIEW, Vol. 52 (June, 1958), pp. 349-366; see also his bibliographical essay "Voting and the Summation of Preferences," in this issue of the REVIEW, below, pp. 900-911.

⁴⁰ An excellent discussion of the work of Arrow, Black, and Dahl will be found in Luce and Raiffa, *op. cit.*, ch. 14. This chapter also will direct the reader to other, more technical work in the general area of "Group Decision Making."

of Influence,"⁴⁶ and "Measurement Concepts in the Theory of Influence."⁴⁷ Dahl's "The Concept of Power"⁴⁸ is consciously concerned with demonstrating how difficult it is to do research even with an operational definition of power, and MacRae and Price⁴⁹ demonstrate that Dahl's operational definition may occasion spurious conclusions *in addition to* the research perplexities already suggested by Dahl himself.

Readers familiar with the above mentioned articles may wonder why they have been grouped together and considered as one approach when Simon argues in terms of causality and the structure of the power relationship, March depends more formally on set theory, and Dahl simply uses symbolic language to define the relationship in terms of probability. A partial answer is to be found in their common intellectual stimulus: all three are responding to a problem cast up by Harold Lasswell and not satisfactorily handled by him or by anyone else. More importantly, all three authors are centrally concerned with making the concept operational, putting it to work in the service of the study of politics. They are united as much by common concerns as by common analyses. Yet each is quick to realize that much theoretical and empirical work remains to be done. In what directions might such future efforts turn?

The only actual or potential research site discussed in the articles is the U. S. Congress. Yet this is clearly one of the most difficult institutional settings in which to gather data relevant to the several conceptualizations. Interviewing would seem a necessary research technique and an institutional (rather than experimental) setting would also seem desirable. Thus, decision-making bodies in the state and local hierarchies might offer untapped resources for those interested in pushing ahead with the Simon-March-Dahl formulations. Numerous other local but non-governmental institutions also offer attractive sites for research.

The third and final approach to the study of power dates from the publication of Shapley

and Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System."⁵⁰ The authors define the power of an individual in terms of "the chance he has of being critical to the success of a winning coalition." The "power index" of an individual is formally defined in a calculation suggested by game theory. Clearly, this power index is applicable only when individuals are involved in some formal system of voting. Moreover, in direct contrast to the Simon-March-Dahl approach, the index does not depend on the particular incumbent of the voting role but rather only on the size and structure of the voting body.⁵¹ This is not the place to discuss the Shapley-Shubik index in detail; the original presentation is both compact and readable. However, it is illuminating to outline the subsequent literature which relates directly to this article.

In their own words, Luce and Rogow attempt "to go beyond the Shapley-Shubik analysis of a legislative scheme to an analysis of a legislature."⁵² In short, they build a model of Congress, the two party system and the presidential office, which derives its form from actual arrangements in the United States. On the basis of this model, the authors are able to generate a series of propositions about the relative amounts of power which the president, the parties, or some factions of the parties have in various situations. Although the authors apologize for the political simplicity of their analysis, most readers will find it an impressive attempt.

⁵⁰ L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, in this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (September, 1954), pp. 787-792. Strictly speaking, there is one other mathematical approach to the study of power. This was stated by L. S. Penrose, in "The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. 109, Part I (1946), pp. 53-57. On page 54 Penrose says that "In general, the power of the individual voter can be measured by the amount by which his chance of being on the winning side exceeds one half." The author's argument is not very productive of new insights and seems to have died on the vine as far as political science is concerned.

⁵¹ The artificiality of our bibliographical distinctions here becomes extremely obvious. The Shapley-Shubik approach to the study of power could equally well be classified under "The Democratic Process."

⁵² R. Duncan Luce and Arnold A. Rogow, "A Game Theoretic Analysis of Congressional Power Distributions for a Stable Two-party System," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 1 (April, 1956), pp. 83-95, at p. 87.

⁴⁶ This REVIEW, Vol. 49 (June, 1955), pp. 431-451.

⁴⁷ *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 19 (May, 1957), pp. 202-226. Both March and Simon use "influence" synonymously with "power."

⁴⁸ Robert A. Dahl, in *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 2 (July, 1957), pp. 201-215.

⁴⁹ Duncan MacRae, Jr., and Hugh D. Price, "Scale Positions and 'Power' in the Senate," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 4 (July, 1959), pp. 212-218.

at a game theoretical investigation of an empirical situation.⁵³

It is natural to expect that game theoretical concerns might recede quite rapidly when political scientists employ the Shapley-Shubik index as a tool of analysis. Just such a reaction can be noticed in an article by Riker and Schaps.⁵⁴ The authors are concerned with federalism as a form of political organization. They use the Shapley-Shubik index as the basis for establishing a party power index in both national and state governments. On the basis of these indices they calculate an "index of partisan disharmony." The core of their article is built around this index of disharmony which they correlate with state-national conflict as suggested by certain types of Supreme Court cases. As can be readily seen, the Shapley-Shubik index is just an investigatory aid in a research design which is focused on the dynamics of federalism and its advantages and disadvantages as a political form.⁵⁵

One final article by Riker should be mentioned in concluding this discussion of the literature deriving from the Shapley-Shubik approach to the study of power. Riker's "A Test of the Adequacy of the Power Index" is an ambitious attempt to examine a natural legislature (French Assembly) to see if members *do* in fact seek to maximize their power positions by migrating to parties with higher power indices.⁵⁶ Underlying the hypothesis that members will migrate "up" the party power hierarchy is, clearly, a model of power-seeking political man. Riker's data do not definitely support his hypothesis, as he himself is quick to admit. However, his discussion does suggest an extremely promising focus for

future research: a complex of factors probably determines inter-party mobility in a multi-party legislature; the part played by calculations of increased power is unknown. The Shapley-Shubik analysis gives the investigator a baseline which predicts the behavior of a 100 per cent power-seeking man. The explanation of observed *deviations* from the pure power-seeking behavior then becomes the central research problem. That such deviations will frequently appear is amply documented both in Riker's presentation and in the more traditional literature. A multitude of research techniques would be needed for a thorough investigation of mobility in legislatures.⁵⁷

International Politics and Strategy. The "father" of the mathematical approach to problems of international politics and strategy is Lewis F. Richardson.⁵⁸ For many years interest in Richardson's work was slight, but recently Anatol Rapoport has championed a reexamination of its significance for political science.⁵⁹ Part I of Rapoport's *Fights, Games, and Debates* is devoted to a critique of Richardson's work, particularly that segment devoted to armament races,⁶⁰ which depends heavily on systems of linear equations that in turn contain variables such as "hostility" which are particularly difficult to operationalize and

⁵⁷ William H. Riker, "A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls in Voting Bodies," in John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, eds., *Legislative Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959), is a much needed addition to the tools available to investigators of legislative behavior, although the essay does not bear directly on the problem of inter-party mobility.

⁵⁸ Recently, two volumes of his work have been collected and edited in convenient form. See Lewis F. Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity* (Pittsburgh, The Boxwood Press, 1960) and Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Pittsburgh, The Boxwood Press, 1960). Richardson was trained in the physical sciences, turned to the social sciences later in life, and died in 1953 at the age of 72.

⁵⁹ The key article here is Anatol Rapoport, "Lewis F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 1 (September, 1957), pp. 249-299. This article is followed by a biography of Richardson and a bibliography of his original articles. A critique of Rapoport's evaluation may be found in Sten S. Nilson, "Political Equilibrium," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 3 (December, 1959), pp. 383-390. Rapoport answers in "Remarks on 'Political Equilibrium' by Sten S. Nilson," *ibid.*, pp. 391-393.

⁶⁰ See note 22, above.

⁵³ As might be expected, an incisive critique of Shapley-Shubik and Luce and Rogow will be found in Luce and Raiffa, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-259.

⁵⁴ William H. Riker and Ronald Schaps, "Disharmony in Federal Government," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 2 (October, 1957), pp. 276-290.

⁵⁵ J. Roland Pennock replies to the Riker-Schaps analysis in "Federal and Unitary Government—Disharmony and Frustration," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 4 (April, 1959), pp. 147-157. Interestingly enough, the author does not concern himself with the power index at all, but rather offers a counter-argument in terms of an analysis of national and local voting patterns. Thus, in three brief intellectual generations a problem occasioned by the theory of n-person games has evolved into a contribution to the extensive, non-mathematical literature on federalism.

⁵⁶ William H. Riker, in *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 4 (April, 1959), pp. 120-131.

measure. Rapoport is well aware of the limitations of Richardson's approach and the political scientist interested in applying Richardson's model to current events would do well to heed Rapoport's warnings. However, many investigators, whether following in the theoretical footsteps of Richardson or not, might profit from familiarity with the impressive collection of data which he amassed in his later years. This collection is the fruit of an exhaustive historical inquiry.⁶¹

A recent article by Arthur Lee Burns, "A Graphical Approach to Some Problems of the Arms Race," is a direct descendant of the Richardson-Rapoport approach to the problem.⁶² Yet Burns's analysis deserves special mention because it suggests some modifications of the earlier approach. In the author's words, "By progressively introducing assumptions about information, sophistication, productive potential, lead times, and varieties of asymmetry, we shall try to make our discussion politically more realistic."⁶³ Furthermore, he mentions the possibility of three-cornered as opposed to two-sided races, and differentiates between quantitative (number of weapons) and qualitative (superior new weapons) armament races. Clearly, the distinction between qualitative and quantitative races has special importance for discussions focused on the nuclear age. Although these distinctions did not originate with Burns, their introduction into a mathematical argument serves two purposes not specifically emphasized by the author. In the first place, the problems of index construction and data collection are reopened (although not necessarily made more difficult) by the theoretical reformulation. This phase of research needs more examination before judgment is passed on the viability of Burns's

formulation. Secondly, Burns's analysis encourages some grounded speculations about the possible stability and instability of *potential* international systems. Analysis of this type appears to have the special virtue of being able to carry us with some degree of rigor into the future, permitting analysis of hypothetical arrangements for which no historical precedents (and therefore no data) exist.

The marriage between game theoretical conceptualizations and discussions of international strategy promises to be both enduring and productive. This should not be at all surprising, for game theory—particularly as it is currently being modified and becoming sophisticated—provides the most viable model yet for the international strategist. In addition to those papers about game theory which were suggested in the introductory section of this essay, the following works seem to be important contributions to the literature.

Perhaps the most widely circulated application of game theoretical concepts to international strategy is Part Four of Morton A. Kaplan's *System and Process in International Politics*.⁶⁴ A more limited, though similar, argument may be found in his "The Calculus of Nuclear Deterrence."⁶⁵ His use of the game theoretical model is analogical and suggestive rather than rigorous and deductive. Since both his critics and his defenders seem to forget this at times, it is profitable to quote Kaplan himself on this point:

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the following sections do not constitute an exposition of formal game theory. They are based on analogies with game theory and utilize pragmatic considerations rather than accepted formal game strategic theory in order to give some indication of the way in which newer developments in game theory eventually may be applicable to some strategic problems of international politics or of politics generally.⁶⁶

Another important book length contribution to the literature is Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*.⁶⁷ Schelling is particularly

⁶¹ See Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*.

⁶² In *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 3 (December, 1959), pp. 326–342. In order to appreciate Burns's position fully, the reader would do well to consult Maurice A. Ash, "An Analysis of Power, With Special Reference to International Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. 3 (January, 1951), pp. 218–237. This article was partially responsible for stimulating the analyses in two other articles by Burns. See his "From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis," *World Politics*, Vol. 9 (July, 1957), pp. 494–529 and "The International Consequences of Expecting Surprise," *World Politics*, Vol. 10 (July, 1958), pp. 512–536. These two articles, in turn, support the conceptual framework employed in "A Graphical Approach to Some Problems of the Arms Race."

⁶³ *Op. cit.*, p. 328.

⁶⁴ New York, 1957.

⁶⁵ In *World Politics*, Vol. 11 (October, 1958), pp. 20–43. Another important addition to the literature on game theory and deterrence is Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Power," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, IV (June 1960), pp. 163–178.

⁶⁶ Kaplan, *System and Process*, p. 223. The entire passage is emphasized in the original.

⁶⁷ Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960. Schelling originally presented his arguments in a series of essays published in various journals.

concerned with enlarging the conceptual framework of game theory so that it can more easily deal with situations "where conflict is mixed with mutual dependence—the nonzero-sum games involved in wars and threats of war, strikes, negotiations . . ."⁶⁸ Schelling has gone much farther than Kaplan in deriving from the logic of bargaining situations hypotheses capable of being tested both in the real world and in the laboratory. In fact, it is in the work of Schelling that the possible relationships between theory, historical analysis, and laboratory investigations become most obvious. A reader of *The Strategy of Conflict* no longer feels that applications of game theory to international politics must stay forever at the theoretical rather than the empirical level.⁶⁹

It should be noted that in discussing the Richardson-Rapoport and the game theoretic approaches to the study of international politics we have been particularly concerned with topics such as deterrence and arms races rather than with "international relations" broadly defined. A recent article suggests that it may be possible to bring to bear on the analysis of international systems an entirely different branch of mathematical reasoning—graph theory. Frank Harary, in "A Structural Analysis of the Situation in the Middle East in 1956," has discussed a particular international system in just such generalized terms.⁷⁰ Specifically, Harary analyzes the dynamics of shifting international alignments in the Middle East and finds that the process was generally consonant with the theory of structural balance. Of particular interest is the author's list of "conceptual problems" which need to be solved if future applications are to be more sophisticated. At the operational level, graph theory (unlike game theory) does not demand "impossible" amounts or types of data. The simplicity of Harary's approach, coupled with

its focus on the *process* of international relations, should win for it a wide audience among political scientists.

Organization Theory and Administration. As a number of critics have pointed out, students of public administration have been slow to establish communication with those working in related areas of management science and organizational theory. As a result, relevant mathematical work in the latter fields has had little substantial impact on work in the former.⁷¹ Therefore, it is not possible to point to a mathematical literature which deals directly with problems of public administration. It is possible, however, to list at least two mathematical approaches which have been explored in the "industrial" context and which might also prove useful in the study of public administration at some future date.

The first approach is game theoretical. As an introduction to this approach, Martin Shubik's "Games, Decisions and Industrial Organization" is useful.⁷² Shubik feels that although direct applications of game theory to industrial problems are almost unknown, the theory can "provide a framework in which many concepts of importance . . . can be studied." Edward G. Bension, in "Capital Budgeting and Game Theory," offers an analysis of the manner in which game theory can be brought to bear on a specific problem.⁷³ His presentation, therefore, might be classified as an exception to Shubik's generalization about the lack of direct applications of the theory. Bension discusses the case of a firm attempting to budget its capital in terms of the economic forecast for the coming year. This is, of course, a special type of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. Analogies with the field of public planning and budgeting are easily made. Most importantly, in public administration more than in any other area of political science, the assumptions of rationality made by the game theoretical model seem most consistent with the assumptions normally made by the student of political behavior. Therefore, in the next few years, it would not be surprising to find among students of public administration an interest in game theoretical analysis comparable to that already found among students of international politics.

Some of these essays have been rewritten and incorporated into *The Strategy of Conflict*. Readers wishing to consult the originals will find them listed on page vii of *The Strategy*.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁶⁹ Readers wishing to continue reading in this area will find a helpful discussion and abundant bibliographical leads in Richard C. Snyder and James A. Robinson, *National and International Decision Making* (New York, The Institute for International Order, 1961), pp. 118–126.

⁷⁰ In *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 5 (June, 1961), pp. 167–178. Those not familiar with the work of Harary, Cartwright and others on graph theory and balance theory will find a short bibliography at the end of Harary's article.

⁷¹ The work of Herbert Simon, bridging as it does the several fields, is a notable exception to this generalization.

⁷² In *Management Science*, Vol. 6 (July, 1960), pp. 455–474.

⁷³ In *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 34 (November–December, 1956), pp. 115–123.

The second approach to the study of industrial administration which also seems promising for the study of public administration uses graph theory. The best introductory essay and bibliography is Dorwin Cartwright, "The Potential Contributions of Graph Theory to Organization Theory."⁷⁴ Frank Harary's "Graph Theoretic Methods in the Management Sciences" is more research-oriented.⁷⁵ Harary suggests ways in which graph theoretical analysis might increase our understanding of such organizational sub-phenomena as cliques and status hierarchies. His focus, if not his conceptualization, is reminiscent of the classic treatment given these topics by Chester Barnard. Particularly, Harary's essay suggests that graph theory has much to offer those interested in the now well established study of the sociology of organizations.⁷⁶

Before closing this brief section, it seems worthwhile to mention two recent articles which, although they represent two quite different analytical concerns, focus on the same substantive area—behavior in the large organizational setting. The first is a discussion by Karl W. Deutsch and William Madow, "A Note on the Appearance of Wisdom in Large Bureaucratic Organizations."⁷⁷ With a simple probability argument the authors show that in a large organization certain decision-makers may produce a series of correct decisions on the basis of chance alone. These "spurious wise men" may rise to positions of great responsibility while actually possessing less ability than many of their co-workers. In a particularly interesting closing section, the authors discuss "some implications for political and organizational behavior."

Of a quite different nature is the paper by Sydney C. and Beatrice K. Rome, "The Leviathan Technique for Large-Group Analysis."⁷⁸ The Romes report on a "series of investiga-

tions into internal dynamic governing and deciding processes of large social groups, in particular of organizations that possess complex structure and perform serious productive work."⁷⁹ Because of the complexity of such organizations, the authors have found it necessary first to develop models of organizational structure and process, and then to simulate the functioning of the organization on a large computer. It appears from the authors' discussion that a wide variety of previously non-operational hypotheses might eventually yield to testing by the Leviathan technique. On the more pragmatic level, proposed plans of reorganization could be tested in advance to determine the influence of structural changes on other relevant variables. In any event, "The Leviathan Technique" suggests both the level of sophistication and the degree of abstraction at which some students of public administration may well operate in the future.

Judicial Behavior. Very clearly, the monograph by Braithwaite which was mentioned above under *Normative Theory* has direct and far-reaching implications for the study of judicial processes. Rather than discuss this study again here, we shall turn briefly to the work of several other men:

At first glance, Fred Kort's "Predicting supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the 'Right to Counsel' Cases," does not seem to fit our criteria of inclusion at all.⁸⁰ Specifically, Kort derives from empirical data (past decisions) weights for relevant factors such that he is able to predict future decisions in similar cases with great accuracy. Thus, his analysis does not use "mathematical reasoning in presenting (its) theoretical argument(s)." In fact, one can question whether Kort presents a theoretical argument at all, or rather just an empirical discussion bound sharply by time, place, and subject matter. However, as Franklin M. Fisher has pointed out in "The Mathematical Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Quantitative Methods,"⁸¹ it is possible to formalize and generalize the problem which Kort attempts to handle.⁸²

Thus, these two articles taken in conjunction

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

⁸⁰ In this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (March, 1957), pp. 1-12.

⁸¹ In this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (June, 1958), pp. 321-338.

⁸² Kort answers Fisher's criticisms in "Reply to Fisher's Mathematical Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (June, 1958), pp. 339-348.

⁷⁴ In Mason Haire, ed., *Modern Organization Theory* (New York, 1959).

⁷⁵ In *Management Science*, Vol. 5 (July, 1959), pp. 387-403.

⁷⁶ Also relevant to studies of both formal and informal organization is the extensive mathematical literature on small groups. This literature has been organized and reviewed by James S. Coleman, "The Mathematical Study of Small Groups," in Herbert Solomon, ed., *Mathematical Thinking in the Measurement of Behavior* (Glencoe, 1960).

⁷⁷ In *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 6 (January, 1961), pp. 72-78.

⁷⁸ In *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 6 (April, 1961), pp. 148-152.

to meet our criteria of inclusion, for the latter makes quite explicit the mathematical nature of the (idealized) precedence structure. In short, Fisher is able to demonstrate that if certain rather loose conditions are met by the Court's behavior any number of specific weightings will offer perfect prediction of certain classes of future decisions.⁸³ The true value, therefore, of the mathematical analysis of the precedence structure does not inhere in its predictive power but rather in its analytical power. The scholar's attention is directed toward the manner in which each new case *eliminates* a set of previously possible potential decisions until such time as a fairly complete but certainly not wholly deterministic precedence structure is created. Thus, the mathematical analysis enables students of the Court to understand the dynamics of precedence more clearly, but the detailed analysis of any *specific* set of cases is perhaps best carried out by other means.⁸⁴

In Chapter IV of his *Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior*, Glendon A. Schubert has applied a game theoretical model to the analysis of the Supreme Court.⁸⁵ The model used derives from what we have identified as the Shapley-Shubik approach to the study of power. Thus, Schubert conceptualizes blocs of justices as power-maximizing "players" in a game which is essentially an *intra-Court* struggle. Clearly, the institution with which Schubert is concerned is structurally much less complex than the various legislatures which Luce and Rogow, and Riker have attempted to analyze in their "power" articles. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that Schubert is able to move from his conceptualization to his empirical material and back again with considerable ease. In fact, for those interested in the application of game analysis to empirical material, Schubert's work offers perhaps the most felicitous example to be found in the literature of political science.⁸⁶

⁸³ Another more straightforward method of predicting judicial decisions is offered by Stuart Nagel, "Using Simple Calculations to Predict Judicial Decisions," *The American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 4 (December, 1960), pp. 24-28.

⁸⁴ See Fred Kort, "The Quantitative Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions," *PROD*, Vol. 3 (March, 1960), pp. 11-14, for a brief discussion of a content analysis-factor analysis approach to the study of sets of Supreme Court cases.

⁸⁵ Glencoe, 1959.

⁸⁶ S. Sidney Ulmer has also used the Shapley-Shubik index for analyzing behavior in the Supreme Court. See his "The Analysis of Behavior Patterns on the United States Supreme

However, as was suggested previously, analysis of this type depends on the existence of a *collegial* decision-making body which is neither overly complex nor shrouded in secrecy. In the American judicial structure the Supreme Court is obviously the institution which most perfectly meets these requirements, and Schubert and others have gone far in exploring the possibilities of this research site. Yet, if game theoretic analysis is to be continued and refined, it would seem necessary to look in other directions for supplementary research sites. Among those which come immediately to mind are the American administrative agencies which have quasi-judicial functions, and various other small national and international decision-making bodies (*i.e.*, Security Council). Although studies analogous to Schubert's might move far from his substantive concerns, they nevertheless would retain a tight theoretical bond with his work. Such theoretical unity across substantive areas is an outcome much to be desired in the study of politics today.

Conclusion. It is quite obvious that only a minority of the material mentioned above was written by persons who would formally be identified as political scientists. Furthermore, some critics would suggest that there exists an inverse relationship between the mathematical content and the political content of this and related literature. Thus, it becomes both legitimate and necessary to inquire briefly into possible working relationships between political scientists and the mathematical literature. Perhaps these relationships can be suggested most effectively by the following list of generalizations:

1. As desirable as increased formal mathematical training for political scientists may be, it will probably not come about very rapidly.

2. Informal reading sequences of the type suggested at the beginning of this paper will suffice in the interim to enable the political scientist to understand much relevant material.

3. Political scientists, even if only so informally equipped, will find collaboration with mathematicians at the theoretical level both feasible and profitable.

4. Those who do not wish or are not able to work alone at the level suggested in (3) will nevertheless find the mathematical literature richly suggestive of hypotheses which can often be tested by *non-mathematical* means.

5. The problems of operationalization, meas-

Court," *Journal of Politics*. Vol. 22 (November, 1960), pp. 629-653, particularly pp. 639-640.

urement, and data collection which are generated by the mathematical arguments provide an almost untouched research area for the discipline. Here the substantive expertise of the political scientist would be invaluable.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ The difficulties of building, operationalizing, and testing mathematical models of political phenomena—particularly the difficulties engendered by lack of relevant data—have been discussed by Duncan MacRae Jr. and R. Duncan Luce. See MacRae's *Dimensions of Congressional Voting*, University of California Publications in Sociology and Social Institutions, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1958), pp. 354–382. See Luce's "Analyzing the Social Process Underlying Group Voting Patterns," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur

6. If, in fact, there actually exists an "inverse relationship between the mathematical content and the political content of this . . . literature," political scientists might see this as a challenge rather than as a rationale for rejection. After all, there is little in either the history of any related discipline or in the literature cited above which would warrant a summary rejection of the application of mathematical reasoning to the study of politics. Although the surface has only been scratched, those wishing to work in this area will find that they can ignore the work already done only at their own peril. If the structure is as yet hardly visible, at least some firm foundations have already been built.

J. Brodbeck, eds., *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, 1959).

VOTING AND THE SUMMATION OF PREFERENCES: AN INTERPRETIVE BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW OF SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE LAST DECADE*

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The occasion for this bibliographical essay is the publication in 1958 of Duncan Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958), which is one of the most important books on political theory to be published in this century. The latter half of it is devoted to an excellent interpretation of the major contributions to the theory of voting from the discovery (by Condorcet and Borda) in the eighteenth century that a theoretical problem existed through the rediscovery of the problem in the nineteenth century by Lewis Carroll (C. L. Dodgson). Black's essay does not deal with twentieth century developments, partly, I suppose, because the main rediscovery was his own, reported in papers and a monograph from 1948 to 1951 and reinterpreted in *The Theory of Committees and Elections*. Since Black's papers were published, however, a number of important contributions

have been made, especially by economists and psychologists. The purpose of this essay is to draw together the work of the last decade, partly as a supplement to Black's essay and partly to elucidate the present state of the theory both for political theorists and for students of political behavior who, probably more than any other social scientists, should be, but mostly are not, concerned with the problem of the summation of preferences.

I. THE PARADOX OF VOTING

The problem arises in its simplest form in the so-called paradox of voting which occurs when voting on pairs of alternatives does not result in a transitive social preference even if all the individual preferences are transitively ordered. Defining *transitivity*, a relation, R, among three objects, a, b, and c, is said to be transitive if one can validly write: if aRb and bRc , then aRc . The notion of equality possesses the transitive property (one writes: if $a=b$ and $b=c$, then $a=c$). So, for another example, does the relation of brotherhood. For a counter-example, however, the relation of fatherhood is not transitive. I assume the transitive property for the relation of preference, P. (I will write " aPb " to mean " a is preferred to b ".) It is intuitively easy to say that P is transitive for,

* Messrs. Kenneth J. Arrow, Duncan Black, and Clyde H. Coombs have generously helped very much by calling my attention to many of the papers cited and by commenting on the exposition. It was possible to write this essay only because I was at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and hence a neighbor, as it happened, of Messrs. Arrow and Coombs.

indeed, we often define rationality as the ability to order preferences transitively. Certainly we think a man terribly confused if he says he likes Socialists better than Democrats, Democrats better than Republicans and Republicans better than Socialists. Assuming, then, that P is transitive and that there are three alternatives a , b , and c (which may be thought of as candidates, motions, states of society, etc.), then there are six ways in which the alternatives may be transitively ordered: abc , acb , bac , bca , cab , cba . If three or more persons choose one or more of these transitive orderings, a voting process may produce a social or summary preference which is one of these six transitive orders or one of these two intransitive or circular arrangements: aPb , bPc and cPa ; or aPc , cPb , and bPa . An example of a set of individual orders which add up to a circular result is, for three people, 1, 2, and 3:

For (1), aPb bPc and aPc

For (2), bPc cPa and bPa

For (3), cPa aPb and cPb

Adding by pairs according to the rule of simple majority voting, it is apparent that two voters (1 and 3) prefer a to b and that two (1 and 2) prefer b to c . One might therefore expect that the majority preference would be aPc . But in fact two voters (2 and 3) prefer c to a . This is the paradox: that the summation of transitive preferences sometimes produces a circular result. The key to it lies, of course, in the fact that a dyadic procedure of summation is operated on a set of triads. Unfortunately, as will be shown, all triadic procedures heretofore suggested involve intellectual difficulties even more formidable than the paradox.

Political scientists not familiar with the paradox will find the simplest introduction to it in Marc Barbut, "Quelques Aspects Mathématiques de la Décision Rationnelle," *Le Temps Moderne*, Vol. 15 (No. 164, October, 1959), pp. 725-45. This lucid essay has been translated by Corrine Hoexter under the title "Does the Majority Ever Rule?" and published in *Portfolio and Art News Annual*, No. 4 (1961), pp. 76-83 and 161-68, with an introduction by Kenneth J. Arrow in which the relevance of the paradox to concrete voting situations is discussed.

An historical approach to the problem may be pursued through the writings of Condorcet, especially *Essai sur l'Application de l'Analyse à la Probabilité des Décisions Rendues à la Pluralité des Voix* (Paris, 1785), and recent commentaries on it, of which the most important are: Black, *Theory of Committees*, pp. 159-80; and Gilles-Gaston Granger, *La Mathé-*

matique Sociale de Marquis de Condorcet (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1956), especially pp. 118-36. Condorcet's work was stimulated by Jean-Charles de Borda, "Mémoire sur les élections au scrutin" in *Mémoires de l'Académie Royale des Sciences* (1781), an essay which is translated with sensitive commentary in Alfred de Grazia, "Mathematical Derivation of an Election System", *Isis*, Vol. 44 (1953), pp. 42-51. Black discusses Borda's work on pp. 59-66 and 156-59 of *The Theory of Committees*. Condorcet, however, appears to be the first to have observed the paradox and for this reason French writers have lately preferred to call it "l'effet Condorcet"; but Condorcet's discovery did not remain in the scholarly consciousness and hence the paradox was rediscovered several times and given such names as "cyclical majorities" and "the paradox of voting." The first rediscovery was that by Lewis Carroll (C. L. Dodgson) whose pamphlets on the subject are reprinted with annotations in Black, *Theory of Committees*, pp. 214-38, and sensitively analyzed, pp. 189-213. While one might expect that the numerous *fin de siècle* advocates of proportional representation would have discovered and commented on the paradox, only one of them (apparently) did so. Presumably the blinders on their hobby-horse covered their eyes as well against the arithmetic that would surely confound them. The one exception is E. J. Nanson whose essay "Methods of Election," *Transactions and Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria*, Vol. 19 (1882), pp. 197-240, reprinted in *British Blue Book, Miscellaneous No. 3* (1907), Cd. 3501, offers a method of voting which purports to (but does not) resolve the paradox. Still another apparently independent rediscovery of the paradox is reported in E. V. Huntington, "A Paradox in the Scoring of Competing Teams," *Science*, Vol. 88 (1938), pp. 287-88, where it is shown that the rank order method of scoring (in, e.g., trackmeets) may involve instances of the paradox. Finally, Duncan Black rediscovered the paradox in the mid-1940's and reported on problems related to it in "On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 56 (1948), pp. 23-34; "Un appoggio alla teoria delle decisioni di comitato," *Giornale degli economisti e annali di economia*, Vol. 7, new Series (1948), pp. 262-84; "The Decisions of a Committee Using a Special Majority," *Econometrica*, Vol. 16 (1948), pp. 245-61; "The Elasticity of Committee Decisions with an Altering Size of Majority," *Econometrica* Vol. 16 (1948) pp. 262-70; "The Elasticity of Committee Decisions with Alterations in the Members'

Preference Schedules," *South African Journal of Economics*, Vol. 17 (1949), pp. 88-102; "The Theory of Elections in Single-Member Constituencies," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 15 (1949), pp. 158-75; "Some Theoretical Schemes of Proportional Representation," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 15 (1949), pp. 334-43; and finally a monograph, Duncan Black and R. A. Newing, *Committee Decisions With Complementary Valuation* (London, William Hodge & Co., 1951). With these publications the problem of *l'effet Condorcet* may be said to have fully re-entered scholarly consciousness.

II. ARROW'S THEOREM

Shortly after Black's writings appeared, Kenneth J. Arrow published a proof of his general possibility theorem: Kenneth J. Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York, John Wiley and Sons, Cowles Commission Monograph #12, 1951). Since this theorem states the problem of summarizing preferences in its most general form and since, by reason of its disconcerting impact on many economists, it has occasioned much of the subsequent discussion, I shall summarize it here in (so far as possible) non-mathematical language. What is lost thereby in precision will, I hope, be compensated for by the increase in comprehensibility for those not accustomed to reading mathematical symbols.

Arrow starts with two axioms which define the notion of preference. Given a set of three or more alternatives ($a, b, \dots, n$) and a relation, R , which may be thought of as preference and indifference combined, the alternatives are said to be *weakly ordered* when they are ranked by this relation.¹ Such orderings have two properties:

- I. They are connected. For any pair of alternatives, a and b , it is possible to compare them by R . This axiom states that at least one of the following sentences is true: aRb or bRa . If $a=b$, then both are true.

¹ When ranked by preference alone (with indifference not allowed), the alternatives are said to be *strongly ordered*. Weak orderings are especially appropriate when choice occurs in a continuum, while strong orderings are appropriate when the alternatives are discrete. Economists, who deal with continuous phenomena like money, find weak orderings most useful; but political scientists may find strong orderings simpler to work with and just as useful (for many political alternatives are discrete).

II. They are transitive.

These axioms seem intuitively acceptable. There is hardly any point to talking about preference unless the alternatives are in fact comparable (Axiom I). And it would greatly violate our sense of comparability to say that preference is intransitive, e.g., to say that while it extends over dyads, it does not extend over triads. Hence follows Axiom II. Nevertheless, there is some dispute about Axiom II and we will return to it later.

Given a society of two or more persons, each of whom has individually ordered the alternatives, the social problem is to sum or aggregate the individual orderings to produce a unique social ordering. The technique of summation (or vote counting) is called a *social welfare function*. Imagine such a function as a set of instructions fed into a vote-counting machine to inform the machine how to select a victor from the set of ballots. The goal of the theory of summation of preferences is to discover a social welfare function which, from a set of weakly ordered preferences of individuals, produces a unique weakly ordered preference for society. The substance of Arrow's theorem is, however, that, if certain reasonable conditions are placed on the function, then no function exists that can invariably produce a unique weakly ordered social preference. After this theorem, one feels the same sort of retrospective pity for the arithmeticians of proportional representation as for the geometers who tried to square the circle until it was discovered that π was a transcendental number.

Arrow's conditions for the social welfare function (as revised in Julian H. Blau, "The Existence of Social Welfare Functions," *Econometrica*, Vol. 25 (1957), pp. 302-13) are:

1. Condition 1: *Universal Admissibility of Individual Orderings*: Each person may choose any one of the weak orders of alternatives. This is an absolutely crucial condition, and intuitively it seems acceptable for one would not wish to impose restrictions on individual choice simply to make a social welfare function work. To impose such restrictions, one would require, for example, that, if person 1 has chosen an ordering j and if person 2 has chosen an ordering i , then person 3 may not choose some ordering k . (In Arrow's presentation (p. 24), this condition is much more restricted; Blau, however, found a counter-example that disproved the theorem until this revised form of the condition was adopted.)
2. Condition 2: *Non-Perversity or Positive*

Association of Individual and Social Values: Given a set of individual orderings of alternatives with its associated social orderings, suppose that aRb in the social ordering and that one or more persons raise the alternative a in their preference order, while making no other change. Then, aRb is the social ordering after the change by individuals. Arrow justifies this condition with the observation: "Since we are trying to describe social welfare and not some sort of illfare, we must assume that the social welfare function is such that the social ordering responds positively to alterations in individual values, or at least not negatively. Hence, if one alternative social state rises or remains still in the ordering of every individual without any other change in those orderings, we expect that it rises, or at least does not fall, in the social ordering" (p. 25).

3. Condition 3: *Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives:* Assume that individual members of society have ordered the alternatives so that a social welfare function produces the social ordering aRb . Then suppose that alternative c is eliminated from consideration. The social ordering for a and b should still be aRb . This is a crucial consideration, and, while intuitively plausible, it has been the subject of much controversy.
4. Condition 4: *Citizens' Sovereignty:* The social ordering is not *imposed*, where *imposed* is defined as the requirement that the social ordering contain aRb regardless of what the individual orderings may be (including, of course, the possibility that for all individuals bRa). As noted by Arrow, this condition assumes that there is some connection between individual and social orderings and specifically excludes certain Platonic situations in which there is no connection.
5. Condition 5: *Non-dictatorship:* The social ordering is not *dictatorial*, where *dictatorial* is defined as the situation in which some individual member's preference, aRb , decides that the social preference is aRb , regardless of the preferences of other individuals (which may, of course, otherwise unanimously be bRa).

Once these conditions have been stated, it is possible to write Arrow's Theorem: *Every social welfare function satisfying Conditions 1-3 and producing a social ordering satisfying Axioms I and II must violate either Condition 4*

or Condition 5. Stated otherwise, the five conditions for a weakly ordered social preference are inconsistent.

There are a number of proofs of this theorem, none of which will be reproduced here. Arrow's most detailed proof is contained in *Social Choice and Individual Values*, pp. 51-59. Julian H. Blau, who found a counter-example which forced the revision of Condition 1, then proved a new and similar theorem in the essay already cited. Political scientists will probably find the explanation of the conditions and the recapitulation of the proof most usefully related to political materials in R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1957), pp. 327-70. This chapter is, in fact, an excellent survey of the whole problem. A proof of a similar theorem, interesting because it involves a weaker form of Conditions 4 and 5, is to be found in Ken-ichi Inada, "Alternative Incompatible Conditions for a Social Welfare Function," *Econometrica*, Vol. 23 (1955), pp. 396-99. In Kenneth O. May, "A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision," *Econometrica*, Vol. 20 (1952), pp. 680-84, it is shown that a slightly stronger form of Condition 5 results in the system of simple majority voting. Taking off from this point Murakami has shown that Arrow's original conditions (as modified by Blau) are expressed in complex as well as simple majority voting; and in the process of doing so, he has translated the proof from the language of set theory to the language of propositional logic: Yasusake Murakami, *Some Logical Properties of Arrowian Social Welfare Function* (Tokio, Tokio Center for Economic Research, Publication III, no date but circa 1959), 15 pp.

III. RECENT DISCUSSION OF ARROW'S CONDITIONS

Great attention was given to Arrow's theorem when it appeared for it seemed to destroy the foundations of welfare (normative) economics. Since the mathematical argument (after Blau's revision) is conclusive, most economists have attacked his premises, especially the notion of independence from irrelevant alternatives. In Clifford Hildreth, "Alternative Conditions for Social Orderings," *Econometrica*, Vol. 21 (1953), pp. 81-94, it is argued that Arrow adopted this condition to avoid interpersonal comparisons of utility, that in everyday life one must make interpersonal comparisons, and that, if the condition is dropped, many satisfactory social welfare functions are possible, one of which he set forth. If choosers are allowed to state the degree of intensity

with which they desire each alternative, then a social ordering is easily arrived at by summing the degrees of intensity (which, of course, involves interpersonal comparison). Such a procedure is advocated in Murray Kemp and A. Asimakopulos, "A Note on Social Welfare Functions and Cardinal Utility," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 18 (1952), pp. 195-200. In Leo Goodman and Harry Markowitz, "Social Welfare Functions Based on Individual Rankings," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 58 (1952), pp. 257-62, is offered a powerful argument for the relevance of irrelevant alternatives given interpersonal comparisons of taste. If, in a choice between *a* and *b*, person 1 very much prefers *a* to *b* and person 2 only slightly prefers *b* to *a*, then, they argue, it is reasonable for the society of 1 and 2 to choose *a*. One discovers the facts of "very much" and "only slightly" by introducing the apparently irrelevant alternatives *c*, *d*, and *e* so that, for example, person 1 orders *a c d e b* and person 2 orders *b a c d e*. Thus the supposedly irrelevant is in fact relevant.

These writers are, I believe, mistaken in assuming that the main point of the condition of independence from irrelevant alternatives is to avoid interpersonal comparisons of utility. While it does indeed avoid such comparison, it also serves more significant purposes in that it is:

- (a) apparently necessary to guarantee a unique social ordering
- (b) equivalent to a prohibition of strategic misrepresentation
- (c) analogous to a general (psychological) rule of individual decision-making.

Considering (a), in John G. Kemeny, "Mathematics Without Numbers," *Daedalus*, Vol. 88 (1959), pp. 577-91, there are set forth two social welfare functions satisfying all of Arrow's conditions except independence from irrelevant alternatives and Kemeny interprets his results as by-passing the paradox. Yet one of Kemeny's functions sometimes produces ties even if the number of voters is odd and the other sometimes produces several (*i.e.*, non-unique) social orderings. It is difficult to conceive of what is meant by a vote-counting device that does not distinguish among alternatives, so we cannot say these functions avoid the paradox. Indeed, they produce ties or non-unique orderings in exactly those instances in which the paradox occurs with simple majority voting. Hence, it may be said that Kemeny has ingeniously re-defined the paradox but not avoided it. Since Kemeny's functions do not admit of interper-

sonal comparisons of utility and since they violate only one of Arrow's conditions, one infers from this example that independence from irrelevant alternatives may be a necessary condition for a unique social ordering. If so, it has a far more important function than merely outlawing interpersonal comparisons. In selecting states of society, non-unique choices may be acceptable, but in voting on candidates or motions non-unique outcomes are null. (b) In William Vickery, "Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 74 (1960), pp. 507-35, it is shown that, in the absence of this condition, voters may, by misrepresenting the position in their preference structure of an irrelevant alternative, increase their influence on the social ordering. Thus, in a society of two people, if person 1 orders the alternatives *a b c*, while person 2 orders them *b a c*, the best person 2 can expect if he tells the truth is a tie between *a* and *b*. If, however, person 2 misrepresents the position of an irrelevant alternative *c* and reports his ordering as *b c a* and if, for example, Kemeny's function of minimizing the squares of the distances is used, the society adopts the order *b a c*. Under Kemeny's rules, in fact, *a* and *b* tie if both persons lie or both tell the truth; but if only one lies, the liar wins. Since misrepresentation involves the reordering of *c*, an irrelevant alternative as between *a* and *b*, no misrepresentation is possible if the independence condition is met. Vickery remarks: "Immunity to strategy and independence are thus at least closely similar requirements, if not actually logically equivalent," (p. 518). Thus the justification of the independence condition is lifted from a logical to an ethical plane. There may be nothing wrong with lying as a political strategy, but one would not, I assume, wish to give a systematic advantage to liars. (c) In R. Duncan Luce, *Individual Choice Behavior* (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1959) it is suggested that a rule similar to the independence condition is "a general law of [individual] choice behavior" (p. 134). Luce defends his Axiom I, a probabilistic version of the condition, with the following heuristic argument:

To deal with complicated decisions it is usual to subdivide them into two or more stages: the alternatives are grossly categorized in some fashion and a first decision is made among these categories; the one chosen is further categorized and a second division is made, etc. It is commonly accepted, and is probably true, that when such a multistage process is needed the overall result depends significantly on which partitionings are employed. One senses, how-

ever, that if the decision situation is quite simple—so that a two stage process is not really needed—then the intermediate categorization, if used, will not matter (p. 7).

—which is to say that in simple decisions, the independence condition holds. (Presumably, it might also be supposed to hold at each intermediate stage of a multistage process.) While Luce's general law is attractive in that it greatly simplifies certain features of economic and psychological theory, it has not yet been experimentally tested, although Luce suggested a number of tests. The closest approximation to a test is discussed in Clyde H. Coombs, *The Theory of Data*, forthcoming, Chapters 5 and 18, in which it is shown that Luce's axiom holds for unilateral triples and bilateral split triples, but not for bilateral adjacent triples. (These terms will be explained, *infra* p. 910.) If further experiments should support Luce's axiom, at least for these first two cases, we would then have another powerful reason for imposing the independence condition. The argument would run as follows: If one regards social choice as analogous to individual choice, then one might reasonably require that the process of social choice meet standards of coherence at least as rigorous as those imposed on individual choice. Among these standards imposed on individual persons are the transitivity requirement (which assures that the individual satisfy an elementary condition of rationality) and the condition of independence from irrelevant alternatives (which is, as suggested by the evidence from Kemeny's function, necessary to ensure a choice at all). If, however, one does not expect social decision to meet these logical and psychological standards, then one may, I suppose, dispense with both conditions.

The analogy just drawn between individual and social choice has been sharply questioned by several writers with respect to others of Arrow's premises: Arguing the unreasonableness of the non-dictatorship condition, I.D.M. Little ("Social Choice and Individual Values," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 60 (1952), pp. 422-32) insisted that, for n persons, there are at most n orderings (not $n+1$). Thus, what comes out of the vote-counting machine is not an ordering and, so Little argued, is necessarily dictatorial. As Vickery suggested (in *op.cit.*, p. 531), this is a rather far-fetched inference. Still the point that social decision processes are not analogous to individual decision processes is perhaps well-taken. Three statements of the arguments against the analogy are to be found in: James M. Buchanan "Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Mar-

kets," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 62, (1954), pp. 114-23; James M. Buchanan, "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 62 (1954), pp. 334-43; and Murray C. Kemp, "Arrow's General Possibility Theorem," *Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 21 (1953-4), pp. 240-43. I leave to economists the question of whether or not the market, as a machine for summation, should be expected to provide transitive social orderings; but to political scientists I point out that, if, in voting on persons or motions, transitivity is not required and if in fact no majority exists for one alternative, then the social preference is entirely dependent on the order in which candidates or motions are voted on. "The later any motion enters the voting, the greater its chance of adoption," says Black (p. 40). With respect to voting systems, as distinct from other methods of summation, it seems that transitivity of outcome is an essential requirement.

IV. THE RELEVANCE OF ARROW'S THEOREM TO POLITICAL THEORY

One may characterize the state of the discussion by economists of Arrow's conditions and axioms by saying that there is sharp disagreement about whether or not his theorem is relevant to welfare economics. Aside from the writers already cited, Abram Bergson, whose essay, "A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 52 (1938), pp. 310-34, partially set the scene for Arrow's work, concluded in 1954, "On the Concept of Social Welfare" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 68 (1954), pp. 233-51, that Arrow's theorem was irrelevant. William Vickery, whose essay "Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to Risk," *Econometrica*, Vol. 13 (1945), pp. 319-33, also partially set the scene for Arrow's work, on the other hand apparently concludes in "Utility, Strategy, . . .", *op. cit.*, that the theorem is relevant, although he wisely remarks at the end of the latter essay: "Problems of social choice will not vanish merely because the tools available to handle them are declared to be imperfect" (p. 535). An interesting essay which accepts (though somewhat transforms) Arrow's conditions is Jerome Rothenberg, "Conditions for a Social Welfare Function," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 61 (1953), pp. 389-405.

Whatever the relevance of Arrow's theorem for economics, its relevance for political theory seems indisputable—even Bergson in 1954 suggested as much. Arrow specifically pointed out its relevance to idealist political theory (by

which he meant the kind of theory held by Rousseau and Kant) in which the problem of summation is avoided by assuming unanimity on moral values (*i.e.*, general will, categorical imperative). But though the notion of the general will may be interpreted as a device to escape the paradox and the conclusion of Arrow's theorem, Rousseau allowed the problem of summation to enter by the back door when he asked citizens to decide in assembly on the continuation of (a) the form of government and (b) the governors.² To illustrate the relevance of the problem of summation to more recent theorizing, I take a question analyzed in Glendon Schubert, *The Public Interest* (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1960). Schubert categorizes writers on the subject thus:

- (a) Rationalists, who assume that a public interest is discoverable by the summation of preferences;
- (b) Idealists, who assume that a public interest exists but who do not assume that it is necessarily related to individual opinions; and
- (c) Realists, who, in the tradition of Arthur Bentley, assume that a substantive public interest cannot be defined.

Manifestly, the problem of the summation of preferences does not arise for the realists for they would not apply Arrow's Axiom II or Conditions 2-5 to a social welfare function. (One of the beauties of Black's and Arrow's analysis is that it reveals the full extent of the irrationality these writers attribute to social decision.) Idealists in the Platonic tradition are not concerned with summation either, although all idealists who expect a public interest (or general will) to appear in a democratic context cannot avoid the problem of *l'effet Condorcet*. Rationalists, however, who play the same role in political science as welfare economists in economics, should be intensely concerned with the work of Black and Arrow. At the end of his study Schubert remarks "there is no public interest theory worthy of the name" (p. 223) and suggests that the whole discussion of the "public interest" as such is a dead-end. So it may be, but I suggest that, until political theorists avail themselves of the appropriate tools for discussion (*e.g.*, the work on the para-

dox), it is inappropriate to conclude that the discussion can have no worthwhile outcome

V. RESTRICTIONS ON ADMISSIBLE SETS OF PREFERENCES

As I have indicated, at least for those concerned with voting decisions, there is little point to disputing Arrow's Axiom II and Conditions 2-5. This leaves as the only avenue of escape from the theorem and the paradox some restriction on his first condition. Such is the line of attack pursued by Black, who, in the work cited, proved that simple or special majority voting produces a unique transitive ordering if the whole set of individual orderings are single-peaked. By "single-peaked" is meant that *all* the individual orderings can be represented on a graph with the rank of preference on the ordinate and the alternatives themselves on the abscissa such that each ordering (or preference curve) appears as a curve with one and only one peak. (See Figure 1.) Hereafter the condition of single-peakedness will often be referred to as Black's condition of sufficiency.

In Michael Dummett and Robin Farquharson, "Stability in Voting," *Econometrica*, Vol. 29 (1961), pp. 33-42, an attempt is made to weaken Black's condition of sufficiency. They define a situation as *stable* if no group of voters can by voting differently (others voting the same) obtain a different result which the group prefers. They then prove that a sufficient condition for stability is that "there be at least one outcome x such that, for every other outcome y , some majority regards x as at least as good as y " (p. 40). This admits of curves with horizontal distances (*e.g.*, curve g in Figure 1) and thereby widens the range of permissible individual orderings of preference. This widening may be very useful in economics (especially since it involves an exploitation of the indifference relation), but it is only partially useful for politics inasmuch as it does not require a unique majority decision. As in the case of Kemeny's result, it is difficult to imagine what is meant by a system of majority decision that does not generate a unique outcome, although in the particular example offered by Dummett and Farquharson, the outcome seems reasonable even though it is not necessarily unique. Nevertheless, so long as this weakened condition of sufficiency cannot guarantee a uniquely preferred outcome, we are left with Black's condition of single-peakedness.

Black's notable discovery may be epitomized by saying that social welfare functions exist without inconsistency among the conditions if some sort of inner harmony exists among the persons in the society. One way to characterize

² At least three coherent opinions are possible on Rousseau's two questions. If " a " is a yes answer to (a) and " $\bar{a}$ " a no answer to it, and similarly for (b), then at least these distinct and coherent opinions are possible, $x: (a,b)$, $y: (a,\bar{b})$, $z: (\bar{a},\bar{b})$, and possibly $w: (\bar{a},b)$. In any event the paradox may then arise.




FIG. 1. Examples of preference Curves

Note: All curves but e and g are single-peaked. Curve g is allowed in Dummett and Farquharson's condition for decision, but is not single peaked within Black's definition. Curves a and f are symmetric and strongly monotonic. Curves d and f are, in addition, linearly descending.

this inner harmony has been suggested by G. Th. Guilbaud in "Les théories de l'intérêt général et la problème logique de l'aggrégation," *Economie appliquée*, Vol. 5 (1952), #4 ("L'avantage collectif"), pp. 501-84. (This whole issue of the journal is concerned with the summation of preferences and this essay, in particular, is an excellent survey of the problem.) Guilbaud remarked of the conditions for the absence of the paradox:

On commence par choisir deux opinions extrêmes qu'on appelle respectivement la "première" et la "dernière"; il suffit qu'elles soient contradictoires—par exemple si la première opinion est celle qui dit "non" à toutes des questions, la dernière sera celle qui répond partout "oui." Pour aller de la première à la dernière, on peut construire diverses "chaînes" ou séquences d'opinions telles que chacune se déduit de la précédente par une "concession": remplacer un "non" par un "oui" (pp. 547-48).

Those familiar with the theory of opinion-scaling will recognize this as a description of a Guttman scale with a coefficient of reproducibility of one. While Guilbaud somewhat misinterpreted Black's condition and made it too strong—a Guttman scale is always monotonic and a single-peaked curve need not be—still he deserves credit for having pointed out the relationship between single-peakedness and scalability. The relationship between single-

peakedness and a more general method of scaling (Coombs' unfolding technique) has been thoroughly discussed in Clyde H. Coombs, *The Theory of Data*, forthcoming, chapters 9 and 19. (See also Clyde H. Coombs, "Social Choice and Strength of Preference," pp. 69-86 in R. H. Thrall, C. H. Coombs, and R. L. Davis, *Decision Processes* (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1954).) Unfolding technique is a device for discovering from stated preferences of individual persons what the underlying dimension of choice is. While it was developed primarily to study individual choice behavior, still, if individual patterns of preference are identified as single-peaked curves above an abscissa which is itself the dimension of choice, then the parallelism between the theories is apparent. For psychologists the problem is to "unfold" the curve of individual preference, by projecting it onto the abscissa in order to identify the underlying dimension. Thus, scaling theory provides a significant insight into Black's result. If the preference curves in the set are single-peaked, then, as Coombs has shown (*Theory of Data*, ch. 18), there exists a common qualitative dimension along which all preferences are ordered. If one places further restrictions on the curves, requiring not only that they be single-peaked but also strongly monotonic and symmetric, then they must be generated from a common quantitative dimension. Finally, if the curves are in addition linearly descending, then simple majority voting could be said to yield a

least-disliked social preference. As Coombs remarked, however, it is seldom to be expected that these additional conditions will be met in the real world. Leaving aside these additional conditions, what Guilbaud's and Coombs' observations contribute is the realization that the single-peaked curves sufficient for majority decision reflect a cultural uniformity about the standard of judgment, even though, as implied by the difference in curves, choosers may differ about how the standard is to be applied.

Black has shown that a majority decision exists if voters' curves are single-peaked. Further, he has shown that if there are m possible choices and at least $m-1$ pairwise ballotings, then the majority choice, if it exists, will be chosen. Finally, he has shown that, if there are m alternatives and no majority choice, then, if there are m ballotings, the result will be that all alternatives fail. The confluence of these three propositions is of great interest for the study of social decisions. If the procedures of decision are such that the non-existence of a majority-preferred alternative can be discovered—and, with some exceptions to be noted subsequently, they usually are in committee-like bodies—then the very discovery of the non-existence of a majority-preferred alternative is itself interesting. The fact of non-existence implies the absence of single-peakedness, which is a sufficient condition for decision. Since we know from scaling theory that single-peakedness is equivalent to the unanimous adoption of cultural standard(s), the failure to arrive at a decision implies the failure to agree on standards. Thus the failure of all alternatives implies that sort of cleavage in society that does not easily admit of reconciliation. It would make our analysis simpler if the opposite inference were also true, if, that is, the existence of a majority preference implied the presence of single-peakedness. Unfortunately, however, it does not inasmuch as single-peakedness is not a necessary condition for decision. Nevertheless single-peakedness appears to be a usual concomitant of majority decision, at least when $n=3$ and provided that one ordering of the n alternatives does not have an absolute majority over all others. And if this is indeed the situation, agreement on an alternative carries with it substantial agreement on norms. If the act of decision strongly suggests single-peakedness or an agreement on norms, then we face a question heretofore both unasked and unanswered both by political theorists and students of political behavior: Why and how do people come to agree on norms?

If one considers the *a priori* chance that simple majority voting will produce a majority

decision, it turns out to be quite small. The mathematical problems here are difficult and not yet fully investigated, but the work so far done indicates how small the chance is. Single-peakedness is a function of the number of alternatives, the number of choosers, and the number of standards of judgment. Black (*Theory of Committees*, pp. 50–51) started the calculation of the random *a priori* expectation of cyclical majorities, but was unable to discern the general rule. Simpler series (which will, undoubtedly, enter into the calculation Black proposed) have, however, been discovered. Condorcet (Black, *idem*, pp. 173–74) observed that the total number of distinct outcomes possible in a social ordering of n alternatives is $s=2^{n(n-1)/2}$. Kendall, who was interested in the number of inconsistent (intransitive) triplets possible in s in order to construct a coefficient of consistency (or measure of the degree of transitivity in individual rank orderings), calculated the number of inconsistent triplets for $n \leq 7$. (See Maurice G. Kendall, *The Advanced Theory of Statistics* [New York, Hafner Publishing Co., 1952, 5th ed.], p. 428.) But for the theory of voting, one wishes to know, not the amount of possible inconsistency, but the frequency with which inconsistency prevents majority decision. Let t be the total number of transitive orderings. Of course, $t=n!$ (read “ n -factorial,” that is, $1 \cdot 2 \cdot \dots \cdot n$). Let $s-t=u$ and let $u=v+w$, where v is the number of social summations containing both inconsistent triads and a majority decision and where w is the number of social summations without majority decision. What one wishes to know then is the ratio $(t+v)/s$, that is, the ratio of possible orderings with majority decision to the number of social summations. This is set forth in Table I, where columns I and II contain the series discovered by Condorcet and column III contains a series I discovered. For easier reading, I have added column IV, which is the ratio w/s or the ratio of the outcomes without a majority to all outcomes. (To prove, for column III, that $(t+v)/s = n/2^{n-1}$, first identify t , v , and s for a given n thus: $t^{[n]}$, $v^{[n]}$, $s^{[n]}$. Then observe that $t^{[n]} + v^{[n]} = ns^{[n-1]}$. Since, from Condorcet's discovery that $s^{[n]} = 2^{n(n-1)/2}$, it follows that $t^{[n]} + v^{[n]} = n2^{(n-1)(n-2)/2}$, it therefore follows that $(t+v)/s = n2^{(n-1)(n-2)/2} / (2^{n(n-1)/2} = n/2^{n-1}$.) The main inference to be drawn from this table (or from Black's or Kendall's) is that the *a priori* expectation of the existence of a majority decision, if it could be calculated, would be quite small, at least for $n \geq 5$. Further considerations decrease the *a priori* expectation even more. If individual voters use a unidimensional standard of choice, it does not seem terribly difficult to

TABLE I. *A priori* EXPECTATION OF OUTCOMES WITH AND WITHOUT A MAJORITY FOR SOME ALTERNATIVE

$n =$	Col. I.	Col. II.	Col. III.	Col. IV.
	$s = 2^{n(n-1)/2}$	$t = n!$	$\frac{t+v}{s} = \frac{n}{2^{n-1}}$	$\frac{w}{s} = 1 - \frac{n}{2^{n-1}}$
3	8	6	3/4	1/4
4	64	24	1/2	1/2
5	1,024	120	5/16	11/16
6	32,768	720	3/16	13/16
7	2,097,152	5,040	7/64	57/64
8	$3 \cdot 10^7$ approx.	40,320	1/16	15/16
9	$7 \cdot 10^8$ approx.	362,880	9/256	247/256
10	$35 \cdot 10^{11}$ approx.	3,628,800	5/256	251/256

arrive at single-peaked curves. But suppose they use two standards or more. (For example, in a set of amendments about an appropriation, legislators might be concerned with the amount of money in each amendment and the party affiliation of the member who moved it.) Then the likelihood of arriving at a set of single-peaked curves is greatly decreased. Black and Newing have exhaustively considered this situation in *Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation*. Their geometrical argument is too complex to recapitulate here; but they do show that, if members' preferences are mapped as a set of indifference curves, a majority decision exists if and only if there is a point at which the curves for each member meet tangentially but do not overlap. Manifestly, this is a highly restrictive condition, even when there are only two standards of judgment and three voters. In *Theory of Committees*, p. 139, Black remarks of this situation: "The frequency of occurrence of a majority motion as a fraction of the total number of cases . . . is infinitesimally small. . . . And no doubt if the treatment were extended to three, four . . . variables [standards of judgment], the probability of the existence of a majority motion would become still more negligible. It would also seem . . . that the probability declines still further with an increase in the number of members. . . ."

The foregoing calculations in this section have, of course, assumed that persons are able to order preferences transitively. But suppose they are not. Then the chance of a transitive social ordering declines still further. Hence it is of considerable interest that work in experimental psychology and economics has shown that in fact subjects often do not order transitively. In Warren S. McCulloch, "A Hierarchy of Values Determined by the Topology of Nervous Nets," *Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics*, Vol. 7 (1945), pp. 89-93, are reported

experiments on rats leading to circular choice. (By contrast, however, P. T. Young and J. L. Folkin, "The Relative Acceptability of Sodium Chloride Solutions as a Function of Concentration and Water Need," *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, Vol. 49 (1956), pp. 569-75, found single-peaked curves for rats' choices of salt solutions.) Kenneth O. May has reported an experiment on students choosing attributes of prospective mates. About 27% had intransitive preferences, which resulted in an intransitive social outcome (of, presumably, the market in dowries). He concluded that when persons choose on the basis of conflicting standards, "preference patterns may be intransitive unless one criterion dominates." ("Intransitivity, Utility, and the Aggregation of Preference Patterns," *Econometrica*, Vol. 22 (1954), pp. 1-13, at p. 7.) Ward Edwards' experiments on choices in gambling resulted in about the same degree of inconsistency that May found, largely because subjects were presented with alternative bets in such a way that they had to choose between them on the basis of several criteria, no one of which dominated. "Probability Preferences in Gambling," *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 66 (1953), pp. 349-64 and "The Theory of Decision-Making," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 51 (1954), pp. 380-417. (This latter paper is an exhaustive review of the literature on individual choice up to 1954.) Arnold M. Rose, however, conducted a repeated experiment on rankings of the seriousness of crimes and found that almost all the intransitivity was owing to carelessness or random error. True intransitivity, he concluded, was "very rare, if it exists at all." ("A Study of Irrational Judgments," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 65 (1957), pp. 394-402.) Similarly, John M. Davis, seeking to replicate May's and Edwards' experiments, not only found somewhat less intransi-

tivity but also found evidence (a) that the intransitivity could be explained by random choice and (b) that stable circularity had not been shown to exist. ("The Transitivity of Preference," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 3 (1958), pp. 26-33.) A more promising attack on Edwards' finding is to explain the origin of the circularity. This is what C. H. Coombs and D. G. Pruitt did by presenting subjects with choices between alternative bets in such a way that choice was made by only one criterion (others being held constant). In this case only a negligible amount of intransitivity appeared ("Components of Risk in Decision-Making: Probability and Variance Preferences," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, Vol. 60 (1960), pp. 265-77).³ The best explanation of intransitivity of individual preferences is that of Clyde H. Coombs, "On the Use of Inconsistency of Preferences in Psychological Measurement," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, Vol. 55 (1958), pp. 1-7, reinterpreted in his *Theory of Data*, chap. 5. Let a chooser's ideal point for a given attribute lie on a unidimensional scale in effect dividing the scale into two parts or sides, and let him be given choices between pairs of stimuli also on this scale. If both stimuli lie on the same side of the scale, relative to the chooser's ideal, the pair is *unilateral*. If they lie on opposite sides, the pair is *bilateral*. As for ranked triples of stimuli, Coombs distinguishes three categories: (a) *unilateral triples* in which all three are on the same side of the chooser's ideal; (b) *bilateral adjacent triples*, in which two adjacent stimuli in the ordered triple are on one side of the ideal while the third (either the first or last in the triple) is on the other side; and (c) *bilateral split triples*, in which the first and last stimuli from the triple are on one side, while the middle one is on the other. He then predicted a high degree of transitivity for unilateral triples and a high degree of intransitivity for bilateral

adjacent triples. In the latter case, the location of the chooser's ideal (especially if it varies somewhat in replicated experiments) presumably confuses him as to the relative psychological distances on the scale among the pair on one side and the single stimulus on the other. In the former case, however, the location of the ideal to one side of all three stimuli does not interfere with judgments of relative distance. Finally, for bilateral split triples, Coombs predicted almost perfect transitivity inasmuch as the bilateral pair at either end of the ordered triple fixes the calculation of distance on the scale. His data (for preferences among shades of gray) strongly supports this prediction. On the basis of this evidence and explanation, one may conclude, therefore, that individual preferences are transitive or intransitive according to the scale location of alternatives relative to the chooser's ideal point. There is no reason why bilateral adjacent triples may not occur in nature. Hence, the likelihood of intransitivity of social preferences is increased by the likelihood of some intransitivity in individual preferences.

Given all these considerations that indicate a low *a priori* expectation of a majority decision (i.e., the sharp decline of transitive and majority outcomes as the number of alternatives increases, the sharp decline in majority outcomes as the number of relevant standards of judgment increases, and the possibility of intransitivity by individuals), the surprising fact is that majority decisions occur at all. This remarkable circumstance deserves investigation in both theoretical and experimental fashions. Some indications of the theoretical reasons for decision have been suggested. Arrow, for example, remarked that the basic justification for the two-party system is that it avoids the paradox by offering choosers only two alternatives. Such narrowing of the choice does indeed restrict the choosers to one cultural norm and undoubtedly the dichotomizing habit of choice thereby engendered serves an important social purpose of inducing decision. In Richard A. Musgrave, *The Theory of Public Finance* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1959), pp. 116-35, is set forth a theoretical consideration of the bases of majority decision in the absence of the two-choice restriction. Musgrave considered several kinds of budgets and systems of taxation, combining budgets and taxes in several ways and categorizing the combinations according to whether or not the results of majority rule were "arbitrary" (i.e., intransitive). Recalling Black's analysis of complementarity of standards of judgment, it is interesting to note that in those cases involving two standards of choice (and some others) majority rule

³ There is a substantial amount of recent work on individual choice in gambling situations, most of which is, however, ancillary to our present interests. The most significant and relevant of this work is: Donald Davidson, Patrick Suppes, and Sidney Siegel, *Decision Making: An Experimental Approach* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1957); Donald Davidson and Jacob Marshak, "Experimental Tests of a Stochastic Decision Theory," in C. W. Churchman and P. Ratoosh, ed., *Measurement: Definition and Theories* (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1959), chapter 13; and H. L. Royden, P. Suppes, and K. Walsh, "A Model for the Experimental Measurement of the Utility of Gambling," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 4 (1959), pp. 11-18.

broke down. Further investigation of this sort is necessary in order to determine the theoretical boundaries of majority rule; but on the basis of the theory as so far developed, it appears at least that majority rule is reasonable only if the rules of decision present the voters with a unidimensional standard of choice.

What remains is the practical question of how majorities are ever arrived at. Sometimes, of course, spurious majorities occur by reason of a subterfuge in the social welfare function, so that members of a voting body produce what appears to be a majority decision but in fact may not be. (For an example of such rules of decision, see my essay, "The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (1958), pp. 349-66.) More to the point, however, is the question of how majorities are arrived at when the rules of voting require that a genuine majority exist for action. This question, vital though it is for an understanding of politics, has not been examined by students of political behavior. A major theme of this essay is that it should be.

A related question, which has been cursorily examined, is that of how majorities are *not* arrived at. It is evident that, if members' preference curves are single-peaked, a prospective loser may, by introducing an alternative not previously under consideration, force the re-ordering of members' preferences to produce some double-peaked curves. Indeed, this is one of the classic strategies of parliamentary delay. For example, conservative Republican senators, opposed to the Seventeenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, delayed its passage in the Senate for nearly ten years by introducing an amendment to the proposed Amendment which attracted liberal Republican support and which alienated some Southern Democrats who would otherwise have voted for the Amendment to the Constitution.

One of Black's most interesting theorems, also concerned with *not* arriving at a majority decision, is: "When the ordinary committee procedure is in use, it may be open to one or more of the members to bring into existence a decision more favourable to themselves by voting otherwise than in accordance with their schedules of preference" (*Theory of Committees*, p. 44). This is what is involved in the United States Congress when, for example, opponents

of federal aid to education vote in favor of restricting the aid to desegregated schools (which, in the case of Southern Democrats, is almost certainly a misrepresentation of their preferences) in order to bring about the defeat of the whole measure. Similar examples of misrepresentation are discussed in Arrow, pp. 80-81; Black, *Theory of Committees*, pp. 182, 232-33, 237-38; Tapas Majumdar, "Choice and Revealed Preference," *Econometrica*, Vol. 24 (1956), pp. 71-3; Riker, *op.cit.*, p. 364; and Dankwart A. Rustow, *The Politics of Compromise* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 191-95.

V. CONCLUSION

The main point of this bibliographical essay has been to suggest that the work of Black and Arrow is of great importance both for political theory and the study of political behavior. Yet on the whole political scientists have tended to ignore this literature. (There are at least two exceptions: In Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956), the problem of the paradox is elucidated in several footnotes, pp. 42-44; and in Anthony J. Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1957), the problem is dealt with fairly extensively, pp. 60-68.) This relative neglect is, it seems to me, unfortunate. If students of political behavior were to discover and explain the range of mechanisms and social conditions leading to that agreement on norms sufficient for a set of single-peaked curves, then political theorists might be able to evaluate such notions as the public interest and the general will on the basis of empirical knowledge, a kind of procedure which is, I regret, almost unprecedented in the study of politics. Even if such a happy outcome is not possible, many spheres of political life can, I am certain, be more perceptively explained than they have been by the use of the theory here reviewed. (I think especially of legislative strategy, which most writers have treated as a mystical art, but which may on examination by this theory turn out to be a science with quite coherent rules.) And it is in the hope that at least some such explanations will be forthcoming that this review was undertaken.

BOOK REVIEWS

Science and Government. By C. P. SNOW. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. 88. \$2.50.)

Science and Public Administration. By JAMES L. McCAMY. (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1960. Pp. viii, 218. \$3.50.)

Scientists in Government. By EARL W. LINDVEIT. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960. Pp. viii, 84. \$3.25.)

These three books suggest interesting and complex questions about the relations between science and government, on which the literature, still slim, is increasing rapidly.

Since C. P. Snow's Godkin Lectures on "Science and Government" have circulated widely and been much discussed, it is unnecessary to review in detail the story he tells with his usual literary skill. Its hero is Sir Henry Tizard, whose Committee for the Scientific Study of Air Defense, by concentrating upon the development of radar, made possible the defense of Britain in 1940. Sir Charles admires Tizard: "Tizard's was the best scientific mind that in England has ever applied itself to war." He has little respect for Tizard's rival, F. A. Lindemann (Lord Cherwell), who, as Churchill's confidential advisor, forced Tizard's retirement from government service in 1940. In addition to his other faults, "Lindemann was quite un-English." One need not fully accept Snow's assessment of Lindemann to appreciate some of his inferences from the account: for example, "it is dangerous to have a solitary scientific overlord"; no scientist should have "the powers of choice that Lindemann had;" a scientist who has succumbed to "the euphoria of gadgets," as Snow maintains Lindemann had, or to "the euphoria of secrecy," should be given no power of choice at all. One wonders whether Tizard's choice to concentrate on radar was not at the time a desperate commitment to a new gadget. And indeed Snow acknowledges that some other "gadgets," the atomic bomb, for example, were remarkably efficacious. His stronger case against Lindemann would seem to be Lindemann's reliance upon "court politics," in this case the support of Churchill, and his consequent freedom from effective criticism by other scientists.

Snow has no confidence in advisory committees; he is willing to bet on a committee like the Tizard Committee, provided its objective is clear and limited, provided it is properly located in the governmental hierarchy, and provided it has some powers of action. But he reminds us that the decisions of such a commit-

tee will be carried out by non-scientist professional administrators, and that, since in the end all levels of administrators will probably be involved, it is important to have scientists included in all levels of government as well as in high level committees.

James McCamy's book, based upon his University of Alabama lectures, is broader in scope and designed for a professional rather than a general audience. But his central problems are the same: how should government get and use the advice and service of scientists, and what should be the relation between scientists and policy-making administrators? His recurrent theme is the urgent need that science and administration work together more closely, since science creates social problems requiring public action at a constantly accelerating rate. Adequate collaboration has been hindered in the past by the conception of science as an area apart from other kinds of human activity, by the myth of scientific infallibility, and by what Snow calls the "euphoria of secrecy." These attitudes, McCamy maintains, have also supported the development of "a formidable power group" of scientists, engineers, and administrators of scientific and technological programs, "the atomic energy-military power elite." Its unfortunate influence upon federal policy has produced disproportionate support to applied rather than basic science and to physical rather than biological science, not to mention the neglect of social science. Applied science, McCamy points out, receives year after year ninety per cent of the federal funds appropriated for science; less than ten per cent goes to basic research.

What is to be done? In general, McCamy is sceptical about using scientific advisers for brief occasional consultations; he has more confidence in "built-in experts who by constant experience learn public administration." But, given the very pressing demands of government, industry, and education for scientific personnel, he acknowledges that government must continue to supplement its scientific staff by enlisting the temporary service of scientists from outside. He argues, therefore, for much more federal financial support for the training of scientists and for basic research and suggests the desirability of more flexible arrangements for exchange of scientific personnel.

Since the problem of administering scientific activities is not unique, McCamy would apply to it familiar principles of organization and responsibility. Scientists regularly employed by the federal government should be integrated

into the structure rather than segregated; hence, for example, McCamy would reject the proposed Department of Science and Technology. He would, I assume, applaud Snow's statement: "I want scientists active in all the levels of government." But he sees no reason to believe that "only scientists can administer scientific enterprises": this is merely a residue from the myth of science. Like other activities, scientific enterprises require competent administrators, whether they be scientists, like Tizard or Vannevar Bush, or whether they come from less glamorous disciplines. At this point McCamy would presumably agree with Henry DeWolfe Smyth, who declared recently that "neither the methods nor the substance of science is so mysterious as to preclude an intelligent layman's general understanding of present knowledge and probable trends" ("Science and National Policy," Shepard Lecture, Ohio State University, 8 February 1961). In a rather utopian chapter, McCamy bravely proposes to reconstruct the whole system of American education in order to broaden and integrate the education of scientists and non-scientists and thus to "provide more scientists, public administrators, and citizens who are really and not just nominally educated to understand each other and their world."

In his second chapter, McCamy distinguishes four ways in which the federal government is involved in scientific activities: research and development by governmental personnel; research and development contracted out; consultation with advisers; stimulation of research by grants to individuals and institutions. When one comes to his general recommendations, one wonders whether something would not have been gained by subdividing the first category. Are the problems of managing and supervising the N. A. S. A. or the Atomic Energy Commission really subject all along the line to the same principles as apply to the Patent Office or the Geological Survey? The question at least invites more discussion than McCamy gives it.

One of the virtues of McCamy's book is his recognition that the problem of science and public policy is much broader than the present urgent problem of defense. This theme runs through the book, appearing in its emphases upon the equal importance of the biological with the physical sciences, upon the encouragement of basic research lest the well of scientific progress run dry, and upon the role of the social sciences in defining policy as well as organizing its execution.

Earl W. Lindveit sets out "to appraise some of the factors relating to the development, nature, and extent of retaining scientific personnel in federal employment." Appraisal,

however, is limited; the book is largely a job of reporting, some of which is rather mechanical. It is not very rewarding, for example, to read a list of the functions of the Bureau of the Budget as they relate to personnel, or of the functions of the Civil Service Commission, both taken from the *U. S. Government Organization Manual*. However, drawing largely from government reports, Lindveit has summarized an impressive amount of information on the extent of federal scientific activities and on the training, recruitment, retention, environment, and attitudes of the federal scientific personnel. In view of the difficulties that the federal government faces in competing for the services of highly skilled scientists, he suggests consideration of a policy of contracting out more of the federal scientific programs to industries, universities, and private research agencies.

Directly and indirectly, the three books underscore once more several general propositions in addition to the importance of recognizing the greatly expanded role of science in government. First, at the same time that government becomes increasingly in need of scientists, science is increasingly affected by governmental policy. Second, "scientists speak with many voices," as Smyth puts it. Third, in spite of the growing dependence of government upon factual data that only scientists can supply, other ingredients must also go into the formulation of policy. At this point, as McCamy suggests, scientists must be prepared to accept decisions on policy which may differ from those they have proposed.

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The Decline of American Pluralism. BY HENRY S. KARIEL. (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1961. Pp. x, 339. \$6.75.)

Pluralism has declined, but not as the institutional basis for American society; quite to the contrary, it has run amok, and the purpose of this book is to analyze the inadequacies of political philosophy in the United States as an appropriate basis for the realization of the good life. Kariel sets out to challenge what he considers to have been the uncritically accepted liberal assumption that the freedom of the individual is maximally—or even adequately—protected under a system of multiple, decentralized, fragmented, and unintegrated public governments operating, in the milieu of a mature industrial society, within the context of a host of private governments who share in the exercise of the functions of public policy-making and execution. It is for such a conglomeration that American liberalism in gen-

eral, and pluralistic thought in particular, provides an apologia.

The indictment of the *status quo* is writ large throughout the first part of the book. Welfare capitalism has bred a class of industrial statesmen who "resemble the sovereign, conscience-burdened individuals in whose behalf John Locke vindicated the Glorious Revolution"; and it is precisely because modern corporate management, having become divorced from effective accountability to its manifold stockholders, has assumed the responsibility for a stewardship of societal values transcending the market, that governmental control of management's exercise of "public power" is demanded. Big labor, long since irresponsible to the rank and file and no longer confined to or even primarily concerned with the militant and competitive role of advancing the homogeneous economic interests of workingmen, has extended its goals to subsume socio-political values which shape the lives—not merely the livelihood—of a substantial fraction of the public. Gargantuan, heterogeneous labor organizations have now become the partners of an enlightened capitalism, equally concerned with assuring the stability of the enterprise, the controlled exploitation of markets, the investment of surplus capital in welfare funds, and the disciplined domination of the lowest common denominator of the "labor business." Economic criteria no longer are adequate to evaluate the exercise of corporate industrial power; therefore, political criteria must be supplied and applied.

Unfortunately, the departments of the national government with greatest responsibility for public control of big business and big labor are revealed to be, in fact, the fiefs of the groups which they purport to regulate. In agriculture, the democratic decentralization of public policy-making results in a set of interlocking directorates at the county level which is tantamount to governance by the dominant minority elements within the leading farm organizations. The federal regulatory commissions are exposed as the acolytes of the railroads, the securities exchanges, the networks, *et cetera*; and the situation is even worse when one turns to the states, where the integration of industry and the professions with the structure of public government is more intimate and pervasive than at the national level. Everywhere one turns, it is to find public subservience to the dominance of the reigning oligarchies of private groups and associations, each of which tends to be a law unto itself within the sphere of its own domain.

Social scientists have done their bit to contribute to this miasma, by stressing the abnor-

mality of deviance from the pathways of accommodation which sustain the homeostasis that is postulated as the ideal of a healthy, balanced society. Conflict, competition, and similar forms of neurotic behavior result in social waste and must therefore be abjured; but social engineering, with therapeutic manipulation of social deviants by policy scientists, will make possible the harmonious reintegration of a balanced society. In such a system in equilibrium, not only each group, but also each individual in each group, must fit into, and stay put in, the role assigned; thus a scientific order replaces the natural order of an earlier age, and pluralism functions as a social analogue to feudalism. The individual retains his freedom because he rationally must want to do what is best for him; and to the extent that he must be educated to attain the latter wisdom, he need only respond to the influence of experts who are masters of the soft sell. Social scientists, without examining their own inarticulate major premises, have preached a liberal rhetoric to uphold a most conservative ideology; and "an existing, well-institutionalized pluralism may be equated with a value-neutral science." A pluralist society is one in which social scientists are rampant.

One gathers from the first nine chapters that American pluralism is sick. But the disease is one of the soul rather than the body; what appeared initially to be the empirical ills of pluralism are now revealed to be the somatic manifestation of a genetic philosophical frailty. Kariel deplores the very "effectiveness" of our "healthy" political institutions and practices, since our practical success has deprived us of "first-rate political speculation" and has "stunted" our political thought. Only the Civil War produced a crisis of sufficient magnitude, and entailed an appropriately macroscopic breakdown in political machinery, to result in the limited production of "something like political philosophy." Faced with this lament, some of those who are not professional lovers of political wisdom may wonder: what price glory?

On an empirical level, Kariel's major finding is that large-scale organizations do not provide the institutions for the adequate representation of individual interests, and the investiture (whether *de facto* or *de jure*) of "public functions" in private groups sanctions their immunity to the criteria of responsibility that are applicable to public groups. From a theoretical point of view, his review of the writings of those lesser figures who have addressed themselves to the relevant theoretical problem leads him to conclude that the logical implication of pluralism is the elitism of a managerial aristocracy.

One's natural reaction to a polity that is portrayed as both irresponsible in practice and unsound in theory is to ask: what is to be done?

Kariel's answer is enthusiastic, but hardly (as he admits) novel: big government must be further strengthened to protect individuals against private groups; the excesses of unchecked private power are to be checked by even greater excesses of public power. The final hundred pages of the book fit neatly into a long and reputedly honorable tradition of writings by political scientists who have demanded that "the people" be given the power to govern effectively. The familiar watchwords are: Nationalize! (p. 274) Centralize! (pp. 275, 277) Integrate! (pp. 278-9) Organize hierarchically! Separate the political executives "at the top," whose "only expertise is and should be political," from the technicians who comprise the civil service. ("The Hoover Commission was emphatically right in its 1955 recommendations"! Reorganize the major political parties so that they can truly become the efficient, rational, alternating instruments of the general will. But let there be conflict! And let bureaucrats be zealous, so that the public interest—to which there is frequent reference in these pages—may transcend the parochial interests of private groups and geographical localities, and may include the diffuse, disorganized, and inarticulate—but nonetheless "real"—interests of potential groups.

The philosophic basis for such specific reforms is "liberal constitutionalism." Such a political order necessitates a clear demarcation of public and private sectors, since the private sphere is to be "utterly inviolable" while the "arm of public government must touch, as intimately and pervasively as necessary to achieve public purposes, all private elites tending to incorporate society as well as all public agencies tending to collaborate with them." Basically, this means that intervention is justified in regard to involuntary heterogeneous, but not voluntary homogeneous, private groups. The base of liberal constitutionalism is equalitarian, and its only really fundamental "public interest" is the norm of due process of law, procedurally defined, which "supports not particular decisions but a political system in general, a universal process for political conciliation and compromise, a means for communication and negotiation between social interests." "Thus," he says (p. 231), "an integral liberal theory postulates as essential (1) a variable social base, (2) a variable moral order, and (3) a state which provides for the continuity of these variations, which provides for the maintenance of a changeable, moving equilib-

rium." The test of liberal constitutionalism is the pragmatic sanction.

But by Kariel's own ample evidence, the "public government" of which we hear so much in the later chapters consists of the very same "public groups" whose weakness we have been led to accept by the early chapters. It is these "public groups," one supposes, upon which reliance must be placed in the just state of liberal constitutionalism, for the effective regulation in the public interest of private groups. One wonders if the author intends that he be taken seriously when he implies that such public groups can be beefed up so that they are meet to be the potent instrumentalities of a benevolent presidential autocrat, if only we will produce a few miracles (pp. 288-9) by implementing the sage advice of such illustrious prophets of reform as the 1950 Report of the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, or the 1955 Report of the Hoover Commission's task force on personnel. If this be his intent, Kariel does not explain why, granting the really breathtaking assumption of the feasibility of his proposed reforms, we ought rationally to prefer Leviathan to anarchy. The polity that he seeks to substitute for the present multiplicity of irresponsible private oligarchies may aptly be characterized as a potentially irresponsible public oligarchy, for labelling the new elite "responsible" and "public" will not necessarily make it become either of these; and in his quest for the effective structuring of real power to control private tyrants, Kariel would destroy the very institutional forms and processes that have, heretofore, provided an "effective" and "healthy" set of safeguards against public tyranny.

Perhaps the explanation for the ambiguity between the author's realistic critique of pluralism and his utopian scheme for its transcendence is that this mystique is a stylistic device which he deliberately has preferred, since his penultimate paragraph states that "our prose should reflect existing tensions, [and] should make the most and not the least of ambiguities. . . ." Perhaps the tension reflected by the conflict between the major parts of the book is intended as an elaborate *tour de force*, the real point of which is the futility of attempting to invoke the familiar nostrums of political science as an antidote to the ills of a decadent pluralism. Perhaps this explains, also, the concluding chapter, in which the author prescribes "an orientation for research" in which social science is defined as a harmonious, tolerant, leisurely, and healthy synthesis of a "naturalistic, behavioral science in quest of generalizations which explain and ultimately control reality

but also a humanistic discipline in quest of knowledge about, and love for, the specific moment." Perhaps we have come full circle, because a social science which is a homeostatic synthesis of empiricism *plus* humanism seems to describe very well the decadent pluralistic social science of the *status quo ante novellus*.

GLENDON SCHUBERT

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The Grand Tactician: Khrushchev's Rise to Power. BY LAZAR PISTRAC. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961. Pp. 296. \$6.00)

Apparatchik is the Russian word to describe a professional Communist organizer, propagandist, expeditor, unswerving follower of the Party line and loyal subordinate of the Party boss. With this personality profile, Lazar Pistrak sets the story of Khrushchev's rise to power. Using all sources of available information about this "dynamic and arresting personality," as President Eisenhower described him after the American meeting in September 1959, Pistrak concentrates on Khrushchev principally in the Stalin era. In the words of the author, "This book is a retrospective analysis of Khrushchev's political past in the light of his present position rather than analysis of his post-Stalin transmutations." To the reader who hopes to have more insight into the present day Khrushchev as the successor to Stalin, the book is somewhat disappointing, but to the general reader and student of Soviet affairs the book presents in great detail, backed by scholarly documentation of early Khrushchev speeches and writings, an illuminating political biography.

Extracting every scanty piece of evidence which he could discover, Pistrak has put together a damning indictment of the earlier record of the present First Party Secretary of the CPSU and Chairman of the All-Union Council of Peoples' Ministers. It is obvious to the reader that Mr. Pistrak, a former refugee from Bolshevism, identifies himself with those many who have suffered from Stalinism. Many of his friends have paid the supreme price for their thoughts and deeds. While the charge may be levelled at this book that it is too subjective in its recounting of the horrendous actions of Khrushchev, the data which Pistrak presents will stand up. One is reminded of the story of the disturbed patient who reported to his psychiatrist that he had just dreamed that he was being persecuted and he added, "Doctor, I really am."

We are informed about the youth of Khrushchev, which is partly still shrouded in mystery. By impressive documentation of conflicting "official" biographies, Pistrak shows that Khrushchev was a late comer in the Commu-

nist organization. He did not join the party until 1918 when he was twenty-four years old. This event took place at least six months after the Great October Revolution. Very early in his Communist Party career, Khrushchev demonstrated to his superiors a subordination and pliability on which they could depend. Even before the death of Lenin, Khrushchev allied himself with the developing Stalin machine. Clever and astute like his master, Khrushchev even went his master, Stalin, one better by anticipating the extreme position of Stalin against the Left-Wing Opposition and denouncing the Opposition leaders in 1926 shortly before Stalin had formally done so. Not stopping with scathing attacks on Stalin's opponents, Khrushchev showed real political sagacity by putting forward at the Tenth Ukrainian Party Congress in 1927, which was primarily concerned with final excommunications of the Opposition, a practical plan for strengthening the power of the Central Party apparatus in regional and district party committees—the creation of secretariats in these party organs. At the time of the purges in the late twenties, Khrushchev played an active part in denouncing the Bukharinites just as he had attacked the Trotskyites shortly before. Furthermore, Khrushchev acted, according to Pistrak, as a spokesman for Stalin, probably without Stalin knowing of it until later, in charging that the Right Wing was sabotaging the work of the Central Committee. The result of Khrushchev's being more Stalinist than Stalin was his assignment to Moscow in the fall of 1929. He went to Moscow first as a student in the Industrial Academy, which was established by the Party for the training of industrial managers. While at the Academy, Khrushchev showed his penchant for organizational work by serving as the secretary of the Academy's party organization. He did not finish the three-year course of the Academy but took the post as Party Secretary of one of the ten Moscow party districts. He moved up through the Moscow city and regional party hierarchy to become First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee in 1934 and the following year to take on the additional position of First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee. He had proven himself to Stalin in the Great Purges of the thirties. In 1938 he was appointed an alternate member of the Politburo and in 1939 a full-fledged member.

While Moscow secretary, Khrushchev demonstrated his administrative and organizing ability as the Party functionary charged with supervising the completion of the Moscow subway. Khrushchev showed his ability to work with Stalin by holding the Moscow party

positions during the crucial years of 1934–8, when most of Khrushchev's seniors in the Party and many of his subordinates were shot. Pistrak devotes much space recounting the Party purges and the role of Khrushchev in them. By 1938, seventy per cent of the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party had been shot. Pistrak argues that Khrushchev survived these purges because of his sycophancy to Stalin. Moreover, Khrushchev was an ambitious *apparatchik*, who was not interested in recognition of his intellectual accomplishments. Stalin did not want intellectuality, which was the prized possession of many of the adversaries he purged. Pistrak writes that Stalin wanted "simple minded people with overemphasized ambition, strong nerves, without scruples, ready to follow blindly."

Pistrak has a kind of sympathy for the old Bolsheviks eliminated in the 1937–8 purges. While admitting their brutality, Pistrak contrasts them with "intellectual, low brow Khrushchev" and refers to their "intellectual superiority" and "the spark of honesty in their hearts." These men never could take second place to Stalin. Pistrak has unearthed many of the hate-ridden and violent speeches delivered by Khrushchev as Stalin's vicar in the Ukraine in 1938, quoting his exhortations to "eliminate the Trotskyite-Bukharinite bandits" and "all kinds of bourgeois nationalists," meaning especially the non-Stalinist Ukrainians. Pistrak shows how Khrushchev not merely followed the Party line but made every effort to whip up enthusiasm for the purges. In a detailed exegesis of the long speech of Khrushchev at the XX Party Congress, Pistrak quotes all the comments of Khrushchev on how false and wrong were the ruthless policies of the purges, pointing out that the record still holds as to what Khrushchev did during these purges.

While the latter part of this book deals with Khrushchev as a civilian general in World War II, his struggle with Malenkov, his politics of agriculture, and his utterances on "peace," the book's scholarly contribution is in the treatment of Khrushchev in the twenties and thirties. The author writes with the deep personal conviction of a man who believes in the need to expose the sham of this most formidable contemporary world figure. The book should be read by all political scientists who wish to know more about the nature of Soviet politics.

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Red China: An Asian View. BY SRIPATI CHANDRA-SEKHAR. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961. Pp. viii, 230. \$4.00.)

Presumably as a special attraction, this book carries the subtitle "An Asian View." In truth, no trace of it can be found. Mr. Chandra-Sekhhar is a cosmopolitan. His opinions, sparingly expressed, are strongly anti-Communist, of no particular nationality. Most of the time, the author presents a factual report of his travels through Communist China, and the facts he discovers are sufficiently devastating for the nature of the regime. His was a guided tour, with a Chinese interpreter at his heels and no illusion on his part that he would see or hear anything the Communists would consider detrimental to their cause. What they overlooked was the difference in their standards, and the author's, especially with respect to human dignity. There was enough open evidence of developments to shock the humane traveller.

The Introduction sets the scene with a general description of the way of life of the new Chinese: his and her monotonous, uniform dress of blue trousers and high-collared coat; inescapable loudspeakers blaring propaganda everywhere, night and day; an ideological obsession with personal honesty and cleanliness, "Comrade, what will Chairman Mao say when he hears that you spat?"; work and sleep, with no alternative; complete uniformity between the sexes, short of natural barriers. To the Communists, this human degradation seemed the unobjectionable prerequisite for progress, to the author the terrible cost of the great achievements his hosts boasted about all along the route.

This perceptive and sensitive summary and analysis in the Introduction is not fully carried on in the main body of the book. The author limits himself there, essentially, to an account of the goals, plans, and achievements as they were presented to him with deadening similarity by his well-drilled informants. He was not an expert on most of the things he was shown. He had no means of proving the veracity of the information, especially the preposterous statistics. He merely doubted it. Embarrassed silence or answers to his occasional questions confirmed his doubts.

The stunning production figures in agriculture he was given, of harvests reaped or yet to come, have since been thoroughly belied by two catastrophic famines. The Communes, "more terrifying than all the conceivable hells put together," must have appeared such to their inmates as well, for the government has since been obliged to relax on them. Industrial progress would have impressed the author more had the results been put to better than military use. The emancipation of women and the abolition of the world's oldest profession were

noticeable everywhere. Not so the police state methods bringing them about nor the destruction of a woman's role as mother and wife and therewith of the family. Education, the author found, had become the monopoly of the state, from babyhood to university graduation. The criterion for admission to higher education was, in addition to quality, the student's standing with the Party. The facilities for education were there or rapidly improving, but its content was shocking. The liberal arts—except for Communist doctrine—were abolished as “useless” and its students sent to the factories and fields. Beyond the schools, there was only practical vocational training on the lower levels or theoretical in the technical subjects on the academic level.

A large chapter is devoted to Population Problems, including Health, the author's own specialty. Its most impressive item is the estimate that before 1968 there will be 800 million Chinese. Its most impressive story is the sudden switch by the government from an intense campaign in favor of birth control to its condemnation, in May 1959, as a bourgeois, reactionary, and Malthusian plot. The author was never given an official explanation and was prevented from seeing the people who might have known what it was. The speculation that the government was afraid that support of birth-control might have implied that it was unable to supply a growing population with a livelihood does not sound very plausible. The campaigns for and against were too massive for such a simple explanation.

The second and brief section of the book is devoted to a rather superficial survey of Sino-Indian relations as demonstrated by the suppression of Tibet, the invasion of Indian territory along the Himalayan border, and competition in social development. The author concludes from China's behavior that the Communists do not deserve to be represented in the United Nations and that India must revise her policy of neutrality in favor of alliances to strengthen her for continuous growth and progress.

The Western reader has heard the author's opinions before. He has facts available which turn the doubts expressed in the book into certainty. In brief, the book tells only part of a bigger story already known to the informed reader. But even he may find satisfaction in hearing it from an Indian.

WERNER LEVI

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*Fascism in Italy. The Cross and the Fasces:
Christian Democracy and Fascism in Italy.*

By RICHARD A. WEBSTER. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960. Pp. xiii, 229. \$5.00.)

This short book tries to cover seventy-five years of extremely tortuous history—the rise, fall and resurrection of Christian Democracy in Italy. The author relies primarily on a prodigious search of secondary materials, and what emerges is necessarily only a brief summary of developments that have strongly influenced the vicissitudes of Italian politics from unification to the present.

In these pages one will find carefully selected and lucidly presented material on the role of Catholicism in Italian politics. In addition, there are often shrewd judgments and observations of what has been the Vatican's strategy over time in dealing with a state it did not want, which it has accepted with reluctance, at best, and over which, at worst, it intends to exercise an unbending hegemony.

Professor Webster sees the origin of the Italian Catholic political movement in the adversity the Vatican associated with Liberalism and with the particularly ominous turn the latter took during the Risorgimento. The Hierarchy saw mass organization as the necessary means of combating at their own level the left-wing popular movements that emerged during the nineteenth century. The purpose of the Catholic Church was relatively simple: it sought to safeguard church interests, to combat the heresies of Liberalism, and to reconquer Italian national life. However, the Hierarchy sought to limit the degree of autonomy exercised by any of the lay groups. Thus, for a time, it was able to inhibit the development of a Christian Democratic party. Only the death of a pope and the tenacious skill of Don Luigi Sturzo permitted a relatively autonomous Popular party to come into being following the First World War.

Sturzo's Popular party and the eventual removal of the *non expedit* prohibition were most significant expressions of the degree to which Catholicism itself was conditioned by the Liberal state. Yet, the history of the *Popolari* dramatically underlines how tentative and qualified is the Vatican's support of its own lay movements. When Fascism offered the prospects of a solution to the “Roman Question,” the Hierarchy traded a concordat for the destruction of the Popular party and of auxiliary Catholic organizations like the labor unions. This lesson in Vatican priorities has not been lost on some modern Christian Democratic party and union leaders who wish to limit the degree of organizational control that emanates from the other side of the Tiber.

The author is careful to present a balanced

panorama of Catholicism's involvement in Italian politics. On the one hand, there is Catholic support for the Libyan War, the invasion of Ethiopia, and the intervention in Spain; there is also considerable Catholic responsibility for the deterioration of parliamentary institutions and the onset of the Fascist Regime, as well as striking support of the Regime by Catholic elements, including some buttressing of the anti-Semitism that Fascism fostered in 1938 and later. In its tendency to overreact against the "Red Menace" and Socialism, Catholicism in Italy has continually been led to support movements, forces and policies that undermine democracy.

On the other hand, Professor Webster emphasizes how erroneous it is to view Italian or other Catholic forces as a bloc. From the very beginning of mass political involvement, for example, the Catholics have been split over what should be the relation of political parties and other mass movements to the Vatican. These differences of opinion—in and out of the clergy—were also manifested in Catholic reactions to Fascism both during the Regime's apogee and in its tumultuous last days when the Resistance, as well as the Allied armies, brought it crashing to the ground. In other words, there does exist a Catholic Left, even if, as Gaetano Salvemini once remarked sardonically, it has been for Italy a political vaccination against real revolution.

The book includes an excellent analysis of how Italian Catholic Action, during the Fascist years, served as a training ground for many of the future Christian Democratic leaders. Alcide De Gasperi, who was to emerge as the best of the postwar Catholic leaders, found a haven in the Vatican itself. Unlike the Clerico-Moderates and Clerico-Fascists, who became apologists for Fascism and intermediaries between the Regime and the Hierarchy, De Gasperi and others not only avoided identification with the "Third Rome," but were later to emerge as leaders of the Catholic anti-fascist movements.

This is not to say that Catholic Action was a bulwark of opposition to Mussolini's Italy. On the contrary, Catholic Action, closely tied to and controlled by the Vatican, has been essentially a conservative—even reactionary—force in Italian society. Yet, within its ranks there have also always been radical movements. Thus, during the Fascist era (particularly its later years), both FUCI (Catholic University Youth Federation) and *Movimento Laureati* (Catholic University Graduates) of Catholic Action were breeding grounds for strong Catholic opposition. The militant leaders developed by these organizations fought in the Resistance and later emerged as prominent

postwar Christian Democratic leaders.

One or two of the author's observations are disquieting. For example, it is correctly pointed out that Italy became a confessional state through a *concordat* which, with Communist support, was incorporated into the present constitutional system. A second, and I think correct, observation is that many of the younger Christian Democratic leaders, who were developed in a tightly controlled Catholic Action, do not have the drive for autonomy of the Vatican once characteristic of Sturzo and clearly detectable in De Gasperi, Gronchi and others of their generation. These younger Christian Democrats tend to be impatient with democracy and sometimes behave as men who want to provide Italy with a total, integral, Catholic solution to all of her problems. Such motivations have ominous implications for democracy when it is remembered that the *concordat* and the Christian Democratic party are major instruments through which the Vatican continues to influence Italian affairs.

The book contains some uneven spots. For example, at page 176, the author rightly includes the Communists among those forces which in 1945 succeeded in "thwarting the democratic transformation of the country." Four pages later he attributes the failure of revolution only to the Western occupying powers and the Catholic movement. Despite such minor flaws, this is a study that will reward the reader's attention.

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Strategy and Arms Control. By THOMAS C. SCHELLING AND MORTON H. HALPERIN, (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961. Pp. 148. \$2.50.)

There is no more important problem today than the control of armaments and the prevention of another major war. All nations have been sharply reminded of this by the recent resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union and the United States and the consequent intensification of the nuclear arms race.

The problem, moreover, has been greatly aggravated by the nature of present military technology and weapons development which gives an enormous advantage in warfare today to the party which strikes first and which reduces to a matter of minutes the time available to decide what to do. Given the dangerous character of modern weapons, the present study explores various ways whereby a system of arms control might reduce the incentives to war or restrict its destructiveness in the tragic event it might occur.

The book is an outgrowth of the authors'

participation in a Study Group on Arms Control comprising some fifty physical and social scientists from universities and research institutes throughout the country. The group met during the summer of 1960 at M.I.T.'s Endicott House near Boston under the auspices of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences with the financial support of the Twentieth Century Fund.¹ Several of the participants had shared earlier in 1960 in a conference on arms control also sponsored by the Academy which culminated in the special issue of *Daedalus* on Arms Control in the fall of 1960.² Whereas the *Daedalus* volume included papers from widely differing viewpoints on many facets of disarmament and arms control, the Schelling-Halperin study focuses more intensively on the relationship between arms control and military strategy and does not attempt to probe the political issues in the negotiations on disarmament or nuclear testing.

Like several other recent writers in this field, the authors prefer the term, "arms control," to "disarmament," feeling that the former conveys a broader meaning than the latter. While recognizing that disarmament may be a promising area of arms control, they do not attempt to pass judgment on what forms of arms control should be ultimately sought. Within their definition, arms control might, for example, embrace improved systems of military communication to reduce the dangers of accidental war. It might involve an inspection system to decrease the likelihood of surprise attack; or it might provide certain "traffic rules" for military aircraft or vessels to assure that they do not venture so close to the territory of rival states as to cause fear of attack. While such forms of arms control might not include any reduction in armed force levels, the fact that they might reduce the incentives which could lead to war would give them some value of their

own. In this sense, such limited steps would not be in opposition to disarmament, but might actually pave the way for ultimate disarmament and might indeed, in the present state of international tension, be the most that could now be politically achieved.

Although to some advocates of disarmament, as well as to certain military planners, arms control might seem antithetical to the objectives of military strategy, rather Schelling and Halperin believe there is no inherent incompatibility between them. In their judgment, the aims of both arms control and of a responsible military strategy should be substantially the same, with arms control serving as a supplementary means of achieving the objectives of military strategy. The authors regard arms control as a "promising, but still only dimly perceived, enlargement of the scope of our military strategy," resting essentially on the recognition that our military relation with potential enemies is not exclusively one of conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interest in such things as avoiding accidental wars, minimizing the costs and risks of arms competition, and curtailing the scope and violence of war should it occur. Part I of the book suggests in greater detail several ways whereby arms control might serve these and other objectives of national security.

Part II is devoted to the problems of evaluating arms control proposals, and raises a series of questions which would need to be answered in determining the effects of an arms control agreement. For example, in what ways might the agreement reduce or perhaps increase East-West tension? Would continuous inspection in the Soviet Union become a source of increasing irritation and difficulty? What would be the political costs and gains of including Communist China in the agreement, or of excluding her from it? What effects would the agreement have on the strategic balance between the Soviet and western blocs? Would the agreement, by reducing some of the incentives to general war, actually increase the possibility of local wars? How might the agreement be evaded and what effects would this have on the military balance? Such questions as these—which are only a few of the many which the authors pose—illustrate the kind of analytical thinking, which must precede the crystallization of arms control measures.

Part III of the book tackles the even more difficult problems of making arms control work. Here again, questions are suggested for study rather than answers or conclusions to the problems. For instance, what methods of negotiation and bargaining are most likely to pro-

¹ A companion volume, *Arms Reduction—Program and Issues*, edited by David H. Frisch, another member of the Study Group, has also been published by the Twentieth Century Fund, and a third study by Arthur T. Hadley, *The Nation's Safety and Arms Control* (Viking Press, 1961), a less technical interpretation of the whole problem, is based partly on his association with the Study Group.

² Most of the papers in this issue of *Daedalus*, together with some new ones covering recent developments, have been published in *Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security*, edited by Donald G. Brennan (Braziller, 1961), and distributed as a Summer 1961 Alternate Book-of-the-Month-Club Selection along with the Hadley book.

duce effective arms control measures? What forms of arms control are conceivably possible without the prior settlement of major political issues, and what ones inherently involve political settlements? How much needs to be known about the extent of a state's compliance with the agreement? What kind of evidence would be needed to prove violations? How can faulty evidence be minimized? To what extent would the traditional intelligence activities of national governments have to be curtailed or modified if a formal international system of inspection were in operation?

A particularly thought-provoking chapter suggests that the process of effectively enforcing an arms agreement will be more akin to the process of administering the great regulatory agencies of government than it will to the relatively simple police-like efforts implied by the term, "inspection." Willful cheating will of course need to be detected and restrained. But there will be a great variety of more subtle activities involving the use of loopholes or stretching the rules of the agreement which will occasion wide differences of opinion as to how honestly a country is actually living up to its obligations. Resolving such differences of opinion and arriving at accurate interpretations of the true intent of the parties concerned will be one of the most important tasks of those charged with the administration of arms control measures.

This is not an easy book to digest, despite its relatively short length (148 pages). It needs to be read slowly and then reread in order for its points to be fully grasped. Perhaps a more extensive use of specific illustrations from the records of actual disarmament negotiations would make its ideas more easily understood. Many of the examples presently cited seem excessively general and hypothetical in character. Nevertheless, if one will persist and study this book carefully, he will be rewarded with a new insight into both the possibilities and complexities of arms control as a means of reducing the dangers of another major war.

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Growth and Stability of the Postwar Economy.
By BERT G. HICKMAN. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1960. Pp. xviii, 425. \$6.00.)

America's march to affluence in the present generation has been marked by important changes in the structure and organization of the economy. In the private sector, agriculture has grown steadily smaller while the service and durable consumers' goods industries have expanded. The pace of technological change

and the development of markets have stimulated the growth of large-scale corporate enterprise which has been "countervailed" by the coming of age of large-scale unions. In the public sector, the growth of government, particularly the Federal government, has been even more pronounced. On the one hand, in the face of persistent internal welfare problems and external security problems the government has had to claim a proportionately larger share of the gross national product. On the other hand, the attempts to find solutions to these problems have led to the proliferation of agencies and policies which in one way or another constrain the operation of the market mechanism. So great are these changes in the private and public sectors that a visitor from the late 19th century might have trouble in finding familiar landmarks in the economic landscape.

One thing, however, he would be sure to recognize: the cyclical course of the growth of income. Since the end of World War II the economy has passed through three cycles—1945–49, 1949–54, and 1954–58—and at present is in the midst of its fourth. A perceptive observer with many questions about the characteristics of these cycles and how they compared with 19th-century cycles could do no better than to refer to *Growth and Stability of the Postwar Economy* by Bert G. Hickman. Hickman, a staff economist for the Brookings Institution, has undertaken the formidable task of analyzing the effect of structural and organizational changes in the American economy on the business cycle from 1946 to 1958 in an effort to determine whether these changes have induced, in any systematic fashion, alterations in the cycle relative to its historical forebears. In short, he wants to know to what extent the business cycle is still with us.

Though this book is not central to the issues with which political scientists are usually concerned, there are at least two reasons why they will find it useful and interesting. First of all, it is a masterful and highly informative marshaling of the income data relevant to the measurement of economic activity. After a chronological description of the postwar cycles, Hickman devotes the greater part of his book to an analysis of the key factors—for example, federal expenditures, consumer demand, residential construction, monetary policy—which affected the performance of the economy, all the while drawing comparisons and contrasts to their behavior in the prewar cycles. For those political scientists who are anxious to give quantitative content to the economic environment from which they abstract, here is an invaluable source, complete with dates of crucial turning points, the lags in key variables,

and a careful evaluation of their interdependencies.

Secondly, given the penchant of political scientists in recent years to engage in agonizing methodological reappraisals and to cast covetous eyes on the methods used in sister disciplines, they should find *Growth and Stability of the Postwar Economy* a fine example of the indispensable union of theoretical and empirical work. Where many economists have been reluctant to confront their theoretical exegeses with hard empirical data and many political scientists have seen little need to give theoretical structure to vast quantities of descriptive data, Hickman has relied upon the theoretical constructs of income analysis—the product of the Keynesian Revolution in economics—in organizing, and asking questions about, the empirical material with which he is concerned. Thus the business cycle is viewed as stemming from the impact of autonomous forces such as wars, inventions, population changes, and changes in consumer tastes on endogenous economic variables such as consumption and investment expenditures. The cyclical growth of income, then, may be a consequence of periodic shocks from the former or of the induced expansion or contraction of the latter.

Hickman, of course, is primarily concerned with the behavior of the expenditures variables. Though he may be pleased to leave the prediction of the capricious occurrences of war, for example, to the political scientist, he has complex enough difficulties of his own because of the aggregative nature of income data. When only partially disaggregated, both consumption and investment turn out to consist of components which do not necessarily behave in a consistent manner. Expenditures on consumer services do not follow the same pattern as expenditures on consumer durables. Nor do business expenditures on inventories behave like business expenditures on fixed capital. Moreover, changes in consumption and business expenditures may be induced by income changes or by changes in the propensities to spend out of given incomes. Further, the relative expansion of government expenditures has increased the proportion of the GNP which is generated by autonomous forces. Can one expect government expenditures to offset the cyclical flow of income in the private sector, thus leading to greater stability? Or will they reinforce it? And what influence do fiscal and monetary policies have on income? Are we really able through discretionary policy to achieve greater stability at more satisfactory

levels of employment than the market itself?

Of Hickman's answers to these and other questions I can say very little within the limits of a short review. The evidence reveals unambiguously that the performance of the American economy since World War II has been good. The expansions of economic activity during the cycles have been longer and the contractions shorter than in pre-war cycles. Average annual unemployment, at least up to 1958, was lower than for any period of similar length since the first decade of the century. The responsibility for this performance, however, cannot be determined unambiguously. In part it was attributable to autonomous forces, for example, the backlog of demand for durable consumers' goods and the accumulation of liquid assets brought on by World War II. In part it was attributable to structural features of the private sector of the economy, for example, the tendency of the corporation to maintain dividends in the face of declining income, which has contributed to the relative stability of postwar disposable income and consumption. But it also has been due to the influence of government. The celebrated automatic, or built-in, stabilizers, especially changes in tax receipts, played a role in placing a floor under income. Federal expenditures, however, destabilized as much as they stabilized, which is hardly surprising in view of the fact that military expenditures, their largest component, respond to cold-war rather than stability considerations.

Hickman lends support to the opinion widely held among economists that unemployment and depression of the magnitude experienced in the 1930's need not occur again. We know more about the cycle, are better able to recognize the symptoms of declining income, and are more conscious of the effect of monetary and fiscal policies on the flow of income. He is not so optimistic about the opposite problem—inflation—believing that the institutional framework of the economy “favors the initiation and propagation of inflationary impulses but guards against their reversal.” Whether in subsequent cycles the American economy achieves a better record with respect to employment and price stability than hitherto depends to a very considerable extent on the use to which responsible governmental officials put their economic powers. All the more reason why they would be well advised to look carefully at this meticulous picture of the postwar economy.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought. BY HANNAH ARENDT. (New York: The Viking Press, 1961. Pp. 246. \$5.00.)

Hannah Arendt has collected in one volume six essays forming a unified inquiry into political thought. These offer "experience in *how* to think; they do not contain prescriptions on what to think or which truths to hold." Her

chief aim is to discover the real origins of traditional concepts in order to distill from them anew their original spirit which has so sadly evaporated from the very key words of political language—such as freedom and justice, authority and reason, responsibility and virtue, power and glory—leaving behind empty shells with which to settle almost all accounts, regardless of their underlying phenomenal reality.

A reader must ask how she is sure that these terms originally contained a "spirit" which, though now evaporated, she knows to be phenomenally real. Her evidence is faith in the affirmations and subsequent tradition bequeathed by Plato and Aristotle, together with her understanding of political life in the Roman Republic. Her case for the Romans is not overly convincing, though one person's history need not be another's. Whenever she speaks of the classic writings, however, she is abundantly persuasive. The "spirit," then, may not be that of life in ancient cities, a past culture now dead, but is certainly that of those cities' most brilliant and articulate critics. To this everyone can agree; the problem is what has been lost, what gained.

What is lost is the classical tradition of political thought. At its heart is the concept of authority. Her first and third essays reaffirm the well known classical formula: that proper political authority requires superiority of insights or wisdom from those in authority (parents, rulers, teachers) before it should be accepted or endured. Yet there have never been such superior persons; authority is then limited, for all who live by the light of this concept, whenever and to the extent that anyone pretending to authority understands what it is that he presumes to possess. Secondly, should such authority ever in fact be possessed by a society of persons, it would be a classless and stateless society in the sense anticipated by Marx. What Marx did was to mistake a critical or normative tradition for a political program realizable in empirical existence. This error destroyed the function of that traditional measure or norm. Misuse of the measure frustrated societies attempting to answer the measure's criticism through trying to place themselves beyond its

criticism; in turn frustration led to abandoning the tradition as unworkable. Within this "crisis" of misunderstanding, violence seemed the only way to bring about the impossible. Thus Dr. Arendt explains the Marxist cult of revolution.

The same theme is reworked and applied, perhaps more clearly for many readers, in her fifth essay, "The Crisis in Education." Here she says that authority implies superiority "such as can never exist among adults and which, from the point of view of human dignity, must never exist." Adults may sometimes temporarily possess superiority over children, though she does not claim even this to be true. Equally insightful is her fourth essay on political liberty. It is a mistake to suppose, she says, that freedom for privacy of thought is the fulcrum of political liberty; one's will to be secure from interference merely turns into slavery of the self to oneself. Actual freedom is gained in activity, especially political, which forms the beginning of something fresh as against purely habitual behavior. Such an answer may not satisfy older liberals, but for a younger generation it should blow a lot of stale air out of musty rooms.

Her last essay, "The Crisis in Culture," refers to a crisis in taste and political judgment rather than culture in the anthropological sense. The latter she seems not to have encountered; in her second essay, after brilliantly tracing successive alterations of perspective upon human history, she stops short of that contained in cultural anthropology. In the same essay her faith that there are truths self-evident beyond all doubting makes incomprehensible for her the modern openness toward any assumptions whatsoever: "... we can take almost any hypothesis and *act* upon it, with a sequence of results in reality which not only make sense but *work*." For Dr. Arendt such events should not be true, or perhaps kept hidden as secret knowledge available only to Plato's guardians of the city (though she does not say so). She realizes but distrusts our ability to create self-consciously a new culture internally self-critical rather than criticized from a position (intended by the ancients, though we deny its possibility) outside culture. And she understands very well the condition that underlies this new event:

For to live in a political realm with neither authority nor the concomitant awareness that the source of authority transcends power and those who are in power, means to be confronted anew . . . by the elementary problems of human living-together.

To be so confronted makes almost certain, in her judgment, the terrors of totalitarianism. Yes, but behold the heartless pillage of ancient cities, the barbarity of regarding strangers as barbarians. While knowing this, she fails to acknowledge it. Dr. Arendt is sensitive, learned, often compassionate. The services of her generation of refugee scholars to American graduate schools have been incalculable. It is not for us to criticize her lack of faith that, just as a critical political tradition arose in response to past terrors, so may another arise out of ours, this time built on different assumptions. If that event takes place it will not be despite the warnings of Dr. Arendt and her fellow scholars but by their aid, especially the intellectual discipline that they have so generously taught. It is in her avowed purpose of offering "experience in *how to think*" that she makes a very great contribution which no one should ignore.—PHILIP S. HARING, *Knox College*.

Machiavelli and Renaissance Italy. BY J. R. HALE.
(New York: The Macmillan Company. 1960.
Pp. xii, 240. \$2.50.)

The name of Machiavelli arouses diverse passions in the minds of most students of political thought. People seem to actively like or dislike what he had to say. There are few neutrals. The ideas which have made the term "Machiavellian" an epithet to some and which elicit approbation from others all too often arise from a reading of Machiavelli's *The Prince* and selections from the *Discourses*, apart from the history of the man and the period in which he lived. Too little has been done in English on the life and times of Machiavelli in an attempt to show in some detail the relationship between Machiavelli's world and the things he wrote.

This book, one of a series entitled "Teach Yourself History," intends (as do the others in the series) by way of biography to "... open up a significant historical theme." It is the first biography in English which gives in a short space a comprehensive narrative of the year-by-year life of Machiavelli and connects this with his writings.

The stated purpose of this volume is to provide information on Machiavelli's social and political environment, to examine his major works in light of these, and to answer such questions about his work as: What were their purposes? For what audience was each written? On what experience was Machiavelli drawing?

Little attention is given to the political history of Florence during Machiavelli's youth; the detailed account begins with the year 1498, Machiavelli's involvement with the newly established Republic of Florence, and his letters concerning Savonarola. Nearly half of the book is given over

to following Machiavelli's journeys, negotiations, and writings intertwined with social and political events (including such things as the long and bitter struggle to return Pisa to Tuscany) of the period from 1498 to 1512, the date of the return of the Medici and the dismissal of Machiavelli from his position in the Florentine chancery. This "education" of Machiavelli in a period of almost constant crisis provided the basis for his works on domestic politics and foreign affairs, on war and peace; the account is handled well and succinctly.

The last half of the book covers the years from 1513 to Machiavelli's death in 1527. During this period—in which he was either in active disfavor with the Medici or was not trusted for major missions—Machiavelli produced *The Prince*, the *Discourses*, *The Art of War*, *The History of Florence*, and various other literary works. The author continues his careful examination of the political and historical setting, the audience to which the works were addressed, and the mind of Machiavelli as revealed in his social and public life and in his letters.

Hale, a Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, is a competent scholar and translator. His studies and writings emphasize the Italian Renaissance. The scholarship in this volume is solid though it is not cumbered by footnotes and cross references. It is readable and should stimulate those readers who desire to learn more in detail of this segment of the western heritage.

This is not a definitive history of Renaissance Italy or Florence; nor is it a definitive biography of Machiavelli. It was not so intended. It supplies answers to the questions it raises. Some may differ at points with certain "facts." (For example, Hale, contrary to a long line of scholars who have held that the *Discourses* were begun in 1513, holds that they followed *The Prince* and reflect, in part, the events to 1515 when he believes the work was undertaken.) This is a sound job which fills a void for both teachers and students of political thought.—JOHN W. BAKER, *The College of Wooster*.

Escape from Authority: The Perspectives of Erich Fromm. BY JOHN H. SCHAAR. (New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1961, Pp. x, 349. \$6.50.)

Despite his fame as a psychoanalyst, his fashionably deviant flirtations with Zen Buddhism and facets of existentialism, his merits as a critic of contemporary values, his contribution toward the understanding of the relationship between character and the appeals of fascism in Germany, Erich Fromm, when playing the role of social philosopher, is a square: his vision of the good life lacks psychological sophistication, his claim to a scientific genesis for his ethical biases is naive, his recommendations for reform are

alternately fuzzy and pedestrian, his vocabulary (which relies heavily upon such ambiguous terms as "productivity," "love," and "spontaneity" to designate approved traits of personality) is vulnerable to critical semantic analysis, and the bulk of his work rests upon a mass of contradictory and dubious premises. Such is the harsh, but largely substantiated, judgment rendered by this book.

Casting his argument in the form of a dialogue with the author of *Man for Himself*, *The Sane Society* and *Escape from Freedom*, Schaar, who is Professor of Political Science at the University of California (Berkeley), systematically exposes the shoddy conceptual foundations of Fromm's utopian thought. He accomplishes his task of intellectual demolition with tenacity, analytical discrimination, and unusual (but not unfailing) literary elegance and lucidity. Like a well-organized teacher, he periodically announces his intentions, generally carries them out, and then reminds the reader of what is supposed to have been achieved. The style of presentation mitigates against possible oversight of any of Schaar's major themes.

Schaar's attitude toward Fromm is not ungenerous. At the outset, he declares that "the major premise of the dialogue is that Erich Fromm is a man worth talking to." In his opinion, Fromm is a "good" social critic. He regards Fromm's concept of character formation as "an excellent instrument of description and analysis," and evaluates *Escape from Freedom* "as one of the finest examples in modern social science of what C. Wright Mills calls 'the sociological imagination.'"

But the dominant tone of the book is sharply critical. The basic needs imputed to man in *The Sane Society*—relatedness, transcendence, rootedness, identity, and frame of orientation and devotion—can be fulfilled (and have been fulfilled), as Schaar demonstrates, by hate and destructiveness, the twin emotions Fromm seeks to eradicate. Although he takes note of death in his writings, Fromm lacks the courage of despair and an appreciation of the inadequacy of Marxian social therapy for curing the deep wounds of individual alienation. In a sense, Schaar thus sets Fromm on the same cliff-face with Rousseau and Marx, struggling onward and upward to the good society—with Freud, resigned to the inevitability of tragedy, poised at the bottom, prepared to account for the predictable dizziness and rapid descents of the climbers. Without "a clear and accurate conception of the political," Fromm "cannot see that when authority is lacking fashion reigns," and the "regime of fashion is not constitutional." After brilliantly linking the psychological concept of guilt to the concept of authority, Schaar concludes that if Fromm's

writings "are collected and published in a uniform edition, they might be issued under the title *Fear of Authority*."

While engaged in his controversy with Fromm, Schaar, whose interests obviously embrace numerous and diverse frames of discourse, cannot refrain from unburdening himself of statements of preference which are extraneous to his main arguments. Thus he believes that Freud, evidently in contrast with Fromm, "developed a penetrating theory of character" and possessed "the insight of genius." He damns political realists who focus on interest and power as men who "are always bumping into themselves and into each other." He condemns Fromm for failing to answer such hazy questions as: "Under what conditions should political power be used to spur the efforts of recalcitrant classes and interests? Under what conditions should political power be used to arrest the retrograde tendencies of one or another class or interest?" He commits some of the sins which he attributes to Fromm when he demands the substitution of his cant for Fromm's: "Tact, respect, pride in achievement, delight in variety, admiration of excellence—these, and not sympathy and sincerity disguised as love, are the basic constituents of that larger and nobler community of human excellence toward which our age can aspire." And he casually interjects a conclusion which relegates to a heap of irrelevance a huge aggregate of polemical efforts, including his own: "The ultimate choices which guide an ethical system are esthetic and temperamental, and I am willing to put my differences with Fromm on these grounds."

Schaar has some important things to say about Erich Fromm, and he says them well in this book; the elaboration of his own values deserves a separate book.—MERLE KLING, *Washington University (St. Louis)*.

A Case Study of High Level Administration in a Large Organization. BY JOHN D. GLOVER AND PAUL R. LAWRENCE. (Boston: Harvard University, Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1960. Pp. vi, 120. \$2.)

This case study is the product of an enviable opportunity accorded the authors (both of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration) by Eugene M. Zuckert, presently Secretary of the Air Force. Mr. Zuckert, in the fall of 1951, invited the authors to make an intensive study of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Management) which he had headed since its inception in 1947. The study was intended solely for use by the Department of the Air Force and was not released for general publication until 1959.

Located at the top level of civilian control and policy formulation, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Management) was viewed as a significant innovation in administration—an office at the highest level whose central concern was management, the promotion of maximum departmental efficiency, the realization of greatest results with limited resources. It was the authors' hope that the study of this Office's concrete experience would lead to some conclusions as to "the kinds of methods, behavior, and administrative philosophy which produced useful results and those which did not." (The period and concentration of time devoted to this study is never made clear, except to say that it was as intensive as limited time permitted.)

Following a brief Introduction explaining its origin and purposes, the study examines the environment in which the Office worked. Environment is important, the authors believe. It may somewhat condition the actions of the administrator and at the very least "is the backdrop against which the administrator acts out his role." Various environmental factors, some general, some particular, are noted. Important among these are the military character of the organization, the resignation of Symington as Assistant Secretary and his succession by Thomas Finletter, and various technical and budgetary trends.

The organization, functions, internal and external relationships of the Office are the foci of Chapter III. Formally but vaguely charged with responsibilities in the formulation and supervision of policies for business management, including those connected with program control, civilian personnel, organization planning, mobilization, and the Departmental budget, Zuckert had built a staff varying in number from fifteen to twenty-five and divided into a group of civilian deputies and special assistants which handled the more important policy and operating problems, and a military executive staff performing most of the routine paper work and liaison with "the working levels of the Air Staff."

A chapter entitled "Patterns of Administrative Attitudes, Behavior, and Results" is largely devoted to showing that in the years 1947-52, the administrative attitudes and behavior of the Office of the Assistant Secretary fell into two patterns, designated A and B. Pattern A, negative and bad, was marked by "feelings of frustration, self-seeking, hostility, suspicion, by relationships of mistrust, nonconfidence, arm's length dealings, . . . and by a lessened capacity on the part of the organization on the whole to solve problems." Pattern B, positive and good, was marked by a tone of humility, cooperativeness, candor, willingness to give and take.

Evidence of the presence of these behavioral and attitudinal patterns was obtained chiefly by interview and is presented in the form of brief quotations unrelated to any substantive issue. The authors acknowledge the danger of oversimplification in their methodology.

The study concludes with a number of admonitions to top level administrators which as the authors recognize, have been made by other students of administration. Among these are the need for perspective—to keep major goals in view while retaining flexibility and the capacity to compromise on lesser things—and the need to work effectively with others.

In the judgment of this reviewer, this is not a satisfactory or rewarding study. Some of the reasons are clear; others can only be a matter of speculation.

To begin, the study appears to suffer seriously from the limitation of its origins. Because it was undertaken for use by those already familiar with the organization, functions, and relationships which are its subject, the authors were precluded from the kind of treatment that would have been given had they been writing for the general readership of students of administration. (The fact that with two exceptions names are invariably disguised and positions often so does not contribute to this weakness.) The scope of the study is exceedingly ambitious in relation to the space available, and quite possibly to the time which could be given to it. There is an abundance of easy, high-level generalizations. Rigorous, careful examination of organizational lines, administrative functions, and intradepartmental relationships is nowhere to be found. Study of the substantive problems and responsibilities of the Office is explicitly excluded. The acknowledged oversimplification in the chapter dealing with patterns of administrative attitudes does not invest it with value for students familiar with the available body of literature on administrative behavior. Had there emerged the clear picture of a first-class administrator (and the preface makes plain that the authors believe Mr. Zuckert to be such), moving with skill and imagination to meet the challenging and essentially creative task that confronted him in 1947, this study could have had substantial value. The figure of the administrator is rarely visible, and never developed. Again one assumes that the conditions implicit in the study denied the authors the opportunity for such development.—CHESTER B. EARLE, *The American University*.

The Judicial Decision: Toward a Theory of Legal Justification. BY RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961. Pp. 197. \$5.00.)

Professor Wasserstrom has undertaken in this study to provide both a descriptive and a prescriptive analysis of the process by which judicial decisions are made and should be made within the framework of the Anglo-American legal system. The orientation of his study is distinctly toward the "how" side of the judicial process.

The central theme of the work is the question of what would constitute desirable decision procedure. And it is around a consideration of three alternative, although not mutually exclusive, doctrines of judicial justification that the study turns: First, a consideration of the procedure of *precedent* wherein the appeal is to the relevant existing legal rule. Second, a consideration of the procedure of *equity* wherein the appeal is to that which is just or equitable for the particular case. And third, a consideration of what Professor Wasserstrom has chosen to give the not wholly satisfactory label of a "*two-level procedure of justification*." It is his thesis that this third procedure, by way of comparison with the other two, involves "... certain distinctive attributes of each while eliminating some of the more serious deficiencies of both."

The two-level procedure of justification, it is claimed, resembles precedent in that an appeal to a legal rule is a necessary condition for deciding a case in a certain way; but the legal rule *alone* will not suffice. The resemblance to equity is found, of course, in that considerations of justice are directly relevant to the justification of any decision. But it is the *justice of the legal rule* rather than the justice of the particular decision that constitutes the sufficient justification.

Thus, Wasserstrom is seeking to come to grips with the time-honored problem of the law: How to devise a decision process which combines the elements of certainty, stability, and predictability associated with precedent with the flexibility and adaptability associated with equity.

One of the more vigorous contentions of the author is his claim that the two-level procedure of justification can tend to mitigate the effects of bias, mistake, and ignorance in a way not likely to be attained under equitable procedure. He stresses that the two-level doctrine, in requiring the judge to make explicit the premises of his argument, thereby minimizes the appearance of judicial whim and caprice in the decision making process.

It is to the author's credit that he does not claim more for his thesis than would be warranted. He is candid in stating that the study does not present a definitive theory of how all cases ought to be decided. Hence the sub-title *Toward a Theory of Legal Justification*. Perhaps of greater importance is his recognition that his two-level procedure "... may be very much like the pro-

cedure of justification most often described as that which the courts have in fact usually employed."

These disclaimers in no way detract, however, from the merit of the work. It is a good piece of scholarship, although a bit uneven. The digression in Chapter Six on Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism causes the book to lose some of its tightness of organization.

The process by which courts seek to justify their decisions has had inadequate study from the legal and political science fraternities. Professor Wasserstrom's study faces up to some of the problems that too often have been treated inadequately or wholly ignored. It may be that the decision making formula offered in this work contains procedural safeguards that could protect the courts in some measure against the extremes of abuse and criticism leveled by the militant critics of sociological jurisprudence.—RAYMOND H. GUSTESON, *Ohio University*.

War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be Conducted Justly? BY PAUL RAMSEY. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1961. Pp. xxiv, 331. \$6.00.)

The most recent study published for the Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity and Politics, this book deserves the respectful attention of those involved in nuclear statecraft and of all students of ethics and war. For the volume represents nothing less than an effort to work out a version of the traditional theory of the just war which developed in Christian thought and to use it to validate and encourage a self-disciplined armament system limited in means and purposes.

For his considerable undertaking Professor Ramsey returns to St. Augustine's commentary on war and peace and interprets the early Christian idea of a justified war as one that did not presume the full ability of men to know a just from an unjust cause. The Bishop of Hippo, it is said, was more confident of men's capacity to know the moral limits of armed conflict than of their power to state with precision which party is righteous and which is not. Later ages forgot or misunderstood this basic point that the author convincingly demonstrates as crucial for the task of returning today's international politics to a morality of means. Examining the changes in the ideas about a just war during the Middle Ages, the inquiry selects for lasting importance those rules that give immunity to non-combatants. More than once this immunity is said to be binding on the totally organized society of this century as it was on the feudal order, though no specialized reasons are given as to how this is possible. In understandable fear of absolutism,

Professor Ramsey turns aside from medieval attempts to define "justice" in accordance with natural law and looks to supernatural charity for guidance.

Unlike Roland H. Bainton's *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace* which rejects the crusade and the just war, the present book does not distinguish between the conflict in which the enemy is without rights and the struggle with ethical controls over methods and objectives. Clearly the confusion of these types of war has damaged the reputation of the doctrine of the just war and placed an added responsibility on its proponents to show that they are not the same thing and may be opposed to each other. Although Professor Ramsey does not meet this problem, he is well aware that since the Enlightenment the trend has been to dismiss the idea of a just war as an exercise in self-justification. And he labors diligently to prove that the idea has built-in limitations which are not to be found elsewhere. In the process he removes most of the scholastic paint from the *justum bellum*; but owing to the lack of enthusiasm for it among modern Protestants, he relies for support on a few Roman Catholic writers, particularly Fathers John C. Ford and John Courtney Murray, and, among laymen and public figures, Thomas E. Murray. The author probably overestimates the influence of these men within their confession in this country. As a Protestant he criticizes rigid aspects of Roman Catholic moral theology. Yet generally he is attracted to Roman Catholic views about "double effect," institutional rather than individual responsibility in matters of state, and the use of rightful force for Christian ends.

When he reviews American Protestant thinking on war, Professor Ramsey finds chaos and "Calvinism gone to seed." He warmly criticizes the Provisional Study Document on atomic war issued in 1958 by the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches for assuming that the abolition of war is the first and last goal, thereby fallaciously equating the Peace of God with the truces of men, and for rejecting "the option of making living contact again with just war theory." Discussing nuclear test bans and the possible future effects of fall-out, he scores neo-orthodox spokesmen for excessive hand-wringing about the future. Testing *may* be necessary to make possible the managed use of limited force. Even the "aggressor-defender" concept of war is attacked as an inferior model.

The alternative held out is "counter-forces" warfare, possibly allowing the use of "small" nuclear weapons, but certainly banning the manufacture and possession of tools for killing non-combatants or for use with a policy of deterrence. With this qualification, some ABC weapons might be licit, but amorality will be given strong medicine: gradual, *unilateral* steps toward this rational system permitting justified war. The Herman Kahn type of conflict is also rejected.

At a minimum the book supplies an overdue refinement of the just war theory at a time when choices are obscured by the language of nuclear pacifism. I would rank the study as a valuable contribution to the restoration of the tradition of the Christian conscience about war as a rich source for guides to action.—PAUL F. POWER, *University of Cincinnati*.

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership. By JAMES Q. WILSON. (Glencoe, Ill. The Free Press, 1960. Pp. x, 342. \$5.00.)

James Wilson's sophisticated analysis of Negro leadership in the northern "Black Metropolis" makes a substantial contribution to our understanding of Negro politics. It is a valuable addition to the literature on urban politics generally, not only because of the growing importance of Negroes in city government, but also because of the pains taken to place Negro politics in adequate contextual background. The book provides a major case study centered mainly on Chicago, but some comparative data are drawn from Detroit, Los Angeles and New York.

Thus the upsurge of militancy in the South, exemplified in student adaptations of Gandhian civil disobedience tactics and Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference, lies outside the analysis. There is also some imbalance in the primary reliance on conditions in Chicago. However, there are enough data to sustain insightful, albeit tentative, comparisons of the general characteristics of Negro civic and political leadership in the northern urban setting.

Wilson describes political organization in the Negro community as a response to the metropolitan political system of which it is a part. For example, the tight political machine of Congressman William Dawson is shown as an adaptation to the way politics is organized generally in Chicago. By contrast, New York's more manifold power bases facilitate the maverick and mass appeal roles of Congressman Adam Clayton Powell. More particularized kinds of questions are also raised, such as the effort to explain the differential speed at which Negroes attained high political office in various cities. The rate of Negro immigration, the density of the Negro area, and the size of the basic political unit tend to account for these differences with respect to elective offices. Surprisingly, "the strength of the organization seems unrelated to, and in some cases hinders, the ability of Negroes to secure important appointive offices in the state and local governments."

Moreover, the strength of the Negro "machine" does not significantly determine the size of the party's vote, nor the number of straight ticket votes. Nor is this to be accounted for as a consequence of ineptness, for "Negro Democratic precinct captains, by and large, are more able than are those in other wards where the native and foreign-born whites have found more attractive and less arduous routes for personal achievement." Under the light of Wilson's compelling

evidence, a number of deductively drawn theses concerning the impact of strong party organization will have to be abandoned.

Civic leaders are contrasted with politicians, and it is one of the contributions of the book that it clarifies the minimal overlap between these roles in the Negro community. Negro politicians interact with white politicians and share their tendency to respond to immediate (the politicians see these as "realistic") interests. Race relations issues on the grand scale of civil rights politics are carried on by civic organizations, and are frequently initiated by white leaders rather than by Negroes. Indeed a basic reformulation of the conventional model of protest is provided. The flow of protest action is not simply from the point at which injustices are experienced to the governmental decision-makers. Most often, the action is initiated at pre-existing organizational levels as a part of the process by which professionals justify their organizational existences. The action then consists of mobilizing symbols of mass support from a sometimes apathetic community, and with only nominal support (and sometimes opposition) from Negro politicians.

Paradoxically, this analytical model provides both the strength and weakness of the book. The revised model is undoubtedly sound as a standard framework with which to confront normal organizational and political situations. But the tendency is to reckon only with these "normal" relationships when stabilized conditions maximize community apathy, and when career ambitions and organizational supports depend on "maintaining connections" in *status quo* channels of influence. But there have been critical conditions in the history of the Negro protest when normalcy did not prevail, and when protest leadership and organization changed dynamically. Indeed, such is now the case in the revolution in race relations and protest movements in the South. And the cumulative consequences of that resurgent militancy have necessarily begun to alter the style of northern Negro politics as well.

The dilemma over conflicting goals of Negro leaders is acutely examined. Long term "status" gains frequently conflict with more immediately alleviating "welfare" gains. Thus, the desire for more hospital beds or more school facilities conflicts with all-out opposition to existing segregation patterns. To place these much needed facilities in Negro neighborhoods makes them automatically "jim crow," and provides an implicit acceptance of segregation. At the same time, the very status goal of complete integration in housing may well require acceptance of quotas if

whites are not to flee "overly" integrated areas thereby merely extending ghetto boundaries.

The race problem is easily the most vital domestic issue confronting the United States. Our international standing also is much affected by this blot on our claim to democratic world leadership. Remarkably, there is a paucity of scholarly attention to the politics of intergroup relations despite its importance and the abundance of case materials available for research. The skills of political scientists are badly needed to supplement the many studies of prejudice and discrimination which social-psychologists have provided. It is to be hoped that James Wilson's fine study of Negro politics will stimulate other political scientists to lend their talents to this vital area of research.—HERBERT GARFINKEL, *Michigan State University*.

Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration. BY SHERMAN ADAMS. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. Pp. xvi, 481. \$5.95.)

The publication of the recollections of Sherman Adams marks the beginning of the inevitable spate of books by and about the key figures of the Eisenhower administration. One may hope that his coming successors—including, notably, the former President himself—will offer us a more distinctive picture of the past administration than this volume affords.

Yet Adams occupied a vantage point of special dimensions. His publishers are not reluctant in their assertions of the uniqueness of the observations offered by the man who was *The Assistant* to the President. The reader will be disappointed: there are few facts here that have not been broadcast by the wire services and few interpretations not previously offered by the columnists.

But perhaps this is too much to ask. Perhaps all that memoirs should contribute are characterizations, profiles, perspectives. Still, Adams is loath to do any of these things. The image of President Eisenhower that emerges from his pages is thinly outlined and inconclusive. It is, at best, the picture of a well-intentioned man beset by ill health (more than the public knew), fits of despondency and his own lack of political sophistication. John Foster Dulles would seem to have been knowledgeable, if perhaps a little too certain of his knowledge, but most of all jealously, almost pettily, concerned with the prerogatives of his position. C. D. Jackson and "Bobbie" Cutler receive a lion's share of favorable mention but fail to emerge as real persons. As forceful a personality as the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy here fails to come through in these pages: the Wisconsin senator, it turns out, was duped into anti-administration action by those nasty

Democrats, Stuart Symington and John L. McClellan (needless to say, the assertion is without supporting evidence)!

The late Senator Robert A. Taft is one of the few figures in Mr. Adams' narrative who seem to come to life. Whether in support or in criticism of the administration, the Bob Taft we see here is forthright, vigorous and sharply perceived. Senator Knowland's picture is less objective perhaps but still breathing reality. Few other figures passing through these pages rise above routine description.

Most regrettably, the author himself remains indistinct and inscrutable. This man who for the better part of two Presidential terms was thought to hold the key to the Chief Executive's deliberations and decisions time and again disappears behind an impersonal, plural "we." When the reader would hope to learn which single person did or said what, Adams only tells us that President Eisenhower never told him specifically what duties were entrusted to him; he also asserts that he never acted contrary to the Chief Executive's will. At the risk of exaggerating one could almost say that Sherman Adams would have us know that he was a very important personage in those days but he is reluctant to tell us why or how.

But it is not fair to belabor Adams so. He has probably told us all that it was possible for him to tell. The pressure which publishers and public (including political scientists) exert on former public figures to "tell all" produces results of rather questionable value. If a retired statesman discusses events as he recalls them he may not only offer a highly subjective picture but may do injury to persons and damage to good causes. Many memoirs of recent years were thus written "under wraps." Sherman Adams was hardly free to write without inhibitions as long as Eisenhower had not written—and he may not feel free then. Indiscretions are more likely to be committed by chambermaids and seamstresses than by persons accustomed to the responsibilities of public office—unless, of course, the latter want to be indiscreet for good reason.

Sherman Adams, obviously, had no desire to commit indiscretions. Much of his narrative covers well-known ground and not always is one even aware of the author as the observer. The writing is smooth and the organization effective but this is not likely to be remembered as *the story* of the Eisenhower administration.—FRANCIS H. HELLER, *University of Kansas*.

Romance and Realism in Southern Politics. BY T. HARRY WILLIAMS. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1961. Pp. xii, 84, \$2.50.)

For many years it was popular to stereotype the South and Southern politics in terms of a

romantic harking back to the glory of the *ante bellum* days. In an engaging little book based on a series of lectures delivered at Mercer University, the distinguished authority on the Civil War, T. Harry Williams, has sought to explode the myth associated with this stereotype. Williams' version of post-Civil War history depicts the politics of the South as running in two directions. The first, fitting the old stereotype, is referred to as romantic and is dominated by those who characteristically glory in the past. The second, fitting Williams' definition of realist, encompasses all those individuals and groups who put aside the past and deal with the "real" issues of the day—existing economic struggles. In developing his categories Williams unfolds case studies from the Reconstruction Period, the Populist era, and the Depression of the 1930's.

Had this work appeared prior to World War II it would rightly have taken its place alongside of Beard's *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* as a groundbreaker in historical writing. Appearing in 1961 in the light of present social science knowledge an economic determinist classification of the terms "romance" and "realism" is perhaps itself a bit romantic.

Williams' third vignette interpreting the depression politics of Huey Long's Louisiana is most illustrative of this. Referring to the contribution of Huey Long the author says, "He forcibly introduced a large element of realism into Southern politics. He asked the South to turn its gaze from outside devils and the imagined past and take a long hard look at itself and the present." Long, of course, as the author states so well, did arouse the economic "have nots" in Louisiana and gained for them political ascendancy. But like the "romantics" that he belabors who swept economic issues under the rug, Huey himself avoided certain "real" issues, particularly those involving racial strife (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan question in 1924).

Huey Long's heir to the throne in Louisiana, Earl Long, continued in the same tradition and apparently did so calculatingly. In his public utterances he talked of economic conflicts, the need to aid the "have-nots" and the avoidance of reality by those who would bring up the race question. But in a most candid private conversation with A. J. Liebling he acknowledged the importance of the struggle between the white supremacists and the forces of desegregation and even predicted ultimate victory for those who seek racial equality.

Economic motivation has always been a major element in political conflict, but Professor Williams has fallen prey to the charm of the Longs if he assumes that it represents the sum total of the ingredients of the "real" issues of the

day now or in the past. Anyone who has had the experience of observing the political process in the South from close range, as this reviewer has, is abundantly aware of the stark realities of the forces in conflict which far transcend any explanation of realism in simple economic determinist terms.—ROBERT S. FRIEDMAN, *University of Michigan*.

Our National Park Policy: A Critical History. By JOHN ISE. (Baltimore: 1961. Pp. xiii, 701. \$10.00.)

This work by an economist, who has previously written histories of forest policy and of oil policy, is essentially a chronicle of events relating to the establishment and management of the national parks. Although sub-titled "A Critical History," the book is primarily concerned with criticism of those who have attacked the national park program. Professor Ise is too fond of the parks and of the National Park Service to be very analytical, let alone critical, of what has been accomplished since 1916 when the National Park Service was created. In the tradition of the Conservation Movement and of Progressive historians generally, he portrays the struggle between those favoring the parks and those opposing them as primarily a battle between good and evil.

The account is meticulous in its detail, but does not put the policy and program developments into a social or political context. As a reference history, the book will be of considerable value to political scientists, but as an account of policy processes or administrative decision-making, it leaves much to be desired.

The study is divided into three parts: "The Early Parks: 1872-1916"; "The National Park Service: 1916-1959"; and "Special Park Problems." Part two is the longest and most detailed, being a history organized in terms of the several National Park Service directors.

The book is one of the conservation studies supported by Resources for the Future, Inc.—NORMAN WENGERT, *Wayne State University*.

Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915. By ARTHUR S. LINK. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. Pp. x, 736. \$10.00.)

This is the third volume of Professor Link's multi-volume biography of Woodrow Wilson, the first volume of which appeared in 1947. The first two volumes of this series, together with two other important books dealing with Wilson and his era, have established the author as the premier Wilson scholar. The present work will further enhance that reputation.

The first two volumes brought Wilson to the presidency and dealt with domestic politics dur-

ing his first two and a half years in the White House. This volume is devoted exclusively to problems of foreign policy in the eighteen months from the outbreak of war in Europe to the resolution of the *Arabic* crisis in October 1915. The successive crises growing out of the war in Europe have, inevitably, received most of the author's attention, but there are five chapters in which he discusses perceptively and in detail the formation of policies relating to Mexico, the Caribbean, and Japan's ambitions in China. These chapters are, as Professor Link ruefully admits, distractions both for him and the reader as they were also for Wilson, but they were important in their time and added a confusing dimension to Wilson's efforts to develop a viable policy in our relations with Great Britain and Germany.

The story of American neutrality in 1914-1915 is one which has been many times told by scholars. The basic outline of events is well known, and the author can add new information only in matters of detail. The contribution of this work is that, as may be expected in a biography, it places Wilson in the central position of the narrative as he clearly was in the formulation of policy. It is not only a well known story; it is one which offers ample room for differences in judgment and interpretation, and in this respect it is as controversial today as it has been for almost half a century. Professor Link has provided a straightforward narrative, without heroes or villains and without any overriding theme save that of a hard working and conscientious president striving diligently, if sometimes perplexedly, to maintain American neutrality and to defend, as best he could, American interests on the high seas. As each issue develops, the author seeks to understand the motives which impelled Wilson and others to act as they did, but this he does without either persistent praise or criticism. The picture which emerges will satisfy neither the admirers nor the critics of the President. It was in Wilson's efforts to bring stability and democracy to Mexico and the Caribbean that his policies appeared most vulnerable. There he was often ill informed, sometimes naive, and ultimately was forced to adopt actions wholly inconsistent with the high principles he professed.

This volume, like its predecessors, reflects the prodigious research of the author. It seems very unlikely that any future writer can add any significant information concerning the development and implementation of American policy in 1914-1915. It is, therefore, close to being a definitive study. It is only because the topics with which he has dealt are so open to a variety of judgments that we may assume that this distinguished work is not the last word on American neutrality in 1914-1915.—HAROLD WHITMAN BRADLEY, *Vanderbilt University*.

Referendum for Isolation: Defeat of Article Ten of the League of Nations Covenant, BY JOHN CHALMERS VINSON. (Athens, Ga: University of Georgia Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 148. \$2.50.)

The Wilson era, with its rich materials on political conflict and vast portent for modern America, is a favorite subject of American historians. Not least exhaustively explored among the events of the period is the defeat of the League Covenant at the hands of the United States Senate. With research time made available by a Guggenheim fellowship, Professor Vinson of the University of Georgia History Department has succumbed to the lure of the League controversy and written a brief history of the rise and fall of Article Ten of the Covenant.

The author disclaims any attempt to present an overall view of the League debate or pass final judgment on the importance of Article Ten to the ultimate defeat of the Covenant. Hence the book must find its *raison d'être* in bringing to light new facts about Article Ten or new insights into the events of this troubled period. No one else has tried to isolate Article Ten from the rest of the Covenant and write a book to show that the mutual guarantee of each member's territorial integrity was out of harmony with traditional American foreign policy. To this extent Vinson has a new approach. Yet, despite the rather copious quotations from various collections of private papers, the narrative never seems to go far beyond existing secondary sources. It is probably fair to say that Professor Vinson recognizes this and lays no claim, implied or otherwise, to unearthing new facts.

From the preface it is clear that his intended contribution lies in a suggested new interpretation of the facts. Personal hatred, partisan spite, and blind stubbornness, he feels, have been properly emphasized as prime causes for the rejection of the League. But there has been a corresponding—and unwarranted—neglect of the honest differences of opinion which divided protagonists in the struggle. In the hope of remedying the latter, the author attempts, as he puts it, to "isolate the element of truth in the League debate, to examine the logical as opposed to the emotional causes for its rejection."

If the "elements of truth" thus isolated are distilled to their barest essentials, they run something like this: opponents of the League, though partisan and at times petty, were sincere in their opposition to the extensive international commitments contained in Article Ten; the American people, likewise, were still responsive to the isolationist tradition; and the article was rejected because it was out of harmony with this persisting tradition of limited commitments in American

foreign policy. Few students would care to deny these generalizations. At the same time, they scarcely rise to the level of significant new insights.

Until the second world war the importance of the isolationist tradition and honest differences of opinion may have been somewhat neglected. More recently however, historians and students of foreign policy have commonly given these aspects of the controversy due emphasis—e.g., Robert E. Osgood (1953), John A. Garraty (1956), Selig Adler (1957) and Arthur S. Link (1957). Furthermore, the spite, the stubbornness and the partisanship can hardly be over-emphasized when dealing with the loss of the Covenant as a whole. Except for those influences, no one doubts that the Covenant would have been approved in one form or another, the isolationist tradition notwithstanding. Granted, they are less important when Article Ten is considered alone. But how many reputable scholars have ever taken the position that Article Ten did not raise serious, honest doubts in the minds of the Senate and the public at large?

Referendum for Isolation is not a bad book. It is not unskillfully written, the facts are straight, the citations adequate, the index excellent. It has the virtue of brevity. The conclusions throughout are reasonable and rendered with scholarly detachment. Yet in the mind of this reviewer, it falls short of making a significant new contribution to our understanding of the period.—ROBERT E. RIGGS, *University of Arizona*.

Powers of the President During Crises. By J. MALCOLM SMITH AND CORNELIUS P. COTTER (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press. 1960. pp. viii, 184. \$5.00.)

This book is a helpful contribution to the complex of questions involving the ability of constitutional democracies to reconcile the imperatives of national survival and individual freedom. The research task which the authors set for themselves was to survey and classify the statutes delegating emergency power to the executive branch in the United States during the period 1933–1955. The important result is an exhaustive, well-organized, and henceforth authoritative catalogue of emergency legislation. On the basis of their survey, the authors discuss some of the problems raised by emergency legislation and suggest solutions for them.

Smith and Cotter prefer to conceptualize the problems involved in the expansion of executive power as those of achieving effective action within the bounds of constitutionalism, i.e., without surrendering “the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power and political responsibility of the government to the governed.” They eschew the

idea of a “constitutional dictatorship” which, they feel, implies the suspension of basic constitutional safeguards and which ignores the British and American lesson that such suspension is not necessary. Discussions of the techniques and the adequacy of congressional and judicial restraints on emergency powers are related to the problem of preserving constitutionalism.

The statutory survey and the generalizations which flow therefrom constitute the strength of the book. Thus it seems clear, on the evidence marshalled here, that the scope of emergency legislation has nearly “shorn” the concept “emergency” of its meaning, that the term is used often “for the legitimization of ordinarily suspect governmental action desired by influential groups” (the National Defense Education Act is an excellent recent example), that legislative restrictions on individual freedom of action have steadily increased, and that the legislature has increasingly sought “to share the detailed burdens of administration.”

It is questionable, however, whether the technique employed herein (i.e. surveying the statute books) advances the authors very far toward their larger purpose of making “an assessment of the adequacy with which democratic government has, in the recurrent economic and military emergencies since 1933, combined . . .” mobilization for survival with the protection of individual freedom. One cannot judge the “adequacy” of overall performance—nor the excessiveness of congressional checks, nor the preferred role of the Supreme Court, without first establishing clear standards and then collecting evidence as to how a given statute was in fact implemented. The standards of constitutionalism are established—albeit in very general terms. More troublesome, however, is the existence of a huge data gap between the letter of the law and the kind of analysis of legislative intent plus actual operation which alone will support conclusions about adequate performance. One need only compare the authors’ reading of a provision of the Defense Appropriations Act of 1955 with Edith T. Carper’s detailed study of that same provision in the ICP series to measure the width of the data gap involved. The authors realize full well the need for additional studies, but at key junctures of judgment their own data are made to carry a heavier load of conclusions than they can bear.

In preference to “the unrealistically detailed and restrictive emergency provisions of existing statutes,” the authors want Congress to enact a single law empowering the President to proclaim a thirty-day emergency and to issue rules and regulations under it. Congress would possess the authority to revoke Presidential action by concurrent resolution, and would establish for legisla-

tive control techniques "to serve an interest which is broad and public." "We must free congressmen from constituency loyalties and subject them to party discipline." The Supreme Court should confine its activity to deciding only whether or not Presidential action squares with congressional intent. These final prescriptions should command interest. The lasting contribution of the book, however, is the rich reference list of emergency statutes which form a substantive base on which future research can rest.—RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., *University of Rochester*.

The Crossroads of Liberalism—Croly, Weyl, Lippmann and *The Progressive Era, 1900–1925*. By CHARLES FORCEY. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. xxix, 358. \$7.00)

Mr. Forcey's book focuses on the years 1909 (the date of publication of Herbert Croly's *The Promise of American Life*) to 1914 (the date of the founding of the New Republic), and the roles of three of the New Republic's editors, Herbert Croly, Walter Weyl, and Walter Lippmann. The roles of these scholars in public affairs and their relationships with associates in journalism as well as in public life have been exhaustively documented in the book under review. The central figure is Herbert Croly; his great book the standard for judgment of ideas, leaders, and even public programs. Most of the prominent figures of the progressive period are identified in the development which is essentially narrative in its method.

To criticize the historical treatment of the wealth of episodic material is best left to the historians and their journals. Of importance to political scientists in connection with this treatment, however, is the evaluation of the political ideas and their relationship to the state. Although the book is not analytical in this respect, the concepts of political thought it contains must be given consideration.

Efforts to find a consistent pattern in American liberalism have always met with frustration, but if any one principle unites liberals in its support and conservatives against it today it is positive government, government acting in full authority and with adequate instruments to meet the problems and issues both domestic and foreign, using means that are based on standards of freedom and democracy toward ends similarly described. American pluralism makes it impossible that any one issue should monopolize political debate, and complex position variances on these several issues are found among people who are grouped toward the "liberal" end of the political spectrum.

American liberalism during the first two decades of the twentieth century was caught up in the Progressive movement. Mr. Forcey assumes

the task of delineating various strands of this pragmatic movement and finds that they may be grouped into those that are Jeffersonian in origin and dedication on the one hand and those that are based on Hamiltonian means but seek Jeffersonian ends on the other. Unfortunately, in Mr. Forcey's view, liberals of the progressive period too often chose to take the Jeffersonian route, characterized by democracy, civil liberty, and most of all laissez-faire. To have taken the other direction would have made possible the attainment of "Jeffersonian ends by Hamiltonian means." Populism does not fit into either category, being a mutation or perhaps a hybrid combination of democracy and socialism, so it is not mentioned in the list of reform movements arising in the country between 1800 and 1920, only Republican movements being listed after 1850. Perhaps this is why (or is it because?) Populism does not follow the behavior pattern laid down for reform movements—they surge forward in good times and fade away in bad, while Populism arose in adversity and was destroyed by the prosperity that came with rising farm prices in 1895.

There is some validity in the view that the best conditions for reform require the combination of good times with a large and active middle class. The inroads unemployment has made on union strength is an example of the effects of economic exhaustion. But this frame of reference can be carried too far, as Mr. Forcey has done in this book. Those who voicelessly endured the bleak months following 1929, jobless and even homeless, could tell the difference when the New Deal came to power. Because Roosevelt belonged to the Jeffersonian strand of Progressivism with a strain of Populism does not warrant the judgment that he was more conservative than Hoover. The administration's program of legislation in the famous 73rd Congress, must be considered. To term the New Deal "experiment for experiment's sake" ignores the resounding affirmation in the election of 1936 of the proposition that the experiments of the previous four years had been for the alleviation of unemployment and farm foreclosures.

A part of the difficulty with this work arises from the author's efforts to measure the accomplishments of a government by the standards of a semi-utopia—such as the plan envisaged in Croly's *The Promise of American Life*. What a scholar can contrive in his study is not subject to the limitations that confront the practitioner beset with the realities of political life. Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt brought to the presidency concepts of progressivism. What happened to these concepts in the heat of conflict might be expected to

disappoint the literary critic or the scholar with a reformist bent. (Harry Truman is mentioned nowhere in the book, a significant omission especially since reference is made to Eisenhower and "dynamic conservatism.")

The outcomes of the Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt administrations were short of the ideal, but to lay the blame for these shortcomings at the doorstep of Jeffersonian dogma overlooks the totality of political forces operating in these eras. The implication that a causal relationship exists between Democratic policy and international conflict is hardly up to the level of fair campaign pamphleteering, and to say the least, is not a balanced treatment of political ideas.

For the most part, the derogation of Jeffersonianism and recent Democratic administrations is a minor theme in the book in the sense that no substantial evidence of the alleged inadequacies is presented. The narrative account of Progressivism and its leaders and intellectual architects is an excellent demonstration of historical craftsmanship. Much more would be needed to make the evaluation of the related political ideas convincing.—LOUIS H. DOUGLAS, *Kansas State University*.

Growth and Prosperity Without Inflation. By JOHN PHILIP WERNETTE. (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1961. Pp. v, 143. \$3.75.)

Perhaps nowhere do unsophisticated political scientists need more economic enlightenment than in seeking to understand the problems of growth, prosperity, and inflation. This little book

helps us not at all. Indeed, it is hard to conceive at what adult audience this work aims. Little steps for little feet may be a sound educational maxim, but whose feet are *this* small? We can do much better with publications such as those of the CED, and even harried businessmen can find more profound guidance in business journals.

The book apparently intends to offer in an easily digestible form analyses of growth, of inflation, and of the means of promoting stability. It partly succeeds, succinctly dealing with most of the relevant topics—but at the cost of gross oversimplifications. Where the author does present economic analyses sharply and concisely, he still achieves a level of understanding well below that reached, let us fervently hope, in most elementary economics courses. Thus while we may learn that "[i]f the commodity price level doubles, the purchasing power of the dollar is halved" we are ill-prepared to deal with most of the complexities of economic problems and analyses.

Nor does he always do this well. A reader seeking assistance in understanding, for example, administered prices and their significance for employment and countercyclical policies would be poorly served by this book. Nor is the reader guided to many other sources. The list of "Additional Readings" is short, and the footnotes refer most often to the author's other works.

Finally, Professor Wernette should have fought the fight for "flation" with his publisher, who set a price of \$3.75 on this book of 143 small pages and large type.—JOSEPH C. PALAMOUNTAIN, JR., *Wesleyan University*.

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

A Mexican Interest Group in Action. By MERLE KLING. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961. Pp. xi, 67. \$3.95).

The Mexican political system is particularly interesting because under it considerable social reform and economic development have been achieved and a stable, one-party government that

displays many democratic features has been established. The Mexican case is thus instructive to all who wonder about the prospects for democracy in other under-developed areas of the world. With this study of one of Mexico's interest groups, the *Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales y Economicas*—the Institute of Social and Econo-

mic Research-Professor Kling has considerably helped to round out our knowledge of its political process. The Institute is an association that propagates the free-enterprise doctrines of a group of wealthy financial and industrial interests, many of which are linked with foreign corporations. It is an organization that dissents from the ideology of the Mexican Revolution and operates completely outside the dominant *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI).

The principal contribution made by this book to our understanding of the Mexican system is the point (admitted by careful students like Frank Brandenburg and Robert Scott, but now fully stressed by Kling) that the PRI though representative of many interest groups does *not* encompass the large financial and industrial interests. The book goes on to show how the larger political system *does* manage to encompass such groups. The Institute has connections with PAN, an opposition party, but this party is still ineffective. More important, the Institute rallies the free-enterprise and pro-foreign capital groups within the official Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CONCAMIN and CONCANACO). It has been amazingly successful in getting its materials published in the Mexican press, the conservative tone of which contrasts with the quasi-socialist and nationalist doctrines of the Revolution. In addition to this propaganda success, the Institute has various forms of direct access to the all-important President of Mexico. These factors buttress Kling's concluding suggestion that the ideological dissent of a group does not necessarily correlate with either economic or political weakness. We have here a clearer picture of the pluralism of Mexican society and we learn how an economically powerful group exercises political power outside the official party in a "one-party system."

The author's awareness of the pluralism of Mexican political life is also demonstrated in his account of who does and does not join the Institute. The data here destroy (if it still needs to be destroyed) the simple notion that certain economic groups must act politically in predetermined ways. Thus the heavy representation of foreign enterprises in the Institute does not mean that all, or even the most important of them, give it backing. Though some decline for public relations reasons others, like the U. S. automobile interests, apparently benefit from the nationalist and protectionist policies opposed by the Institute. The student of foreign policy will be interested to learn that, despite the Institute's warm welcome to U. S. capital, little support has come from the U. S. Embassy; indeed, the Embassy has angered the Institute by sponsoring such books as Galbraith's *American Capitalism*. More-

over, certain purely Mexican businesses back the Institute's program even though the result is to bring keen North American competition. Throughout this discussion, the author has a sure command of the richness and subtleties of economic groupings and their political behavior.

In the whole field of Latin American politics there are few studies of interest groups. To the work of Brandenburg and Scott on interest groups in Mexico and Edwin Lieuwen on the military everywhere in Latin America we can now add Kling's pioneering study of a propaganda group in Mexico.

The only disappointing feature of the book is the rigor with which the author eschews the larger theoretical issues of interest group analysis. The chapters that describe and analyze the Institute are brief enough; the final chapter on "Implications and Hypotheses" is even briefer. The theoretical suggestions contained in the latter are tantalizing, so much so that this reader wished that the author had tried to lead us further in this direction. That Kling evidently has the talent for this has already been demonstrated by his earlier article proposing a theory of power and political instability in Latin America (*Western Political Quarterly* 9:1, March 1956, pp. 21-35). At a time when the very utility of interest group studies is under attack by some students of comparative politics [Joseph LaPalombara in *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22 (Feb. 1960) pp. 29-49, and Roy Macridis in *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 23 (Feb. 1961) pp. 25-45] all those who, like the author here, have done the difficult and valuable work of studying interest groups outside the United States surely ought to be encouraged to enter the controversy. If it seems unfair to criticize the author for showing us only a tree in this book when he has already shown us the forest in his earlier article, let it finally be added that it is done only because this reviewer is convinced that we have here an able guide.—EDWARD J. HEUBEL, *Michigan State University—Oakland*.

The Struggle for Democracy in Latin America,
By CHARLES O. PORTER AND ROBERT J. ALEXANDER (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961.
Pp. 208. \$4.50.)

"Latin America is ready for democracy," is the optimistic thesis of this book. The result of the joint labors of two competent authorities on Latin American affairs is a study written in a brisk and terse style, which will provide new insights to the specialist and would also serve as a fine introduction for one undertaking a study of the politics of this region. Nonetheless, it is a thesis that is being presented, and the scholar would do well to maintain a critical eye as the evidence is

marshalled in support of the authors' point of view.

A challenge to the oligarchy which has historically dominated Latin American politics arose out of twentieth century economic conditions. The quest of industrial powers for the markets and raw materials of Latin America "quickened the way of life of the region." As two world conflicts interfered with economic intercourse between Latin America and the industrialized regions, Latin America began a process of industrial and commercial development.

Political change accompanied economic development. New forces emerged to advocate democratic political practices. The authors classify and describe the conflicting forces in the new "struggle for democracy." On the side of democracy we find the democratic political parties, trade unions, progressive middle class elements, intellectuals and some sectors of the Roman Catholic Church. (This is one of the first studies to stress the Church's increasingly liberal political role.) Their antagonists include the old economic elite, the armed forces, ambitious politicians, and totalitarian political parties. The authors develop the interesting concept of the "Jacobin" political party, almost xenophobic in its nationalism and program of reform, to embrace such movements as those which supported Getulio Vargas in Brazil, Juan Peron in Argentina, and Fidel Castro in Cuba.

While this scheme of classification seems to advance the authors' argument, it does recall the problems which the study of Latin American politics will face until we more clearly define our concepts concerning the relevant actors in the politics of this region. Are not some of the more meaningful conflicts of Latin American politics being carried on *within* the above-defined sectors? Characteristic of the region are the divisions between those Catholics who have accepted European Christian democracy as their guide and the conservative clergy; between the generals and the junior officers' cadres who often are the prime movers in establishing the conditions for political activity by other "democratic" forces; between student groups of left and right.

And what of the recurring patterns of relationships between these political forces? What are the implications for the cause of democracy when a liberal political movement comes to power, but can only maintain political control through assurances to established elites that their privileged position will not be affected by the policies of the new administration? Such thwarting of needed reform policies, it would seem, can only lead to disillusionment with democratic practices, perhaps a return to the "no-nonsense" government of the military *caudillo*, or worse. Yet, this state of

affairs would seem to characterize the political situation in a great number of the nations listed by the authors as having experienced "recent democratic triumphs." Peru and Ecuador will serve as examples.

The bulk of the book consists of essays on "recent democratic victories" and "remaining tyrannies" in individual Latin American nations. Some of these, such as the sections on Argentina and the Dominican Republic, are outstanding. Here is one of the first adequate accounts of the rather remarkable liberalization of Honduran politics. The judgment that Fidel Castro is "the man who betrayed a great revolution" seems to put the matter most succinctly.

Yet, it would seem time for Latin Americanists to put away their long-cherished dichotomy of "democrats" and "dictators," a type of distinction which permits one only to err in the direction of one extreme or the other. The rich complexity of Latin American politics demands much more subtlety. As one ponders the "democratic victories" and "remaining tyrannies," and the categorical judgments made on various regimes, one wonders whether the distinctions are really as clear-cut as the authors would have them.

The study concludes with a commentary on United States foreign policy toward Latin America. Particularly revealing is the discussion of the American political process in the formulation of that policy. Diverse political pressures have made our Latin American policy "fitful" and "inconsistent." It is time to establish long-range policy objectives toward Latin America.—CHARLES W. ANDERSON, *University of Wisconsin*.

The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941. BY AMIN BANANI. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1961. Pp. ix, 191. \$5.00.)

Iran has had contact with the West for over 2500 years, but only in the most recent times has Iran experienced the "impact" of the West. In an effort to curb the influence of the Western powers in Iran and break away from the stagnation of the past, Iranians have been trying throughout this century to transform their country into a modern nation-state, politically, economically, and socially. The most dramatic attempt to modernize Iran was that made during the time of Reza Shah. Cognizant that the political structure adopted by Iran during the constitutional era at the turn of the century only strengthened the force of traditionalism, Reza Shah assumed dictatorial power during his reign and subordinated political development to reforming other sectors of society.

The reforms introduced in Iran under Reza Shah constitute the subject matter of Professor Banani's little book. In this regard, the book is,

perhaps, of only limited value to the political scientist. Over a third of the book consists of historical background material, which is rather pedestrian in quality. Much of the rest of the book is devoted to a topical description of the reforms introduced in this period relative to the army, the administration, public health, and education. The chapters dealing with secularization of the Iranian legal system and economic development are more pertinent to political science, but even here one must sift through material of only peripheral value to ascertain the political significance of reforms in these fields.

Notwithstanding these qualifications, this book is recommended for all those interested in the modernization of developing societies. Why? Because Banani, as a Western-educated Iranian, reveals in sharp outline the ideological dilemma facing all educated Iranians today. He is not afraid to come to grips with the problem, namely, the consequences of rejecting the ideology of Islamic traditionalism, as manifested in contemporary Iran. To say that he is opposed to Islamic traditionalism is to put it mildly. He identifies the reforms instituted even before Reza Shah as "a tacit recognition of the breakdown and anachronism of the socio-political structure of Islam". In describing the nationalist mood of the interwar period in Iran he writes, "if the reforms of Reza Shah had an ideological content, it was the spirit of secular nationalism." Even Reza Shah's efforts to secularize the law are interpreted by Banani as "an unspoken admission of the inadequacy of the social institutions of Islam for our time."

Moreover, argues Banani, "ever since the disintegration of the Safavid dynasty, . . . the strangle hold of the [Islamic] clergy has paralyzed every source of cultural vitality and intellectual vigor in Iran," and "the charge of fatalism so readily leveled at the masses cannot be considered independently of the pervasive influence of the clergy."

But what is the alternative? Under Reza Shah a program of national unity, Westernization, and secularization was built around the glorification of the state. There was too much to do, too much to reform, to bother with constructing a neat ideological framework first. Reza Shah was a man of action, not a thinker. He provided no articulated ideology to substitute for the heritage of the past. As a result, if the Iranian "gravitates to the materialistic man-centered trends of Western thought," concludes Banani, "invariably he cannot resist the allure of one form or another of Marxian socialism, combining as it does the pseudo-scientific rationalistic approach, the humane message of justice and equality, and the massive sanction of half the world."

It is Professor Banani's statement of this dilemma that is his most significant contribution to political science.—RICHARD H. PFAFF, *University of Colorado*.

Independent Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics from 1932 to 1958. BY MAJID KHADDURI. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. Pp. viii, 388. \$7.20.)

Challenge in the Middle East. BY HARRY B. ELLIS. (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1960. Pp. vii, 238. \$4.00.)

In this second edition of Khadduri's work originally published in 1951, the author—an Iraqi who became a naturalized U. S. citizen—added some ninety-odd pages of new text while revising and expanding certain parts of the first edition. The book is largely a history of Iraq from 1932, the date of its independence, to the eve of the revolution of 1958. Considering that the manuscript was submitted to the press in May of 1959 (the date of the preface to the second edition), it is to be regretted that the author did not include a final chapter or at least an addendum on the revolution itself.

In his account of Iraq's recent history the author deals both with domestic politics and foreign relations. The story of the internal struggle for power among the ambitious politicians, of the frequent army intervention in politics, of the numerous intrigues, plots, coups and counter-coups is told with commendable attention to detail and accuracy. Such an account, though hardly designed to cater to popular reading tastes, should prove of considerable value to all those who are interested in the intricacies of Iraqi politics and to whom detailed information embracing the politicians' names and shifting attitudes is both meaningful and useful. Equally diligent in its attention to fact, sequence, and the causal interrelationship of events, is Khadduri's extended treatment of Iraq's foreign policies. The new edition has been expanded especially in those chapters which deal with World War II, with Rashid Ali's coup of 1941, and with Iraq's secret and overt contacts with the Axis powers. In fact, these chapters are probably the most interesting of all, providing as they do new insights on the Pan-Arab policy orientation in the crucial years when the West's destinies hung in balance under the challenge of Nazi and Fascist totalitarianism. Particularly revealing are those passages which portray the policies and mentality of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and of Iraq's short-lived rebel premier, Rashid Ali. It appears that these men (who thought of themselves as clever and Machiavellian in pursuance of their anti-British policies) were often motivated more

by emotion than by reason. They certainly grossly underestimated the West's chances of winning the war and, rather blithely, tended to ignore both the Italian colonialism in Libya and Germany's treatment of the conquered peoples.

The new edition has been enriched by the additional sources in the form of memoirs and various documents on the Axis foreign policy which had become available since the war. Furthermore, the author has interviewed a number of key figures, both Iraqi and foreign, who survived the war and its aftermath, thus adding to the breadth and depth of the earlier edition. His treatment of the subject matter is commendable for its objectivity. The work as a whole is a very useful contribution to the political literature on the Middle East.

In many ways, Harry Ellis' *Challenge in the Middle East* stands in contrast to Khadduri's *Independent Iraq*. While the latter is the work of a scholar obviously following the academic canons in research and writing, the former is the product of a newspaper correspondent whose interest lies in current issues of the day and whose technique is journalistic, designed to dramatize the problems and single out those which have particular relevance to the contemporary American interests and policies. By the same token, while Khadduri's book is largely (though not exclusively) straight history, Ellis' volume tends to be primarily analytical and descriptive with the historical material treated as a necessary minimum to make the present day trends and issues more intelligible. This basic difference in kind and in the techniques explains also the difference in the treatment of the source material. Devoid of footnote documentation, Ellis' book has the swift and flowing style of a man obviously at ease with daily writing. Like Khadduri, Ellis has interviewed a good many people. His interviews, however, were not geared to the reconstruction of past events but to the elucidation of present ones. Sometimes their objective seemed merely to throw light on the personality and the mentality of the interviewed leader rather than to elicit the whole truth.

With all the above observations, it should be stressed, however, that *Challenge in the Middle East* is a product of responsible journalism. The author, who has spent a number of years in the Middle East as a regional correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor*, has obviously treated his task seriously. He tried both to understand the Middle Eastern point of view and to keep in mind the essential interests of his own country in this area. His account contains a number of statements of fact which were hitherto either unknown to the public at large or not publicized enough. Lacking supporting documentary evidence some of these statements will, naturally, have to be taken merely as the author's assertions pending satisfactory verification some time in the future.

The following sample list may serve as an illustration. Thus Ellis claims that at one time, alarmed by Communist indoctrination of U.A.R. students in Russia, Nasser decided to transfer several hundred of them to the Western universities; he says that considerable rivalry exists between Communist China and Russia in their activities in the Middle East; Col. Husni Zaim, according to him, carried out his coup in Syria with American connivance; Kermit Roosevelt was instrumental in inducing Nasser to sign the Suez evacuation agreement with Britain; and Assistant Secretary George V. Allen did not deliver to Nasser the message he was expected to deliver, on behalf of Secretary Dulles, to protest the Cairo-Moscow arms deal. Here and there one might be tempted to disagree with the author's inclination toward optimism or with his refusal to acknowledge the unbridgeable cleavage and hatred between certain forces and leaders in the area. Thus, with reference to the feud between Hussein of Jordan and Nasser of Egypt, Mr. Ellis somewhat sentimentally says: "Both men are impressive, possessed of obvious ability. How much better for their peoples if their talents were devoted to working jointly for the Arab cause rather than against each other!"

To sum up: this is an informative, readable book shedding a good deal of light on the complexities of current politics in the Middle East.—GEORGE LENCZOWSKI, *University of California* (Berkeley).

Toward Unity in Africa: A Study of Federalism in British Africa. BY DONALD ROTHCHILD (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960. Pp. vi, 224. \$5.00.)

Although the cultural and linguistic diversity of the African continent might suggest otherwise, there have been very few attempts by African states to establish themselves along federal lines. Where such attempts have been made, the impetus towards federalism stemmed mainly from either the colonial power (as was the case with the former Federations of French West and Equatorial Africa) or from European groups resident in an African colonial state (as was the case with the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953). The only federal system in Africa that has emerged from truly African demands and desires is the Federation of Nigeria, which obtained independent status in October, 1960.

Rothchild's book is mainly an account of events and situations that led to the establishment of the proto-federal East African High Commission which administers a set of technical services common to Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika (e.g., rails, telecommunications, ports, etc.), the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and

the Federation of Nigeria. What there is in the way of analysis is often quite superficial and the book's discussion of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland sometimes borders on the naive. Although there is some validity in Rothchild's assumption that federalism provides an adequate and satisfactory arrangement for accommodating the diversity of interests and needs characteristic of multi-cultural or -racial societies, there is very little validity in his suggestion that the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was established to secure this end. Unlike the Federation of Nigeria which evolved from genuine African needs and desires for a political arrangement that would represent the cultural diversity of Nigeria's peoples, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was primarily, if not exclusively, the result of the desire of Europeans resident in Central Africa to strengthen and extend their political predominance over the African majority.

Due to failure to analyze the sources and character of political power in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and his reliance upon official statements as to what the Federation was meant to be, Rothchild is unable to provide any real insight into its true character. If he had analyzed the development of the electoral system under the Federation, for instance, he would have recognized its essentially authoritarian character, as well as the unlikelihood of its evolving into the kind of federal system he suggests it was meant to be. At the foundation of the Federation in 1953, the Federal Parliament was elected by territorial "common rolls" which, in Southern Rhodesia, consisted of 99% Europeans and 1% Africans, and in Northern Rhodesia there were only 11 Africans on the "common roll." Six years later when a Federal roll had been instituted, only 7% of the Federal voters were African. Furthermore, some 75% of the Africans on the Federal roll had only special votes, which meant that they could vote for only 2 of the Federal M.P.s in Northern Rhodesia and in Nyasaland, and for only 5 in Southern Rhodesia.

Confronted with a federal arrangement that clearly placed overwhelming political power in the hands of a small European population, the Africans inevitably opposed its establishment and have done so ever since. Although Rothchild recognizes the fact of African opposition to Federation, he seems so pre-occupied with his belief in federalism as an ideal system for multi-cultural societies that he tends to view African opposition to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as illegitimate. Thus, at one point he observes that "Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia shared some of the blame for stoking the fires of suspicion among the settler community." It appears that in Rothchild's view, such behavior is dysfunctional to the attainment of the

satisfactory relationships between peoples of diverse cultures and race that federalism can provide. The point Rothchild misses, however, is that Africans never intended for the Federation either to be established or endure, as long as it constituted nothing more than an extension of European political power without a comparable change in their own position.

As for Rothchild's discussion of the Federation of Nigeria, it consists mainly of an account of the positions taken by Nigerian political parties and their leaders during the several Constitutional Conferences in 1950-58 at which the Federation was worked out. It contains little that is new and, like the section on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, it is weak in analysis and insight. James Coleman's *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* is still the best and most sophisticated analysis of the forces that produced the Nigerian Federation. On the whole, *Toward Unity in Africa* is not a particularly useful contribution towards the understanding of federalism in British Africa. —MARTIN L. KILSON, *Harvard University*.

The Arab Middle East and Muslim Africa.
EDITED BY TIBOR KEREKES. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961. Pp. 126. \$4.00.)

This small volume contains seven studies originally presented at the Third Annual Round-Table Conference of Georgetown University's Institute of Ethnic Studies in 1960. Each study deals with certain aspects of the revolutionary political, social and economic changes occurring in the Arab Middle East and Moslem Africa during the past decade. All assess Islam as a motivating force and the current challenges to it. The conclusions are diverse, and the predictions vary from glowing optimism to gloomy pessimism.

The book opens with an analysis by Sir Hamilton A. R. Gibb, director of Harvard's Center for Middle Eastern Studies, of the spiritual roots of modern Arab outlook and policy and popular movements. What basically separates the Moslem and the West is symbolism. To the Moslem, the symbol predominates over the object; and action must conform to the Islamic symbol of truth and right, rather than to the Western material objectification of workability. Accordingly, as a symbol, Arab nationalism means much more than freedom from foreign interference. It means also the unity of family, clan, economic class, and even nations; and consequently, each material advance is viewed by Moslems not as a solution to an economic problem but as "a symbol of the new determination . . . to control . . . for themselves the destinies of their country."

In what is probably the most rewarding of the studies, William H. Lewis' "Islam and Nationalism in Africa" delves into the winds of change

pouring through the continent. The Negro African is awakening politically, and his drive for independence, equality and status is cloaked in many forms, such as messianic movements, tribal revivalism and modern nationalist organizations, and assumes many modes of expression, including Mau Mau barbarism, boycotts, agitational strife, and passive resistance. Large masses of Negro Africans and their leaders have embraced Islam. At least ten of Africa's seventeen independent nations are led by Moslem statesmen. This association of Negro Africans with Islam is neither new nor solid; nor will it encourage the emergence of a vast Islamic bloc because of such deep-seated cleavages as traditional tribal and ethnic rivalries, diverse racial backgrounds, differences in degree of religiosity and ritual practices, clashing economic interests, class hatred, and marked variations in degree of Westernization. Islam in the Negroid African belt, furthermore, is not the national religion it is in the Arab Middle East. African nationalism appears to be a stronger unifying force—a secular religion—than Islam. The Negro African Moslem is far more interested in immediate material benefits than his Arab counterpart in North Africa and the Middle East; and this fact has steered the Negro nations on different courses. Witness, for example, the case of Guinea which, despite its overwhelming Islamic population and leadership, has recognized Israel and maintains close economic ties with her. These factors lead the author to conclude that Islam may prove to be more of a divisive than a unifying factor in the Negro belt, and that tribalism and nationalism are likely to prove more potent forces in Africa than religion.

In addition to the Moslem Negro African feeling no kinship with the Moslem Arab of North Africa and the Middle East by virtue of similar religious profession, rivalry among the Arab leaders discourages the formation of a large united Moslem bloc. William Sands, editor of the *Middle East Journal*, feels, though, that some limited form of a united Maghrib is "one of the probabilities of our political generation." He correctly points out that the rivalry in Arab leadership and France's role in North Africa may delay such an event much longer.

Islam appears to have ceased to carry any real meaning to the young Arab intellectual, Hisham Sharabi observes. To replace this loss, with its consequent psychological uprootedness, loss of moral and religious certainties, and valuational drift, he has imported ideologies from Europe and America. Betrayed in the past by the sheiks, he still fears future betrayal and the sidetracking of radical reforms.

While a decade of revolution has brought about profound, social and political changes in the

Moslem Middle East, the main problems—Palestine, ignorance and poverty—remain unresolved. George F. Hourani attributes the blame to an impatient public demanding immediate reform and not permitting more efficient governments to take power and carry out long-range programs. Aptly he maintains that conflict with Israel will not take the place of reform; and pessimistically he asserts that it may take another decade before "the necessary spirit of conciliation will appear on both sides." A major weakness of the nationalist movements, William R. Polk asserts, is the failure to be concerned with representative government as the means of eradicating the hold of tribal sheiks, opportunists and vested interests. Also, they differ on the basic question of identification. "Of what territory, people, and culture is one to be a nationalist?"

Most optimistic of the authors represented, Albert J. Meyer predicts a favorable economic outlook for the Arab Middle East. The only dark factors could be rapid population growth and heavy arms budgets.

The book is not a unified volume with its component studies linked in logical development; but, then, this is true of many useful symposia. It is valuable in that experts have presented briefly and clearly a wide range of timely material with diverse and provocative views.—OSCAR KRAINES, *Executive Department, New York State*.

The Mideast in Focus. By NORMAN GREENWALD. (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960. Pp. 86. \$2.50.)

The "focus" is hard to discover; the title of the first chapter, "Meet the Middle East," might have been better. As it is this slim book can inevitably present only a few generalities. Unfortunately even these are frequently misleading and often contradictory. The first chapter contains the statement that, "the total number of people in the middle east is above 90 million." The last chapter begins: "The future of the 80 million inhabitants of the middle east. . . ." This is typical. Thus, for instance, it surely is incorrect to maintain that the Turks ruled the Middle East only from 1453 onward (p. 8), that Coptic, "is a form of Semitic much the same as Hebrew (p. 11)," and that only under the Turks, "most of the important academies of the Islamic world came to be located in Egypt (p. 28)." A general statement to the effect that the problem of Cyprus disturbed friendly relations between Turkey and Greece "considerably" (p. 18) might pass, though it would be equally true to say that its effect was surprisingly small. To say that the western border of Turkey is the Aegean (p. 16) is to ignore the European possessions of that republic. And history is telescoped and distorted in

more than one respect when the author writes that, "because the Sultan of the Turkish Empire was also Caliph of the Orthodox or Sunni Moslems, the Safavid Shah established the Moslem Shi'a sect as the national religion of Iran (p. 20)." The short absence of the Shah during the period of the fall of Moussadeq, in 1953, is presented in these words: "The Shah was forced to flee the country, but in 1954 his supporters, especially in the Army, rallied and desposed (sic) Mossadegh (p. 21)." On page 27 we read that, "Jordan and Arabia were allowed nominal independence as British protectorates," after World War I. At that time Jordan did not exist, while the Hashemite leadership of Arabia was successfully challenged by Ibn Sa'ud. Now "Saudi Arabia is theoretically independent, but is in fact very much an American protectorate (p. 44)." How much is "very much?" Does it involve control over foreign policy, over internal administration—or what does it mean? The multi-party Knesseth is not easily recognized as "a democratic form of government similar to that of Great Britain (p. 51)." One might also question to what extent it is really accurate to say that the Jewish communities of Iraq, Syria, and Egypt were "driven out" (p. 56). They undeniably had a hard time during the Arab-Israeli War, but Iraqi Jews, for instance, broke the law by emigrating (with the help of an American air-lift), and those who stayed behind seem to think that they got the better part of the deal, and that they might have retained much of their traditional influence had their numbers not been depreciated so much.

To ascribe the Balfour Declaration to the "fundamentalist Protestant backgrounds" of many English Liberal leaders (p. 56) is to ascribe the sentiments of Cromwellian Levellers to the British War Cabinet of 1917. The number of Arab refugees is carelessly given as "more than 600,000" (p. 61)—perhaps a misprint for 900,000?—of whom, "more than half are under fifteen years of age and have no recollection of Palestine (p. 62)." Resettlement is presented as the only possible solution. There is no mention of compensation or of blocked accounts. The Egyptian Delta, "consists of various tributaries of the Nile (p. 33)." On page 42 we read correctly of the "Bedouin," on page 26 incorrectly of "Bedouins." On page 70 the Crusaders are said to have fought, "to gain control of the spice routes to India." On page 71, "the Turkish Straits have been an important water link connecting Southern Asia with the Mediterranean world." On page 73 TAPLine has become "tapeline," and on page 75 Kuwait has a population of 150,000, while on page 43 it still had 200,000. On page 80 we read that, "it was not until after the death of Stalin that the Soviet Union made a major effort to become a power in

the middle east." But on the following page we learn that, "one of the first post-war indications of Soviet aggressiveness occurred in the middle east in 1946." The Middle East is variously referred to as the "middle east," the "mid east," the "mid-east," or the "mideast," a careless assortment indicative of the author's attitude towards spelling altogether. There is nothing here to warrant the claim made in the preface that, "this book is designed to fill the need for a general but concise introduction to the sociology, history, and politics of the modern middle east." The need is still there, and I for one can only regret that this book has appeared with such unfounded scholarly pretensions.—HENRY G. DITTMAR, *University of Redlands*.

Religion and Politics in Pakistan. BY LEONARD BINDER. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961. Pp. xiii, 440. \$7.50.)

On October 7, 1958 President Mohammad Ayub Khan assumed full powers in Pakistan's bloodless revolution. This event obviously meant that the Constitution of 1956 had been suspended and that, at best, Pakistan had embarked upon the road of a so-called "guided democracy."

It appears from the latest development that Pakistan's constitutional effort at least for the time being ended in failure and frustration. Could it be that the "constitution makers" in Pakistan as in other newly emerging countries were so preoccupied with the formal aspects of parliamentary government, with ideological and religious currents, and with vested interests that they were forgetting some of the pressing problems most of these nations are facing, such as meaningful land reforms, improvement of living standards, education, and over-population?

Neither the answer to this question nor the most recent "anti-constitutional" development in Pakistan comprise the substance of the work of the author here. However, his excellent study provides us with extremely valuable background material and thereby with a better understanding of the complexity of present conditions in Pakistan.

The examination of modern constitution making within the Western environment has been for some time a challenging and rewarding undertaking of political scientists. On the other hand the study of like processes in newly emerging nations has been handicapped until recently by two major factors. First of all there were relatively few incidents which could be classified as deliberate acts of "modern constitution making" in the areas adjoining the Western-styled nations. Secondly, there were indeed very few Western scholars who had the necessary intellectual equipment to undertake such a task.

The work presently under review is, therefore, especially welcome because it presents a thorough and most competent analysis and evaluation of the struggle toward a workable constitution of the new state of Pakistan and toward the establishment of an orderly government. It points out the tremendous difficulties which resulted from the efforts to find through democratic methods acceptable compromise solutions. Since the time Pakistan obtained her independence from Great Britain in 1947, the various political, religious, and social groups in Pakistan were attempting to superimpose their respective political concepts upon the new state. Some of these groups were and still are strongly moved by the religious motive of bringing into existence an Islamic constitution. Others, while paying lip-service to Muslim doctrines, were more concerned with the dynamic forces of political pressure groups and vested interests. It appears that one of the major factors which contributed to the present frustration and to the failure to produce there a viable constitution was precisely the incapability of finding an acceptable balance between the religious concepts involved in an Islamic constitution and the anti-traditionalist and secularist views of the Westernized politicians. This situation in Pakistan is further aggravated by the long-disputed question of the federal relationship of the provinces comprising this new state.

The author of this work deserves appreciation and acknowledgment for his remarkable grouping of diverse thoughts and actions of the various groups and individuals in order to facilitate an understanding of the major forces involved in producing a constitution. His effort is largely successful, partly because of his own knowledge of Muslim political theory, partly as a result of his careful analysis of conflicting theories of the nature of an Islamic state. The latter he was able to study from official but unpublished reports of the various constitutional committees. Also the author's personal interviews with some of the leading personalities enriched immensely his insight into the complex process of religious and political interaction.

The value of this book is not confined to a mere better understanding of Pakistan. Some of the problems discussed are, in spite of regional peculiarities, of great influence also upon political developments in other Muslim states.—ERIC WALDMAN, *Marquette University*.

Tojo and the Coming of the War. By ROBERT J. C. BUTOW. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. 584. \$10.00.)

This book takes up once again the story of the rise of the militarists to control of Japan in the period 1931 to 1945 and for the first time in

English gives the biography of Tojo, who in many ways exemplifies the militarists of the period. The principal contribution of the present account is the objective interpretation of Tojo's career and role in the coming of the war with the United States in 1941. This subject was necessarily basic to the judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which seems to have been faulty in important respects as implied by the author's material. While accepting the analysis of such writers as Richard Storry in *The Double Patriots* and Yale Candee Maxon in *Control of Japanese Foreign Policy* who cover this ground, Butow here documents more fully from the original Japanese sources many of the crucial decisions that led to the war. He puts them into the context of the events not only as seen from the vantage point of an outstanding general such as Tojo but of the military groups and civilians intimately connected with the decisions that led to the disastrous and unjustified war.

The gross misrepresentation of Tojo's career in the foreign press is corrected for those who may still believe he was a sort of Japanese Hitler. More important is the relatively little connection of Tojo with the now well known military conspirators who cowed the civilian leaders into accepting the army's war in China. He was one of the few who tried to impose some control over them. This demolishes one of the principal charges against him as a ringleader in the rise of the military to power. Tojo as war minister was, nevertheless, the spokesman for the military who would not permit any concessions to the United States and thus brought the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet shortly before the war with America. Like other students of this period Butow grounds the determining force for such decisions in the middle ranking officers of the army and navy general staff. Tojo and most of his contemporary officers fully accepted the narrow military thinking which deceived itself that Japan was being driven into war by the hostile action of the United States and therefore had no other recourse. He was not the originator or source of such ideas and policies, according to this account. When he became prime minister and acquired a broader view of the national interest, he was frustrated by the same narrow-minded military group which he could not curb even when he himself simultaneously took the post of chief of the army general staff. Tojo was thus not even a powerful leader like Roosevelt or Churchill, and did not correspond to the picture painted of him abroad at the time or in the Tokyo trials.

In describing Tojo's leadership and that of his predecessors, this book reveals perhaps more fully than before the almost incredible lack of coordination in crucial government decisions. Although

the present period is somewhat different because of greater concentration of Japanese government authority and responsibility, this description does reveal something of Japanese sociology and psychology which is still important. Scholars never tire of pointing out the precedence of group relations and the weakness of the individual as such in Japanese society. This record bears out this interpretation and its disastrous consequences for government policy-making. Japan seems to have become committed to a war through the exercise of various group pressures which could not be resolved by the exercise of any individual authority or by rational discussion of the serious weakness in the arguments of the emotional war party. While similar situations can arise elsewhere it seems to be a grave problem for Japan as long as the Japanese adhere closely to rigid formalized group relationships and suppress open expression of individual opinion. There is a trend away from it now, but the persistence of the older group patterns in party leadership and voting behavior, for example, prevent the government system from functioning in a truly liberal fashion even today.

There is a moral aspect too which seems to be implicit in this work. The International Tribunal assumed that a Japanese leader would be fully responsible for the consequences of his decisions as would a Western leader. Tojo, however, probably could not feel guilty or responsible in just that way. He did insist that he took full responsibility for his conduct of office. That is, he fully acknowledged all the decisions which he made as a minister or general. He did not see that he was mistaken in his judgment that the war was necessary. Even if he had, belatedly, perceived that his judgment was faulty and that universal misery resulted from his action, he would probably not have a feeling of personal guilt. When so many people and groups were involved, he would not view the responsibility as peculiarly his own just because he was associated with the decision. He assumed responsibility as the titular head of a group, but this is not the same thing as taking upon oneself the group's responsibility and to feel that it was your own will that brought on the consequences. Even from a Western point of view this attitude is not unreasonable. It would be going too far to suggest that Japanese are creatures of fate, or that they act out their role in a group, without responsibility for the part they play. It is also, surely, going too far to judge them personally responsible for all the evil consequences of their official acts, a standard we might hesitate to apply to ourselves.

With regard to those for whom the book is written, it seems intended for a broader group than the purely academic one, for it includes intimate or newsworthy items in great profusion.

If the author were willing to commit himself more to reinterpretation of events or some political analysis upon the basis of the insight provided by his penetrating material, the book's interest would have been greatly heightened for the scholarly audience.—FRANK C. LANGDON, *University of British Columbia*.

Mr. Secretary Peel: the Life of Sir Robert Peel to 1830. BY NORMAN GASH. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. 693. \$12.50.)

The past three and a half decades have witnessed a revival of interest in Sir Robert Peel and in his long-term influence on the course of British politics. A biography of Peel by Miss A. A. W. Ramsay appeared in 1928. Two short studies by G. S. R. Kitson Clark—*Peel and the Conservative Party* and *Peel*—were published in 1929 and 1936. Sir Tresham Lever's *The Life and Times of Sir Robert Peel* appeared in 1942. Professor Gash's first full-length study dealing with Peel's era was published in 1953 and is entitled *Politics in the Age of Peel*. Now, in 1961, appears the first volume of the same author's definitive, comprehensive, and fully documented biography of Peel. Though only the first book of a projected two-volume study, it is nevertheless complete in itself. It covers Peel's life through November 1830, or until the fall of the Duke of Wellington's government in which Peel was Home Secretary and Leader of the House of Commons.

The *raison d'être* for such a detailed study is summed up in the next-to-last sentence of his Introduction: "But though the myth of conservatism has been more often Disraelian, its practice has been almost uniformly Peelite." This practice has been the attempt on the part of British conservatives to fashion a viable compromise between the governmental system as inherited and the pressing necessities of the changing world with which conservatives have actually been faced when in power.

Those portions of the volume which should be of particular interest to political scientists are the ones dealing with legal reform, law and police; the administrative methods Peel employed in his efforts to govern Ireland while its Chief Secretary (1812–1818) and later as Home Secretary; and the long fight in Parliament over Catholic Emancipation, the "civil rights" controversy of Peel's day. The intricacies of each of these problems are handled lucidly and with great skill.

In terms of reader interest, the high point is reached, in the opinion of this reviewer, in the chapter entitled "Catholic Emancipation." The author here vividly describes Peel's decision in 1828–29 first to abandon the political beliefs which he had championed so ably and clung to so tenaciously for twenty years because he came to

regard them as no longer tenable, and then to brave further the obloquy of his former brothers-in-arms by spearheading the forces which carried Catholic Emancipation through Parliament in 1829.

It is perhaps in the first and last sections of the volume, however (the "Introduction" and "Envoi"), that Gash manages to make his greatest and most lasting contribution. Here are found his analysis and estimate of Peel the man and Peel the statesman—his character, motivating drives, political aims and objectives, weaknesses and strengths.—EDWARD N. MACCONOMY, *Albion College*.

H. M. Hyndman and British Socialism. By CHUSHICHI TZUZUKI, EDITED BY HENRY PELLING. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Pp. 304. \$5.60.)

H. M. Hyndman, the leader of the Social Democratic Federation movement, was one man who can with justification be thought of as the founder of organized Socialism in Britain in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Hyndman was an extremely able political agitator and theoretician; he was also a man of curiosity, conflicting personal characteristics and interests. Thus, like a number of the other early Socialist leaders, he was a member of the upper middle classes, well educated and endowed with considerable wealth, and yet he spent his long life fighting for the advancement of the poor and deprived segments of the British population. He was able to reconcile his business activities, which were mostly of a speculative nature, with his role as a Socialist prophet leading the masses of British workers into the promised land of government ownership and social welfare. Personally he sought to hasten the realization of democratic values in British political, economic and social life, and yet he was often charged with "dictatorship" by his fellow workers in the Federation. By family background and by political instinct a Tory rather than a Liberal, he easily made the transition to radical Socialism. Hyndman was a disciple of Marx, but his Marxism was of a genuinely British type. For him, Socialism could not have the same implications as it had for its Continental exponents, particularly the German Social Democrats. Hyndman was keenly aware of the importance of maintaining British national power and developing the Empire; he was during World War I opposed to the efforts of those British Socialists who were pacifist and who sought to resolve the difficulties with Germany by non-violent means.

Hyndman was a competent and colorful personality who comes to life in the pages of Professor Tzuzuki's exceedingly well written political

biography. During the eighteen eighties and nineties when Socialism was a newly organized but vigorous political enthusiasm, it was more identified in the popular mind with Hyndman than with William Morris, or Bernard Shaw, or Keir Hardie, who were his contemporaries. On the Continent his eminence among British Socialists was equally recognized. His form of Marxism, adapted as it was to the social and political traditions of his country, lost favor after his death, as the Communist and the non-Marxist Socialists divided the Socialist world between them. Since he was never a member of Parliament and therefore did not participate directly in the modest legislative victories won by the early Labour Party, Hyndman's impact on the changing course of events was gradually forgotten. The subsequent generations of Englishmen knew little about his life and work and what they did know suffered from considerable distortion. The only biographies which were written were uncritical works by Rosalind Hyndman, his second wife, and by F. J. Gould, his enthusiastic disciple. His own memoirs and the official history of the S. D. F. are far from complete and lack objectivity. This new biography thus fills a definite gap in the literature of British political and economic reform and constitutes a significant contribution to our better understanding of the development of Socialism both in Britain and in Western Europe.

Hyndman's work with the Social Democratic Federation dates from its establishment in London in June, 1881. Tzuzuki in his book pictures Hyndman as something of a romantic adventurer and yet basically a realist. During his entire career he worked on the assumption that reform would come gradually by piecemeal legislation. As the years passed, he was disappointed that more rapid progress was not made toward the establishment of a Socialist society. His zeal for the cause was unflagging and he continued to work tirelessly, writing and speaking for the S. D. F. until a few days prior to his death late in 1921 at the age of eighty. Hyndman was personally very ambitious and yet he was never elected to Parliament. The reason was not that he adhered too rigidly to principles as some critics charged, for he could be very opportunistic when the occasion required it. Rather, his character and personality were not conducive to electoral success. He lacked many of the political virtues, such as tact, a willingness to listen to other people, and a capacity to suffer fools gladly. The Federation elicited the continuing loyalty of a small group of enthusiasts, but it never secured wide approval among the masses of the British electorate. It undoubtedly won many recruits for Socialism, but it retained few for its own organization. The existence of so many left-wing groups during the first two decades of the

twentieth century when the Labour Party was growing slowly and preparing itself for the responsibilities of government, is ample evidence that it failed to provide as it had hoped the one broad channel for the emergence of Socialism in Britain. Yet the Federation's contribution to British Socialism should not be underestimated. Hyndman and his colleagues did make a significant addition to the storehouse of Socialist theory and knowledge; more important, they helped to make the British electorate, particularly the membership of the trade unions, familiar with Socialist ideas and programs.—JOHN S. HARRIS, *University of Massachusetts*.

The Crusade Against Capital Punishment in Great Britain. BY ELIZABETH ORMAN TUTTLE. (London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1961. Pp. xii, 177. \$5.75.)

The author properly titles this book. It is primarily a chronicle of the efforts of nearly a century and a half toward the abolition of the death penalty as a punishment for crime in Great Britain.

Source materials are chiefly the Parliamentary Debates, the reports of various Select Committees and Royal Commissions which dealt with the matter through the years, and the documents and pronouncements of influential propaganda organizations, especially the Howard Association.

The proponents of this reform usually were adamant in their stand against merely reducing the number of crimes punishable by death, which at one time was substantial. The abolition groups sought the end of capital punishment. The author reports there were in excess of 200 crimes punishable by death in 1808. By 1937 (the end of the first reform period) this number had been reduced to sixteen capital offenses.

During the remainder of the 19th century and until World War I, the question of eliminating the death penalty as a matter of public policy, was raised frequently in the Parliament. Influence was marked, too, by such writers as Dickens who asked whether the death penalty was necessary for the punishment of any crime. Put another way, the abolitionist asked, was there any remedy for punishment of death?

Mrs. Tuttle presses her thesis primarily through quotations from the materials upon which it is based and with the basic assumption that the reformers were right, that capital punishment should not exist.

The debates in the Parliament echo the same arguments each time a bill or other proposal is presented on the question. The primary argument for retaining the death penalty for some crimes was that it was necessary to deter serious crime, and this was fundamental to the premise that

fear of the consequences of the commission of a serious crime was essential to the very protection of society. Opponents chanted the same theme for generations: it was unhumanitarian, punitive rather than remedial, and once applied, capital punishment was irrevocable. It was shameful and debasing; it imposed a burden upon innocent relatives and it violated the belief that the state was unduly interfering with the sanctity of human life.

In the recent period, since World War II, two parliamentary bills receive major consideration. One, the Criminal Justice Bill of 1948 was the first postwar unsuccessful effort in the Parliament to end capital punishment. The other was the Homicide Act of 1957 which reaffirmed the parliamentary position that the death penalty should be retained for a limited number of crimes.

The abolition of the death penalty did not become a party issue in that the matter was not of consequence during elections generally. And once "free voting" of the members was allowed and a clear majority supported the proposition that some legislation should be considered either toward reducing the number of crimes which carried the death penalty or to permit the issue of its elimination to be brought before one or both Houses, the Government in 1956-57 under Sir Anthony Eden had little choice but to permit some time for a bill which might include abolition.

Prime Minister Eden's position was that capital punishment had to be retained to safeguard law and order, that the level of crime was high and that it could be reasonably feared that if the deterrent of the death penalty was removed, criminals would add murder to their other crimes. The Government bill known as the Homicide Bill retained the death penalty for certain offenses: murder in the course of theft, murder by shooting, murder by resisting arrest or escaping from custody, murder of police officers in the execution of their duty.

Apparently it was the intent of the authors of the bill and the Government to abolish the doctrine of constructive malice as a basis of liability for murder, a doctrine which allowed a person to be convicted of murder where he had caused the death of another in the course of the commission of a felony, whether or not he had intended to kill or do grievous bodily harm. The Homicide Bill produced most of the same arguments from abolitionists and from those who opposed eliminating the death penalty as had been heard during much of the previous century, but the bill which compromised total abolition was passed by both Houses of the Parliament and became law on March 21, 1957.

Mrs. Tuttle leaves the matter at that point, but the book includes a valuable and very readable

appendix by J. E. Hall Williams. This section covers developments since the passage of the Act. He presents an analysis of the essential features of the 1957 law and reviews the convictions which have resulted from its enforcement. Of twenty-nine convictions since the effective date of the Act to the end of 1960 sixteen persons were executed. This is a reduction from previous records, from thirteen a year to four a year. Williams claims, however, that there continues to be a resentment which grows against the Act "which perpetuates such a blot on our jurisprudence" and insists as does Mrs. Tuttle that there can be no compromise but rather ultimate victory in the abolition of the death penalty.

This work is a valuable addition to the literature on substantive criminal law. It is somewhat repetitive and is more of a calendar of events and a resume of arguments than an analysis of the development of public policy in criminal law and legislation. Its primary benefit will be as a handy reference for those who want a shortcut through Parliamentary Debates.

There is a useful bibliography and an index.—
ADAM C. BRECKENRIDGE, *University of Nebraska*.

God and Caesar in East Germany. By RICHARD W. SOLBERG. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961. Pp. xiv, 294. \$4.95.)

This is a study of the Church in Communist Germany, especially its Protestant components. While Dr. Solberg includes the Catholic Church in his discussion, it is given subordinate treatment—partly because it is much smaller numerically. Solberg's own religious affiliation is Lutheran and he has served in Germany not only as Senior Representative of the Department of World Service of the Lutheran World Federation, but also as Religious Affairs Adviser to the U. S. High Commissioner in Germany.

Yet Solberg's predominant concern with the German Protestant Church by no means implies bias; the problems faced by all Christian Churches in the so-called German Democratic Republic are virtually identical. These problems are the theme of his book, and his treatment of them is basically chronological. Like Soviet policy in Germany generally, policy on religion has undergone twists and turns so that a chronological approach lends clarity to the narrative.

Contrary to what one might assume, the first Soviet policy was quite friendly. The author attributes this to the "concentration camp effect," (for many Churchmen had suffered Hitler's punishments side by side with Communists, and their anti-Fascist orientation was well known) and to the urgent Soviet need to restore order and administer aid in the midst of chaos by any means at hand.

Inevitably the honeymoon was soon over. The first dissensions were over the use of schoolrooms for religious instruction, which was no longer to be considered normal procedure. Yet before the real bitterness set in, an important step was achieved. At the Eisenach Conference of 1948 (in East Germany) two all-German structures, the Evangelical Church in Germany and the United Evangelical Lutheran Church, held their constituent assemblies. Thereby the Protestant Church gained a postwar unity which still endures despite the Iron Curtain. The Church in Germany thus became the only major all-German institution functioning in both East and West.

Dr. Otto Debelius, Evangelical Bishop of Berlin, who has contributed a foreword to the book, bulks large in its narrative. For Bishop Debelius' synod embraced both West and East Berlin. His struggle with the Communists typified the battle as the Communists sought recurrently to turn the Church to its uses or to eliminate it.

As with many other things the June, 1953 uprising ushered in a period of moderation, just as the period after the Hungarian uprising saw a new intensification of the struggle. Beginning in 1958 a series of pseudo-religious ceremonies were introduced by the Communists to compete with the Christian rites of baptism, marriage, and burial. Sample: "Being responsible to all working people, to ourselves and to each other, we pledge to regard our marriage contracted this day in mutual love as a community founded for life. We vow to strengthen by concerted efforts the Socialist achievements, and the power of the workers and peasants. . . ." The Youth Dedication (replacing communion) saw a rise from 15% participation in the first year of 1955 to 65% by 1959 despite firm opposition.

Dr. Solberg's account of these developments is highly readable, quite accurate, and a welcome addition to the contemporary literature on Germany.—FREDERICK H. HARTMANN, *University of Florida*.

The Transformation of Russian Society. Edited by CYRIL E. BLACK. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. vii, 695. \$9.75.)

This book is an attempt to treat the "whole" of Russia and to view it in the perspective of the past hundred years. Made up of a collection of papers, originally presented at a conference held at Arden House in 1958, the book is the work of some three dozen contributors. For the most part, they are historians, political scientists and sociologists, although several other disciplines are also represented. Their work is divided into six sections and a conclusion, as follows: Society and Change; Law, Politics, and Social Change; Social Stratification; Education, Scholarship, and Religion;

Family, Youth, and Human Welfare; Personal and Social Values. With one exception, each section is followed by a summary and review, although in some instances the summarizers have taken the liberty of writing new essays, with scant reference to the papers they were expected to summarize and to review.

Most of the authors are concerned with the dilemma of continuity and change in Russian history. On the whole, they find many elements of continuity, but they also find that, by and large, totalitarianism is something rather unique. One of the outstanding contributions is that of Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, who compares the political systems of the Tsarist and the Soviet periods. While he is aware of certain elements of continuity, he rightly stresses the differences. He notes, for example, that while a distinction could be made between the state and society under Tsarism, this is impossible under the Soviets. Moreover, the Tsarist power operated within the framework of societal and traditional restraints. Not so the Soviet power. He points out that the Tsars vacillated between repression and concession in dealing with the opposition, but that even in their most brutally repressive moods they lacked the cold-blooded efficiency of the Soviet totalitarian regime. The more liberal Tsars tried to narrow the gap between the regime and society, whereas the Soviets have ruthlessly stamped out all opposition, so that no gap can exist between society and its leadership.

Similar conclusions are reached by other contributors. Sydney Monas, for example, points out that the Tsarist political police was relatively inefficient and that it operated over a considerable period within a framework of legal restraints, in sharp contrast with the Soviet period. Moreover, the Tsarist police numbered its victims in thousands and tens of thousands, while the Soviet political police has stamped its mark on millions. Similarly, Alexander Vucinich notes that the

Zemstvo, while hemmed in by all sorts of restrictions, embodied and practiced a degree of self-government which local soviets under Bolshevik rule were never able to attain.

Other authors, in discussing social stratification, education, family, youth and human welfare, emphasize the dominant role of the state in both the Tsarist and Soviet periods. They note also that much progress was made in all of these areas under Tsarism, although they recognize that more needed to be done. Tsarist society progressed from social stratification to a society where talent was recognized and increasingly drawn from a broader social base. Opportunities for access to the schools and the civil service improved markedly. Similarly, in education the Soviets have done more than the Tsars to poison the atmosphere in which scholars work, but the Russian scholar and scientist seems to have a will toward quality that persists despite adverse societal conditions.

Some of the contributors suggest that there is a very close connection between rapid industrialization and totalitarianism, leaving the impression that perhaps the former can only be achieved by totalitarian methods.

Although this work is an excellent source of information on Russia, some readers will find cause for disagreement here and there. Sociologists will no doubt argue with Robert A. Feldmesser's psychological definition of social class, which leads him to conclude that no social classes have existed in Tsarist or Soviet Russia. Some readers will regret that there is no systematic discussion of ideology and the changes that have taken place in it. Others will note that little attention is devoted to ethnic minorities and that the mass media, so much a part of totalitarianism, are not systematically treated. But there is a limit to how much can be included within the covers of an otherwise excellent book.—ALEX N. DRAGNICH, *Vanderbilt University*.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

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Washington, D. C.

General

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy. EDITED BY MAX F. MILLIKAN AND DONALD L. M. BLACKMER. (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1961. Pp. xiv, 171. \$4.50.)

American policy toward the developing nations, if it is to be soundly based, will require increasingly sophisticated political and economic analyses of the problems of the emergent societies. Traditional patterns of analysis in international politics, whether of the realistic or the idealistic school, seem mainly irrelevant to the actual situation in most of the newly independent world. This book is an excellent example of what is needed. For a number of years the Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology has conducted a series of group and individual research projects on the underdeveloped areas—projects involving interdisciplinary teams drawn from the fields of economics, political science, sociology, psychology, and history. Several of these projects have had close association with government policy development.

This relatively short work is, in a sense, the distillation of a long list of separate studies. It was prepared originally for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations as a report on "Economic, Social and Political Change in the Underdeveloped Countries and Its Implications for United States Policy," but has been extensively revised. No less than ten senior staff members of the Center are listed as authors, but the final work emerges as one of collective authorship, without individual attribution of separate chapters or sections. The editors state that in the working seminar which produced the study, and in the process of drafting and redrafting, individual contributions became "virtually impossible to identify."

Principal emphasis of the study is on the transition process—the complex parameters which define the movement from traditional to modern society. Special attention is devoted to social

change, economic modernization, and political development, though with the ever-recurring theme that these processes are intimately interrelated. On the basis of this survey, the authors pinpoint as typical and crucial alternatives confronting the emerging peoples the traditionalist extreme, the various extremes of radical modernization, and the more moderate "third choice" of gradual modification of traditional society in the direction of modernization. This third choice, usually supported by at least some traditionalists and some modernizers, would retain some of the traditional cohesive features of the old society without the ruthless suppression of forces promoting change which is most likely to result in disruptive violence.

In the second major section of the study, devoted to implications for United States policy, the authors propose a specific set of principles of development aid—proposals which bear a striking similarity to those submitted to the Congress by President Kennedy. They ask that the economic criteria on which development capital is offered be clear and unambiguous, that the offer of capital for productive use be held out over a long enough time period to permit the incentive effects to work, that the amount offered be enough to be persuasive, that the purposes be varied enough to help all important sectors of the recipient economy, that local leadership in the underdeveloped countries be encouraged to plan development in national terms, and that adjustment of a developing economy to the growth of the international economy be a major goal so as to make possible relatively early freedom from dependence on aid. An interesting tabular appendix summarizes "suggested levels of international aid for underdeveloped countries" over the period 1961–1976, drawn from a special study by one of the authors, P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan.

Other participants in the authorship of the volume include: F. M. Bator, R. S. Eckaus, E. E. Hagen, Daniel Lerner, Ithiel de Sola Pool, L. W.

Pye, and W. W. Rostow.—OLIVER BENSON, *University of Oklahoma*.

The United Nations and the Use of Force. BY INIS L. CLAUDE, JR. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1961. Pp. 60. \$1.35.)

Professor Claude has written an exemplary little study of one of the most vexing problems extant today: the role of international organization in the use and non-use of force in international politics. Though not yet graced with hard covers (this volume was published as the March, 1961 issue of *International Conciliation*), it is obviously part of a wider ranging inquiry into the problems of power on the international level. The beginning is auspicious.

The United Nations aims at peace, yet it must to a certain extent rely on instruments of force and violence to achieve that end. The Charter faces this paradox on the one hand by preventing the use of force on the part of members except in self defense, and on the other by requiring the collective use of force by members in repelling aggression. Claude does not construe this second requirement to be the basis of a collective security system, as is often argued. On the contrary, "the veto rule is an explicit declaration that the framers of the Charter rejected the idea of making, or attempting to make, the United Nations an instrument of collective security in cases involving aggressive action by the great powers." Thus it is not fair to blame the United Nations for a breakdown in collective security since it was never intended to operate as such against the great powers anyway. Nor, in Claude's view, is it correct to castigate the framers for their lack of attention to realities of power and the importance of force, and he points to the gingerly phrased clauses on disarmament as proof of this realism.

The Charter is but a blueprint and in practice there have been rearrangements of priorities on questions of force. First, disarmament has come to the foreground as an imperative of the thermo-nuclear age and the great capacity for destruction that the leading antagonists possess. Claude even manages a few sanguine observations here about the persistent arms race and the rough military balance that exists, although he is obviously alive to the dangers. Second, the plan to equip the Security Council with an international armed force has not been implemented because of fundamental disagreement between the Soviets and the West over the size and function of such an arm. Third, the ideal of collective security has returned to cast its spell periodically, but the tide has receded from the high water mark of Uniting for Peace which seemed to overturn the original intent of the Charter. Thus, the price of collective

action against a great power appeared to be too high in the Hungarian case, and UNEF, an instrument of pacific settlement, was devised as an alternative in the Middle East crisis. The author observes that the experience with UNEF, and more recently the Congo Force, makes it clear that even limited efforts to deploy international force, however bereft of coercive power, raise crucial questions for the United Nations. Events are clearly validating that judgement.

Claude does not deny a significant role to the United Nations in his probing of the problems of power and force in world politics. On the contrary, he labors to dispel the legends that have grown up in order to reveal more clearly that the primary task now is in "stabilizing dangerous situations so as to prevent their becoming focal points of struggle between major blocs." Felicity of style and a willingness to offer broad judgments and generalizations help to make this a provocative inquiry.—DONALD E. HABBE, *University of South Dakota*.

The Challenge of Coexistence. BY MILTON KOVNER. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961. Pp. vi, 130. \$3.25.)

Few readers of this slender volume will be satisfied that it exhausts discussion of "the challenge of coexistence." Nor does the author claim to have pronounced the definitive and final word on that complex subject. Instead, his purpose is rather to examine the foreign economic policy of the Soviet Union in its political setting, "as an integral part of Soviet foreign policy." The terms of presentation stress "the unique relationship of foreign trade to a Soviet foreign policy which posits economic competition in place of revolutionary violence as the decisive factor in the struggle between East and West." Granting the political importance of economic competition, the diplomatic, ideological, and even military aspects of the struggle cannot so easily be put out of mind.

Actually, the author does tell us something—if not quite enough—about the larger dimensions of the problem. There is the reminder, always a salutary one, that in the Soviet view "coexistence" is only a transitory stage in relations between the Soviet Union (and now the Soviet bloc) and the non-Communist world, an 'epoch' limited "to the period between the emergence of the first Socialist state and the inevitable decline of the last capitalist state." Kovner also distinguishes Khrushchev's activist and expansionist practice of coexistence from earlier versions of the doctrine, including the initial defensive quest for a "breathing space."

The primary focus of this study, however, is on foreign economic policy. Accordingly, the author

includes a brief historical sketch of the evolution of Soviet foreign trade practices and a disquisition on the role of Soviet gold. The core of the analysis may be found in successive chapters on "The Politics of Economic Coexistence" and "Ruble Diplomacy in Underdeveloped Areas." The first of these is devoted to three "case studies": the cancellation of Soviet contracts for the supply of oil to Israel, the vulnerability of Finland to Soviet economic pressure, and the devious course of Soviet-Yugoslav economic relations. Each of these surveys is meant to demonstrate that the USSR has in various ways manipulated trade and aid in order to gain political objectives. A similar conclusion emerges from the chapter on "Ruble Diplomacy" which argues that although "there may be a small economic advantage, or at least very little disadvantage, in expanding commercial relations with the underdeveloped countries," Soviet motives are basically political rather than commercial in nature. Kovner's argument serves as a persuasive rejoinder to those who have concentrated solely on the apparent (but not always real) economic "complementarity" between the USSR and the underdeveloped countries.

To accept the author's main thesis is not necessarily to endorse his treatment of the complexities and imponderables of Soviet economic activity abroad as entirely adequate. Readers with a historical bent of mind, for example, will find the historical chapter very sketchy indeed and may well lament the author's concern with matters of doctrine to the neglect of a more detailed discussion of actual Soviet behavior, *e.g.*, Soviet Russia's role at the Genoa Economic Conference, the policy of concessions in the twenties, and the like. As far as the current "challenge" is concerned, Kovner's analysis cannot be judged to probe very deeply. In fact, although his study raises the crucial question of whether "ruble diplomacy" will succeed in binding the new nations to the Soviet bloc, the many dimensions of that tantalizing question—recently much in dispute within the Communist camp—remain largely unexplored. It may seem excessively demanding to expect such historical and analytical treatment from so compact a study of a subject with so many ramifications. Yet, despite the brevity of the book, the author does manage to introduce into the body of the text fairly lengthy excerpts from official Soviet sources, many of which beg precisely this kind of question at least as readily as they illustrate the intended point.—MELVIN CROAN, *Harvard University*.

The Political Foundations of International Law,
BY MORTON A. KAPLAN AND NICHOLAS DEB.
KATZENBACH. (New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Inc., 1961. Pp. xi, 372. \$6.95.)

A careful probing of the political foundations of international law has long been needed. Now systems theory is given a public testing as a device for such probing and thereby explaining international law in its political environment.

How should the undertaking be judged? Reasons listed by the authors as to why textwriters are often persuasive to decision makers include "the ethics of scholarship in accurate statement and citation of authorities, including those that do not support their conclusions. . . . To the extent that these conditions are not present in their work, they lose status as scholars." Does this standard apply to the present work? Near the end, the authors employ a bit of game theory and explain that "at this level of analysis game theory simply reinforces insights that might be obtained from more discursive analysis." Lowness of the level of analysis apparently results from the stated purpose of writing at one time for three audiences, scholars, statesmen and public, and students. One result is that the text is left uncluttered by footnotes and specific references, although a short list of references in English is appended. Furthermore, since in the effort to communicate with three audiences "we have also been forced to compromise on the precision of our vocabulary—and occasionally of our theorizing . . .," some seventy-three inaccuracies, omissions of consequence, and misleading statements, besides some inconsistencies, appear.

Is it proper in Chapter 2 to refer to nations and nation-states in the 18th and 19th centuries without reference to the changes wrought in consequence of the French Revolution? If the law of nations, including the law merchant, was nationalized in the 19th century, what was Lord Mansfield doing in the 18th century? Would anyone who has travelled along the *Vierwaldstättersee* agree that there was a "multilateral creation of Switzerland" in the 19th century? Is it proper to treat consular courts as "imposed" during the 19th century and omit reference both to the introduction of the Capitulations to meet the needs of Europeans outside the pale of Islamic law and, the topic being political foundations, to the transformation in the nature of the institution? Did the idea of free seas take over in the 19th century only because of "a marriage of laissez-faire economics to British gunboats" or were there also significant domestic political pressures related to extension of the suffrage in 1832 and to Britain's possession, like the Dutch in the 17th century, of the world's largest commercial fleet? Was only a Prisoners of War Convention produced at Geneva in 1949? Precisely what distinction is involved in saying that, "In the nineteenth century, public organizations of a supranational character did not and could not

exist" and that in that century there were "no important multilateral organizations"?

Enough of this, for the volume has important value for a careful reader well versed in history. Exceptionally useful insights are to be found, *e.g.*, in the discussion of force and neutrality. A number of the points made concerning differences between the old balance of power system and the current bipolar system are potentially useful analytical tools, even if the inflexibility of the present system may be overstated in a way to give careless readers an impression of permanence. Emphasis upon flexibility of alignment in the older system and of the effects upon conduct of today's enemy being tomorrow's ally—the opposite possibility should be given due weight—are important to the understanding of the system.

Systems theory is not truly tested by references to Belgian and Hungarian revolts that leave out such things as the geopolitical concern of the British over the Low Countries, differences in the Dutch and Austrian internal political situations, and the consequences of 1848 outside the Hapsburg Empire. It is not tested by saying that in general 19th century statesmen, unlike those of today, concentrated on maintaining flexibility and that foreign policy was largely not subject to internal political considerations, at least those abroad, without ascertaining the reasons, some of which may be political in nature, why this should have been so. In short, systems theory has not here been subjected to a fair test that might give it a chance to come off well. The political foundations of international law are not exposed, and the theory, when not hampered by generalities minus evidence, sometimes even gets in the way. The end can better be achieved by examining the emergence, survival, and sometimes demise of a number of significant rules in the light of the politics that produced them, with concern for the flow of the history of events and of ideas, both accurately presented. Systems theory might yet be most valuable in shedding light upon the political foundations of international law. But it can do so only if the central topic is not lost sight of, if the present authors' clue that the international system is a subsystem-dominant system is followed without oversimplification, and if it is remembered that Lycurgus preceded Plato.—
WESLEY L. GOULD, *Purdue University*.

The United States in World Affairs 1960. By RICHARD P. STEBBINS. (New York: Harper Brothers Co., for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1961. Pp. xii, 436. \$6.00.)

To those of us who tend to view political history as something of a seamless web, it is always a source of wonder and admiration to see the neat and precise way in which the professional chroniclers of our time can isolate a single calendar year

and serve it up as a package, complete unto itself even to the dramatic unities including a beginning, a middle, a climax, a dénouement, and a fitting end.

The Council on Foreign Relations in its publishing program is in the business of so packaging modern diplomatic history, and does an uncommonly fine job of it both with chronicle and with documents to back up the chronicle. The present volume is in a series begun in 1931—thirty years ago—and is the eleventh by Mr. Stebbins. These particular thirty years have, one would think, been so untidy that a very special genius is necessary for the chore of slicing them neatly into January 1–December 31 packages. The necessary skill is here in abundance.

"Ten more years like 1960," comments the author with a barely suppressed groan, "would leave America and the free world in a critical if not hopeless position." 1960, for those who can barely recall it through the *sturm und drang* of 1961, was the last year of the Eisenhower regime, the year of evaporation of the Spirit of Camp David, and a time of intensified competition between Soviet and Western systems on five continents and in outer space.

Mr. Stebbins' artfulness in packaging history in neat annual segments is matched by the appropriate and meaningful ways in which he splits up the indigestible mass of problems that do emerge in the course of a twelvemonth. His eight chapters represent one way of doing it: Foreign Policy Through American Eyes; The Soviet Bloc and East-West Relations; The Western Community; The Year of Africa; The Middle East and South East Asia; Communist China and Its Neighbors; The Inter-American System; and The World Society.

Like the experiments with the Federal "performance budget," the world scene can be subjected to other forms of intellectual discipline. The Cold War obviously runs through more than just Chapter 2. The Revolution of the Emerging Nations permeates chapters 1 through 8, and could have been a separate theme. And that other transformation which is changing the very map of human society—science and technology—seems to find no adequately significant niche in the scheme offered here.

But after we grant that another author could have done it differently and possibly even better—a dubious premise on which innumerable reviews in the academic world seem to be based—Mr. Stebbins has arranged contemporary history for us in a series of molds which are thoroughly adequate to encompass the vast and reverberating events of 1960. Those events include the U-2, the abortive Summit, the Japanese riots which precluded Mr. Eisenhower's visit, the independence of a staggering eighteen new countries, seventeen

of which became members of the United Nations; the *de facto* admission of France to the nuclear club, the shoe brandishing of Nikita Khrushchev at the United Nations, and indeed the whole complex of happenings stemming from the obscenely hasty abdication of Belgian rule in the Congo which Mr. Stebbins does not particularly headline but which could fix, for better or worse, the basic patterns of decolonialization, of international administration, and of the possibility of keeping the east-west battle at a distance in Africa.

From 1961's perspective, 1960 rather resembles an incomplete portrait, or an early chapter of a much revised story. Yet 1960 was the womb in which 1961 matured. If 1961 harvests for us some bitter fruits of a decade of military imbalances, 1960 was a final stage of gestation; if West Berlin seemed to "stabilize" in 1960, we know in 1961 that life is full of illusions and unfulfilled promises. And if in 1961 we must summon up in a series of historic confrontations those things for which we stand, the self-conscious efforts in 1960 to define the "national purpose" perhaps had a vital rationale. For those who seek comfort—and who does not—Mr. Stebbins concludes that the "slow erosion" in the national position is not really irretrievable.

This account is balanced, lively, well-written, and endowed with a talent for making a single year not only come alive but fit solidly into a larger perspective.—LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*.

No Transfer; An American Security Principle. BY JOHN A. LOGAN, JR. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1961. Pp. 430. \$6.75.)

With the sharp eye and wise judgment of a trained historian, Professor John A. Logan, Jr., has turned his attention to the basic principles of United States security from the beginning of the republic. Paramount among these he identifies United States opposition to the transfer of western hemisphere colonies from one non-American power to another. From the founding fathers to the present, American statesmen have seen that such a transfer of sovereignty might involve the United States in extrahemispheric power struggles. Consequently, United States foreign policy has reacted strongly in opposition to such transfers, particularly to the transfer of American possessions from a weaker to a stronger power, which paradoxically transformed the United States at times into one of Spain's staunchest defenders against her stronger European neighbors.

Professor Logan presents the Monroe Doctrine as actually a corollary of the No-Transfer principle and demonstrates that the vigor of the application

of this principle has always been in direct proportion to the extent to which the United States felt its security threatened by any proposed or anticipated transfer. The villain in the diplomatic drama has always been that particular non-American power which seemed most menacing at the time, beginning with England in our early history down to the Soviet Union at the present. United States sensitivity to the transfer of particular areas has always been due to the strategic position of these areas with relation to our vital interests, hence United States fixation on the Caribbean and perpetual concern about Cuba.

The integration of the Monroe Doctrine with the No-Transfer principle and the internationalization of the Monroe Doctrine among the American states are presented as logical developments of this basic security policy. Anxious readers, distressed by the precarious contemporary position of the United States, will be heartened to read how statesmen of previous generations have often been forced to rely on diplomacy, good luck, and shrewd international maneuvering to protect the national security. Those with an eye to the future will find a brief forecast of what is happening to these policies in the light of modern-world strategy based on intercontinental ballistic missiles.

This book is somewhat uneven in quality. In a few places the author lapses into a controversy with other professional historians as to which of various scholars has the proper interpretation of various policies and incidents. This type of material might profitably be relegated to the footnotes. In general, however, the book is rewarding reading with many wise judgments and shrewd insights. It demonstrates how a trained historian can judiciously summarize standard source materials with great penetration and insight from a fresh point of view. Anyone interested in American foreign policy should read "No Transfer"; scholars and diplomats cannot well neglect it.—WARD M. MORTON, *Southern Illinois University*.

American Diplomacy in a New Era. EDITED BY STEPHEN D. KERTESZ. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961. Pp. xi, 601. \$10.00.)

This "modest endeavor to clarify the course of American diplomacy since 1945—its major objectives, and problems of formulating and implementing them," clearly reflects the breadth of the area of study called diplomacy. It also acknowledges the scope of this collection of nineteen essays by as many students of the field. Taken together, these essays, ranging from discussions of NATO (Kertesz), to containment and alliance systems (Morgenthau), to the role of the specialist (Elder), point up how necessary it is for even the com-

petent student—not merely the expert—to specialize.

J. B. Duroselle, the lone non-American contributor, opines from a Frenchman's point of view that "Politics cannot always be scientific. Ultimately it needs leadership." He sees continuity (if sometimes rigidity) in American foreign policy since 1945. Perhaps "morality" might have reflected a deeper insight—Professor Morgenthau (using America's "traditional purpose") *almost* concedes that morality may have a place in diplomacy.

Professor Duroselle feels that American foreign policy is also blessed with being adaptable, *has* been effective without being excessive—certainly it has maintained peace, and has been supported by internal public opinion—although it is here that he warns against imperfect leadership. But, this foreign policy is immature. This is most readily seen in the area of external support. His argument reminds one of the trap Benjamin Franklin spoke of, for we "go about suitering others," and ally ourselves merely for the sake of allying, and give of our substance so as "to provoke a very human reaction from him who is humiliated in receiving and who detests his benefactor." (Duroselle.)

The eighteen other essays in this sequel to *Diplomacy in a Changing World* (published two years ago) are largely reportorially descriptive rather than critical, interpretative, or prognosticative. Professor Kertesz's own preface is brief, and laudable in that it clearly identifies the nature, scope, and *dramatis personae*, and then does not further weary the reader—who has a substantial 568 pages before him. Part One is clearly a geographical arrangement. From NATO it circles the globe to the satellites and national communism. The impact of the birth of new states and of

formerly diplomatically slumbering regions (Africa, for example) is pointed up. That the United States has officiated at many of these accouchements, with attendant responsibilities being added to this country, cannot be mistaken. Robert H. Ferrell forcefully brings home the influence of one such lying-in and wet-nursing upon domestic politics (Zionism in Truman's day).

Part Two considers the mechanization and implementation of American foreign policy as it deals with "Who Determines our Foreign Policy?" (Lindsey Rogers—who tends to redundancy), then Congress (Ernest S. Griffith), aspects of the Department of State, informational activities, the United Nations, and military factors, to name a few. Dean Griffith, perhaps also characterizing the entire period as well as Congress's integrity in a field in which it reversed its historical position, says "the continuation of enlightened national interest and international-mindedness . . . had come to dominate the postwar years."

Part Three, "Future Policies and Expectations," has but a single essay: "American Policy: Dangers and Prospects." To this reviewer, Philip Mosely concludes on a note too dour and pessimistic. More hope and joy seemed called for in terms of the clarity of descriptive material that had gone before, and the occasional provocative suggestions earlier essayists had made. Perhaps, though, he had in his mind's eye the rather melancholy binding—a bilious green.

This book is for the more advanced student who, although already master of his fundamentals, is still in the area of general foreign policy study. Highly factual, though not pretending to plumb a subject to its depths, it is a work of hard-hitting prose that is consistent.—W. C. B. LAMBERT, *University of Omaha*.

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WILLIAM H. ROBERTS

Catholic University of America

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NEWS AND NOTES

NOMINATIONS

The Association's Committee on Nominations invites all members to propose candidates for the elective offices of the Association, to wit: President-Elect, three Vice-Presidents, Secretary, Treasurer, and eight members for two-year terms on the Council. Suggestions and supporting statements may be sent to any member of the Committee: Roland Pennock, Swarthmore College, Chairman; Dayton McKean, University of Colorado; Lucian Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Weldon Cooper, University of Virginia; Stanley Parry, University of Notre Dame; Jack Peltason, University of Illinois. The sooner suggestions are received the better; to be considered at all they must arrive by March 15, 1962.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

Fifty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association: Minutes of the Council Meeting

The Council of the American Political Science Association met at 9:00 A.M., September 5, 1961, in Room 1, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, St. Louis, Missouri with President Emmette Redford presiding. The following members of the Council, nominees for election in 1961, and former presidents of the Association were present: Gabriel Almond, William Anderson, Lawrence L. Durisch, W. O. Farber, Carl J. Friedrich, Charles E. Gilbert, John H. Hallowell, Ivan Hinderaker, Charles S. Hyneman, Marian D. Irish, Gladys M. Kammerer, V. O. Key, Jr., Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Merle Kling, Harvey C. Mansfield, John D. Millett, George A. Peek, Jr., C. Herman Pritchett, Emmette S. Redford, Leo C. Riethmayer, Lester Seligman, Richard C. Snyder, George W. Spicer, Paul G. Steinbicker, Robert A. Walker, J. D. Williams, Rene Williamson, Bryce Wood.

Prior to the meeting each council member received by mail reports from the following: Personnel Service Committee; Committee on Standards of Instruction in Political Science; Committee on High School Instruction; Program Committee, 1961; Managing Editor, *THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*; the Executive Director; the Treasurer; the Auditor; the Nominating Committee, 1961. This enabled the council to conduct its business with better understanding and dispatch.

1. The council received the report of the Personnel Service Committee which recommended strengthening and extending the person-

nel service facility of the Association. A motion that the report be adopted was passed with the following modification of Section 8, which concerned assisting persons to secure new academic positions who have suffered because of attacks of extremist groups: "We recommend that the Association reaffirm the support it gave in 1947 to the 1940 AAUP Statement of Principles of Academic Freedom and Tenure and that the Association make known to the profession and to institutions utilizing its personnel service its firm support of these principles."

2. Merle Kling summarized the written report of the Committee on High School Instruction in Civics and Government. The council accepted and enthusiastically endorsed the report and passed a motion that the Executive Committee take whatever steps are feasible to implement the committee recommendations.

3. Evron Kirkpatrick reported on a conference held at Swarthmore College concerning the establishment of a *Journal of Political Theory* that might be sponsored by the Society of Legal and Political Philosophy. No final commitments have been made for the sponsorship or publication of the journal. It was moved and passed that the Association express its friendly interest in this prospective publication and that the Executive Committee be advised to take practical steps in any way feasible to give assistance.

4. The council appointed Avery Leiserson to serve a second term as the representative of the Association on the Social Science Research Council.

5. On the recommendation of Harvey C. Mansfield the council appointed Otto Kirchheimer of Columbia University to the editorial board of *THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*.

6. Evron Kirkpatrick made a report on the biographical directory of the Association. The new directory which was mailed in September is larger and more comprehensive than previous editions. After extensive discussion of the frequency of the directory the council recommended that the Executive Committee consider the feasibility of an annual circular listing members by name and address and then publication of the regular directory every three or four years.

The council passed a motion expressing its appreciation to Dr. Franklin Burdette for the time and energy he devoted to the precise and careful editorial supervision of the directory.

7. Emmette Redford reported on the continuing effort being made by officers of the Association for the full acceptance of the discipline of political science by the National Science Foundation in the awarding of research grants. The National Science Foundation has established a Social Science Division and the officers of the Association have had a number of discussions with Mr. Riecken, Head of the Social Science Division, but no statement has as yet been agreed upon recognizing the place of political science. It was moved and passed by the council that the Executive Committee be advised to continue discussions with the National Science Foundation and that the case for political science be put in the firmest way possible.

8. John D. Williams presented a written report to the council recommending that the Association sponsor a series of lectures to be known as Freedom Lectures, designed to inform the American public about the nature of our constitutional democracy, as a partial answer to the attacks directed at our system by extremists, particularly of the right, who in fact constitute a profound danger. The resolution produced considerable discussion. The consensus appeared to be in sympathy with the aims of the resolution though doubts were expressed as to (a) whether the Association, in view of its own constitution, could engage in precisely this kind of effort, and (b) whether this particular approach was the most effective one in view of the end sought. Mr. Williams moved to table his motion and this was passed. It was then moved by Evron Kirkpatrick and passed that the council express its concern about the threats posed to our constitutional democracy by extremists of both left and right and that the Executive Committee be advised to take under consideration alternative projects for informing the American public more adequately about these threats and about the character and value of our democratic institutions.

9. John Millett presented the report of the Committee on Standards of Instruction in Political Science. The report expressed concern about

political science instruction at two levels: (a) in small colleges with staffs in political science of less than three members; (b) graduate training by departments not adequately staffed and qualified to give graduate instruction. The statement concluded with five action recommendations designed to put pressure upon accrediting agencies to upgrade standards in political science departments and to advance alternatives to colleges and universities for properly relating political science to other social sciences. The report was discussed at length. In view of Council discussion, Mr. Millett said his committee might wish to make some minor revisions before the report was put in final form. With this in mind, the Council accepted the report and requested the President to continue the committee with the charge of examining in more detail some of the problems raised and advancing solutions in line with standards held by the Association with a view to early publication of the report and action to carry out its recommendations.

10. The reports of the Treasurer and of the Auditor were presented, discussed and accepted. The Council accepted the proposed budget for the fiscal year 1962 and authorized the Executive Committee to make minor modifications during the year on the recommendation of the Treasurer and Executive Director, if such modifications are necessary.

11. The Council recommended that the Executive Committee consider holding the annual meeting in 1963 in one of the larger cities of the Northeast and in 1964 in a city on the Pacific coast.

12. It was moved and passed that the Council express its appreciation to the United States Employment Service for operation of the Personnel Service at the 1961 annual meeting.

The Council adjourned at 5:00 P.M.

GEORGE A. PEEK, JR., *Secretary*

Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting

The Annual Business Meeting of the American Political Science Association was called to order by President Emmette Redford in the Gold Room of the Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, St. Louis, Missouri, 4:45 P.M., September 6, 1961.

The minutes of the Council meeting of September 5, 1961, were read by the Secretary and were approved.

On behalf of the Council the Secretary moved that the annual meeting express its appreciation to Dr. Franklin Burdette for the time and energy he devoted to the precise and careful editorial supervision of the directory. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously.

On behalf of the Council the Secretary moved that the annual meeting express its appreciation to the United States Employment Service for

its assistance in establishing the Personnel Service at the convention in St. Louis. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously.

From the floor a member inquired whether the Council had considered the action of the American Sociological Association which had insisted that all the facilities including the swimming pool of the hotel where it met in St. Louis be opened to all irrespective of race. President Redford replied that the matter had not come up. When the member moved to resolve that the annual meeting go on record in support of the action of the American Sociological Association, he was reminded that by constitutional requirement resolutions must first be submitted to the Council; hence the resolution was not in order. In the ensuing discussion, it was clear that the motion from the floor represented the consensus of the meeting. President Redford pointed out that our Association had always taken a firm stand that facilities be open to all regardless of race, color or religion. He asked if there were objections to having the officers of the Association express its firm concurrence with the action of the American Sociological Association. No objection was heard.

Dayton McKean reported for the nominating committee, recommending the following slate of candidates:

President-elect, Carl J. Friedrich (Harvard University);

Vice-Presidents: Gabriel A. Almond (Yale University), C. Herman Pritchett (University of Chicago), and Dwight Waldo (University of California);

Secretary, Marian D. Irish (Florida State University);

Treasurer, Max M. Kampelman (Washington, D. C.);

Members of the Council for two years: Robert E. Ward (Univ. of Michigan), Leo C. Riethmayer (University of Colorado), Lester G. Seligman (University of Oregon), Sigmund Neumann (Wesleyan University), John Hallowell (Duke University), Bryce Wood (Social Science Research Council), Vernon Van Dyke (State University of Iowa), and Alfred deGrazia (New York University).

Mr. McKean then moved approval of the slate. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously.

Harvey C. Mansfield, Editor of the REVIEW, made a brief report and invited members' attention to a panel discussion on editorial policy of the REVIEW scheduled for Friday afternoon.

Evron Kirkpatrick, the Executive Director, made a brief report on Association activities. He said that as executive director he had already expressed his concurrence with the recent action of the American Sociological Association, since it was and had been for a long time in line with the

views of our Association. He reported that mimeographed material relating to special panels for the program was available. He invited attention to his written report of the activities of the Office of the Executive Director, available in the room. He added that the insurance program, the charter flights to Europe, the Regional Seminars, and the Congressional Fellowship program were all exceedingly successful operations during the year. In conclusion he expressed appreciation to the officers of the Association and particularly the President for their generous and cooperative efforts.

From the floor John Williams said that he was sure it was the unanimous opinion of the meeting that an expression of appreciation to Evron Kirkpatrick was in order and moved the adoption of such a resolution, which was unanimously approved. President Redford, speaking for the meeting, expressed his sense of gratitude to Mr. Kirkpatrick.

Max Kampelman, Treasurer, reported that our financial situation was relatively favorable. At the present time the Association has assets of approximately \$550,000, mostly earmarked for special projects. In the fiscal year just ended, the Association had a surplus of \$29,000 but this will be used in the near future to defray the expenses of the *Directory* and to adjust to a need for adequate operating reserves, which are now about \$76,000. This healthy condition is determined in large part by increased membership which is now about 8,500. He concluded by reading a list of private contributors, both individuals and corporations, who have given financial support to the Association. President Redford stated that the officers of the Association have expressed appreciation to these contributors. He added that Mr. Kampelman serves the Association as treasurer, attorney, and investment counselor all without charge.

Clarence Berdahl, a member of the Advisory Committee on *Foreign Relations*, made a report for his committee which advises the State Department on publication of historical records of American foreign policy.

President Redford expressed his appreciation to the convention for having been privileged to be President of the Association. It was, he said, a thrilling experience to watch the growth and variety of activities of our organization. He thanked the officers for their generous cooperation in making the year so successful.

President Charles Hyneman took the chair as the new president. He expressed the heart-felt opinion of the Association in thanking ex-President Redford for a job well done. The members rose and applauded.

The meeting was adjourned at 5:40.

GEORGE A. PEEK, JR., *Secretary*

The Fifth World Congress of The International Political Science Association was held at the UNESCO building in Paris, France, September 26-30, 1961. Over five hundred political scientists attended and there was representation from over forty countries. The Congress was held under the auspices of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of National Education of France. Professor J.-J. Chevallier, President of the French Political Science Association, headed the Organizing Committee. Five series of panel discussions dealt with (1) the contribution of studies of political behavior; (2) the political problems of polyethnic states; (3) administrative problems in the field of nuclear energy; (4) technocracy and the role of experts in government; and (5) civil-military relations in the field of foreign policy making. Norman Chester, Warden of Nuffield College, Oxford, was elected President of IPSA for a three-year term, succeeding Jacques Chapsal, Directeur de l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de l'Université de Paris. Carl J. Friedrich (Harvard), Jovan Djordjevic (Belgrade), Francesco Vito (Milan) and S. K. Kogekar (Poona, India) were elected vice-presidents and Evron M. Kirkpatrick was elected to the Executive Committee. The next International Congress of IPSA will be held in

1964, at a place to be determined later.

The Fifteenth Annual meeting of the New York Political Science Association was held at Cornell University on April 21 and 22, 1961. Panel sessions were devoted to "Government and Resources Development," and "Politics of Developing Areas." At the dinner session Laurin Henry of the Brookings Institution discussed "Presidential Transition." Officers of the Association for 1961-62 are: William R. Willoughby, St. Lawrence University, president; Channing Richardson, Hamilton College, vice president; Frederick T. Bent, Cornell University, secretary treasurer; and James Riedel (Union College), Frederick Englemann (Alfred University), and Herbert Rosenbaum (Hofstra College), members of the executive council.

A joint meeting of the Western Political Science Association and the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association will be held March 23-24 at Portland State College. Officers of the WPSA are president, Hugh A. Bone, University of Washington; vice-president, Ivan Hinderaker, UCLA; secretary, Brock Dixon, Portland State College. Members of the executive committee are: Harold Enarson, Roy V. Peel, Bernard C. Hennessey, Ned Joy, Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., Kline Swygart and Leo Riethmayer.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Milnor Alexander has been given appointment as instructor in political science at the Pennsylvania State University.

Paul Alexander, Jr. of Vanderbilt University has accepted a position as instructor at Marshall University.

Henry S. Albinski has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University.

Vernon V. Aspaturian has been promoted to rank of professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University.

Hans Baerwald has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at Miami University (Ohio).

Stephen Kemp Bailey, professor of political science, has been appointed as the fourth dean of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, effective September 1, 1961.

Russell H. Barrett has been advanced to a full professorship at the University of Mississippi.

Kenneth E. Beasley has been appointed associate professor of political science and public ad-

ministration at the Pennsylvania State University. Prior to this, he was assistant professor of political science and assistant director of the training program of the governmental research center at the University of Kansas.

Gary L. Best, formerly on the staff at the University of Oregon has accepted an appointment as assistant professor at Miami University (Ohio).

Yaroslav Bilinsky, formerly of Douglass College, Rutgers University, has been appointed assistant professor at the University of Delaware.

Rev. Virgil C. Blum, S.J., has been promoted to professor of political science at Marquette University.

John N. Born is now an instructor at the University of Nevada.

Robert Bone, formerly of Tulane University, has been appointed associate professor at Florida State University.

Clark W. Bouton, formerly of Drake University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado.

Robert Burrowes, Ph.D. candidate at Princeton, has been appointed instructor in political science at University College, New York University.

Leo D. Cagan has been appointed chairman of the government department at San Francisco State College.

Mark W. Cannon, formerly administrative assistant to Congressman Henry Aldous Dixon, has been made associate professor and chairman of the department of political science at Brigham Young University.

Donald F. Cate at Stanford University has accepted a position at San Francisco State College.

Hsien t'ing Peter Ch'en has been appointed instructor in the department at Brown.

Yung Ping Chen, on leave from the Pan American College, has been appointed as lecturer in the European program of the University of Maryland commencing in September, 1961.

Edwin Cobb, a doctoral candidate at the George Washington University, has been appointed an instructor of political science at the Montgomery Junior College.

George A. Coddling, formerly of the University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of Colorado.

Stuart Edgar Colie, formerly of Bowdoin College, took up his duties as assistant professor of political studies at the American University of Beirut in Lebanon in September, 1961.

Thomas I. Cook has been named chairman of the department of political science at the Johns Hopkins University.

Eugene E. Dais has accepted appointment as assistant professor on political science at the Johns Hopkins University.

David J. Danelski of the University of Illinois has become assistant professor at the University of Washington.

Paul Dolan has been promoted to full professorship in the department of political science at the University of Delaware.

Harry Eckstein of Princeton has been promoted to full professor.

Jack D. Edwards has been appointed instructor at the University of Nevada.

Luigi R. Einaudi has been appointed as an instructor in government at Wesleyan University.

Emery Fast has been made professor of political science at Montgomery Junior College.

Edward T. Ferguson III, formerly of the faculty of Southern Illinois University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Oregon.

Richard M. Fink, candidate for the Ph.D. at Harvard, has been appointed an acting instructor at the University of Wisconsin.

Mildred L. Fitch, associate professor of government, Purdue University, retired from the University on June 30, 1961. She was named Professor Emeritus by action of the Board of Trustees.

Milton E. Flower has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Dickinson College.

Wayne Francis has been appointed instructor and research assistant in the bureau of government research at Indiana University.

Elke Frank, tutor at Harvard, has been appointed assistant professor at Florida State University.

Carl M. Frasure, who has served 26 years as chairman of the department of political science has been appointed dean of the college of arts and science, West Virginia University.

Robert L. Friedheim, who expects to complete the work for his Ph.D. at the University of Washington in August, 1961, was appointed assistant professor of government at Purdue University, effective September 1, 1961.

Robert S. Friedman of Louisiana State University, has resigned to accept a visiting associate professorship at the University of Michigan.

Richard T. Frost, formerly assistant professor of politics at Princeton University, is associate professor of political science and administrative assistant to the president, Reed College, effective September, 1961.

Jack G. Gabbert, formerly of the University of Texas, has been appointed instructor in political science at Washington State University at Pullman.

Fred Gantt, Jr., formerly of the University of Texas, has been appointed instructor in history and government at the A & M College of Texas.

Robert Moulton Gatke has retired after 25 years as professor and chairman of the political science department at Willamette University and 40 years as a member of the faculty.

William Gerberding has accepted an appoint-

ment as assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles.

John D. Gerletti has been promoted from associate to full professor of public administration at the University of Southern California.

Robert C. Gibson, who recently received his Ph.D. from Ohio State University, has been appointed assistant professor in the department of political science, West Virginia University.

Arthur C. Glover has been appointed assistant coordinator of the contract programs in public administration at Indiana University.

Charles D. Goff, formerly of the University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee), has been appointed associate professor political science at Wisconsin State College, Oshkosh.

Edward M. Goldberg, formerly of San Diego State College, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Los Angeles State College.

T. William Goodman, formerly of the University of Tennessee, has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at the University of Rhode Island.

William J. Gore, University of Kansas, has been appointed associate professor of government at Indiana University.

Wesley L. Gould, associate professor of government, Purdue University, has been promoted to professor of government, as of September 1, 1961.

Richard B. Gray has been promoted to associate professor of government at Florida State University.

Harry S. Hall, who recently received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Temple University.

Donald Habbe has been promoted to associate professor at the University of South Dakota.

Murray C. Havens, formerly of Duke University, has been appointed an assistant professor of government at the University of Texas.

James J. Heaphey has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley.

Richard F. Heiges has become associate professor in the social studies department at Indiana State College, Indiana, Pennsylvania.

Edward J. Heubel, formerly of Wayne State University, has been appointed associate professor

of political science at Michigan State University, Oakland.

Victor K. Heyman of Marshall University has resigned to accept a position in the Department of Defense.

Milton Hobbs has been promoted to assistant professor at Indiana University.

Walter V. Hohenstein has been named assistant director in charge of Korea for the Far East Division of the University of Maryland.

Harry A. Holloway has been advanced to assistant professor at the University of Texas.

Chun-tu Hsueh, research associate in the department of political science at Stanford University, has been named lecturer on modern China in the department of history at the University of Hong Kong, beginning February, 1962.

Colin A. Hughes has been appointed fellow in political science at the institute of advanced studies, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.

Erwin Jaffe is now assistant professor of political science at Nevada.

George P. Jan, formerly of Northern Illinois University, has been appointed assistant professor of government at the University of South Dakota.

Henry Janssen has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at San Diego State College.

Ned V. Joy has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at San Diego State College.

John J. Kennedy has been advanced to the rank of professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia.

John H. Kessel of Amherst College has accepted an assistant professorship at the University of Washington.

Marshall Knappen, who joined the faculty of the University of Delaware in 1960, has been appointed Fletcher Brown professor of history and political science.

Leo Koutouzos has been appointed as lecturer in the European program of the University of Maryland commencing in September, 1961.

Earl R. Kruschke has been appointed instructor in the department of political science, extension, the University of Wisconsin.

John C. Lane has been appointed assistant dean

of the college of arts and science of the University of Buffalo, effective September, 1961.

Joel Larus, formerly assistant professor of public law and government at Columbia University, has been appointed assistant professor of politics at Brandeis.

M. Harry Lease, Jr., has received the degree of Ph.D. in political science from Indiana University and has been promoted from instructor to assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth.

Charles E. Larsen, formerly of Rutgers University, Newark, has been promoted to associate professor and elected chairman of the division of social sciences at Mills College.

Leslie Laszlo has been appointed as lecturer in the European program of the University of Maryland commencing in September, 1961.

Don Laws has been appointed instructor in the political science department at Willamette University.

Murray B. Levin has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at Boston University.

Erwin Levine has been appointed assistant professor of government at Skidmore College.

Leon N. Lindberg, candidate for the Ph.D. at Berkeley, has been appointed an acting instructor at the University of Wisconsin.

Ernst Linde, former U. S. secretary of the bipartite control office for Germany is now serving as program officer in the Governmental Affairs Institute in Washington, D. C.

William S. Livingston has been advanced to full professor at the University of Texas.

Klaus Loewald has accepted a position at San Francisco State College.

Richard Longaker has accepted an appointment as associate professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles.

J. George Longworth, formerly of Columbia University, has been appointed an instructor in the department of political science, University of South Carolina.

Dean McHenry of UCLA has been appointed chancellor of the University of California, Santa Cruz.

Carl McMurray, formerly of Illinois State Normal University has been appointed assistant professor at Florida State University.

Earlean McCarrick, instructor in government at LSU, has been transferred to LSU in New Orleans.

C. Peter Magrath, formerly of Cornell, has been appointed an instructor at Brown.

Ralph Miwa, formerly of the University of Missouri, has joined the staff at the University of Hawaii.

Richard V. Montag has resigned as assistant professor of political science at Saint Mary's College of California, in order to accept a special appointment to the faculty of the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey.

Malcolm Moos has accepted a position with the Rockefeller Brothers beginning in the summer of 1961. His association with the department of political science at the Johns Hopkins University will continue; he will give a series of lectures throughout the year and will participate in the supervision of dissertations.

William L. Morrow, who received the doctorate from the State University of Iowa during the past summer, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at DePauw University.

Donald C. Munding has been promoted to associate professor of government at Valparaiso University.

Charles B. Neff has been appointed assistant professor of government at the University of Hawaii.

Frank W. Neuber has joined the department of social science at Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, as an associate professor of political science. Mr. Neuber was most recently assistant professor of government at Western Washington College of Education, Bellingham.

William J. Newman has been promoted to the rank of full professor at Boston University.

Stanley S. Newman has been appointed instructor of political science at Temple University.

Felix A. Nigro, formerly of Southern Illinois University, has been appointed professor of political science at San Diego State College.

Robert C. Noel has been appointed instructor in political science at the Pennsylvania State University. During the past year he was at the institute for social research in Oslo, Norway, under a fellowship granted by the center for research on conflict resolution at the University of Michigan.

Clark F. Norton has been appointed assistant

dean of the university at DePauw University. He will continue to give one course each semester in the department of political science.

George Olgyay, graduate fellow at Notre Dame has been appointed assistant professor of government at St. Michaels College.

David M. Olson, formerly of the University of California at Berkeley, has completed a year as a congressional interne and has accepted appointment as assistant professor of government at the University of Texas.

Nissan Oren has been appointed assistant professor of international relations in the department of political science at the Johns Hopkins University.

Robert E. Osgood was appointed professor of political science at the University of Chicago as of July 1, 1961. During 1961-62 he will be on leave from Chicago as visiting professor of American diplomacy at the school of advanced international studies and research associate at the Washington Center for foreign policy research.

Joseph C. Palamountain, Jr., professor of government at Wesleyan University, has been appointed chairman of the department.

Robert L. Peabody has accepted appointment as assistant professor in political science at the Johns Hopkins University.

Anthony J. Pearce, most recently an editor at Doubleday & Co. has been appointed an assistant professor in the department of government at New York University.

Stanley A. Pearl has joined the department at the University of Nevada as instructor.

Clara Penniman has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin.

Edward L. Pinney has been promoted from instructor to assistant professor at Louisiana State University.

Hanna F. Pitkin has accepted a position at San Francisco State College.

Nelson W. Polsby, formerly of the University of Wisconsin, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Wesleyan University.

Paul F. Power has accepted a position at the University of Cincinnati.

Robert H. Puckett has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Mary Washington College of the University of Virginia.

Quentin Quade, formerly of St. Louis University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Marquette University.

Leo F. Redfern has been promoted to associate professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, university extension division.

Eugene Pyzuir has been appointed assistant professor of political science at St. Louis University.

Four new appointments have been made to the faculty of the school of public administration of USC, beginning with fall, 1961: David Mars, visiting associate professor; Garth Jones, visiting associate professor; Kent Lloyd, assistant professor; and Chong Mo Pak, instructor.

John Cornelius Rensenbrink, formerly of Williams College, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of history and government at Bowdoin College.

William A. Ritchie has been appointed assistant professor at the University of Delaware.

Francis E. Rourke has been promoted to professor in the department of political science at the Johns Hopkins University.

John W. Ryan has been promoted to associate professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, university extension division.

Thomas M. Sanford has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of government at Wesleyan University.

James R. Scarritt, formerly of Northwestern University, has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Colorado.

Carl J. Schneider has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at the University of Nebraska, succeeding Jasper Shannon.

Theodore L. Shay has been promoted to professor and appointed chairman of the political science department at Willamette University.

John C. Sherry has been promoted to professor of social sciences at Pace College.

Lloyd M. Short has resigned the chairmanship of the department of political science and the directorship of the public administration center at the University of Minnesota, but will continue as professor of political science. He is on leave for the academic year 1961-62 to serve in Korea as consultant to the I.C.A. training program in public administration, conducted by the University of Minnesota at Seoul National University.

Richard Sklar who recently completed his doctorate in African studies at Princeton University has been appointed assistant professor of politics at Brandeis.

Rhoten A. Smith, formerly director of the Citizenship Clearing House and professor of politics in the department of government and law school at New York University, has accepted an appointment as dean of the college of arts and sciences, Temple University, effective August 1, 1961.

James Soles has become instructor at Florida State University.

Philip S. Sperry, formerly of the department of political science at Washington State University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Utah State University.

George Stambuk has been promoted to assistant professor at Indiana University.

W. J. Stankiewicz has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at the University of British Columbia.

James A. Steintrager of the University of Chicago has been appointed instructor in the department of government of Louisiana State University.

Lois Stone has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the State University of New York College of Education at Albany.

Robert S. Sullivant of DePauw University, who spent the second semester and a part of the past summer in research at the University of Moscow under a grant from the Inter-university committee on travel grants has been promoted to an associate professorship.

Loren E. Tesdell, formerly assistant professor of political science at Temple University, has become director of the social and technical assistance program of the American Friends Service Committee.

Thomas L. Thorson has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin.

George O. Totter, formerly of Boston University, has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island.

Robert W. Tucker has been promoted to professor in the department of political science at the

Johns Hopkins University. He will be on leave of absence for the year 1961-62.

S. Sidney Ulmer has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at Michigan State University, effective July 1, 1961.

Clement E. Vose has been promoted to the rank of professor of government at Wesleyan University.

Morris Watnick, who has held research grants in Soviet studies at the Harvard Russian Research Center and recently at Ohio State University, has been appointed lecturer in politics at Brandeis.

Edwin W. Webber, formerly of the college of William and Mary, has been appointed assistant director of the bureau of government research and assistant professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island.

Marvin Weinbaum, who is a candidate for the doctorate at Columbia University, has joined the history and government department at Colby College as an instructor in government.

Alex Weilenmann, formerly of the University of Zurich and recently holder of a post-doctoral fellowship at Yale University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Oregon.

Barbara Wells, Ph.D. candidate at New York University, has been appointed instructor at Skidmore College.

John R. Williams has been appointed chairman of the department of political science, West Virginia University.

H. Victor Wiseman, senior lecturer at the University of Leeds, England, is a visiting professor of political science at Temple University for the academic year 1961-62. Charles A. McCoy, assistant professor of political science at Temple University is lecturing at the University of Leeds in an exchange arrangement with Dr. Wiseman.

Julius F. Wolff, Jr. has been promoted to professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth.

Quincy Wright retired in June as professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia. During 1961-62, he will serve on the faculties of the University of Manchester, England and the Indian School of International Studies at New Delhi.

Kwanha Yim, formerly of Dartmouth College, has been appointed instructor in government at Bowdoin College.

Shao Chi Yuan has been promoted to associate professor and director of graduate instruction in political science at the Kansas State University.

Paul A. Zehner has been appointed instructor in the department of political science extension, University of Wisconsin.

Lawrence Zirring has been appointed an instructor in the department of government and

law at Lafayette College.

Victor Zitta, formerly of DePauw University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Marquette University.

Aristide R. Zolberg who has completed his work for the doctorate at the University of Chicago, has been appointed an assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The University of Delaware has received a \$500,000 grant from the Ford Foundation which will enable the university to develop its role as a land-grant university in an urban society.

The grant will be used to develop a pioneering program of urban services to help Delaware communities deal effectively with problems associated with the State's tremendous population growth and industrial expansion. The money will support the project over a five-year period and will provide the means for a three-pronged attack on urban problems through (1) research, (2) consulting and advisory services, and (3) educational activities, including seminars, conferences, short courses and institutes.

The Economic History Association announces a biennial prize competition for the best unpublished manuscript in the general field of economic history. The award, called the Edwin Francis Gay Memorial Prize in Economic History, will be \$1,500.00 plus payment of any costs that may be required to assure publication of the prize-winning manuscript. Funds for the prize and for any publication costs will be contributed by the Council on Research in Economic History.

The judges will take into account both the intrinsic scholarly qualities of the submittals and the felicity with which findings are presented. Preference will be given to manuscripts which combine breadth of enquiry and insight; which open up new areas of scholarship; which explore analytically major changes or developments in economic processes or institutions. No award will be made if, in the opinion of the judges, no manuscript is of acceptable quality.

The competition is open to any American or Canadian scholar. Manuscripts must be in the English language and ought not to exceed the equivalent of three hundred fifty printed pages. Manuscripts and inquiries should be sent to Professor Ralph W. Hidy, Secretary of the Economic History Association, Morgan Hall, Harvard University, Boston 63, Massachusetts;

entries must be received before July 15, 1962 in order to be eligible for the 1962 competition.

The Merston National Security Program of the Ohio State University announces an award of \$2500 for the best book-length manuscript on national security. Manuscripts need not be limited to a discussion of the military threat; they may treat other aspects—economic, political, ideological, scientific or diplomatic. The deadline for entries is April 2, 1962. The winning work will be published by the Ohio State University Press, with royalties to the author. Manuscripts submitted must be original typescripts and should be mailed to the Merston Committee, Ohio State University Press, 164 West Nineteenth Ave., Columbus 10, Ohio. The Committee reserves the right to withhold the award if no work of satisfactory quality is submitted.

Work has begun on the initial stages of the new Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences under the editorial direction of Bert F. Hoselitz. In order to encompass the many advances and most recent developments within the social sciences since the publication of the widely-consulted old Encyclopedia, this project envisages the production of a completely new work rather than a revision of the original. Present plans call for an edition of 12 to 15 volumes with a total of 6 to 7 million words. Simultaneous publication is scheduled for 1965.

The contents of the Encyclopedia will be distributed fairly evenly among the various social sciences—anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, and sociology. It will also draw upon material pertinent to the social sciences in related fields such as social and economic history, education, human geography, business administration, law, linguistics, medicine and psychiatry. The primary purpose of the Encyclopedia is to present authoritative and succinct accounts of the major theoretical, empirical, and methodological concepts of the social sciences and their applications. Substantive data will be included where

significant to illustrate the theoretical and analytical surveys. This Encyclopedia will stress a more international and comparative approach than was possible for its predecessor.

Guidance for the work of the Encyclopedia will be provided by an editorial board of outstanding social scientists from many nations under the chairmanship of W. Allen Wallis, Dean of the Graduate School of Business, of the University of Chicago. In addition, competent scholars in all the relevant fields will be asked to serve as consultants. A group of associate editors and assistants is being assembled at the new offices, 5836 Greenwood Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois.

D. C. Goldberg, of the Intergovernmental Relations subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, has notified the Association that quantities of the following committee documents are available, free, to interested political scientists: Intergovernmental Relations in the United States, a Selected Bibliography (November 1956); Replies from State and Local Governments to Questionnaire on Intergovernmental Relations, Sixth Report by the Committee on Government Operations (H. Rept. No. 575), June 1957; Federal-State-Local Relations. Hearings (July 29, 30, and 31, 1957); Federal-State-Local Relations, State and Local Officials. Regional Hearings; Part 1: Boston, Mass., and New York, N. Y. (Sept. 30, Oct. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7, 1957). Part 2: Chicago, Ill., and Kansas City, Mo. (Oct. 16, 17, 18, 21, and 22, 1957). Part 3: Denver, Colo., and San Francisco, Calif. (Oct. 24, 25, 28, and 29, 1957). Part 4: New Orleans, La., and Raleigh, N. C. (Nov. 18 and 19, and Dec. 10 and 11, 1957). Federal-State-Local Relations, Dade County (Fla.) Metropolitan Government. Hearings (November 21 and 22, 1957); Federal-State-Local Relations, Joint Federal-State Action Committee. Hearings (February 18, 1958); Federal-State-Local Relations, Nongovernmental Organizations and Individuals. Hearings (February 24 and 25, 1958); Federal-State-Local Relations, Federal Departments and Agencies. Hearings (March 26, 27; April 2, 30; May 7, 8; and June 19, 1958); Federal-State-Local Relations, Federal Grants-In-Aid, Thirtieth Report by the Committee on Government Operations (H. Rept. No. 2533) August 8, 1958; Health Research and Training, the Administration of Grants and Awards by the National Institutes of Health, Second Report by the Committee on Government Operations (H. Rept. No. 321) April 28, 1961. Those interested in this material should write to Mr. Goldberg in Room 101, George Washington Inn, Washington, 25, D. C.

Robert O. Berdahl of San Francisco State

College is on a two-year administrative assignment with Commonwealth Fund headquarters in London.

Franklin M. Bridge, formerly of the Ohio Legislative Service Commission, has been appointed assistant director for research projects in the bureau of government research and service, and associate professor of political science at the University of Colorado.

Edouard Bustin of Belgium who has taught at the University of Elisabethville and elsewhere has accepted an appointment for the current academic year as acting assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Winberg Chai has been appointed a visiting assistant professor of political science at Drew University, Madison, New Jersey for 1961-62, taking a year's leave of absence from his present post at the New School.

Robert Daland, associate professor of political science, University of North Carolina, has received a two-year leave of absence to serve as visiting associate professor of public administration at the Brazilian school of public administration in Rio de Janeiro. In Brazil, Daland will be a member of the faculty team from the school of public administration, University of Southern California.

Rowland Egger, chairman of the departments of foreign affairs and political science at the University of Virginia, is on leave from the university to undertake a special assignment in Bolivia as special representative of the president of the United States.

Heinz Eulau, professor of political science at Stanford University, is visiting legislative research professor at the University of California, Berkeley, during 1961-62.

G. James Fleming, professor of political science, Morgan State College, has been named a member of the governor's conference on higher education by the Governor of the U. S. Virgin Islands, Hon. Ralph M. Paiewonsky.

Lawrence H. Fuchs, associate professor of politics at Brandeis, has accepted a two-year leave of absence to direct the Peace Corps mission to the Philippines.

Richard W. Gable, school of public administration, University of Southern California is on sabbatical leave from September, 1961 until February, 1962, and is performing research and consultation services for the public administration

division, ICA. From February, 1962 until September, 1963, he will be a member of the U.S.C. team in Karachi, Pakistan, which is providing technical assistance in public administration education under an ICA contract.

Henry C. Galant, chairman, department of government, Skidmore College, is on sabbatical leave and will spend the year studying and researching in France.

Juanita Gibson of Florida State University has been granted a leave of absence for two years to serve as assistant to the secretary of State of Florida.

Ralph M. Goldman of Michigan State University has accepted a visiting professorship at the University of Chicago for the year 1961-62.

Donald Habbe, associate professor of government at the University of South Dakota, has been awarded the foreign policy association-world affairs center fellowship for the study of international organization for 1961-62.

Abraham M. Halpern of the RAND corporation is serving as lecturer in political science at the University of California, Berkeley, for 1961-62.

John J. Hebal, after serving as lecturer in Europe and North Africa, 1959-61 for European division, University College, University of Maryland, has been appointed visiting assistant professor at the University of Minnesota for the academic year, 1961-62.

Lawrence C. Howard, assistant professor of politics at Brandeis has accepted a two-year leave to be assistant to the director of the Peace Corps mission to the Philippines.

Walter D. Jacobs has been appointed as lecturer to the Atlantic program of the University of Maryland commencing in September, 1961.

Joseph LaPalombara of Michigan State University has been appointed as a fellow to the center of advanced study in the behavioral sciences, Palo Alto, in the academic year 1961-62.

Christian L. Larsen of Sacramento State College is visiting professor at the University of Hawaii.

Carl Leiden, formerly professor of government and chairman of the division of social science at the American University at Cairo, has been named visiting professor of government at the University of Texas for 1961-62.

Edward M. Levine, assistant professor of government, Purdue University, was granted a year's leave of absence (effective September 1,

1961) in order to permit him to accept an appointment as visiting assistant professor at the Illinois Institute of Technology.

Pichon P. Y. Loh, chairman of the department of history and political science, Anderson College, Indiana, is on sabbatical leave during the current academic year and is serving as visiting associate professor of Chinese History at Columbia University under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation.

Albert A. Mavrinac, chairman of the history and government department at Colby College, is on leave during the academic year 1961-62 and is at the Harvard Law School as a fellow in law and political science.

Charles A. McCoy on leave from Temple University has been appointed visiting lecturer at Leeds University for the academic year 1961-62.

Norman Meller, professor of political science, University of Hawaii, is visiting professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, during 1961-62.

Kermit Morrissey, formerly budget commissioner of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, has been appointed lecturer in politics at Brandeis.

Frederick C. Mosher, professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, has been appointed staff director of an independent committee to survey the selection, education and training, and career development of American foreign affairs personnel. The survey, under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, will estimate the personnel needs of the United States in the field of foreign affairs during the next ten years. Former secretary of state, Christian A. Herter, will serve as chairman of the committee of distinguished citizens.

Lewis Mumford is visiting research professor of governmental affairs at the University of California, Berkeley during the fall semester of 1961.

M. K. Nawaz, research fellow of the Indian school of international studies, will join the Woodrow Wilson department of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia as visiting associate professor during 1961-62.

Peter H. Odegard, professor of political science, University of California, Berkeley, is offering a course in American government televised nationally on the Continental Classroom and sponsored by the American Political Science Association, the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, the National Council for

Social Studies, and the National Broadcasting Company. Colleges and universities may offer credit for the course.

Vasant D. Rao, of the University of Bombay, has been appointed visiting Fulbright lecturer in political science and history at San Diego State College. During the 1960-61 academic year he served as visiting Fulbright lecturer at Washington State University at Pullman.

Henry Reining, Jr., dean of the school of public administration, at the University of Southern California, is serving as chief of party for the University's public administration faculty in Brazil for 1961-62. The SC team, numbering 8 professors, assists 4 institutions in various parts of Brazil. Acting dean during Reining's year absence will be Frank Sherwood, professor of public administration.

James R. Roach, associate professor of government at the University of Texas, has been awarded a Fulbright lecturing award for the year 1961-62. Dr. Roach will teach at Rajasthan University, Jaipur, India.

Neal Riemer, professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University has been granted a one-year leave of absence to serve as a Fulbright lecturer in American studies at the University of Innsbruck, Austria.

Jasper B. Shannon of the University of Nebraska will be visiting professor in political science at the Johns Hopkins University for the academic year 1961-62.

Robert F. Smith will serve as acting chairman of the department of government, Skidmore College.

James R. Soukup, assistant professor of government at the University of Texas, has received a

Fulbright award for research in Japan during 1961-62 on the political role of business associations in postwar Japan.

Woodworth G. Thromboley, assistant professor at the University of Hawaii, has taken leave to become research director to the Institute of Public Administration at Bangkok, which is under the sponsorship of Indiana and Thammasat Universities.

Sidney Ulmer is acting chairman of the department of political science at Michigan State University, 1961-62.

Wayne W. Untereiner has been appointed visiting associate professor at Indiana University.

Dwight Waldo, professor of political science and director of the bureau of public administration, University of California, Berkeley, is in Bologna during 1961-62 as University of California representative to the graduate school of administrative sciences of the University of Bologna. In his absence, Eugene C. Lee, assistant professor of political science, is acting director of the Bureau.

William Welch, formerly of the University of California, Berkeley, has been appointed acting associate professor of political science at the University of Colorado for 1961-62.

Hardy Wickwar has been given leave from the Secretariat of the United Nations to serve as visiting professor of political science and public administration at the American University of Beirut during the coming academic year.

Lea E. Williams, associate professor in the department of political science at Brown, is on a two-year leave of absence. He will act as visiting professor in the department of history, University of Malaya, Singapore.

IN MEMORIAM

Kenneth J. Scott, professor of political science at Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand, died suddenly at his home on July 19. A member of the University faculty since 1944, he had been made professor and head of the School of Political Science and Public Administration in 1960. He had been for many years editor of the New Zealand journal *Political Science*, was president of the New Zealand Institute of Public Administration in 1958, and had recently been appointed to a Royal Commission of Inquiry into State Services.

YORK WILLBERN

A battler for human rights and freedom died August 14 in a local hospital. He was Howard J. McMurray, professor of government at the University of New Mexico. He will be remembered especially for two aspects of his career.

The first was McMurray's political career. He moved ahead rapidly in Wisconsin politics to become a United States Representative from that State in 1943-45. The major portions of this career were ended when he was defeated by McCarthy in the U. S. Senate race in 1946. He felt no personal bitterness about this defeat.

However, he was alarmed about McCarthyism, which he fought vigorously.

He was a life-long Democrat who voted a straight-party ticket (with the only exception apparently, being his active support of Governor Mechem).

The second important phase of his career was that as an educator. He received his Ph.D. in 1940 from the University of Wisconsin, which he loved dearly and whose liberal traditions were a constant source of inspiration. He taught at the University of Wisconsin and later at Occidental College, from which he came to UNM in 1949.

Within recent years, problems of academic freedom were an absorbing interest. He bluntly criticized the administration of UNM for its attempt to force the retirement of a colleague, Dr.

Josiah C. Russell. He collected funds from faculty members and others to assist in the court fight which led to Russell's reinstatement.

His teaching was dramatic and effective.

Within the final week of his life, he expressed his concern that "Congress is voting appropriations for better dying conditions but is unwilling to support better living conditions." It was this capacity for expression which delighted students and friends—and disconcerted enemies. (And McMurray had his share of enemies.)

He will be remembered on the UNM campus, in our city, in our State, and in our Nation as a lover of life, exciting, a battler of magnificent proportions.

FREDERICK C. IRION

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
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
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